
JOURNAL *of* CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

285



AN ERROR REGARDING EASTERN GALICIA IN CURZON'S NOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT	- - -	<i>Witold Sworakowski</i>
ITALIAN PROSPECTS IN THE POST-WAR WORLD	-	<i>René Albrecht-Carrié</i>
LATVIA AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE	- - -	<i>Alfred Bilmanis</i>
THE DANUBE BASIN IN RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION	<i>Herman H. Browne</i>	
NOTE ON THE AGRARIAN RÉGIME OF POST-WAR POLAND	- - - - -	<i>Władysław R. Malinowski</i>
BOOK REVIEWS		RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

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BOOK REVIEWS

Halecki, <i>The Crusade of Varna</i> (S. H. Thomson)	76
Schwarz, <i>Imperial Privy Council</i> (F. Engel-Janosi)	77
Bane & Lutz, <i>Blockade of Germany after the Armistice</i> (F. L. Benns)	78
Stirk, <i>The Prussian Spirit</i> (E. H. Zeydel)	80
Kaeckenbeeck, <i>International Experiment of Upper Silesia</i> (W. J. Rose)	81
Hitler's <i>Ten-Year War on the Jews</i> (G. Kisch)	84
Lohe, <i>Roosevelt America</i> (F. Redlich)	85
Singer, <i>Duel for the Northland</i> (E. C. Bellquist)	88
Micaud, <i>French Right and Nazi Germany</i> (E. J. Knapton)	90
Brickner, <i>Is Germany Incurable?</i> (C. V. Easum)	92
Heiden, <i>Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power</i> (F. L. Benns)	93
Weaver, <i>Front Page Europe</i> (W. C. Langsam)	94
Ettlinger, <i>Axis on the Air</i> (W. S. Bernard)	95
Basch, <i>Danube Basin and German Economic Sphere</i> (L. v. Mises)	96
Borsky, <i>Greatest Swindle in the World</i> (A. Schweitzer)	97
Jordan, <i>Great Britain, France & the German Problem</i> (F. W. Pick)	98
Salvemini & LaPiana, <i>What to do with Italy</i> (R. Albrecht-Carrié)	100
Stettinius, <i>Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory</i> (J. Hanč)	101
Robinson, <i>Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure?</i> (J. S. Roucek)	103
Williams & Van Narvig, <i>Secret Sources</i> (J. Hanč)	104

SHORTER NOTICES - - - - - 106

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE - - - - - 110

BOOKS RECEIVED - - - - - 113

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JOURNAL of CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

INDEX TO VOLUME FOUR

APRIL, 1944—JANUARY, 1945

ARTICLES

	PAGE
Abrams, Irwin: The Austrian Question at the Turn of the Twentieth Century	184
Albrecht-Carrié, René: Italian Prospects in the Postwar World	27
Bilmanis, Alfred: Latvia as an Independent State	44
Browne, Herman H.: The Danube Basin in Relief and Reconstruction ..	61
Campbell, John C.: The Influence of Western Political Thought in the Rumanian Principalities, 1821-1848	262
Clementis, Vladimir: The Slovak "State"—How It Was Born and How It Will Die	341
Czubatyj, Nicholas: The Modern Ukrainian Nationalist Movement	281
Gross, Feliks: The Polish Proletariat and Socialism	241
Grossman, Kurt, & Jacob, Hans: The German Exiles and the "German Problem"	165
Kunoši, Alexander: The Nature and Meaning of Regional Economic Grouping	357
Leonhardt, Hans: Why Die for Danzig?	274
Malinowski, Władysław: The Agrarian Régime of Post-War Poland ..	71
Pavel, Pavel: Certain Aspects of the Armistice with Rumania	367
Pick, F. W.: The Last European Settlement	394
Pollock, James K.: Germany's Postwar Boundaries—a Suggestion	349
Rath, R. John: Training for Citizenship in the Austrian Elementary Schools during the Reign of Francis I	147
Rothfels, Hans: The Baltic Provinces: Some Historic Aspects and Perspectives	117
Sworakowski, Witold: An Error Regarding Eastern Galicia in Curzon's Note to the Soviet Government	3
Văleanu, Adrian: The Question of Bukovina—Then and Now	372

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

Statement of Polish Minister of Defence, April 25, 1944	203
Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement for Administration of Reconquered Territories	203
Slav Congress of May 25, 1944	306
The Yugoslav Ministry of Dr. Ivan Subašić	306
Renewal of Franco-Czechoslovak Alliance	307
Lithuanian Appeal to the President of the United States	307

REVIEWS

	PAGE
Allen, <i>Come Over Into Macedonia</i> (C. Anastasoff)	216
Allen, <i>Democracy and the Individual</i> (C. P. Malick)	314
Anderson, <i>People, Church and State in Modern Russia</i> (N. Czubytyj) ..	323
Archer, <i>Balkan Journal</i> (L. S. Stavrianos)	439
Armitage, <i>Europe in Bondage</i> (W. Gurian)	329
Bane & Lutz, <i>Blockade of Germany after the Armistice</i> (F. L. Benns) ..	78
Bane & Lutz, <i>Organization of American Relief</i> (H. H. Browne)	209
Basch, <i>Danube Basin and German Economic Sphere</i> (L. v. Mises)	96
Bienstock et al., <i>Management in Russian Industry</i> (W. W. Leontief) ..	325
Blied, <i>Austrian Aid to American Catholics</i> (F. Engel-Janosi)	427
Bonsal, <i>Unfinished Business</i> (R. Albrecht-Carrié)	313
Borsky, <i>Greatest Swindle in the World</i> (A. Schweitzer)	97
Brecht, <i>Prelude to Silence</i> (F. L. Benns)	435
Brickner, <i>Is Germany Incurable?</i> (C. V. Easum)	92
Bying, <i>Five Year Peace Plan</i> (G. N. Schuster)	329
Callender, <i>A Preface to Peace</i> (F. W. Pick)	317
Cardwell, <i>Poland and Russia</i> (O. Halecki)	210
Chamberlin, <i>The Russian Enigma</i> (W. W. Leontief)	321
Chase, <i>Greece of Tomorrow</i> (P. Charanis)	226
Cianfarra, <i>The Vatican and the War</i> (D. Koenig)	220
Dallin, <i>Russia and Postwar Europe</i> (K. R. Pusta)	223
Dulles, <i>Road to Teheran</i> (F. L. Schuman)	206
Ettlinger, <i>Axis on the Air</i> (W. S. Bernard)	95
Fischer, <i>Passing of the European Age</i> (W. Gurian)	320
Fisher, <i>Russian Fur Trade 1550-1700</i> (G. V. Lantzeff)	205
Goodrich & Carroll, <i>Documents in American Foreign Relations</i> (C. B. Goodykoontz)	331
Hagen, <i>Germany After Hitler</i> (F. T. Epstein)	331
Halecki, <i>The Crusade of Varna</i> (S. H. Thomson)	76
Heiden, <i>Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power</i> (F. L. Benns)	93
Jäckh, <i>The Rising Crescent</i> (H. N. Howard)	432
Jordon, <i>Great Britain, France and the German Problem</i> (F. W. Pick) ..	98
Kaeckenbeeck, <i>International Experiment of Upper Silesia</i> (W. J. Rose) ..	81
Keun, <i>Continental Stakes</i> (F. W. Pick)	222
Kohn, <i>Ideas of Nationalism</i> (P. R. Anderson)	309
Kris et al., <i>German Radio Propaganda</i> (W. S. Bernard)	327
Levandis, <i>The Greek Foreign Debt</i> (F. Engel-Janosi)	426
Levitats, <i>The Jewish Community in Russia</i> (K. S. Pinson)	425
Lohe, <i>Roosevelt America</i> (F. Redlich)	85
Mackiewicz, <i>Colonel Beck and His Policy</i> (S. H. Thomson)	437
Marriott, <i>Anglo-Russian Relations 1689-1943</i> (A. G. Mazour)	424
Maugham, <i>Truth about the Munich Crisis</i> (S. H. Thomson)	218
Meiksins, <i>Baltic Riddle</i> (E. Bellquist)	212
Micaud, <i>French Right and Nazi Germany</i> (E. J. Knapton)	90
Morgan, <i>The Listening Post</i> (D. Koenig)	220
Paneth, <i>Turkey—Decadence and Rebirth</i> (H. N. Howard)	312

Pares, <i>Russia and the Peace</i> (V. Kybal)	445
Pihl, <i>Germany: The Last Phase</i> (P. Slosson)	316
Price, <i>Giraud and the African Scene</i> (E. J. Knapton)	315
Robinson, <i>Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure?</i> (J. S. Roucek)	103
Roucek, ed., <i>Challenge to Peacemakers</i> (W. J. Ehrenpreis)	318
Rupp, <i>A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria</i> (L. D. Steefel)	423
Šafránek, <i>Bobuslav Martinů</i> (J. Loewenbach)	442
Salvemini & La Piana, <i>What to Do with Italy</i> (R. Albrecht-Carrié)	100
Schutz, <i>German Home Front</i> (G. N. Shuster)	329
Schwarz, <i>Imperial Privy Council</i> (F. Engel-Janosi)	77
Seton-Watson, <i>History of Czechs and Slovaks</i> (M. Spinka)	310
Sforza, <i>Contemporary Italy</i> (D. Koenig)	440
Shotwell, <i>The Great Decision</i> (J. S. Roucek)	444
Singer, <i>Dual for the Northland</i> (E. C. Bellquist)	88
Sprigge, <i>The Development of Modern Italy</i> (D. Koenig)	440
Stettinius, <i>Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory</i> (J. Hanč)	101
Stirk, <i>The Prussian Spirit</i> (E. H. Zeydel)	80
Strakhovsky, <i>Intervention at Archangel</i> (G. Vernadsky)	207
Sudjić, <i>Yugoslavia in Arms</i> (P. Steiner)	226
Treviranus, <i>Revolutions in Russia</i> (Mark V.)	429
Weaver, <i>Front Page Europe</i> (W. C. Langsam)	94
Weiskopf, <i>The Firing Squad</i> (R.D.T.)	330
White, <i>Growth of the Red Army</i> (T. H. Thomas)	214
Williams & Van Narvig, <i>Secret Sources</i> (J. Hanč)	104
Wise, <i>Requisition in France and Italy</i> (B. F. Hoselitz)	216

SHORTER NOTICES

Beuer, <i>Sudeten Deutsche Wohin?</i>	231
Beza, <i>The Rumanian Church</i>	449
Bilmanis, <i>Latvian-Russian Relations. Documents</i>	450
Clementis, <i>Medzi nami a Mad'armi</i>	451
Crisp, <i>The Future of Europe</i>	231
Deutsch, <i>Austria in the Framework of World Organization</i>	452
<i>Educational Reconstruction in People's Poland</i>	453
Ehrenburg, <i>The Tempering of Russia</i>	451
Grabowski, <i>Creative Peace</i>	232
Harris, <i>Literature in Estonia</i>	228
Kingscote, <i>Balkan Exit</i>	229
Kramer, <i>Verbannt aus Österreich</i>	228
Ligocki, <i>Legends and History of Poland</i>	231
Lilien, <i>Polish Dictionary</i>	109
Machray, <i>East Prussia Menace to Poland and Peace</i>	107
Machray, <i>The Polish-German Problem</i>	107
Marvey, <i>1000 Years of German Aggression</i>	448
Newman, <i>The Face of Poland</i>	453
Nuntius, <i>Hoelle, Hass, und Liebe</i>	228
Osten, <i>Führers Must Fall</i>	108

INDEX TO VOLUME FOUR

Pavel, <i>Transylvania and Danubian Peace</i> -----	230
Plutyński, <i>We are 115 Millions</i> -----	106
<i>Polish Facts and Figures</i> -----	454
Prange, ed., <i>Hitler's Words</i> -----	452
Sawicki <i>Rocznik bibliograficzny</i> -----	108
Seton-Watson, <i>Transylvania: A Key Problem</i> -----	230
Shuster and Bergstraesser, <i>Germany. A Short History</i> -----	448
<i>Situation of the Jews in Greece</i> -----	454
Coleman, ed. <i>The Polish Land, Ziemia Polska</i> -----	106
Wells, <i>Crux Ansata</i> -----	449

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NUMBER ONE

AN ERROR REGARDING EASTERN GALICIA IN CURZON'S NOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF JULY 11, 1920

by Witold Sworakowski

IN the text of Lord Curzon's note of July 11, 1920, addressed to the Government of the Soviet Union by virtue of the resolution and order of the Conference of Ambassadors assembled in Spa, an editorial error was made, which caused an interpretation of that note that was totally unjust, erroneous, and unfavorable to Poland. As a result of that error the entire territory of Eastern Galicia¹ including the city of Lwów—(a territory whose cession to Russia had not been considered either at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, or at the Conference of Ambassadors in Spa in July 1920)—is frequently mentioned in current discussions, as situated to the East of the so-called Curzon Line, i.e. as a territory which was to remain under occupation of the Soviet armies during the Polish-Soviet armistice.

On the basis of that erroneous interpretation of the so-called Curzon Line on the East Galician territory, the Soviet Government in its communique of January 11, 1944,² propounded this line as the point of issue to settle the disputed Polish-Soviet frontier question which it considered in dispute. Thus, it erroneously assumed that the Curzon Line crosses Eastern Galicia in such a way that the city of Lwów and the entire area east of the city of Przemyśl would remain with the Soviets.

The Curzon Line has also been erroneously drawn in numerous publications and encyclopaedias,³ even in important scientific works.⁴

¹ We shall hereafter use the term "Eastern Galicia", for the whole territory of South-Eastern Poland is so denominated in all French and English diplomatic documents.

² Embassy of the Union of Soviet Republics: *Information Bulletin*, Vol. IV, No. 5, Washington, D. C., January 13, 1944.

³ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 18, p. 150; *The Larned History for Ready Reference Reading and Research* (Springfield, Mass., 1923), III, 2224, and other encyclopaedias.

⁴ Temperley, H. W. V.: *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. VIII (London, 1924). (Map of the Curzon Line).

The fact that public attention is being called to that error, twenty-four years after its appearance in such an important diplomatic document, may be justified by the unusually short-lived legal significance of the note, which was never put into effect, and soon passed into oblivion. The note had potential importance when it was sent from London to Moscow on July 11, 1920, but it lost its legal and political meaning six days later—July 17, 1920—when it was rejected by the Soviet Government.

* * *

Before discussing the above mentioned error one must examine two factors, an accurate knowledge of which is absolutely essential in order to understand how it came about. These are: (1) The development of the Eastern Galician problem at the Paris Peace Conference, and (2) The Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, of December 8, 1919.

While Lord Curzon's note was on its way to Moscow, the matter of Eastern Galicia was in abeyance. According to Art. 91 of the St. Germain Peace Treaty with Austria, signed on September 10, 1919,⁵ the chief Allied and Associated Powers were to be regarded, from the standpoint of international law, as owners of that territory. They remained formal owners of Eastern Galicia up to the time the Conference of Ambassadors rendered its decision, i.e. until March 16, 1923.⁶ On the basis of that decision, the Conference, acting on the authority of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, recognized the sovereignty of Poland over Eastern Galicia.⁷

When the Peace Conference in Paris began its activities, Poles and Ukrainians were battling each other in Eastern Galicia. Representatives of the powers assembled in Paris endeavored, from the every beginning, to stop the fighting. An Inter-Allied Commission, headed by Ambassador Noulens, which was in Poland at that time, was instructed to use its influence in the matter.⁸

⁵ "L'Autriche renonce, en ce qui la concerne, en faveur des Principales Puissances Alliées et associées, à tous ses droits et titres sur les territoires qui appartenaient antérieurement à l'ancienne monarchie austro-hongroise et qui, situés au delà des nouvelles frontières de l'Autriche telles qu'elles sont décrites à l'article 27, partie II (Frontières de l'Autriche), ne sont actuellement l'objet d'aucune autre attribution."

⁶ The same opinion was voiced by Temperley, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 274: "Eastern Galicia is still in international Law the property of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, but it is occupied and administered by the Poles without obligation of any kind." (This volume had evidently been written before the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of March 15, 1923.)

⁷ The rights of the Conference of Ambassadors, as well as details concerning its decision regarding the Eastern frontiers of Poland, have been thoroughly discussed by G. P. Pink in his *The Conference of Ambassadors* (Geneva, 1942).

⁸ Basic instruction of the Supreme Council accepted on February 1, 1919; For the

On February 24, 1919, "an Allied Mission had succeeded in concluding a truce between the two parties, but this was revoked by the Ukrainian Commander-in-chief four days later."⁹ The Ukrainians were, therefore, responsible for the continuation of the struggle in Eastern Galicia. Meanwhile they had obtained reinforcements from the Ukraine on the Dnieper, and hoped to force the Poles to cease fighting for the possession of Eastern Galicia.

On March 17, 1919, at a joint meeting of the Supreme Council and the Supreme War Council, Marshal Foch described Poland's critical situation which was caused by German military pressure in the West and that of the united Ukrainian troops near Lwów. Foch demanded the immediate transfer to Poland of Gen. Haller's Army from France and of the Polish detachments from Odessa. He met with opposition from Lloyd George who maintained that the fate of Eastern Galicia had not yet been settled by the Peace Conference. After a protracted discussion it was decided to examine the possibilities of transferring Haller's army to Poland and bringing pressure to bear on the Ukrainian High Command to conclude an armistice with the Poles.¹⁰ Since attempts to bring about immediate Polish-Ukrainian negotiations failed to produce the desired result, the Supreme Council (the Council of Four) at its meeting of April 2, 1919, decided, upon President Wilson's motion, to establish a special Inter-Allied Commission for negotiating such a truce.¹¹ The commission headed by General Botha met more than three weeks later (on April 26) and continued its deliberations until May 15. Having listened to the arguments of the Polish and Ukrainian representatives, the Commission proposed certain armistice terms which were rejected by the Poles. Consequently the whole matter again returned to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.

Meanwhile the dissolution of the so-called "Ukrainian People's Republic" had begun, due to the internal confusion and the unsuccessful Soviet-Ukrainian struggle.¹² Under these circumstances the Supreme Coun-

text see Miller, *Diary*, Vol. XIV, p. 160. The details of the instruction were later elaborated more fully. For the text see *Conférence de la Paix (Confidentiel). Recueil des Actes de la Conférence. Partie IV. Questions Territoriales* (2). Commission des Affaires Polonaises, Fasc. 3. (Paris, 1928), p. 669f.

⁹ Temperley, V, 335.

¹⁰ For the protocol of that meeting see Miller, *Diary*, XV, 401-409.

¹¹ A detailed report on the work of that Commission can be found in the official publication of the Peace Conference, entitled: *Inter-Allied Commission for the Negotiation of an Armistice between Poland and the Ukraine* (Paris, 1919).

¹² The Galician Ruthenians who on January 20, 1919, had recognized the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic in Kiev, withdrew that recognition on August 28, 1919, because of the rapid disintegration of that Government and the progressing bolshevization of the country. (See Temperley, I, 335).

cil of the Peace Conference by its resolution of June 25, 1919, authorized the Polish Government to occupy the whole of Eastern Galicia up to the Zbrucz river, i.e. to the former Austro-Russian boundary line. This was decided upon in order to protect Eastern Galicia against a Bolshevik invasion and to restore order in the country.¹³

On the same day the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Allied and Associated Powers, acting on authorization of the Supreme Council, resolved that Poland, having concluded a suitable agreement with the Allied and Associated Powers, was entitled to establish her own civil administration in Eastern Galicia. Foreign Minister Pichon notified Prime Minister Paderewski of the above decision of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in his note No. D. 5610-19 of June 29, 1919.¹⁴

It should be emphasized that neither the above resolution of the Supreme Council, nor Pichon's note to Paderewski, nor any other earlier

¹³ The text of that decision of the Supreme Council in its note to the Polish Government (Miller, *Diary*, XVI, 462) reads as follows:

Gouvernement Polonais,
Varsovie.

En vue de garantir les personnes et les biens de la population paisible de la Galicie Orientale contre les dangers que leur font courir les bandes bolchévistes, le Conseil Suprême de Puissances alliées et associées a décidé d'autoriser les forces de la République Polonaise à poursuivre leurs opérations jusqu'à la rivière Zbrucz.

Cette autorisation ne préjuge en rien les décisions que le Conseil Suprême prendra ultérieurement pour régler le statut politique de la Galicie.

The above note was signed by the chiefs of government of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy.

¹⁴ The text of that note to Paderewski, quoted from the *Acts and Documents concerning the problem of Poland's boundaries at the Paris Peace Conference 1918-1919*, compiled and edited by the office of the General Secretary of the Polish Delegation, III (Paris, 1926), p. 20 reads as follows:

CONFERENCE DE LA PAIX
Secrétariat Général.

D. 5610/19
Paris, le 29 Juin.

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Conseil des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères a pris, dans sa séance du 25 juin dernier, les décisions suivantes:

"Le Gouvernement Polonais sera autorisé à établir un Gouvernement civil en Galicie Orientale, après avoir conclu avec les Puissances Alliées et Associées un accord dont les clauses devront sauvegarder autant que possible l'autonomie du territoire ainsi que les libertés politiques religieuses et personnelles de ses habitants.

"Cet accord reposera sur le droit de libre disposition qu'exerceront en dernier ressort les habitants de la Galicie Orientale quant à leur allégeance politique; l'époque à laquelle ce droit s'exercera sera fixée par les Puissances Alliées et Associées ou par l'organe auquel celles-ci pourraient déléguer ce pouvoir.

"La rédaction de cet accord sera confiée à la Commission Polonaise et révisée par le Comité de rédaction.

"Le Gouvernement Polonais sera informé immédiatement des décisions précédentes."

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(-) S. Pichon

document of the Peace Conference, ever established a dividing line between "Eastern" and "Western" Galicia. Nor were the territories comprising the oft-mentioned "Eastern Galicia" ever defined. None of the conceptions and projects which had been submitted at that time was ever approved by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.

Only the proposed agreement between the principal powers and Poland involving a twenty-five year mandate of Poland over Eastern Galicia (approved by the Supreme Council on November 21, 1919,¹⁵ and communicated to the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference in its note of November 24, 1919¹⁶) contained a detailed description of the frontiers of Eastern Galicia. One month later, however, on December 22, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference decided to "suspend the enforcement" of its November 21st resolution. In view of that fact, the afore-mentioned project of an agreement between the Principal Powers and Poland regarding Eastern Galicia (as well as the boundaries of that province drawn therein), was dropped and lost its legal importance. The above decision of the Supreme Council was brought to the attention of the chairman of the Polish Delegation by the chairman of the Peace Conference, M. Clemenceau, in the latter's note of December 22, 1919.¹⁷

From that day on, until the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of March 16, 1923, (as during the Spa Conference) the problem of Eastern Galicia remained in abeyance. It must be emphasized again that during that period Eastern Galicia remained, from the viewpoint of international law, the property "de jure" of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, but was "de facto" in Poland's possession.

* * *

The second factor which should be thoroughly examined before the error in Lord Curzon's note of July 11, 1920, is discussed and explained, is the demarcation line which had been established by the Declara-

¹⁵ For the text of that project see *Acts and Documents*, III, 70-89.

¹⁶ See: *Acts and Documents*, III, 6.

¹⁷ The text of the note (*Acts and Documents*, III, 106), reads as follows:

CONFERENCE de la PAIX.

Paris, le 23 Décembre 1919.

Le Président.

Monsieur le Président,

Le Conseil Suprême des Puissances alliées et associées a décidé aujourd'hui de suspendre l'exécution de la résolution accordant à la Pologne un mandat de 25 ans sur la Galicie Orientale et s'est réservé de soumettre ultérieurement la question à un nouvel examen.

J'ai l'honneur de vous en informer, au nom du Conseil Suprême.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(-) Clémenceau

tion of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference of December 8, 1919.

At the end of February 1919 the Supreme Council requested the Committee on Polish Affairs, headed by Jules Cambon (the so-called Cambon Committee) to prepare proposals regarding Poland's future frontiers. After drawing up an outline of Poland's Western boundaries (reports of March 12 and 19, 1919) the Committee proceeded to study the problem of Poland's Eastern boundaries. The Cambon Committee availed itself of the ample material and suggestions of the Inter-Allied Commission (headed by Ambassador Noulens), then working in Poland. On April 22, 1919, the Cambon Committee concluded its report on Poland's Eastern frontiers and submitted it to the Supreme Council.¹⁸

In its report the Committee on Polish Affairs stated that it had based its work on the following premises:

- (a) The proposed boundary line embraces a sector of East Prussia (i.e. from the former Russo-German frontier), extending to the East of the city of Chelm. The Committee assumed that—according to the instruction of the Supreme Council—the boundary line running southward from that point, as well as the appurtenance of Eastern Galicia would be discussed after the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian armed struggle;
- (b) The proposed line embraces solely indisputably Polish territories. The Committee stated clearly that to the East of the proposed line there are territories of a debatable ethnic nature. Such being the case, a definitive outlining of the boundary should be preceded by ethnic, linguistic, and denominational investigations in those territories, and by ascertaining the wishes of their population. The report did not enumerate these "doubtful territories";
- (c) The Committee proposed that the solution of the problem of Poland's Eastern frontiers be postponed until the establishment of a Russian Government with which the Great Powers could deal.

In conformity with the above premises the Committee drew a proposed delimitation line of these Eastern, indisputably Polish territories. This line ran from the Eastern Prussian frontier to the north of the city of Suwalki, to the north-west of Pinsk, to the north of Zagary, followed the shore line of the Hancza and Niemen rivers to the spot where the Lososna river flows into the Niemen; then it followed the Lososna shores up to the town of Kielbasin, the Likowka and Swislocz rivers, and further, along the boundary line of Bielsk and Brześć Litewski (Brest-Litovsk)

¹⁸ For the text of the report see: Miller, *Diary*, IX, 14-24 and map C in Vol. XXII. The boundary demarcation stops, on this official map, about 50 km. north of Krylow, the northernmost point of the old Austro-Russian frontier.

counties, to the Bug river and from there along the bank of the Bug up to a point East of Chelm.

It should be stressed that the Cambon Committee had erroneously called this line of demarcation "the Eastern Frontier of Poland". The Committee's report had, indeed, made it clear that it was but "a delimitation line of indisputably Polish territories" and that it could be pushed eastward in accordance with the results of the proposed ethnic, linguistic, and denominational investigations and the freely expressed wishes of the local population.

For the above reasons any inference that the Cambon Committee's line was that of "Poland's Eastern frontiers as proposed by the Peace Conference" is unfair and baseless. It is so for two reasons: first, because the Committee's proposal could not be regarded as the viewpoint of the Peace Conference since it had not obtained the approval of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, and second, because the line proposed by the Cambon Committee did not constitute a final proposal relative to Poland's Eastern frontiers.

The Supreme Council examined the Cambon Committee's report on Poland's Eastern boundaries April 26, 1919, together with other reports of that Committee. However, the report on Poland's Eastern frontiers was not discussed in detail at that meeting, nor was any resolution passed.¹⁹

While the boundary line of indisputably Polish territories was being established in Paris, the Polish army had moved far beyond it, eastward. In the latter part of April it had occupied positions east of Wiłno, Lida, Nowogródek, and Baranowicze and West of Pinsk, Sarny and Rowne.²⁰ The Russians who were also fighting numerous "White Russian armies" resisted the Poles rather weakly.

Referring to the Cambon Committee's proposal to postpone the decision of Poland's Eastern frontiers until the establishment of a Russian Government with whom the Principal Powers could deal, one must recall the policies of the Powers toward Russia at that time.

The Powers represented in the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference did not recognize the Soviet Government as the legitimate government of Russia. On the contrary, they supported, more or less openly, the armies of such "white" generals as Yudenich, Wrangel and others who were fighting the Bolsheviks. These powers had even their own expeditionary forces in Russia (in Archangel, Charbin, Odessa, etc.). They believed that the

¹⁹ For the protocol of that meeting see: Miller, *Diary*, XVI, 131f.

²⁰ Adam Przybylinski: *La Pologne en lutte pour ses frontières 1919-1920* (Paris, 1927), pp. 74-77.

"white" armies would sooner or later establish in Russia an orderly Government with whom they could renew normal diplomatic relations.

Upon such premises the members of the Supreme Council approved the suggestion of the Cambon Committee to postpone the solution of the problem of Poland's Eastern frontiers until this desired change had taken place in Russia. These were the real reasons why the Cambon Committee's report on Poland's Eastern frontiers was not discussed at the Supreme Council meeting of April 26.

The protocols and other papers of the Peace Conference indicate that the problem of Poland's Eastern Frontiers was not taken up by the Supreme Council until September 25, 1919.

A despatch of the American Delegation to the United States Department of State gives the following laconic report of the Supreme Council's meeting on that day:²¹

The Council had before it the report of the Commission on Polish Affairs with regard to a proposed Eastern boundary of Poland. The question was raised as to the form in which the Council intended to communicate these decisions. It was proposed to inform the Polish Government that the territories lying west of the line traced by the Commission would definitely be attributed to Poland. It was decided to accept the report in question and to request the Drafting Committee to study and take the report as a basis for the means by which these decisions should be communicated to the Polish Government.

This Supreme Council's resolution became the basis of the well-known "Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers" of December 8, 1919, which has erroneously been called a declaration "regarding the temporary Eastern frontiers of Poland".²² This declaration clearly and unequivocally explains the reasons why it has been issued as well as the aims it was to serve. It begins as follows: (original English text)

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, recognising that it is important as soon as possible to put a stop to the existing conditions of political uncertainty in which the Polish nation is placed, and without prejudging the provisions which must in the future define the Eastern frontiers of Poland, hereby declare that they recognize the right of the Polish Government to proceed, according to the conditions previously provided by the Treaty of June 28,

²¹ For text of the dispatch see: Miller, *Diary*, XVI, 542, also note, p. 489 of the same volume.

²² The irregularity of the title page of the official edition of the Peace Conference, containing the declaration and the currently erroneous name of that document will be discussed below.

1919, to organize a regular administration of the territories of the former Russian Empire situated to the west of the line described below (see Map):

Then follows a precise topographical description of the afore-mentioned territorial line. The concluding paragraph of the Declaration contains a statement of the Principal Powers, which is of utmost importance to Poland. It says:

The rights that Poland may be able to establish over the territories situated to the east of the said line are expressly reserved.

The above text of the Declaration of December 8 makes it entirely clear that the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference:

- (1) in establishing the above mentioned territorial line had no intention of tracing a Russo-Polish frontier;
- (2) distinctly recognized the rights of Poland to claim further territories situated to the east of the territorial line, as traced in the declaration.

In the light of the development of the problem of Poland's Eastern frontiers at the Paris Peace Conference as described above, and particularly on the basis of an analysis of the Supreme Council's Declaration of December 8, 1919, it should be stated that:

- (1) All assertions that the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference or the Peace Conference itself had established any border line between Poland and Russia are unfounded and untrue;
- (2) Particularly the territorial line traced in the Declaration of December 8, 1919, did not establish such a Russo-Polish boundary line.
- (3) Finally, it should be remembered that the Supreme Council's Declaration of December 8, 1919, and the territorial line traced therein definitely did not pertain to Eastern Galicia.

* * *

It must be mentioned here that the official issue of this Declaration, printed by the Imprimerie Nationale in Paris, bears on its title page the following words:

"Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers relating to the Provisional Eastern Frontiers of Poland."

The text of that title page is different from the heading of the Declaration proper, which says merely:

"Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers."

The divergence in the titles makes it apparent that the addition of the words: "relating to the Provisional Eastern frontiers of Poland" was the result of overzealousness on the part of the printer or subordinate editor

entrusted with the printing of the Declaration. In order to distinguish it from similar Supreme Council declarations, we may assume that the printer or editor wished to make it clear on the title page to what problem that particular Declaration referred. Having superficially acquainted himself with the contents of the Declaration, he added that erroneous explanatory supplement.

In connection with the above error in the text of the title page of the official publication of the Declaration it must be stated that, in conformity with the text and the spirit of the Declaration, the territorial line which had been traced, was in fact only a "temporary administration frontier of Poland in the East"—and by no means a "provisional Eastern frontier of Poland". The difference between these two definitions is very essential.²³

* * *

In the text of the Declaration of December 8 reference was made—in connection with the topographical description of the territorial line—to the attached map. The official publication of the Peace Conference, containing the Declaration includes a map (on a 1:1,000,000 scale) prepared by the Cartographical Office of the Peace Conference, on December 11, 1919. (No. 355). The map deserves special attention, as it appears to be the main reason for the error in Lord Curzon's note of July 11, 1920. This map is identical with the map of Poland's western frontiers which was attached to the Versailles Treaty. In printing it, however, a portion of the western and southern borders was cut off while a larger area in the East was added. It has the same red lines, the same names of localities and the same markings as the map attached to the Peace Treaty with Germany.

On the map attached to the Declaration of the Supreme Council of December 8, 1919, a red outline has been added:

- (1) Of the territorial line described in the December 8 Declaration: beginning at the point where the Bug river crosses the former Austro-(Galician) Russian frontier (near the village of Krylow) running northward to the Russo-German (East Prussian) frontier;
- (2) The frontiers of Eastern Galicia, as established in the proposed agreement between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, and related to the temporary cession of that part of Galicia to

²³ A similar error in the text of the title page of the official English publication of the Treaty concluded between Poland and the Principal Powers relative to the protection of minorities, resulted in the registration of the Treaty in the Collection of Treaties published by the Foreign Office under the heading "Treaty of Peace between the U. S. A., the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Poland." (See: *Treaty Series* No. 8, 1919, CMD 223).

Poland—a project approved by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference on November 21, 1919, and revoked afterwards by the decision of the Supreme Council of December 22, 1919. This proposed boundary line of Eastern Galicia ran in the North along the former Russo-Austrian (Galician) frontier. At the point where the Bug river crosses that former border, the frontier of Eastern Galicia met the territorial line of December 8. Further to the West the boundary line of Eastern Galicia followed the former Russo-Austrian (Galician) frontier to a spot where the Eastern boundary of the village of Belzec met that line. From then on, the frontier of Eastern Galicia ran southwestward: to the West of Rawa Ruska, Jaworow, Mosciska and Sambor, and to the East of Chyrow to the Halicz hill at the Polish-Czechoslovak frontier in the Carpathian mountains.²⁴

It may be mentioned here that the territory of Eastern Galicia on that map was given the French name of "Galicie Orientale", and was separated from the territory of the former Russian Empire (situated to the East of the line of December 8) by a green line, which in the explanations was called "Frontiers of other States". A sketch reproduction of the relevant southeastern part of this map faces p. 12.

How can one explain the fact that on the map attached to the Supreme Council's Declaration of December 8, 1919, the boundary of the proposed "Eastern Galicia" was also outlined? At the time the map was being printed (December 11, 1919) the frontiers of Eastern Galicia, as traced therein, were only a project which eleven days later lost its legal validity.

As mentioned previously, the Supreme Council had, by its resolution of September 25, 1919,²⁵ reconsidered the problem of Poland's Eastern frontiers, and had instructed its Editorial Committee to work out a suitable document which was to become the Declaration of December 8, 1919.

The same Committee was simultaneously preparing a project of an agreement between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland regarding Eastern Galicia. The matter of Eastern Galicia was decided upon by the Supreme Council on November 21, 1919, i.e. seventeen days before the December 8th Declaration was issued. No map depicting the frontier of Eastern Galicia as traced in that proposal was included in the project of the afore-mentioned agreement which was communicated to the Polish Delegation on November 24, 1919. One must conclude that the Cartographical Bureau of the Peace Conference, which was to prepare the map

²⁴ The description of that sector of the proposed frontier of Eastern Galicia follows that which is to be found in the proposed agreement between the Principal Powers and Poland, reprinted in *Acts and Documents*, III, 71-73.

²⁵ See above, p. 8.

of Eastern Galicia within the frontiers of the proposed agreement of November 21 and that conforming to the demarcation line traced on December 8, simplified its own task by drawing both maps at the same time. There is nothing in the protocols and documents of the Peace Conference which would furnish a different explanation.

Consequently on the map attached to the official Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference of December 8, 1919,—and although the Declaration relates *verbis expressis* exclusively to the territory of the former Russian Empire—there is one uninterrupted line of the same color and thickness, running from East Prussia to the Carpathian Mountains i.e. through the territory of the former Russian Empire and also through that of Eastern Galicia which had never been a part of the Russian Empire.


Therefore, if any one not thoroughly acquainted with the contents of the Supreme Council's Declaration of December 8, 1919, and with the course taken by the Eastern Galicia problem during the Peace Conference, should peruse the official report of the Peace Conference (which, according to its erroneously worded title page, relates to "Poland's temporary frontiers") and glance at the attached map, his first impression would be that the latter shows the "provisional Eastern frontiers of Poland" from East Prussia to the Carpathian Mountains. Only a closer examination of the corresponding texts of the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, which form the basis of the picture shown on the said map, furnishes the proof that the map attached to the official edition of the Supreme Council's Declaration of the Peace Conference of December 8, 1919, is based on a fatal misunderstanding.

Now, having analyzed the factors which contributed to the error in Lord Curzon's note of July 11, 1919, we may begin to discuss that note as well as the error in its wording.

* * *

The origin of the so-called Curzon Line goes back to the Conference of Ambassadors held in Spa in July 1920. It was then that the Polish Government, at the most critical period of the Polish-Soviet war, asked the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to mediate in obtaining peace with Soviet Russia. At that time, the Polish Government was compelled to accept the conditions of the Powers, which the latter proposed to submit to Soviet Russia with a view to ending hostilities and starting peace negotiations.²⁶ One of the conditions suggested by the Powers and accepted by

²⁶ The atmosphere and the course of the Spa negotiations between representatives of Poland and the Powers has been described in a most interesting way by one of Lord



Poland on July 10, 1920, was an armistice line, which on the day of acceptance of the aforesaid conditions by Poland extended almost in its entire length to the West of the battle front, i.e. to the rear of the Polish army. Only on the territory of Eastern Galicia was the armistice line to be identical with the line of the battle front on the day of the signing of the armistice. Poland was informed that if she would accept these terms, the Powers would give her military assistance—in the event that Russia rejected their proposals and continued hostilities. After the acceptance of these conditions by the Polish Government and the signing of a formal agreement between Poland and the Powers (on the afternoon of July 10, 1920) the Conference of Ambassadors agreed to Lloyd George's proposal to have the British Government send a note to the Moscow Government. Both governments had remained in contact, for in May 1920 the British Government agreed to have a Russian Trade Mission come to London. Lloyd George's instructions were sent to London, and Lord Curzon, then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, forwarded to Moscow the armistice conditions agreed upon in Spa, as well as the proposal to start peace negotiations. This was the origin of Lord Curzon's telegraphic note to the Soviet Government, dated July 11, 1920.

It should be mentioned here that, actually, it was Lloyd George who was responsible for the note. Lord Curzon signed it by virtue of his official position, but otherwise had nothing to do with it. The story told by Nicolson makes this quite clear. In that note the British Government,

Curzon's closest collaborators, Harold Nicolson, in his *Curzon: the Last Phase 1919-1925* (London, 1934). The corresponding passage (p. 204f.) is quoted below *in extenso*.

"On July 10th Mr. Lloyd George interviewed Mr. Grabski alone. He abused the Poles for having advanced into Russian and Ukrainian territory and he ordered them to withdraw some 125 miles behind the line which they at that moment occupied. This would bring them to their 'legitimate' frontier. Mr. Grabski inquired where that frontier lay. Mr. Lloyd George then indicated what has since been known as the 'Curzon Line'—(although Curzon himself had little to do with it)—namely a line running from Grodno through Bialystok, Brest Litowsk and Przemyśl to the Carpathians. This was something very different from the frontier of 1772. Mr. Grabski expressed dissent. Mr. Lloyd George then assured him that if the Poles retired to the Curzon Line, and if the Russians subsequently crossed it, then 'the British Government and their Allies would be bound to help Poland with all the means at their disposal'. This intimation, and the frontier it comprised, were then telegraphed to Moscow with a request that representatives of the Soviet Government should proceed to London to negotiate terms of peace. The French Government refused to join in this communication, since it would have implied official recognition of the Soviet Government. Lenin also refused to respond stating that he preferred to negotiate with the Poles direct. The Russian armies, therefore, continued to advance.

"On July 20th Lord Curzon addressed to Moscow a communication in which he made it clear that the Allies would come to the aid of Poland if the Russian forces crossed the Curzon Line. Wittingly or unwittingly the Bolshevik forces crossed that line at Nowy Dwor on July 24th. They advanced beyond it and then they paused while they communicated with the Trade Delegation in London. Was Lord Curzon bluffing? Mr. Kameneff and Mr. Krassin replied in the affirmative. The Russian armies advanced into the heart of Poland and converged on Warsaw."

acting with the approval of the Powers represented at the Spa Conference (Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan—the representative of the United States was only an observer) became a mediator between Poland and Soviet Russia. The conditions of that mediation were the same as those accepted by Poland in the formal agreement of July 10, 1920, with representatives of the Powers in Spa.

The afore-mentioned error crept into the text of the British note of July 11th while it was being drawn up. The error can best be made evident by a juxtaposition of the texts of (1) the agreement concluded between Poland and the Powers on July 10 and (2) Lord Curzon's note of July 11.

In the transcription of both texts given below the individual sentences are juxtaposed—without interrupting the continuity of the original—so as to render their comparison possible:

Text of the Agreement concluded on July 10, 1920, between Poland and the Powers:	Text of Lord Curzon's note to the Soviet Government, of July 11, 1920:
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"The Polish Government agrees:

(a) That an armistice shall be signed without delay, and the Polish army withdrawn to the line provisionally laid down by the Peace Conference of December 8, 1919, as the Eastern boundary within which Poland was entitled to establish a Polish administration, whereas the Soviet armies shall stand at a distance of 50 kilometres eastwards of that line.

Wilno shall without delay be relinquished to Lithuania and excluded from the zone occupied by the Red Army during the armistice. In Eastern Galicia both armies shall stand on the line fixed at the date of the signature of the armistice, after which each army shall withdraw 10 kilometres in order to create a neutral zone.

"(a) That an immediate armistice be signed between Poland and Soviet Russia whereby hostilities shall be suspended. The terms of this armistice shall provide on the one hand that the Polish army shall immediately withdraw to the line provisionally laid down last year by the Peace Conference as the Eastern boundary within which Poland was entitled to establish a Polish Administration. This line runs approximately as follows: Grodno, Vapovka, Nemirov, Brest-Litovsk, Dorogusk, Ustilug, east of Grubeshov, Krilov, and thence west of Rawa Ruska, east of Przemyśl to the Carpathians. North of Grodno the line which will be held by the Lithuanians will run along the railway running from Grodno to Vilna and thence to Dzwinsk. On the other hand, the armistice should provide that the armies of Soviet Russia should stand at a distance of 50 kilometres to the east of this line; In Eastern Galicia each army will stand on the line which they occupy at the date of the signature of the armistice.

(b) That as soon as possible thereafter a conference sitting under the auspices of the Peace Conference should assemble in London to be attended by representatives of Soviet Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland, with the object of negotiating a final peace between Russia and its neighboring states; representatives of Eastern Galicia would also be invited to London to state their case for the purpose of this conference.

(b) That as soon as possible thereafter a conference sitting under the auspices of the Peace Conference should assemble in London to be attended by representatives of Soviet Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland with the object of negotiating a final peace between Russia and its neighbouring States; representatives of Eastern Galicia would also be invited to state their case for the purpose of this conference. Great Britain will place no restriction on the representatives which Russia may nominate, provided that they undertake, while in Great Britain, not to interfere in the politics or the internal affairs of the British Empire or to indulge in propaganda.

(c) To the acceptance of the decision of the Supreme Council regarding Lithuanian frontiers, the settlement of the question of Eastern Galicia, that of Teschen, and the future Polish treaty with Danzig.

In the event of Poland's acceptance of the above terms the British Government shall immediately send a similar proposal to Soviet Russia and should she refuse an armistice the Allies shall give Poland all aid, particularly in war material as far as would be possible in view of their own exhaustion and heavy obligations undertaken elsewhere. This aid would be given in order to enable the Polish nation to defend its independence."

. . . The British Government would be glad of an immediate reply to this telegram, for the Polish Government has asked for the intervention of the Allies, and if time is lost a situation may develop which will make the conclusion of lasting peace far more difficult in Eastern Europe. Further, while the British Government has bound itself to give no assistance to Poland for any purpose hostile to Russia, it is also bound under the Covenant of the League of Nations to defend the integrity and independence of Poland, within its legitimate ethnographic frontiers. If, therefore, Soviet Russia despite its repeated declarations accepting the independence of Poland, will not be content with the withdrawal of the Polish armies from Russian soil on the condition

of a mutual armistice, but intends to take action hostile to Poland in its own territory, the British Government and its Allies would feel bound to assist the Polish nation to defend its existence with all the means at their disposal. The Polish Government has declared its willingness to make peace with Soviet Russia and to initiate negotiations for an armistice on a basis of the conditions set out above if directly it is informed that Soviet Russia also agrees. . . ."

The juxtaposition of both texts makes it evident that the proposed armistice line was to run as follows:

According to the conditions of the agreement of July 10, 1920, concluded between the Powers and Poland: According to the conditions laid down in Lord Curzon's note to the Soviet Government on July 11, 1920:

(a) On the territory of the former Russian Empire:

"... the Polish army withdrawn to the line provisionally laid down by the Peace Conference of December 8, 1919, as the Eastern boundary within which Poland was entitled to establish a Polish administration, whereas the Soviet armies shall stand at a distance of 50 kilometres eastwards of that line."

"... the Polish army shall immediately withdraw to the line provisionally laid down last year by the Peace Conference as the Eastern boundary within which Poland was entitled to establish a Polish Administration. This line runs approximately as follows: Grodno, Vapovka, Nemirow, Brest-Litovsk, Dorogusk, Ustilug, east of Grubeshov, Krilov, and thence west of Rawa Ruska, east of Przemył to the Carpathians. . . . On the other hand the armistice should provide that the armies of Soviet Russia should stand at a distance of 50 kilometres to the east of this line; . . ."

(b) On the territory of Eastern Galicia:

"In Eastern Galicia both armies shall stand on the line fixed at the date of the signature of the armistice, after which each army shall withdraw 10 kilometres in order to create a neutral zone."

"... In Eastern Galicia each army will stand on the line which they occupy at the date of the signature of the armistice."

It may appear, at first glance, that the conditions set forth in both documents are essentially identical. The addition in Curzon's note of a topographical description of the line of December 8, 1919, ("... provisionally laid down last year by the Peace Conference as the Eastern boundary within which Poland was entitled to establish a Polish Administration.")—does not call for any reservations as long as one does not verify its course on the map. A glance at the map, however, shows that the line traced in Curzon's note runs further than the December 8, 1919, line. This line, according to its detailed description in the December 8 Declaration ran solely across the territory of the former Russian Empire—whereas the topographical description in Lord Curzon's note encroached upon the territory of Eastern Galicia and extended to the Carpathian Mountains.

A close examination of the first two sentences (in paragraph (a) of Lord Curzon's note makes it clear that the first sentence refers to the December 8, 1919, line, while the second, beginning with the words "This line runs approximately as follows," was intended to give a topographical description of the same line (of December 8).

To refresh the reader's memory, the beginning and the end of the topographical description of that line is herewith repeated (from the text of the Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference).

"From the point where the old frontier between Russia and Austria-Hungary meets the river Bug to the point where it is cut by the administrative boundary between the districts of Byelsk and Brest Litowsk, the course of the Bug downstream; . . . thence northwards of the administrative boundary of Suwalki to its junction with the old frontier between Russia and East Prussia."

The foregoing proves beyond a doubt that the December 8, 1919, line—or, as it was called in Lord Curzon's note—"... the line provisionally laid down last year by the Peace Conference as the Eastern boundary within which Poland was entitled to establish a Polish Administration."—did not refer, as shown above,²⁷ to Eastern Galicia, but actually began from the northern boundary of Eastern Galicia and extended thence northward to the East Prussian frontier.

The foregoing also proves that in its topographical description the December 8, 1919, line was incorrectly and erroneously extended south-westward—in the Curzon note of July 11, 1920,—into the territory of Eastern Galicia and up to the Carpathian Mountains.

A correct and precise topographical description would have had this

²⁷ See above, p. 9.

line ended at the village of Krylow, the last place on the Dec. 8 line marked on the map on the territory of the former Russian Empire. The addition in Curzon's note—in the topographical description of the December 8, 1919, line—of the words “. . . and thence west of Rawa Ruska, east of Przemyśl to the Carpathians,” was an error, the origin of which will be explained subsequently.

* * *

Before explaining the editorial error in Lord Curzon's note, it is necessary to determine the reasons and the origin of the differences which appeared in the wording of the text of the conditions of Poland's July 10th Agreement with the Powers on one hand, and the armistice terms in Curzon's note of July 11th on the other; particularly in view of the fact that both documents pertain to the same subject and purport to express the same intentions on the part of the Powers and Great Britain.

Why did the July 10th Agreement use the following words: “. . . the line provisionally laid down by the Peace Conference of December 8, 1919, as the Eastern boundary within which Poland was entitled to establish a Polish administration. . . .”—while the text of the Curzon note reads: “. . . the line provisionally laid down last year by the Peace Conference as the Eastern boundary within which Poland was entitled to establish a Polish Administration. . . .” Both formulae relate unquestionably to the same line. Why, then, did the note not contain the same definition as was used in the text of the July 10th agreement—a definition which mentioned the date of the line's establishment, i.e. December 8, 1919?

The explanation is very simple.

Soviet Russia did not participate in the Paris Peace Conference, and, consequently, was not obliged to be informed of the participating Powers' declarations, or documents and resolutions of the Conference. One must remember that Soviet Russia throughout the Paris Peace Conference did not maintain normal diplomatic relations with any of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. For Russia, therefore, the December 8, 1919, Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference was, from the viewpoint of international law, a typical “*res inter alios acta*”. And this is why,—to avoid a possible complaint on the part of the Soviet Government, that it had no knowledge of the Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference—the author or authors of the British note of July 11, 1920, had rightly used a more detailed description of that declaration and omitted the shorter definition, “. . . the line provisionally laid down by the Peace Conference of December 8, 1919. . . .”—the latter phrase being sufficiently clear in the agreement with Poland, one of the

countries participating in the Peace Conference. Thus the divergence between the wording of the July 10th agreement and the British note of July 11th appears logical and justified from the viewpoint of international law as well as practical reasoning.²⁸ For the same reason, the authors of the July 11th British note added a general description of the course of the proposed territorial line. That is why the Curzon note contains a sentence which does not appear in the July 10, 1920, agreement between Poland and the Powers, which begins with the words: "This line runs approximately. . . ." Desirous of giving a fairly accurate territorial description of that line, the authors of the British note naturally referred to the map attached to the official copy of the December 8, 1919, Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.²⁹

The officials of the British Foreign Office who were preparing the text of the July 11th note were evidently not entirely familiar either with the contents of the Supreme Council's Declaration of December 8, 1919, or with the developments of the problem of Eastern Galicia at the Peace Conference. In following the course of the December 8th line on the map, they failed to notice the important fact that—running from the North southward—this line stopped near the village of Krylow, at the spot where the Bug river crosses the former Russo-Austrian (Galician) frontier. While inserting into the text of the British note an approximative territorial description of the December 8, 1919, line, they did not stop where the line ended, but erroneously included the description of localities situated alongside the proposed frontier of Eastern Galicia, from Krylow to the Carpathian mountains.

What makes us so sure that we are dealing with an *error* in the wording of the British note of July 11, 1920, and not with a *wilful alteration* in the conditions of British mediation, aimed at bringing about a Russo-Polish armistice?

(1) The text of the first sentence of Paragraph (a) of the British note clearly indicated that when the authors spoke of ". . . the line provisionally laid down last year by the Peace Conference as the Eastern boundary within which Poland was entitled to establish a Polish Administration," they had in mind the line of December 8, 1919, especially since the text of the

²⁸ A speedy conclusion of a Polish Soviet armistice was at stake. All reservations and additional questions on the part of the Russians would have resulted, as a matter of course, in a delay which was of considerable consequence to the Polish Government. For one must bear in mind that at that time the Soviet armies were on the offensive, while the Polish army was forced to retreat.

²⁹ See map facing p. 12. The heavy boundary line in the original is red. The original is signed and dated: S.G.A. 11.12.19.

July 10th agreement between Poland and the Powers, in which the first sentence *expressis verbis* mentions the December 8, 1919, line, formed the basis of the British note. The December 8, 1919, line—as shown previously—certainly did not relate to Eastern Galicia;

(2) The insertion of the last sentence into Paragraph (a) of the British note (of July 11th) declaring that "In Eastern Galicia each army will stand on the line which they occupy at the date of the signature of the armistice," clearly shows that the authors of the July 11th note were unaware of the fact that the description of the territorial line of December 8, 1919, in the same paragraph of the note, had actually included Eastern Galicia. The insertion (into the text of paragraph (a) of the British note) of the last sentence referring to Eastern Galicia also proves that the authors did not intend to include Eastern Galicia into the added topographical description of the December 8th line. The insertion into the note of the sentence relating to Eastern Galicia is further proof that the authors of the note did not consciously intend to change the armistice conditions accepted by Poland in her agreement of July 10, 1920. Had the authors of the note really nourished such designs they would hardly have inserted into the text of the note the sentence relating to Eastern Galicia;

(3) The third sentence of the last paragraph of the Curzon note ("If, therefore, Soviet Russia despite its repeated declarations accepting the independence of Poland, will not be content with the withdrawal of the Polish armies from Russian soil. . .") refers to the retreat of the Polish army "from Russian soil." One may question the propriety and correctness of the term "Russian soil" when referring to the area situated to the East of the December 8, 1919, line. However, we must remember that:

(a) The Soviet Government, in its decree No. 698 of August 29, 1918,³⁰ had annulled all partition agreements with Prussia, Austria-Hungary, etc., and had thus renounced voluntarily and by its own initiative, all sovereign rights over the territories of the former Polish Republic, i.e. precisely over territories situated to the East of the December 8th line, and to the West of the Polish frontier of 1772;

(b) The same Powers who participated in the Spa Conference, had—while being represented in the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference—stated in the December 8, 1919, Declaration that "the rights that Poland may be able to establish over the territories situated to the East of the said line, are expressly reserved."³¹

³⁰ See *Sobranie Uzakonenij i Razporiazhenij Rabochevo i Krestinskovo Pravitelstva*, No. 64, of September 1918, pos. 698, pp. 775-777.

³¹ See above, p. 9.

It is an indisputable fact that Eastern Galicia which had never belonged to the former Russian Empire, was not intended by the authors of the Curzon note to be included in "Russian soil". From the latter territories the Polish armies were to retreat, while in Eastern Galicia both armies were to halt on the front line as it existed on the day of the signing of the armistice.

(4) It should also be remembered that the British note of July 11, 1920, was based on the agreement concluded between Poland and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the 10th of July 1920—an agreement which stated in its last paragraph: "In the event of Poland's acceptance of the above terms the British Government shall immediately send a similar proposal to Soviet Russia. . . ." Under these circumstances the conditions of the aforesaid agreement may serve as basic material for the interpretation of the British note. In the text of the conditions accepted by Poland, all matters that might be questioned in the wording of the British note are clearly formulated, precluding any ambiguity.

(5) It must be further borne in mind that Great Britain's representative had signed the July 10th agreement. Thus the conditions of this agreement constituted not only an obligation on the part of Poland toward the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, but also bound Great Britain toward Poland and the other Powers, signatories to the Spa agreement of July 10, 1920. On the other hand, one can not, without sufficient proof, assume that the British Government, having obligated itself toward Poland and the other Powers, signatories to the July 10th agreement, to act as mediator between Poland and Russia, had, before twenty-four hours elapsed, violated the conditions under which it had agreed to mediate.

(6) One must, therefore, dismiss the thought that officials of the British Foreign Office had *consciously* introduced an error into such an important diplomatic document—an error that would allow an ambiguous interpretation of the entire note, or of its most essential constituent parts.

(7) And, finally, it should be stated that on the map, attached to the Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference of December 8, 1919,—as shown before³³—the entire December 8th line, beginning at the frontier of East Prussia to the spot where the Bug river crosses the former Russo-Austrian (Galician) frontier—and the connecting line of the proposed frontiers of Eastern Galicia, traced by the Supreme Council on November 22, 1919, (thus from its junction with the December 8th line to the Carpathian mountains)—are marked on the map in the same

³³ See above, p. 12, and the map on p. 13.

red color with the same pink shading. The misunderstanding which occurred while the map was being drawn,³⁴ favored an erroneous deciphering of the December 8th line.

The above considerations confirm the thesis here taken that the insertion into the text of Lord Curzon's note of July 11, 1920, (namely in the topographical description of the December 8th line) of the words: "... and then west of Rawa Ruska, east of Przemyśl to the Carpathians. . . ." resulted from a mistake in deciphering the course of that line on the map attached to the official edition of the December 8, 1919, Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.

To corroborate the thesis regarding the error and inexactitudes found in Lord Curzon's note of July 11, 1920, it should be stated that the note contains other errors which give the impression that the person entrusted with the "rough" description of the territorial line of December 8th, lacked the proper knowledge of geography and maps, and was unaware of the fact that such a topographical description must be extremely accurate.

Another error of an essential nature consists of the omission in Curzon's note of the additional condition that in E. Galicia the Polish and Soviet Armies were to halt at the front line upon the signing of the armistice, "... after which each army shall withdraw 10 kilometres in order to create a neutral zone." This resolution appeared in the July 10th agreement, but was omitted from the text of Lord Curzon's note. There are no reasons which would justify the omission of that additional condition in Lord Curzon's note to the Soviet Government, other than an inaccuracy in the wording of the British note of July 11, 1920.

We shall refrain from analyzing other editorial inaccuracies in the note. We have stressed above the erroneous use of the term "Russian soil" for areas situated to the East of the December 8, 1919, line, and constituting a part of the former Republic of Poland in the pre-partition period, to which the Soviet Government had renounced in August 1918 all sovereign rights. Many more such inexactitudes could be found in the text of Lord Curzon's note.

At present we shall limit ourselves to stating that the error made in the transposing of the armistice conditions from the July 10th Agreement to the July 11th note, also the errors made in preparing the topographical description of the December 8, 1919, line, and, finally, the inexactitudes in the entire wording of the text of the July 11, 1920, British note, all indicate a general lack of care and caution on the part of those entrusted with the preparation of that note—so important to Poland.

³⁴ See above, pp. 10 and 12.

It may also be worth mentioning that the mistake made in preparing the topographical description of the December 8th line, erroneously extending it across Eastern Galicia to the Carpathian Mountains concerns an area of 50,000 square kilometres (19,500 sq. miles). This is the territory of former Galicia, between the San and Zbrucz Rivers, inhabited in 1939 by more than 4,500,000 people. It includes the cities of Lwów, Stanisławów, and Tarnopol; also rich oil wells, deposits of potassium salts and coal mines, all of which are of tremendous economic importance to Poland.

A sense of fairness, however, forces us to mention an extenuating circumstance which may partly explain the reason for these errors and inaccuracies, namely the haste with which the note was prepared and sent. Poland's representatives signed the Spa agreement late in the afternoon of July 10, 1920, and Lord Curzon's note was telegraphed to Moscow on the following day. Thus it took but twenty-four hours to establish the wording, compare the texts, approve and forward the note. This rush was caused by the desire of the Allied and Associated Powers to come as quickly as possible to the aid of Poland, who was threatened by the rapid advance of the numerically superior Russian armies. This haste may explain the reason for errors and inaccuracies found in the Curzon note, but it certainly cannot justify them.

* * *

Lord Curzon's note of July 11, 1920, was never put into effect. The Soviet Government in its note of July 17, 1920, rejected the British proposal to mediate and regarded the armistice line of Lord Curzon's note as detrimental to Poland.³⁵

Lord Curzon's note of July 11th was little known in Poland. The results of the Spa Conference were brought to the attention of the public in a laconic communique of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasizing that the Powers had, through British intervention, undertaken to mediate in order to obtain an armistice and a peace agreement between Poland and the Soviets. The public received the news with a feeling of satisfaction, for it was unaware of the precise contents of the note. Originally, the text of the note was not published by Polish officialdom. The Polish Press reprinted it on the 15th and 16th of July, 1920, in the form of a translation from the *London Times* of July 13, 1920. The *Times* simultaneously published a map showing the proposed armistice line, including the erroneous topographical description of the Eastern Galician sector.

The publication of the text of the note shocked and dismayed Polish

³⁵ See Nicolson, p. 205; also St. Grabski, *The Polish-Soviet Frontier* (London, 1943), p. 24.

public opinion—yet attention was simultaneously called to the lack of clarity in the wording of the text, and the matter judged to be a result of journalistic inexactitude. People accepted the delusion that the official text was correct, and, at least, corresponded to the conditions accepted by Poland in her July 10th agreement with the Powers.

But before these doubts were cleared up the news came that Russia, in a note of July 17th, had rejected the proposals of Lord Curzon's note. Russia's attitude made the Poles immediately lose interest in Lord Curzon's note. The subsequent military events on the Polish-Russian war front, the Warsaw victory, the Riga peace negotiations and, finally, the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Russia distracted Polish interest to such an extent that Lord Curzon's note was entirely forgotten in Poland.

The attitude towards the note abroad, however, was quite different. International press and public opinion learned of it from the London *Times*. Consequently the note acquired an entirely unjustified importance as an international document concerning Poland. From the *Times*, too, the note and its erroneous geographical interpretation found its way into various encyclopaedias, political and scientific works, gaining an unwarrantable and exaggerated popularity, quite out of proportion to a document which, erroneous in its original form, had never been put into practical effect. Years later, the Poles would mention Lord Curzon's note as an additional proof of the hostile attitude towards Poland of Lloyd George, the spiritual author of the note.

In the light of more recent publications, and particularly in conformity with the opinion of Nicolson, an author of great competency in this matter³⁶ Lloyd George's attitude towards Poland at the Spa Conference should not be regarded as proof of his hostility towards Poland, but as one of political opportunism of the British Prime Minister at a time when the Labour Party's opposition had made his position shaky. His extremely harsh conditions addressed to Poland from Spa were aimed at showing that growing opposition that he respected its slogan: "Hands off Russia!" In the period following the Spa Conference Lloyd George endeavored to strengthen his position at the expense of Poland—a position which, at that time, was already prejudged in the game of Britain's internal politics. In those days it probably did not occur to Lloyd George that twenty years later it would be Stalin who would reap the benefits of his opportunism in the game of Britain's internal politics.

In Poland, in the course of years, Lord Curzon's note of July 11, 1920,

³⁶ Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 16f.

to the Soviet Government passed into total oblivion. It received no attention either in contemporary or subsequent political literature. Its errors, mistakes, and inaccuracies were no longer examined. Moreover, in the only large foreign scientific publication describing the eleven years' activities of the Conference of Ambassadors, not even one sentence was devoted to the episode of the intervention of the Great Powers in the Russo-Polish war.³⁷

Only recently was that forgotten dispatch unearthed from the archives of the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and brought forward, with all its errors, mistakes, and inexactitudes, as a basis for settling the Russo-Polish frontier problem, currently considered a matter of legitimate dispute by the Soviets—thus reviving interest in that extraordinary diplomatic document.

In the light of these considerations which reveal the errors, mistakes, and inaccuracies of Lord Curzon's note (of July 11, 1920) to the Soviet Government and demonstrate the irregularities of its interpretation, *the note loses its entire value as an argument in favor of the present Soviet claims to the territories of Eastern Poland, and particularly their claims to the territory of Eastern Galicia.*

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

³⁷ P. Pink, *The Conference of Ambassadors (Paris, 1920-1931)*, Geneva, 1942.

ITALIAN PROSPECTS IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

by René Albrecht-Carrié

IT has become a commonplace to speak of the unreliability of Italian policy. It is true that in recent times Italy has proved an untrustworthy ally. But this lack of dependability is due neither to any special fickleness in the Italian character nor to darker moral traits that cause the nation to pursue what has been described as "the jackal tradition of Italian politics". The term "jackal tradition" is accurate enough in a sense; but the moral connotations of the phrase tend to obscure the more fundamental consideration that what it describes is in reality the fact that Italy's intrinsic power makes it necessary for her—so long as she intends to play an important rôle in the field of international politics—to pursue a policy of attaching herself to the probable victor in any conflict.

From this point of view, Italian policy can be charged with specific or technical mistakes, but it can also be said to display an element of remarkable consistency and continuity.

When war broke out in August 1914 Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance. Within a bare nine months she was at war with Austria-Hungary. In view of the terms of the alliance, the circumstances of the outbreak of war gave her, to be sure, a sound legal case in not joining her allies at the outset.¹ But the purely technical aspects of the case were wholly overshadowed by the fact that her course was determined on the basis of more relevant considerations of national interest. If Italy had solid grounds in law for remaining neutral, she certainly was under no compulsion to wage war against her former allies. And, conversely, there is no reason to doubt that, had she judged it advantageous in 1914 to wage war on their side, the technical grounds that provided her with a plausible escape would have carried little weight. Salandra, the Prime Minister in 1914, expressed the situation with disarming frankness, when, in October of that year, he assumed the interim of the Foreign Office vacated through the death of the incumbent, the Marquis di San Giuliano. Addressing the officials of the *Consulta*, he explained that his policy was guided by a jealous solicitude for Italian interests; as he put it, by *sacro egoismo* for Italy. The phrase was accurate and truthful, if not wise and diplomatic, especially in the eyes of the outside world wrapped up in a pretense of

¹ Italy rested her case for neutrality on the defensive character of the alliance, on the specific terms of the treaty of alliance, particularly article VII (which had been invoked by Austria-Hungary in restraining her from taking action in the Balkans during the Tripolitan war) and on the fact that she was kept in ignorance of Austria's activity after Sarajevo until the presentation of the ultimatum to Serbia.

high-minded morality. Ever since, and quite unjustly on the whole, Italy has been berated and sneered at for having been too frank.

From the standpoint of purely national interest *sacro egoismo* was sound policy in 1914-1915. After the war, in 1919, the peculiar circumstances of the peace settlements raised false issues where Italy was concerned. But the fact remains that in 1919, had she only known it, Italy emerged as one of the chief beneficiaries of the war.² The current war presented at the outset a situation, in some respects at least, similar to that of 1914. Again, Italy was allied with Germany, and again she remained neutral at first. To be sure, Mussolini, admirer that he is of Machiavelli, may not have pondered to good advantage the latter's admonitions on the dangers of an alliance with a stronger power. But the chief difference between 1915 and 1940 lay in the military course of events. The failure of the German plan of campaign in the West in 1914 was reasonable ground for confidence in an eventual allied victory, a confidence which turned out to have been justified, despite the unexpected duration and the unpredictable vicissitudes of the course of the war. The unexpected collapse of France in 1940 opened up wholly different vistas. The suddenness of it called for quick decision if action were to be taken at all. No doubt, by any moral standards, the "stab in the back" took on a peculiarly unlovely appearance; clearly any notions of international morality or national honor—that much devaluated commodity—ought not to be mentioned in the same breath. It was *sacro egoismo* carried to its logical conclusion, giving forth on this occasion a peculiarly obnoxious aroma.

Mussolini's decision in June 1940 has turned out to have been a sad miscalculation. Again, by any standards of moral judgment, the present plight of Italy may be called a perfect illustration of poetic justice. But the mistake of 1940 was after all a very reasonable mistake. How reasonable may best be judged perhaps by recalling our own somewhat panicky and not too creditable reaction to those events which made it no longer possible to indulge in the comfort of the fiction that happenings on the Rhine were of no significance for America.

For a long time Mussolini had pursued a foreign policy which was essentially in the tradition of his predecessors at the *Consulta*, a policy of exploiting the possibilities of the balance of power. His fundamental mis-

² The disintegration of Austria-Hungary in 1918 and the emergence in her place of a number of weak states opened up for Italy possibilities far beyond the wildest dreams she may have had in 1915, even though she failed to secure at the peace some of the territory promised her when she entered the war.

take consisted in forgetting the proper relationship between the ends pursued and the means available, meaning by that in the last analysis the real power of Italy.³ His mistake was encouraged by the incredible policy of France and Britain, of Britain especially during the Spanish civil war. It was also inherent to some extent in his personality and in the related nature of the Fascist régime. The episode is very reminiscent of the fable about the bull and the frog, wherein ensue most unpleasant consequences for the frog which explodes long before reaching the desired volume. Fascism has indeed exploded with very sad consequences for Italy, and the end is not yet for there is a good probability that the intensity of warfare may increase rather than abate through the length of the Peninsula for some time to come.

The war itself, however, is but a transitory phenomenon and, even while it ravages the country, plans for reconstruction must be set afoot. Not merely physical reconstruction which, pressing though it is, is essentially a technical task and for that reason one that will probably be tackled with success; but also reconstruction in the larger and longer sense of Italy's future prospects and place. It is this latter aspect that we wish to consider here.

* * * *

Any consideration of the future of Italy may be conveniently brought under two heads. First of all, the territorial extent of the country, to which may be linked the fate of the empire; and secondly the place and rôle of Italy as a nation among nations.

We are often told that the discussion of territorial issues would be unfortunate at the present stage of the war. This is due to an understandable fear that the floodgates of controversy which could easily be opened by such discussion might interfere with the tendency toward world coöperation nurtured so far in a general atmosphere of vagueness. Yet, pending the happy day when national boundaries will have lost their significance, the fact might as well be faced that territorial issues, because of their very concreteness, are among the most persistent and deep-rooted sources of conflict. Besides, if there is ever to be a hope that such issues, often trifling by any standards other than those of an inflamed nationalism, are to be relegated to the level of importance to which they properly belong, it would seem that the best hope of achieving this aim would lie in eliminating them as much as possible.

³ The importance of this relationship between ends and means has been well brought out in the case of American policy in Mr. Lippmann's recent analysis, *U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1943).

In the case of Italy, the problem of boundaries may be said to be relatively simple, for the country is capable of unusually clear geographical definition. From west to east, Italy borders on five countries: France, Switzerland, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Greece. There is little cause to examine the various claims which have been advanced in late years in Italy against these nations. These claims had no real foundation in anything but an unwise desire for aggrandizement, and whatever support they may seem to have had in ethnology or history were largely spurious. It may be assumed that Corsica, Nice, Savoy, and the Ticino will remain under their present sovereignty. Marshal Badoglio is following the course of wisdom when he states that "there will be no longer in Italy any one who would want to revive territorial claims against them [France, Yugoslavia, and Greece]".⁴ Corsica, close as it is to Italy by geography and language, has been French for the better part of two centuries; there has been no perceptible trace of irredentism in Nice. Savoy was always French ethnically, and the Savoyard deputies in the Turin parliament spoke of seceding from Piedmont in the event of Italian unification, quite independently of the arrangement which brought the province within the French orbit.⁵ The Ticino seems quite content within the Swiss family. On the other hand, there would seem to be no reason to question the allegiance of the small French speaking minority around Aosta. We may therefore safely assume that the frontiers with France and Switzerland will remain as they have been, and that, even regardless of the circumstances of the present war, such is indeed the most desirable arrangement.

The frontiers with Austria, Yugoslavia, and Greece present a somewhat different problem. To begin with, they are recent frontiers, dating from the last war at the earliest, and they undoubtedly placed in Italy alien, if not very large, minorities. The frontier with Austria and Yugoslavia was the result of two antagonistic forces: on the one hand, the price which in the famous Treaty of London of 1915 the allies formally undertook to pay Italy in exchange for her joining them; on the other, the American influence concretely expressed in President Wilson's Fourteen Points, of which Point IX proclaimed that the frontiers of Italy should be drawn "according to clearly recognizable lines of nationality". The outcome of the conflict was that Italy finally secured the line of the Treaty of London for her frontier between Switzerland and the Adriatic,⁶ but

⁴ Badoglio's interview reported in the *New York Times*, October 25, 1943. It should be remembered that Fascism made its own an older nationalist program.

⁵ See, for instance, S. Cilibrizzi, *Storia parlamentare politica e diplomatica d'Italia*, (Milan, 1925), I, 227.

failed to obtain the northern half of Dalmatia—which was to have been hers—except for the town of Zara and some islands.

The present frontier with Austria, the line of the Brenner, gave Italy some 240,000 Tyrolese whose lot under Fascism has not been an altogether happy one. Despite proposals in 1919 that this frontier be drawn more nearly along lines of nationality (the linguistic line is quite definite in this region) the strategic argument finally prevailed. Strategic arguments cannot be dismissed, any more than ethnological ones, even though the advent of air power has somewhat lessened their importance. Nor is it possible to lay down general rules that will serve as universal and infallible guides in all instances; each individual case must be examined on its own merits. The linguistic line would not make a good military frontier, so that in any case it would be desirable to include some German speaking territory under Italian sovereignty. But the total German speaking population is not large in any event—between 150,000 and 250,000—and this is a case where there might be something to be said in favor of a transfer of population. This solution was in fact the one adopted by direct agreement between Germany and Italy in connection with the formation of the Axis. The arrangement does not seem to have been carried out to completion; perhaps it could be allowed to stand. To some extent the exact location of this frontier might depend upon the future status of Austria. The restoration of an independent Austria could be used as an argument in favor of the compromise lines suggested by the British and the Americans in 1919.⁷ The public announcement given out as the result of the Moscow conference proposes the restoration of an independent Austria. But the circumspect phraseology in which the declaration is couched and the broad qualifications attached to it leave the Allies wide room in which to interpret their commitment in the light of future circumstances. So far, one thing alone seems definite, the refusal to recognize the *Anschluss* with pre-1938 Germany.

The frontier with Yugoslavia was only established after bitterest controversy. It was not in fact agreed upon until after the withdrawal of America from the political councils of Europe following the Democratic defeat of 1920. The issue has left a bitter after-taste in the relations between Italy and Yugoslavia between the two wars. In actual performance, the Fascist régime pursued for the most part a relatively moderate policy in

⁶ In addition, and after much controversy, Italy managed to secure possession of the city of Fiume. On this point, see below, p. 10.

⁷ This line is described in the "British Memorandum on the Tyrol", reproduced in D. Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York, 1928), VI, 407-10 (Document 513). See also *ibid.*, IV, 235-58 (Document 246) for the American Territorial Report.

the Adriatic, but the bombastic nationalism of the régime served to keep suspicion alive until the formal annexation of Albania in 1939 revived in immediate and concrete form the issue of Italian domination of the Adriatic and penetration in the Balkans. The tragi-comical performance of Italy during this war, the ill-fated campaign against Greece, the setting up of a farcical Kingdom of Croatia where the Duke of Spoleto⁸ apparently deemed it politic never to put in an appearance, these episodes have been too short lived and attended by too much ridicule to warrant more than passing mention as illustrations of the vagaries of a system which has finally collapsed in suitable ignominy. They cannot have any lasting effects.

The ethnic facts along Italy's eastern border are simple and not open to dispute. The Treaty of Rapallo of 1920 included some 750,000 Croats and Slovenes in Italy. The frontier agreed upon at that time was essentially the line of the Treaty of London, dictated in the main by strategic considerations which are not so clear cut in this case, however, as in that of the Brenner. In 1919, the Americans, chief opponents of the Italians on this issue, proposed a line—a compromise here also between ethnic and strategic considerations—which ran along the ridge of the Istrian peninsula, the main portion of which would thereby have been assigned to Italy. With possibly minor modifications, the Wilson line of 1919 could well be revived.

The issue of Fiume may reappear at this point, as it did twenty-five years ago. Fiume proper is predominantly Italian, but the arguments which prompted Wilson to oppose its being handed over to Italy were essentially sound, even though his handling of the dispute was not as skilful as it might have been. For the city of Fiume constitutes an isolated island of Italian population, and a small one at that, in a solidly Slav countryside.⁹ Moreover, the provision of the Treaty of London itself which expressly set it aside as the natural outlet of the Croatian and Hungarian hinterland was far saner than the economic absurdities which have been the result of including Fiume within Italy proper.

Continental Italy proper would thus be clearly defined. The frontiers just outlined would involve the yielding of but trifling territory, either in extent or economic value, and while no doubt this would hurt Italian national pride, it would seem not an unreasonable price that Italy should

⁸ He has since inherited the title of Duke of Aosta.

⁹ For a detailed account of the facts about Fiume and of the controversy which centered in it, we may refer to the writer's *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1938). The present frontier separates Fiume proper from its suburb of Sušak, leaving the chief harbor facilities under Italian control.

yield land to which she has no very valid claim. On the other hand, justified as the feelings of Italy's neighbors may be as the result of her wanton aggression, such feelings are no basis for giving free reign to revenge in the form of taking away territory which could only serve to create further irredentas. By way of parenthesis it might be said at this point that the sooner any idea of creating or encouraging any Sardinian or Sicilian separatism, or more crudely of retaining control of these islands for strategic or other reasons, is completely set at rest the better. It is a sad commentary on the confidence inspired by allied motives that Orlando should have been brought out of retirement in order to address a plea of loyalty to the people of Sicily upon the occupation of that island.

In the Adriatic, too, the situation is relatively simple. The Italian dream of dominance must come to an end. The Dalmatian coast and its islands do not belong to Italy. There is, to be sure, an Italian minority in this area and one to which the historic rôle of Venice and the factor of its urban concentration have given importance out of proportion to its numbers. Zara, for instance, is largely an Italian city, and there are appreciable Italian nuclei in some of the other coastal towns. One might be tempted to suggest an exchange between the Italian population of the Dalmatian coast and the Slavic population which the Wilson line would leave in Italy. But exchanges of populations are not to be undertaken lightly. Far better if either minority were guaranteed the enjoyment of its cultural life undisturbed without being uprooted. A frontier drawn in fairness would seem to be the best hope that it might in time prove acceptable to both nationalisms, even though we should not entertain too sanguine hopes. And for that same reason, no encouragement should be given to the more extravagant claims of a too vigorous Slav nationalism. Trieste, for example, while it contains a substantial Germanic and Slav element, is essentially and should therefore remain Italian.

At the entrance of the Adriatic Italy has secured control of Albania. Albania has been from its birth as an independent state in 1913, and will likely continue to be, a thorny problem. But whatever it is, and whether or not capable of independent existence, one thing it is not, and that is Italian. The Italian king, if there is to be one after the final settlement, ought to surrender the battered and tarnished crown of Albania. This would have the further advantage of removing the extraneous and complicating factor of Italian interference when it comes to settling such issues as those of Southern Albania (Northern Epirus) to which Greece is already reviving an earlier claim.

* * * *

The problem of defining the frontiers of Italy would thus appear to be not very complex. The boundaries just outlined are based on the recognition of the principle of nationality. Whatever the importance of nationalism in post-war Europe, it is certain that nationalism as a force is not dead and that the vicissitudes of the war itself will have served to embitter it. In this respect, the settlements of 1919 were sound; if they are open to question it is for not having made an even stricter application of the principle of self-determination, rather than for having proclaimed the principle. There are now, as there were in 1919, many other issues that need consideration, economic and social issues in the main, but the recognition of nationalism is a prerequisite to the settlement of those other issues. The existence of genuine irredentas can only complicate or even wholly distort the solution of economic and other problems. Even this recognition is not, however, a universal panacea; it is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition. Against aggressive nationalism of the Nazi or Fascist type, no frontiers, however fair and reasonable, can serve as any guarantee. Witness the farce of the Munich settlement in 1938.

Assuming then, for the sake of argument at least, that Italy is clearly defined in the post-war map of Europe, the essential problem of Italy still remains. For territorial issues, minor in any case where Italy is concerned, are after all but specific aspects of the broader activity which is the proper field of foreign policy. To clarify matters, it might be specified at this point that this whole discussion is predicated on the assumption that Europe will continue to exist in something like its pre-war pattern, meaning by this that, whatever specific changes occur, it will still be divided up politically into a number of states. We cannot of course be sure of the ultimate effects of German domination, beyond the fact that they will certainly have been profound. This domination will serve to emphasize and embitter national consciousness on the one hand, while on the other it will have altered or destroyed, in many cases beyond any possibility of restoration, all sorts of property relationships, and along with them the social classes whose very existence depends upon these relationships. The state is likely to emerge stronger in any case if for no other reason than the sheer necessity of its taking a greater part in the economic life of the nation. In whose hands the control of the state will be is however uncertain; the location of this control is likely to be one of the crucial issues of the post-war period and the source of sharp and bitter conflicts which in some cases are already coming to the surface. For the moment one can do little more than speculate on these possibilities. But, without venturing too far along the road of prophecy, it would seem safe to hazard the prediction.

that Europe as a whole will neither present the spectacle of a collection of units clamoring for admission to membership in the Soviet Union, nor again unite at once in any sort of political federation. Whether the strengthened states will prove more or less tractable in their dealings with each other is also a matter for speculation. We may just recall in passing the fact that the development of nationalism as we have come to know it has historically been parallel with the growth of democratic institutions. Coming back to Italy, and to repeat our earlier point, let us assume that Italy will be again a nation among nations. Moreover, so far as present indications go, it would seem to be the policy of the three chief allies to restore Europe to something like the political *status quo ante*.

It is worth considering the position that Italy herself has taken or is trying to assume at the moment. Unlike the Nazi, the Fascist régime saw fit to preserve the shell of the constitutional framework of the country, so that when the end came it was sought to present the replacement of Mussolini by Badoglio in the light of an old time parliamentary change of ministry. It was of course in reality much more than that. What the change really represents is the defection of a sufficiently large section in the Fascist fold in coalition with those elements, of which Badoglio himself is the representative, for whom Fascism was a convenient tool rather than an ideology to be taken too seriously. This group, in Italy as in Germany, was mistaken about the nature of the régime which it helped to set up, but the milder nature of the Italian dictatorship plus the circumstances of the war have given it an unexpected opportunity of reasserting itself. In its own eyes, and up to a point correctly, the clock has been turned back to 1922. In a negative sense also, this element may be said to enjoy popular support. Not that the mass of the Italian people would be likely to give it active backing if allowed to express itself; but it must be remembered that the dominant motivation of the Italian people at the present time is one of weariness, fatigue, and passivity. A vast deal of nonsense has been and is being printed about the Italian people. That their enthusiasm for the war was small there is little reason to doubt; that their feelings toward the German ally were mixed is also likely true. But it must not be forgotten, when we read of the Italian hatred for the Germans, that friendship for the British was scant, and if there was any such feeling toward France the evidences of it were remarkably hard to find. America was distant and remote, not part of the Italian horizon, the object of envy, admiration and legend rather than of any active feeling of either enmity or friendship. Or to put it in different words, there is little reason to doubt that, had the gamble of 1940 succeeded and Italy acquired substantial territories in

Europe and in Africa, the régime would have been intensely popular, at least until the price of these conquests should have proved too onerous. After all, we must remember that the Abyssinian adventure was not unpopular in Italy. The Italian people, not very different from other peoples in this respect, did not object too strenuously to the régime in power, but they did object very strenuously indeed to the régime leading them into costly failures. We can easily credit the accounts of popular rejoicing at the fall of Mussolini, for that represented the overwhelming desire of the Italian people to extricate themselves from the war.

The Italian declaration of war on Germany may be looked upon as an atonement for past mistakes, which is the view of certain allied circles, but it can also be regarded, with perhaps even greater justification, as another stab in the back. In the actual prosecution of the war, it will probably be of little consequence. In any case, Italy is destined to be a battlefield, the chief thing that popular feeling wished to avoid, and if it is true that the surrender was due to weariness and exhaustion, there is little reason to expect that any popular enthusiasm will suddenly arise for reëntering the war. Allied propaganda seems to be making a deliberate effort to play up instances of clashes between Germans and Italians. No doubt such clashes occur; German lack of tact and ruthlessness could hardly make it otherwise. But there is little reason to believe that they are more than local and sporadic. Subsequent reports often show that they had been exaggerated; the story of Sardinia and Corsica would seem to be a case in point.

But if the perhaps dubious taste of the haste with which the Badoglio government has turned from an ally into an enemy of Germany is apt to be of little consequence militarily, the same cannot be said of the political significance of this move. In this respect, Badoglio is following, among other things, a purely national policy, a good example of *sacro egoismo*, and, from the national point of view, a sound policy. For, if Italy can so contrive things that she will appear at the final settlement in the ranks of the United Nations, even with certain qualifications, she certainly will have achieved a signal success. Such a policy, just because it is a "national" policy, is certain to commend itself to nearly all sections of Italian opinion. And we can see, already at this stage, how closely two personalities, representing radically divergent points of view when it comes to matters of internal politics as Badoglio and Sforza, are adopting virtually identical positions, stressing alike the need first and foremost of aiding in the defeat of Germany.

This situation brings to the fore the rôle of the United Nations. It may

be considered under two heads: first, the position of the three chief allies; secondly, the position of those other countries which have an immediate concern with Italian affairs.

It is clear that the military task of this war devolves upon the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. Assistance from other sources may be heroic, useful, and symbolic, not to be minimized or sneered at, but in terms of power and effective contribution, the Big Three are carrying and are bound to continue to carry the chief burden of the war. That fact will put into their hands the power to dictate and enforce, at the outset at least, whatever settlement they deem desirable. It is not without interest that the Italian collapse and the recognition of the Badoglio régime should have produced the first instance of real agreement among all three, and that, outside of Austria, Italy should be the only country dealt with in a specific way in the Moscow declaration, even though in her case also the commitments are broad and vague enough to leave ample room for interpretation and for a number of possible developments. One may recall that, curiously enough, Italo-Russian relations have been good rather than the opposite during the major part of the life of the Fascist régime. Present Russian policy would seem to be oriented in the direction of Russian national interest, one aspect of it being a preference for a Europe divided into distinct national entities, as it has been traditionally. Because of the fact that there has been among the chief allies no fear of Italian power as such there is no desire to injure or humiliate Italy. Mr. Churchill has indeed carefully emphasized, perhaps overemphasized, that his quarrel in Italy was with one man, and one man alone—a happy oversimplification. America is essentially neutral, somewhat patronizing perhaps, but rather friendly than otherwise in its feeling toward Italy. These attitudes would militate in favor of a moderate and fair settlement. At the same time, a defeated Italy might be more likely to become reconciled to such a settlement than the Italy of 1919 which, for a variety of reasons and circumstances, some of her own making, some beyond her control, managed to be among the victors of the war and to develop a psychology of defeat at the same time. For these reasons, it might be wise not to exercise undue haste in granting Italy the status of a full-fledged ally.

If we assume then that Italy will continue to exist and function as a nation among nations in the European complex, it must be realized that for the longer run her relations with her immediate neighbors will loom larger in her horizon than her relations with America or Russia. Here Britain occupies an intermediate position, for her stake in the Mediterranean puts her in the category of an immediate neighbor. It used in fact

to be a cardinal principle of Italian foreign policy that under no conditions must Italy be involved in a conflict on the side opposite to Britain.¹⁰ The flouting of this principle with the dire consequences that have followed may serve to restore it to the position that it deserves to occupy in the eyes of future Italian statesmanship.

Relations with France, Yugoslavia, and Greece are apt to be more difficult for two reasons. Franco-Italian rivalry and Italian interest in the Balkans are trends of long standing which Fascism may have carried to unwarranted lengths of absurdity, but which it did not create. Badoglio's renunciation of claims, cited before, must be interpreted as an attempt to avoid retribution rather than as a lasting expression of Italian policy. Secondly, there is a psychological factor deriving from the peculiar behavior of Italy in this war, more particularly the manner and nature of her aggression against those countries. However much this aggression may be explained away on grounds of the necessities of power politics, it is bound to leave an after-taste and a memory which in themselves will be factors that will condition the public opinion of those same countries when it faces the issue of relations with Italy. It is a regrettable situation, but one for which Italy has only herself to blame and for which she will have to pay a price. The price should not take the form of revenge and retaliation, and the frontier settlement outlined in the first part of this discussion may serve to assuage the feelings of the victims of Italian aggression. Some public and official recognition on the part of the Italian government of the error of its ways in 1940 might be of use; so far the nearest thing to it has taken the indirect form of Count Sforza's condemnation of Mussolini's actions. But even Count Sforza's hint at the possibilities of a Latin block, a policy for which under the proper circumstances there may be something to be said, will have to be put down in the category of future long term possibilities rather than immediate prospects. And here it might be added that any attempt on the part of the Anglo-Saxon powers, who were the ones to coin the stab-in-the-back phrase and who make much of morality in international relations, to foist Italy as an ally on a par with the victims of her aggression would be highly impolitic at the present stage; even from a purely practical point of view, such an attempt would be more likely to sharpen than to attenuate certain differences. It may appeal to a large section of American opinion, inevitably uninformed of the background and merits of the myriad and often petty conflicts of Europe, to take the simplist view that Europe is a hopeless hornets' nest

¹⁰ So fundamental was this principle in Italian eyes that it was given formal recognition in the earlier treaties of the Triple Alliance.

and that its component nations should be treated alike by the standards of a detached, if blind, justice. There is no warrant, either in fairness or expediency, for taking such an attitude toward victims and aggressors alike, and we have already heard mutterings of discontent from the French, Greeks, Yugoslavs and Czechs at the mere suspicion of such a possibility. That the objections of these peoples have not been louder is solely due to their present relative impotence which is likely to decrease with their liberation. One would assume also that we and the British are not anxious to promote the unity of Europe through the indirect device of giving it a common focus of xenophobia directed against the Anglo-Saxons. Russian policy, outside of Eastern Europe at least, while it may be more machiavelian, has avoided the possibility of such a charge.

There remains the question of Italian relations with Germany. For the immediate aftermath, there is little reason to doubt that the German association will have left an unpleasant after-taste in Italy. Quite genuinely at the moment, Italy is striving to dissociate herself from this connection. But it would be naive to comfort ourselves with literary quotations on the subject of the everlasting dislike of Italians for Germans. After all, the Triple Alliance was formed in 1882, one year before the birth of Mussolini, and for the greater part of his lifetime Italy has been formally allied with Germany. No amount of vituperation of the Germans, whether it come from Badoglio, from Sforza, or from any one else in Italy, can alter the fundamental realities that lay behind the alliance.

We may be reasonably certain that Germany will emerge thoroughly impotent from this war so that her power will not attract many friends—for a time. Much will depend upon whether she is allowed or able to reëmerge as a power and how soon she can do so. As to Italy, she will naturally seek to play a rôle in Europe and, in order to do this, she will look for desirable connections. The problem in many respects is the same as in 1919; although she was then associated in victory with the western Powers, the connection was gradually broken. Whether such a connection can be reëstablished in a durable sense depends as much on Italy herself as on the policy of those Powers. They must be willing to recognize Italy's place and Italian interests. To put it simply, Italy is first and foremost a Mediterranean nation and in and around the Mediterranean lies her natural sphere of activity.

But Italy is not the only nation with Mediterranean interests, a fact which it is her contribution to recognize. The policy of developing economic interests in the Eastern half of the Mediterranean is as sound as the political idea of *Mare Nostrum* is an absurd pipe dream. As indicated before, there

is reason to hope that the lesson of the consequences of the clash with Britain will not be forgotten for some considerable time to come in Italy. Perhaps the most immediate, direct, and important issue of Italian policy, in the Mediterranean as on the European continent generally, will be that of relations with France.

* * * *

As a final point, the question should be considered of the fate of the Italian Empire or of Italy's position as a colonial power. Just recently, Mr. Churchill announced in the Commons, to the accompaniment of much applause, that the Italian Empire was "lost, irretrievably lost". Discounting the legitimate feeling for just retribution that prompted the applause, the statement is nevertheless one that is likely to prove, in the main, correct. For of what did that Empire consist? By far the most important item, as well as the most recently acquired, was East Africa. In this quarter, there is every justification for undoing the results of the aggression of 1935, however friendly we may wish to be to the government of Marshal Badoglio, Duke of Addis Abeba.¹¹ It may be said that this particular episode of the conquest of Abyssinia was the immediate starting point of a train of events which, through the German militarization of the Rhineland, the Spanish civil war, and the Munich settlement, led by logically and fatally related steps to the present war itself.

That leaves Libya and the Dodecanese. The latter has none but strategic value. Turning these islands over to Greece¹² would at once satisfy the wishes of the overwhelming majority of their inhabitants and serve to remove the latent Turkish suspicion of Italian designs on the mainland of Anatolia. Ever since 1923, Turkey and Greece have on the whole handled their mutual relations in a manner from which greater Powers might have something to learn. The removal of outside influence from this quarter would be calculated to attenuate future possibilities of conflict.

The situation in Libya is rather different. Its acquisition by Italy in 1912 was a typical instance of imperialistic aggression, in this respect no different from British, French, or German colonial expansion. It is not open, however, to the same sort of condemnation as the aggression against

¹¹ Italian East Africa consists of the older possessions of Eritrea and Somaliland in addition to Abyssinia proper. In themselves these older possessions have little value, and it would seem almost equally unsatisfactory to turn them over to either Abyssinia or Britain, as to hand them back to Italy. One should not be too optimistic about the possibilities of international controls, yet that would seem to be the most hopeful solution in this case.

¹² With some possible minor exceptions, such as Castellorizzo, which might better be given to Turkey.

Abyssinia, where far greater issues were at stake than the seizure of colonial territory. The possession has been of little value economically and will continue to be so. As a source of wealth or as an outlet for Italian surplus population it might as well not exist. The territory, though vast in extent, does not possess the bases on which to found an independent state. There are no considerations, other than strategic ones, for evicting Italy from this quarter, and her eviction would be sure to give rise to the charge—not in Italy alone—that Britain (for who else would take it over?) always emerges from a war with some additional colonial territory. For all these reasons, it might therefore be preferable if Libya were left under Italian sovereignty.

This would be tantamount to Italy's renunciation of her hopes of becoming an imperial power. The renunciation may be bitter medicine for the more hopeful and ambitious imperialists in Italy. It may be pointed out, however, that extravagant imperial ambitions have not characterized the policy of Italy for the major part of her existence as a unified nation, nor have they ever commanded the support of a very large section of opinion in the country. Until the later stages of the Fascist régime, Italian foreign policy had been a not unreasonable one for the most part, which had kept its aims in balance with the means available. To a considerable extent in fact, the current plight of Italy may be attributed to her disregard of this balance between ends and means; this is what made her, first a prisoner of her more powerful German ally, then put her on the wrong side in this war. Italy does not command the material resources necessary to support imperial ambitions on a major scale, and, whatever may be said of the morality and desirability of imperialism, this much is clear: empire if not backed by sufficient power is merely an invitation to aggression and conflict.

Italy will doubtless be confronted with major problems after this war, problems of a social and economic nature, which, to a certain extent at least, can be met by internal reforms and readjustments. For that reason, they have not been considered in this discussion. In so far as such problems impinge on foreign policy—and it is of course impossible to draw watertight divisions between foreign and domestic issues—the solution does not lie in the acquisition of bits of territory in Europe or in colonial expansion. Such problems as those of surplus population and access to sources of raw materials can only be met successfully on the plane of international organization. Italy, like many other nations for that matter, will have a strong case in advocating the extension of international controls over the access to raw materials and colonial territory in general. She cannot solve

the problem for herself by her own power. In the setting up of any such international bodies she should be given, after a transitional period of adjustment, a voice commensurate with her resources and power—no less, but no more.

There is no point in inflicting upon her punishment beyond what she will endure as the result of her having become an active theatre of military operations. This particular punishment is inevitable in any case and cannot be charged to the allies. Italy's attempt to become a first class power has ended in dismal failure, and in the long run could not have ended otherwise. It is perhaps fortunate that the failure should have been decisive and not too protracted. The solution advocated long ago by Don Sturzo, democratic institutions at home and acceptance of the position of a second class power abroad is the only hopeful one. To assist in bringing about this solution is the opportunity and the responsibility of the nations that will in effect be in control of the peace.

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BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

The assurance of Allied victory and the collapse of the Fascist régime have placed the subject of Italian prospects in an entirely new light. The following are a few indications that may serve as a guide to the relevant literature.

Recent literature from Italy has of course been largely inaccessible, but in any case a large part of what was written on the subject in Italy, especially since 1935 when it seemed for a while that the megalomaniac dream of empire might be realized, has become little more than a curiosity in the museum of history.

During the period July 25, 1943, when Badoglio supplanted Mussolini, and the beginning of September, when the Italian armistice was made public and the Germans began to take control openly, there was complete freedom of the press in Italy. Newspapers like the *Corriere della Sera* carried articles which might well have been written a quarter of a century ago. It will be both interesting and valuable to have access to the Italian press for that brief interval.

The discussion of Italy's future has been carried on chiefly in Britain and in America by those people interested in the Italian issue, among whom Italian exiles constitute an important element. Despite occasional violent and vocal differences, there is a substantial amount of agreement among the later group. Professor Salvemini's articles in such periodicals as the *Nation*, the *New Republic*, the *Free World*, always highly critical, have expressed the views which, in collaboration with George LaPiana, have been gathered together in their recent book *What to do with Italy* (New York, 1943). In addition to being severely critical of the political activity of the Allies and of the Vatican, this book gives the gen-

eral lines of a program of reconstruction both at home and in the domain of Italy's relations with the outside world; a moderate and reasonable program, and probably the best discussion of its kind up to the present time. Don Luigi Sturzo, leader of the *Popolari* in the pre-Fascist era, has taken up some of these same issues ("Italy after Mussolini," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1943). Likewise Count Carlo Sforza ("Italy and her Neighbors after the War," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1943) and Mario Einaudi ("The Economic Reconstruction of Italy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1944). *The Remaking of Italy* (London, 1941) by Pentad, a collective pseudonym for its authors, four Italians and an Englishman, discusses the future in the light of the historical background. C. Grove Haines' "What Future for Italy?" (*Foreign Policy Reports*, October 1, 1943) is an up-to-date discussion to the time of issue. Count Sforza's book, just off the press, *Contemporary Italy* (New York, 1944) is a very disappointing one, taken up in large part with personal recollections and anecdotes, many of which have appeared in his earlier works.

A fair and up-to-date analysis of the Vatican's policy may be found in Stewart S. Hayden's "Foreign Policy of the Vatican" (*Foreign Policy Reports*, January 15, 1944), a question also discussed at length by Salvemini and LaPiana in the above mentioned book. A more detailed and standard treatment of the position of the Vatican in Italy is D. A. Binchy's *Church and State in Fascist Italy* (London, 1941).

Among less recent publications which provide a useful background we may cite Don Sturzo's *Italy and Fascismo* (London, 1924), a good book and quite timely in many respects despite the lapse of twenty years. Elizabeth Monroe's *The Mediterranean in Politics* (London, 1938) and Pietro Silva's little book *Italia Francia Inghilterra nel Mediterraneo* (Milan, 1939) are primarily discussions of the forces at work within the regions bordering the Mediterranean on the south and east and of the policies of the three chief powers with stakes in these regions.

LATVIA AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE

by Alfred Bilmanis

IN the beginning of the twentieth century several new independent national states appeared in Europe. Norway in 1905 seceded from Sweden; Bulgaria in 1908 and Albania in 1912 seceded from the Ottoman Empire. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria seceded from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and parts of it (Croatia and other territories) were united with Serbia to form Yugoslavia. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was thus dissolved.

In the same year Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, White-Russia, the Ukraine, Poland, in the Caucasus Georgia, Armenia and Azerbeidjan, and in the Far East the Far Eastern Republic seceded from the Russian Empire, whose central part, Russia proper, on November 7, 1917, came under the domination of the Maximalists by a *coup de main*. In one of their first decrees, issued on November 15, 1917, the Maximalists themselves proclaimed the right of any nation subjugated by Russia to secede in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

Of all the states which seceded from the Russian Empire only Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were able to preserve their independence. The others, one by one, were by force of arms reoccupied by the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, a creation of the Maximalists and the kernel of the present U.S.S.R., situated in Central-Russia. Eventually, by 1932, there were 31 independent national states in Europe, of which Latvia ranked nineteenth in area.

In 1939 and 1940 the U.S.S.R. annexed the Eastern parts of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Finland continued to struggle for its independence. On December 14, 1939, the U.S.S.R. as an aggressor was suspended from membership in the League of Nations.

The annexation of the Baltic States by the U.S.S.R., effected by force and unprovoked military action, was not recognized by the United States, the other American Republics or the democratic states of Europe. On August 14, 1941, the Atlantic Charter was signed by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, which solemnly proclaimed the rights of the violated nations to their sovereignty and independence.

Although the U.S.S.R. officially subscribed to the Atlantic Charter she continues to consider Latvia and the other Baltic States, illegally annexed by her under the German-Soviet treaty of 1939, as parts of the U.S.S.R.,

justifying this position on a variety of grounds—strategic, historic, etc.—and insisting that the Baltic States expressed their will in “free” elections to join the U.S.S.R. The fact that the Baltic States were under actual Soviet-Russian military occupation at the time of the elections of the puppet parliaments and their voting is passed over as irrelevant.

There seems to be an impression abroad in the democratic world that this absorption by the Soviet Union is justified by the past and inevitable in the future. Neither of these assumptions has any foundation in fact or justice.

In the light of history and in view of the prevailing democratic principles regarding the self-determination of nations, there is scant reason to doubt Latvia's right to be independent, which, incidentally, during the recent 22 years of its independent existence was never questioned. Latvia has its own territory—an area of 25,402 square miles—situated on the north-eastern shores of the Baltic Sea, with frontiers defined by international treaties. Latvia had no border disputes whatsoever with the U.S.S.R. Latvia is inhabited by a homogeneous people of about 2 million, who are neither Teutons nor Slavs, and who speak a language of their own, derived almost directly from the Sanscrit. It is an agrarian-seafaring country with home industries. The basic economic unit of Latvia is the family living on privately owned farms, there being 237,350 such farms in Latvia in 1938, 89.4% of which are smaller than 50 hectares (1 hectare=2.47 acres). About 77% of the population live in the country, organized in 518 self-governing rural communities, the rest in 60 cities. The capital is Riga, which existed as early as the twelfth century. The crimson-white-crimson Latvian flag was widely known in the thirteenth century. Latvia had a unified government appointed according to the Constitution, adopted by the Latvian Constituent Assembly. Thus Latvia possesses all the necessary characteristics of an independent state: its own territory, nation and a recognized and functioning government. As such Latvia was also admitted to the League of Nations in 1921, and recognized by the United States in 1922.

Latvia is a relatively new name on the political map of Europe, but it is at the same time an old nation. The Latvians have inhabited their country at least since 1500 B.C., the Bronze Age. The name Latvia is derived from “Latvis”, by which the Latvians designated themselves, as testified by the German Superintendent of the Lutheran Church in Kurland in the seventeenth century, Paul Einhorn, in his *Historia Lettica* (Chapter XI), published in Dorpat in 1649. Incidentally, the same author testifies that the provinces of Kurland, Semigallia, Selonia and Livonia,

comprising Latgallia and Talavia, are inhabited by Latvians and historically belong to them. Latvia thus means the land inhabited and owned by Latvians.

According to the annals of history, Latvian land embraced the "Terra Mariana", a Principality of the Holy Roman Empire, which was established on February 2, 1207 by the Emperor Phillip, and eventually included the old Latvian-inhabited kingdoms and principalities of Kurland, Semigallia and Selonia south of the Daugava river, and Latgallia or Lettia and Talavia north of the river. The last two were named Livonia by the German invaders after the Finnish fishermen of the Livian tribe, who had settled at the Baltic outlet of Latvia, on the estuary of the Daugava river, and whom the Germans first met and first "baptized" at the point of the sword. Thus the Germans regarded themselves as "discoverers" of a new country, which had been known to the Scandinavians long before the Germans arrived.

In 1561 the Terra Mariana or Livonia was partitioned. The provinces of Kurland, Semigallia and Selonia became a hereditary Duchy under the Suzerainty of the Polish King, much like the Duchy of Prussia and the Duchy of Mecklenburg, the second of which was under the suzerainty of the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. The Duke of Kurland had his own army, navy, flag (a black crayfish in a red field), and coat of arms (a lion rampant, an oak tree and an elk's head); coined money, sent ambassadors abroad, possessed colonies, and signed treaties, such as the treaty of Oliva of 1660, which stabilized the situation on the Baltic. In 1694 William Penn considered Kurland a quite independent European State. The Duchy of Kurland continued to exist as an almost independent country until 1795, when it was annexed by Russia.

The old Latvian kingdoms of Latgallia and Talavia or Livonia proper were united in 1561 in the "Ducatus Ultradunensis" and became a dependency of the Polish Commonwealth. Poland lost Livonia to Sweden in the beginning of the seventeenth century, and retained only the part of the "Ducatus Ultradunensis" which bordered directly on Russia, later known as the Principality of Polish Inflantes—"Księstwo Inflanskie".

The Swedish domination of Livonia was humane and progressive, but it was not to the benefit of the German squires. But after King Charles XI of Sweden in 1681 abolished serfdom in Livonia, demanded proof of the titles of the German *Landgrafen* to their landed possessions, and in 1694 disbanded by decrees the oligarchic Diet of Livonia, the German squires looked to Russia for help.

Early in the eighteenth century Russia appeared as a contestant for

the Baltic Dominium and succeeded in conquering Estonia and Livonia proper with the help of the leaders of the German landed nobility, which conspired against Sweden.

Following the Great Northern War, as confirmed by the treaty of Nystadt, signed in 1721, Livonia proper was annexed by Russia. Livonia proper, however, constituted only 35% of Latvian territory. The next province of Latvia to be annexed by Russia was the Polish Inflantes, which was incorporated into Russia in 1773, after the first partition of Poland. This province, Latgale, constituted 24% of Latvian territory. Eventually, in 1795, the German squirearchy of Kurland, constituting 41% of Latvia's territory, also begged to be incorporated into Russia, after they saw how Russia favored their kin, the German nobles of Livonia, who were pampered by the Czars because they helped to conquer Livonia from the Swedes.

Napoleon in 1812 re-established the independence of the Duchy of Kurland and created a Council of Regency. A French Consulate was opened in Mitau, the capital of Kurland. In 1813, after Napoleon's retreat, Kurland was finally occupied by Russia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century all Latvian inhabited lands were under Russian rule.

In the nineteenth century the Latvian nation achieved its statehood through a national and economic renaissance, in consequence of which a national autonomous movement arose at the end of the century. It gathered force and in 1904 and 1905 culminated in a revolution against the German squirearchy and Russian gendarmes. A definite political program was then elaborated. But the Latvian revolution was suppressed. In 1907 slight reforms were promised, but were never realized.

During the first World War the Latvian nation proved its national preparedness, when in 1915 it voluntarily formed the Latvian Rifle regiments which fought on the side of the Allies and lost about 32,000 men—a considerable casualty list for a nation of some two million. The conviction among the Latvians was strong that after the war they would obtain their coveted rights of territorial autonomy. The Russian Provisional Government on July 5, 1917, finally granted territorial self-government to Latvia: the German squirearchy was abolished. The Latvian National Political Conference of July 30, 1917, formally expressed the people's desire to become a definite national entity.

The course of events did not presage a peaceful development. On November 7, 1917, the Russian Maximalist party by a *coup de force* gained power over the Russian Provisional Government, whose task was to end the war victoriously and to convoke the Russian Constituent Assem-

bly. The Maximalists at once started peace negotiations with Germany and its allies, which ended with the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, ceding Latvia and the other Baltic States to the German sphere.

Although the Russian Constituent Assembly was elected and convened on January 5, 1918, the Maximalists, owing to the fact that they constituted only 24% of the members of the Constituent Assembly, disbanded it by force the following day. Several hours before the forced dissolution the Latvian Provisional National Council, according to its decision of November 17/18 (old style), 1917, made in Valka, tendered the Russian Constituent Assembly Latvia's decision to apply to the Latvian Nation full self-determination and to convoke its own Constituent Assembly according to the principle of self-determination of peoples. The Latvian National Council also declared a protest against the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty and decided to continue the fight against the Germans.

Eventually the program of the Latvian Provisional National Council was realized. On November 11, 1918, the Latvian Provisional National Council was recognized by Great Britain. On November 18, 1918, the Latvian State Council was formed in Riga, which had been liberated from the Germans, and the first Latvian National Government was elected, in which also the national minorities participated. Latvia was free at last, although great danger still lay ahead and wars with the Germans and Bolsheviks had to be fought. But the Latvian people were ready for supreme sacrifice, and eventually reached their goal to obtain a place under the sun: to be masters of their own land, which had been in their possession for several thousand years.

Latvia's independence rests on the will for self-determination frequently expressed by the Latvian nation in the nineteenth century, also during Latvia's revolution of 1904-1905 and later, in the declarations made by the Latvian Political Conference of July 30, 1917 in Riga, the Latvian Provisional National Council in November 1917 in Valka, and the Latvian State Council on November 18, 1918 in Riga. Latvia's Constituent Assembly, which was elected by universal free suffrage and convened on May 1, 1920, adopted for Latvia a republican form of Government, with a representative parliament (Saeima) elected by free vote, and provided that the judiciary and executive powers be separated from the legislative.

Owing to a radical election law, the elected parliaments usually had more than 20 parties (for 100 representatives). This anomaly hampered considerably the economic life and had its effects upon the political situation. In 1934 a constitutional reform was undertaken to create national unity and a stronger government. A National Chamber system along guild

lines stabilized the economic life and made Latvia prosperous. The constitutional reform was not completed owing to Soviet Russia's invasion of Latvia.

Latvia's international position is based legally on the *de jure* recognition granted by Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and Japan on January 26, 1921, Latvia's admission to the League of Nations on September 22, 1921, recognition by the United States on July 8, 1922, and on its recognition by the Holy See and by other states. Thus Latvia became a full fledged member of the family of nations.¹

Latvia and the other Baltic States were recognized without any conditions or restrictions. Germany and Soviet Russia of their own free will recognized Latvia as an independent state. It would be a fallacy to believe that Latvia was created by European statesmen at a conference table in Versailles. Latvia was not a partner to the Versailles treaty and did not sign it. Latvian and Estonian delegates were indeed present at the peace conference as observers, they even delivered a memorandum regarding their status, but only for the information of the said Conference. In this memorandum the Baltic question was declared to be connected with the question of the freedom of the Baltic Sea, and was thus an international one.²

The Provisional Governments of Latvia and of the two other Baltic States are mentioned only once in Article 433 of the Versailles Treaty, and as already existing governments, not as governments yet to be established. This article forbids German troops to make requisitions or seizures, to make use of any other coercive measures, or to interfere in any way with such measures for national defence as may be adopted by the Provisional Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The self-sacrifice and courage of the Latvian nation created the Latvian State, not a remote peace conference at Paris.

The relations of Latvia with her neighbors and other European states were regulated by various treaties and conventions. In the first place Latvia concluded frontier treaties with Estonia and Lithuania in 1920 and 1921 by arbitration. In the same spirit of mutual conciliation Latvia's frontiers with Soviet Russia were traced on a basis of the absolute ethnographical majority of the population on both sides of the respective border line.

It has always been realized by the Latvians that close collaboration

¹ M. W. Graham, *The Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States, Part III: Latvia*, University of California Press, 1941. S. H. Hackworth, *Recognition of New States*, Digest of International Law, Section 37.

² M. W. Graham, *op cit.*, pp. 422-424.

between all the nations living on the north-eastern shores of the Baltic Sea would be of the utmost benefit to all. For this reason Latvia has always been a supporter of strong Baltic ties.

In January 1920 Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland met and held their first conference at Helsinki. The second was held in August 1920 at Bulduri, a watering place on the Riga beach. All the Baltic nations, including Finland and Poland, participated. It was a most promising gathering, and the resolutions then adopted, had they all been carried out, would have paved the way for a United States of the Baltic, the best guarantee for the freedom of the Baltic Sea.

Indeed, the program of the Bulduri Conference³ proposed by Latvia's first foreign minister, the late Z. A. Meierovics (1887-1925),⁴ made provisions for the closest political relations, as well as for the solution of numerous economic problems, the creation of a high economic council, the unification of the railroad systems, the postal service, telegraph, radio and navigation. Legislation concerning citizenship and fiscal policy was to be coordinated, and conventions regarding extradition, copyright and unified social legislation were proposed, together with protection of labor, old age and unemployment.

The proceedings of the Conference lasted five weeks, during which numerous projects and conventions were drawn up, especially the project for a Permanent Baltic Court of Arbitration. A permanent organ, similar to the Pan-American Union, called the Council of Plenipotentiaries of the Baltic States, with its seat in Riga at the Latvian Foreign Office, was organized for the purpose of carrying out the decisions made at the conference.

Unfortunately, Finland and Poland hesitated to ratify the conventions adopted at Bulduri, and the "Counplenbalt" soon ceased to function. Besides, the Lithuanians were then embittered by the occupation of Wilno by General Żeligowski and refused to participate further in any Baltic conferences at which Poles were present.

The attitude of Finland towards the Central-Baltic States was always friendly. But the Finns were reluctant to enter into closer political relations with the Baltic States and even refused to ratify the so-called Warsaw Protocol of March 17, 1922, regarding consultation in case of aggression. The Finns preferred to retain their neutrality. After that also Poland dropped the Protocol, although it had already been ratified by Latvia and Estonia.

³ *Bulletin of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (Riga, 1920), Nos. 1-30.

⁴ E. Virza and A. Bilmanis, *Zigfrids Meierovics* (Riga, 1934).

As a result, only Latvia and Estonia became allies on November 1, 1923. Nevertheless, hope was still expressed for closer relations with neighboring states somewhat later. We read in Article I of the Treaty of Defensive alliance concluded between Latvia and Estonia:

The High Contracting Parties pledge to pursue a purely pacific policy aiming to maintain and tighten the bonds of friendship as well as develop economic relations with all nations, especially in their intercourse with the nations of the Baltic and neighboring States.⁵

This was a constructive program of good neighbor policy with an invitation extended to all Baltic neighbors. The Soviet Russian reply to this invitation was the unsuccessful Bolshevik putsch in Tallinn on December 1, 1924.

The next step in the rapprochement of the Baltic States was the Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration concluded in Helsinki, January 17, 1925, between Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Poland.⁶ The treaty was based on the principles embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the so-called "Protocol of October 2, 1924". Similar conventions of arbitration or conciliation were later also signed with the Scandinavian countries.

Economic relations between Latvia and the Scandinavian countries were regulated by treaties of commerce and navigation and other specific arrangements. Visas were abolished. Treaties of extradition and judicial assistance were signed. Societies of rapprochement between Latvians, Swedes, Danes and Norwegians were founded. An exchange of artists and exhibitions took place. Latvian professors participated in Nordic congresses. A chair of Swedish language and history was established at the University of Latvia. Regular shipping lines were opened between Latvian and Scandinavian harbors. The venerable King of Sweden, Gustav V, visited Latvia and Estonia in 1929. Cultural and economic relations between Latvia and the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden, steadily expanded.

The Latvian nation has an instinctive trust and confidence in the Swedish nation, because the Swedish rule in Latvia during the seventeenth century had been so benevolent that the Latvians even today speak of "the good old Swedish days".

The rapprochement among the central Baltic States—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—progressed. On September 12, 1934, the Treaty of better understanding and collaboration, or the Baltic Entente, was signed between

⁵ *Recueil des principaux traités conclus par la Lettonie avec les pays étrangers* (Riga, 1930), I, 80.

⁶ *Recueil des principaux traités* . . . I, 98.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This treaty was exclusively pacific in its purpose and aims. The treaty was open to other states.

During its independence Latvia had entered into various international conventions, such as agreements regarding the settlement of international disputes, etc., with other European states. It strictly adhered to its international obligations. It accepted the decisions of the World Court, and of the Hague Tribunal of Arbitration. It respected all the recommendations of the International Labor Organization, and ratified all the conventions concerning labor, hygiene, etc.

In general, Latvia's relations with the U.S.S.R. were based on the principles of international law, non-interference, and specific treaties, conventions and agreements. Normal political relations were established with the U.S.S.R. by the Peace Treaty of August 11, 1920, concluded in Riga. The frontiers between the U.S.S.R. and Latvia were traced at that time without any misunderstandings. An agreement about the repatriation of Latvian refugees and option questions was reached. A number of technical agreements regulating all questions of neighborly intercourse by rail- and waterways followed, especially that concerning railway traffic and transit through Latvian railways and harbors, and also of floating rafts down the Daugava and border rivers. These agreements were accompanied by tariff lists. In 1922 a sanitary convention was signed. Soon afterwards conventions concerning tonnage measurement, settlement of disputes on the frontier, customs, etc. were reached.

In 1927 a treaty of commerce was concluded, with a special section providing for the settlement of differences in commercial and civil matters. Special mutual advantages in economic intercourse were stipulated. This had to be facilitated by the so-called "Russian clause" in Latvia's commercial treaties with other countries. The counterpart of this clause was the so-called "Baltic clause" in Soviet Russia's trade agreements. Lithuania, Estonia and Finland also had such a "Russian clause" in their treaties, with the same reciprocation on the part of Soviet Russia. Among themselves the Baltic States had special preference clauses. The "Russian clause" was well meant, but the practical results, as shown by available statistical data, were regrettably low.

On February 9, 1929, Latvia, together with other states having a common frontier with Soviet Russia, signed a Protocol with the latter concerning the application of the Kellogg-Briand pact of renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. On February 5, 1932, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Latvia and Soviet Russia took place. A convention regarding the settlement of conflicts by conciliation

was signed on June 18, 1932. On July 3, 1933, Latvia and Soviet Russia signed in London a convention regarding the definition of 'aggressor'. On December 4, 1933, a commercial treaty and economic agreement were signed. On April 4, 1934, the non-aggression pact was extended for ten years. All these conventions, pacts and treaties are published in the League of Nations Treaty series.

The above is a bare enumeration of facts illustrating the Latvian attitude, dictated by sincerity and a good neighbor policy. But there is also to be taken into consideration the background of the Soviet attitude, or rather the attitude of the communistic dialectic foreign policy. Soviet Russia, in spite of having no frontier disputes with the Baltic States, never dropped its imperialistic policy of expansion to the shores of the Baltic Sea. Thus it tried many times to "protect" Latvia and the other Baltic States, a euphemism for political and economic control. Everybody now knows what this type of "protection" means. In December 1922 a Moscow emissary, M. Kopp, arrived in Riga to propose a formula which would have isolated Latvia completely from the League of Nations and her neighbors and put her at the mercy of Soviet Russia. It was a formula of unconditional neutrality. The same formula was proposed to Estonia. In both cases the response was negative.

After the unsuccessful communistic putsch in Tallinn of December 1, 1924, Soviet Russia again offered proposals of "non-aggression and neutrality". It was not difficult to see behind these proposals a design to isolate the Baltic States from Poland and Rumania in order more easily to bring them under her control. Soviet Russia then tried to achieve the same end by approaching Poland on January 5, 1934, proposing to the latter state a scheme for joint Polish-Soviet overlordship over the Baltic States. Poland, as was to be expected, rejected this offer. But Soviet diplomacy was not easily discouraged. In March 1934 Russia tried to arrange a joint suzerainty over the Baltic States with Germany, proposing to the Baltic States a joint Russian-German guarantee. This was also rejected by Latvia, but even before that it was rejected by Germany (April 23, 1934).

Then came the episode of the "Eastern Locarno" or mutual assistance pact between Germany, Soviet Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States, which was initiated by France and Soviet Russia. The Baltic States agreed to such a pact in principle. But also this pact failed of realization because of Germany's refusal. Germany had her own plans for the Balticum.

After Germany retook Memel (Klaipeda) on March 22, 1939, from

Lithuania, Moscow, on March 29, 1939, announced unilaterally that Latvia and Estonia were in the sphere of Soviet Russian interests and from then on would be under her special protection. This offer, actually a camouflaged trap, was firmly rejected by Latvia and Estonia on April 8, 1939, as being incompatible with their sovereignty. This scheme should be viewed in the light of the German-Soviet treaty of August 23, 1939, when it was stipulated that Lithuania was to be left in the German sphere of influence. Later, on September 28, 1939, by an additional treaty signed by Herr von Ribbentropp in Moscow, the scheme was changed and Lithuania was granted to Soviet Russia as compensation for agreeing to remain in Poland on the Bug river line. This was revealed by Herr von Ribbentropp in his war note of June 22, 1941.

In April 1939 Soviet Russia had already agreed with Germany in principle on the treaty that loosed the present war.⁷ It was inevitable that Latvia and Estonia in self-preservation should sign a non-aggression pact with Germany on June 7, 1939.

It is now known how Moscow, having already agreed with Germany in principle, tried to obtain from England and France during the summer of 1939 their consent to Soviet occupation of the Baltic States for strategic reasons, and complete liberty as to the time of such occupation. This demand was rejected. Poland then rejected the demand to let Soviet troops pass through its territory.

All Soviet proposals of "protection" or "aid" were based on the principle of automatic aid and assistance.⁸ That meant that Soviet Russia would obtain a free hand to occupy the Baltic countries when it chose. In this connection we may quote the highly significant words that Viscount Halifax, present British Ambassador in Washington and member of the British War Cabinet, pronounced in the House of Lords on December 5, 1939, concerning Soviet Russia's hidden wishes and plans with respect to the Baltic region:

We have tried to improve our relations with Russia, but in doing so we had always maintained the position that rights of third parties must remain intact and be unaffected by our negotiations. Events have shown that the judgment and the instinct of His Majesty's Government in refusing agreement with the Soviet Government on the terms of formulae covering cases of indirect aggression on the Baltic States were right. For it is now plain that these formulae might have been the cloak of ulterior designs. I have little doubt that the people of this country would prefer

⁷ D. J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942* (New York, 1943), pp. 9, 10.

⁸ D. J. Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 29-30.

to face difficulties and embarrassment rather than feel that we had compromised the honor of this country and the Commonwealth on such issues.⁹

On September 1, 1939, Latvia and the other Baltic States proclaimed neutrality in the War which had begun in Europe. Under considerable pressure, however, Latvia on October 5, 1939 (after Estonia had already signed on September 28, 1939), had to sign the so-called Mutual Assistance Treaty with Russia which actually became a springboard for Latvia's annexation. On June 16, 1940 (after Finland had been subdued in March and Lithuania compelled to accept the Soviet ultimatum on June 14, 1940), Latvia, after a short termed ultimatum, was occupied by Red army troops. A dummy government and a dummy parliament were put in office, with the result that in August 1940 Latvia was annexed, and a Soviet "constitution" was imposed.¹⁰ On July 23, 1940, the United States condemned these "devious processes" of the U.S.S.R.

With Germany, for long years the counterpart of Soviet Russia, Latvia also had no frontier or other problems, and the relations of the two countries were, to use the commonly applied expression, "normal and friendly". They began with the 1920 Treaty of Resumption of Relations and, over a series of agreements on trade and technical problems, led to the Treaty of Non-Aggression, signed on June 7, 1939.

The German-Russian Pact of August 23, 1939, confused all international relations in the Baltic and disastrous events developed quite rapidly. Regardless of its secret dealings with U.S.S.R., the German Minister in Riga on September 4, 1939, declared in the name of his Government that Germany did not sign with Soviet Russia any agreement contradicting the German-Latvian treaties. But soon Germany's acts proved the contrary. On January 10, 1941, Germany signed in Moscow with the U.S.S.R. a permanent frontier agreement based on a joint partition of neighboring countries.

It should be emphasized that all these treaties and pacts signed between Germany and the U.S.S.R. concerning Latvia are not legally binding upon Latvia, they are *res inter alios*.

It is a matter of record that Germany violated all treaties with Latvia and thus shares with the Soviet Russian government in the responsibility for the breach of solemn promises respecting Latvia's independence and neutrality.

* * *

⁹ *Speeches on Foreign Policy by Viscount Halifax* (London, 1941), pp. 340-341.

¹⁰ See Appendix.

The illegal acts committed by both occupants: the U.S.S.R. during the period from June 17, 1940, to July 1, 1941, and Germany beginning with July 1, 1941, are contrary to international law and principles of simple morality. The violence and atrocities perpetrated there equal only those in barbarian countries during the darkest middle ages.

The Latvian Minister in Washington on January 4, 1942, submitted to the Department of State on behalf of Latvia a Declaration in which he stated that the Latvian Nation expressed its solidarity with the Declaration by the United Nations. The Latvians are unshakable in their belief in the Atlantic Charter and trust in the ultimate victory of international law and justice.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

APPENDIX

EXCERPTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LATVIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC PUBLISHED ON AUGUST 30, 1940 IN RIGA*

SECTION I

SOCIAL ORDER

Article 1. The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic is a socialistic State of workmen and peasants.

Article 2. The political basis of the Latvian S.S.R. are the Soviets of deputies of the working people, which have been established after the overthrow of the power of capitalists and owners of greater lots of land, and after the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship in Latvia.

Article 3. All power in the Latvian S.S.R. belongs to the urban and rural working people vested in the body of the Soviets of deputies of the working people.

Article 4. The economic basis of the Latvian S.S.R. is the socialistic economic system and the socialistic ownership of the working implements and means of production, which has entrenched itself, abolishing the capitalistic economic system, annulling the private ownership of working implements and means of production in large industrial enterprises, and nationalizing these enterprises, banks, and means of transportation and communication, in order to destroy completely the possibility of person exploiting person and to create a socialistic society.

Article 5. Socialistic property in the Latvian S.S.R. is in the form either of State property or of cooperative property.

Article 6. The land, its riches, waters, forests, large industrial works and factories, mines, sources of ore, transportation by railroad, water and air, banks,

* It is hardly necessary to underline the fact that, even by this "Constitution", Latvia is completely subject to the will of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and that the "independence" of the Latvian Soviet Republic is a fiction.

means of communication, large agricultural enterprises organized by the State (State farms, machine and tractor stations, etc.), as well as communal enterprises and large buildings in cities and industrial centers are State property, i.e., the property of all the nation.

Article 7. Social enterprises in the cooperative organizations, including their livestock and inventory, the products of cooperative organizations, and public buildings are the public socialistic property of the cooperative organizations.

Article 8. Besides the socialistic economic system in the Latvian S.S.R., individual private husbandries of peasants, artisans and producers at home, and dwarf private industrial and commercial enterprises are permissible within the limits defined by law.

Article 9. Peasants are assured of the rent free and indefinite use of the land on their farm within the limits defined by law.

Article 10. The law protects the personal property rights of citizens to the income from their labor and savings, to the house in which they dwell and supplementary land around the house, to the farming inventory and household objects, to objects of personal use and of comfort, and also testamentary rights to the personal property of citizens.

Article 11. The economic life of the Latvian S.S.R. is determined and developed by the national economic plan of the State, the purpose of which is to increase public wealth, indefatigably to raise the material and cultural level of the working people, to enhance the independence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), and to increase its defensive capacities.

Article 12. Work in the Latvian S.S.R. is the duty and a matter of honor of every capable citizen, pursuant to the principle: "Who does not work shall not eat."

The Latvian S.S.R. adheres to the principle of socialism: "From each according to his capability, to each according to his work."

SECTION II STATE ORDER

* * * *

Article 15. The Latvian S.S.R. retains the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 17. The laws of the U.S.S.R. are mandatory throughout the territory of the Latvian S.S.R.

Article 18. Every citizen of the Latvian S.S.R. is also a citizen of the U.S.S.R.

Within the territory of the Latvian S.S.R. the citizens of all the other federated republics have equal rights with the citizens of the Latvian S.S.R.

Article 19. The administration of the Latvian S.S.R. in the body of its supreme authoritative organs and State administrative organs includes:

* * * *

(g) Determination of State and local taxes, fees and other revenues in accordance with the laws of the U.S.S.R., as well as management of the realization of the local budget;

* * * *

SECTION III

SUPREME STATE ORGANS

* * * *

Article 25. The laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian S.S.R. shall be promulgated in the Latvian and Russian languages, with the signatures of the president and secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian S.S.R.

* * * *

SECTION IV

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS

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Article 41. In accordance with the laws of the U.S.S.R. and the Latvian S.S.R., and with the regulations and orders of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and in order to execute them, the Soviet of Latvian People's Commissars issues regulations and orders, and checks their execution.

* * * *

Article 48. The People's Commissariats of the Latvian S.S.R. are either federal [i.e. subject to the respective commissariats of the U.S.S.R.] or local republican (i.e. subject to the Latvian Soviet of People's Commissars. A.B.).

The following People's Commissariats of the Latvian S.S.R. are federal:

Food industry,
Meat and dairy industry,
Light industry,
Forest industry,
Agriculture,
Finance,
Commerce,
Internal affairs,
State security,
Justice,
Health protection,
State control.

The following People's Commissariats of the Latvian S.S.R. are local republican:

Local industry,
Education,

Labor,
Communal Economy,
Social Security.

* * * *

SECTION V

LOCAL STATE AUTHORITATIVE ORGANS

* * * *

Article 67. In conformity with the conditions of the county, the All-Union People's Commissariats and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs establish their administrations with the county Soviets of deputies of the working people on the basis of the laws of the U.S.S.R. and the Latvian S.S.R.

* * * *

SECTION VII

COURTS AND OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

* * * *

Article 77. The judicial tasks of the Latvian S.S.R. are performed by the Supreme Court of the Latvian S.S.R., county courts and people's courts, as well as special courts of the U.S.S.R. established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

* * * *

Article 86. Supreme supervision over all People's Commissariats and the institutions subject to them, as well as individual officials and also citizens within the territory of the Latvian S.S.R., strictly observing the laws is realized by the Attorney General of the U.S.S.R. directly, as well as through the Office of the Attorney General of the Latvian S.S.R.

Article 87. The Attorney General of the Latvian S.S.R. is appointed by the Attorney General of the U.S.S.R., for five years.

* * * *

Article 89. The organs of the Office of the Attorney General perform their duties independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subject only to the Office of the Attorney General of the U.S.S.R.

SECTION VIII

BASIC RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENS

* * * *

Article 98. In connection with the interests of the working people, as well as in order to develop the organized communal and political activity of the masses of people, the citizens of the Latvian S.S.R. are ensured the right to unite in social organizations: trade unions, cooperative associations, youth organizations, sport and defense organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies, but the

most active and most conscientious citizens from the working class and from other circles of the working people are united in the All-Union communist party (of bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle for the strengthening and development of the socialistic order, and the guiding nucleus of all organizations of the working people—both social and state.

* * * *

SECTION IX

ELECTION SYSTEM

Article 113. Candidates for elections are nominated by election districts.

The right to nominate candidates is ensured to social organizations and societies of the working people, organizations of the communist party, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, cultural societies.

THE DANUBE BASIN IN RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION

by Herman H. Browne

BETWEEN the two world wars numerous international conferences were devoted to the food problem. It was approached almost exclusively as a problem of production, and in most instances as a problem of overproduction. Modern nutritional research has made it clear that even in the richest industrial countries great masses of the population are poorly fed and do not get the amount or type of food necessary to secure growth and health. Food is now universally understood and approached as a problem of underproduction, confronting a latent potential demand of the first magnitude. Freedom from want is the goal of the United Nations' food plans. It is not a matter of how to restrict production; but rather the main question has now become how to raise production and living standards. This change of attitude must have a profound effect on all principles of food policy: a higher standard of living on an improved level of nutrition; a more efficient and profitable agriculture; freer international trade permitting a wider flow of goods are the aims which finally will bring more economic and political safety to the world.

Europe will be starving after this war. The direct impact of the war on Russia, France, Yugoslavia, Poland, Greece and other countries has exposed millions of people to starvation. Nazi occupation has deprived them of equipment, and has driven them from their homes. The productivity of agriculture will be at a minimum, and all liberated countries will need quick relief and help to reconstruct their economies.

This discussion deals with a group of countries—those of the Danube Basin—which can bring relief to other European countries, but will themselves need help in reconstructing their own economy. It is their agricultural position in relation to relief and reconstruction which will be considered here.

Rumania's soil is not unfavorable to agriculture. Of a total area of about 74 million acres, only about 16% are unproductive; 34 million acres are arable land, 84% of which are covered with grain crops: 37% maize, 28% wheat, 10% barley, industrial and fodder crops amount only to 6%. The soil in the plains is extremely fertile although the famous black earth is at present in danger of deterioration owing to the lack of manure and fertilizers. Summer in the Danube plains, and even more in the East, is long and hot, and many a hope of a promising crop has vanished under extreme drought during the months of July or August.

Out of a 1938 population of 20 million, about 80% were engaged in agriculture and forestry; industry, in the widest sense, employed 800,000 persons, of whom 350,000 worked in factories. In peacetime in Western Europe not more than 20% of the population was engaged in agriculture. In Rumania, 75% of the peasant holdings average 5 acres (they occupy 36% of the land), 17% have an average of 14 acres (they account for 14% of the land). Many of these small holdings consist of widely separated strips. Work on these scattered plots involves a considerable waste of time in traveling to and from the farm house. The narrow strips squeezed in between fields of other holders frequently prevent efficient and more successful production. The equipment of the Rumanian farmer is very poor, being one-half that of the Bulgarian and one-fifteenth that of the German farmer. It often dates back generations. The proportion of animals to population is extremely low, more unfavorable than in the other Danube countries. Many farms are without draught animals; production of dairy goods is far too small. Application of manure is insufficient, and commercial fertilizers are almost unknown. All these deficiencies keep the yield per acre very low. Between 1930 and 1939 the average yield of corn was 17.1 and of wheat 14.4 bushels per acre. Corn production is favored because maize is less threatened by dryness and demands less capital investment, seed is cheap and the farming work requires less machinery. Another characteristic feature of the Rumanian crop is the frequent variation from the mean yield due to recurring droughts and primitive working methods. This causes disturbing uncertainty in all calculations, and deprives the farmer of the reward for his work.

One of the fundamental factors of Rumanian agriculture is the highly unfavorable ratio of agricultural land to agricultural labor. There are at least 16 active workers per 100 acres (6-9 in Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden). The net output has been calculated to bring in less than twelve dollars per acre, one-fifth to one-third of the results achieved in Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, not to speak of Denmark or Great Britain. A very low yield has to support three times more people than a far higher yield in the Western countries. Accordingly the income of the small farmers and their hired laborers is appallingly low.

Besides mineral products (petroleum), Rumania's main export consists of agricultural products. Grain furnishes up to 70% of the whole agricultural export, livestock not more than 20%. These surpluses, partly set free for export by the low domestic food consumption, could be increased considerably by a higher output.

Bulgaria is the smallest of the Balkan countries. Of a total area of

about 25 million acres, only 40% are arable owing to the mountainous character of the country, although the incorporation of the plain and fertile soil of the southern Dobrogea has recently improved this unfavorable ratio. More than 80% of the population live on and by the land, about 135,000 persons are employed in handicraft, and only 100,000 persons work in industry; but not half of the national income is derived from rural economy. Out of 880,000 farms, 240,000 have less than 5 acres, 320,000 have less than 12.5 acres. These small farms often consist of 12 to 15 plots widely scattered without proper communications. The equipment of the farmer, although much better than in Rumania, is still poor. In 1934 wooden plows were more frequent than iron plows, which numbered less than 400,000 all over the country. The country is short of livestock as a consequence of the insufficient domestic feed supply.

As in all other Balkan countries grain farming occupies the larger part of the arable land in Bulgaria, about two-thirds. The working efficiency is low, for despite scarcity of fertile soil a considerable part remains fallow every year. With more than 20 workers per 100 acres who remain idle for a great part of the year the problem of overpopulation is still more pressing than in Rumania. The average output in 1937 was 20 bushels of wheat and 20 bushels of corn per acre. It is to be recognized, however, that serious efforts at intensification of production have met with success since the first world war, and more has been achieved than in any other country of the Danube Basin. This does not hold good for the livestock production. Since 1929, the area sown with sunflower seed has expanded from 156,000 acres to 453,000 acres, cotton from 12,000 acres to 140,000 acres; and the area in tobacco, hemp and sugar beets has been similarly increased. The fruit industry has developed favorably. Although this development is still in its first phases it is certainly most encouraging and seems to point the way to greater success in the future. The progress towards a more intensive production expresses itself in a higher value of the output per acre and a change in export ratios. Cereals decreased in export since the first world war from 66% to 10% of the total, tobacco increased in the same period from one to 40%, fruit and vegetables from negligible quantities up to 20% of the export total. Eggs now constitute 10% of the export and represent the main export product of the livestock economy. Export of live animals and meat products, together about 8%, is still unsatisfactory and is explained by the above-mentioned shortage of feed.

Yugoslavia covered before the war an area of 62 million acres; the country is very mountainous, and only the northern and eastern part is plainland of highly fertile soil. Of the total agricultural area of 36 million

acres only about one-third is suitable for intensive farming, and approximately 40% of the country consists of forests and unproductive land. Vast stretches of the mountains are not covered by soil and sometimes have no surface water. With about 80% of the population engaged in agriculture, 90% of the farm holdings average 8 acres, only 10% consist of more than 25 acres. The country is badly overpopulated, there being 16 active workers per 100 acres, the worst overpopulation being in the mountainous south. As in Rumania and Bulgaria, the grain crop is dominant, covering more than 80% of the arable land. Corn takes the first place, followed by wheat. Crop yields vary considerably from year to year and from region to region. Livestock plays a big part in the economy of the country, providing 18% of the national income compared to 24% of all other agricultural income. An increase in livestock numbers was clearly noticed the last years before the war: in 1939 there were more than 10 million sheep, more than 4 million cattle, great quantities of hogs and a large poultry stock.

The impact of the war on Yugoslavia's agriculture was disastrous. Wide areas were devastated in the course of enemy action and guerilla warfare; the male population was depleted, horses and farm equipment were looted by the Nazis. No doubt the structure of this valiant land will be changed after this war more than that of any other Danubian country. Relief and reconstruction will be indispensable to this sorely-tried nation.

To complete the picture of agriculture in the Danube Basin we must briefly review the condition of Hungary. Of the total area of 23 million acres, 60% is arable land; by far the larger part of the country consists of fertile plains. Since the last war the industrialization of this country has made good progress encouraged by high import duties and financed by foreign loans, and has absorbed large parts of the population growth. About 50% of the population is engaged in agriculture. Hungary is the only country in the Danube Basin where the big estates were not broken up after the first world war. Although the landlords had to give up land in the course of various land reforms, about 40% of the land is still owned by a few hundred families holding estates of more than 1000 acres, many of them 4000 to 5000 acres. In contrast to the vastness of these estates, 75% of the farms consist of less than 7½ acres, and two million people living by agriculture are still landless or hold dwarf farms of a few acres wholly insufficient to support them. The problem here involved is not one of overpopulation but of unfavorable distribution of land which keeps the larger part of the rural population in misery. Plans of various land reforms recently initiated by the government may bring some allevia-

tion but will hardly change the basic structure. If after this war the big estates should be divided as a result of a land reform, it will be vital to see to it that working efficiency remains near the existing level.

The large Hungarian farms are mainly devoted to extensive grain production. Their farming methods are nearer to Western standards, and the capital investment is more favorable than in other Danubian countries. 73% of the arable land is covered by grain, wheat being the most important crop; industrial crops are insignificant. The average yield is much higher than in any other country of the Danube Basin. The average output of wheat in the period from 1935 to 1939 was over 22 bushels per acre, and the yearly deviation from the mean yield is about one-half of that in Rumania. Corn yields vary much more: from 1930 to 1939 they fluctuated between 20 and 37 bushels. It even happened that in years of meagre maize crops feeding stuff had to be imported. About 80% of the cattle is owned by small peasant farmers, the big estates favoring grain production. The number of hogs is considerable, about 5.5 million heads, and other cattle number about two million. Poultry bulks large in the farm economy, particularly that of the small farmers, and furnishes about 6% of the total farm income.

Farm products furnish two-thirds of the export total. Wheat, live cattle, live hogs are the biggest export goods; lard, poultry, eggs, butter and fruit are of importance.

This brief account may suffice to outline the basic features of agriculture in the Danube Basin. It appears that, notwithstanding many variations, those countries have certain economic characteristics in common: they are all predominantly agricultural and their main difficulties arise from overpopulation, lack of capital and low productivity—all interrelated problems. An increase in invested capital would raise the efficiency of production and provide a livelihood for more people, as well as an improved standard of living. In Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, 80% or more of the population is engaged in agriculture; about 50% in Hungary; less than 30% in Germany and 6% in England. The capital invested in agriculture is only a fraction of what it is in Western Europe. In these countries there are only 10-12 head of cattle for each 100 acres; in Germany 26, in Denmark 37, in Holland 41. It is this live capital which in the West accounts for the higher living standard of the farmer. The poor capital equipment and the small sizes of the farms are mainly responsible for the low yield in South Eastern Europe. There is in East Europe not enough work for all the people living on the farms, and there is not enough food and income from those farms to afford them a minimum decent living standard. These

conditions are largely the result of centuries of war and destruction, and of natural circumstances which so far have eluded human efforts, but may now be open to better control through human science and experience.

Many means must be combined to bring about a more satisfactory state of affairs. The most important is industrialization, and no doubt without industrialization the pressing problem of overpopulation cannot be solved. The difficulties facing industrialization in the Danube Basin arise from lack of raw material and fuel, lack of capital and skilled labor. Rumania has petrol; Yugoslavia, copper, zinc, lead and magnesite; Hungary produces a large part of the world's output of bauxite and has some coal, lignite and iron ore. All of them are short of iron and coal which have been the basis for modern industrial development. A big water plant could serve as a substitute for coal, and the suggestion of a Tennessee Valley authority for the Danube Basin should receive serious consideration. Many signs point to the probability that an increasingly important part may be played by materials other than iron and steel in the future. There may be a chance to develop modern industries based on plastics. Wood may become more and more the raw material for many products. Rubber, sugar, plastics, proteins, vitamins and many other things have been produced from wood already; and there are plenty of forests in the Danube Basin. Certainly a consumers' goods industry could be organized which would require far less capital than heavy industry and employ relatively more labor. Light industry requires a capital equipment of from \$400 to \$1600 per head, whereas heavy industry demands from \$3000 to \$6000 per head. If part of the agricultural population is absorbed by industry a better structural equilibrium will be created in the economy of the country and in its relation to that of other countries. A new division of labor on a higher level must be established among the national economies of the world, with the highly developed capitalistic countries manufacturing products of higher value and those which require greater skill, and trading in raw materials and simple manufactures.

Industry will help to raise the living standard of Danube Europe. Gradually an increasing industrial population will be given purchasing power sufficient to buy more and better food. The present nutrition level in the Danube Basin is extremely low, since the main diet consists of cereals, chiefly maize, and is hopelessly short of protective foods—milk, meat, eggs, and vegetables. The death rate in Rumania is nearly twice that in the United States, proving once more the close relation between income, diet and death rate.

To produce more and better food for domestic consumption and

export, the causes of the present shortcomings must be removed. Irrigation can create new soil and give a sounder basis to production by preventing the frequent crop failures. An increased feeding basis will permit more cattle breeding; and where cattle cannot be bred, sheep and pigs will replace them. The yield per acre must be brought to a much higher level. The Danube countries did not improve their productivity in the period between the two wars when the Western countries made good progress. The use of more manure and fertilizers and elimination of at least the worst cases of the strip system will work in this direction. Lately the Rumanian government has tried to organize village communities to make the farm work of the members more efficient.

Wheat and maize cannot form the sole basis for a higher living standard in the Danube countries, since they cannot keep pace with the large-scale American producers. In the United States there are about 16 acres of arable land per head of the farm population, whereas in the Balkan countries there are only two to three acres. The main and nearest market for Danubian grain is Central Europe, where wheat and maize sell at prices equivalent to the prices of the South American product plus freight to the European port and rail freight to the place of consumption, the producers enjoying the differential between these higher freight rates and the cheaper freight on the Danube. However, if crops are abundant and the surplus cannot be disposed of in Central Europe, the grain has to be shipped down the Danube to the Black Sea and from there to the West. In this event the products not only lose the advantage of the cheaper freight rates but also sell at prices lower than those paid for the American products because, (a) they do not come regularly to these markets, and (b) qualities vary and are not standardized or graded. A system of elevators and improvement of marketing methods are indispensable for a reasonable grain trade.

Livestock farming must be increased wherever possible. The cultivation of the soybean which has been introduced lately in Bulgaria and Rumania may bring some prosperity. Production of beans, peas, oil seeds, industrial plants, vegetables, fruit, etc. could be considerably expanded.

Opinion is divided as to whether a Danube federation would benefit its members from a purely economic point of view. The national economies dealt with in this brief study do not complement each other and at present there is no large interchange of goods between them. Only 6-7% of the respective exports and imports remain in this area. Therefore it is not to be expected that such a federation could prove a decisive factor in progress, although undoubtedly some advantages would result. What can

be achieved, with or without federation, is a positive collaboration among the Danube countries and with other nations. For instance, it is inconceivable but none the less true that not a single bridge crosses the Danube between Rumania and Bulgaria. A power plant could be built as a common project, and many other common institutions could serve all the Danubian countries, reducing the expenses for every one of them. Undoubtedly there are vast reserves of natural and human resources in the Danubian countries unutilized so far and only waiting to be discovered. Industrialization and intensification of farming, going hand in hand, will gradually eliminate the depressing poverty of that part of the world, and the exchange of goods produced on a higher level of labor division will increase in the mutual interest of all concerned. Capital and hard work will be required to break into the vicious circle which so far has obtained in the life and economy of the Danubian area.

During the last decade the Danube countries have been tied up more and more with Germany, until economically at least they have been practically incorporated into the German economic system. Germany did not promote either industrialization or livestock farming. She wanted to keep these countries as a granary, reserving for herself the more profitable branches of agriculture. A German defeat will furnish the opportunity to rebuild the economy of the Danube Basin *de novo* because the ties with Germany will be severed abruptly and, at least for some time, this severance will be complete. After the expulsion of the Nazis, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary—hardly Yugoslavia—may be able to play an active part in relief work, and this part may facilitate the initiation of reconstruction. While the long-run food plans of the United Nations call for better nourishment throughout the world, the immediate program when hostilities cease will be to rescue millions of people from starvation. All sources which can spare surpluses will have to contribute to this immense task. In Europe the Danube Basin represents the only source of that kind, and when the first peace crops are brought in it will certainly make a substantial contribution. As we have pointed out, there are considerable natural surpluses, consisting for the most part of cereals. Although these surpluses have been set free only by low domestic food consumption, they have always been available and have always been exported, and will be much needed by a starving Europe. They offer the advantage of being near to the place where they will be wanted, and can be shipped on the Danube by barges which are plentiful, thus relieving the railway system, which will be worn out, disorganized and overtaxed. It is also in the interest of the Danube countries themselves to utilize their own resources

as quickly as possible in order to obtain foreign exchange for their most urgent needs.

Rumania exported on an average in the years 1935-1939 about 870,000 tons of wheat and rye; in 1937 more than 1.2 million tons were exported; in 1939 the export was at a record high. The export of other cereals in 1937 shows the following quantities in tons of 1000 kg.: corn 523,000, barley 317,000, oats insignificant; 1936, 49,000 tons, 1937, 24,000 tons of dry beans were shipped abroad. The same year, 240,000 hogs, 2.5 million poultry and 43,000 cattle were exported. The fruit export was rather modest, furnishing in 1937 about 35,000 tons. It is reported that this (1943) year's grain harvest has been ample, leaving an export surplus of about 700,000 tons of wheat, although the domestic bread ration has been increased. Other sources report a wheat surplus of 1 to 2 million tons. The oilseed crop (1943) is estimated to yield nearly 700,000 tons, an unbelievably large quantity when compared to a crop of about 250,000 tons in 1942. This certainly bears out our belief that immediately after the war essential surplusses may be available.

Bulgaria tried hard, as we have seen, to adjust her agriculture to a changing demand. Most remarkable is the decreasing export of cereals which, amounting to 330,000 tons in 1937, was halved in 1938 and was even less in 1939. In the same period the export of fruit increased from 53,000 tons to 89,000, grapes making up the larger part. Of bran (1937) 58,000 tons were exported, of sunflower seed, 50,000 tons; 19,000 tons of eggs and 1500 tons of cheese were shipped abroad. The export of dry beans is substantial, nearly 25,000 tons. The export of live animals and of meat products is relatively small: 29,000 hogs, 12,000 cattle, 800,000 poultry (1937). Although of little relevance for relief work, the increasing importance of the tobacco export is worth mentioning.

By far the most important agricultural export of Hungary is wheat: 480,000 tons in 1938 and 1.1 million tons in 1939. In comparison to wheat the export of other cereals is unimportant, rye not furnishing more than 110,000 tons in 1937. 18,000 tons of oilseeds and about 40,000 tons each of vegetables and fruit were sold abroad. The export of live animals and animal products is essential: 230,000 hogs, 55,000 cattle, 28,000 tons of poultry, 21,000 tons of lard and bacon and 15,000 tons of eggs.

Yugoslavia will need relief after this war, and Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary will be the nearest sources available for this purpose. But even without Yugoslavia the aforementioned exports amounted in 1937 to more than two million tons of grain for human consumption and about 1.2

million tons of feed grain, quantities which will weigh heavily in relief work, besides the considerable amount of food stuff of all kinds as shown above. The importance of this source may become more obvious if we compare, for instance, the above mentioned export surplus of 2 million tons of wheat with the proposed wheat relief pool of 2.7 million tons (Wheat Conference 1942).

The Balkan peasant with the experience of many wars and with the bottomless currency devaluation of the last war still fresh in his mind, will bring his produce to the market if he can buy equipment, clothes and the most essential goods which have not been available to him for many years. New seeds and some tools will enable him to prepare the first peace crop.

The Danube countries can make a substantial contribution to the fight against hunger in Europe. During the phase of acute food shortage obviously there cannot be any switch over from one type of production to another. The important thing then will be food, in whatever form. But when the acute shortage is overcome the task of readjusting agriculture throughout the world will present itself. It is a problem intimately connected with international policy in general and with international economic policy in particular. The United States will be the world's greatest industrial power and the world's greatest creditor, possessing the best capital equipment and the largest amount of the world's gold stock. Only a constructive policy, giving a chance to other countries, will secure peace and prosperity. A peace based on a solid foundation and freer economic collaboration is indispensable for a prosperous economy, and not in the Danube countries alone.

NEW YORK CITY

NOTE ON THE AGRARIAN RÉGIME OF PRE-WAR POLAND

The interesting article on the "Agrarian Régime of Pre-War Poland," by the late Mr. George Kagan published in October, 1943 issue of the JOURNAL seems to me to call for certain corrections.

Some of the statistical data on which the author based his remarks and conclusions must be considered incorrect. Thus, in discussing land distribution in Poland (pp. 247-248), on the basis of the 1921 Census, Mr. Kagan used the following figures:

TABLE 1

Landholdings of up to 5 ha incl.	- - -	15.3% of the total land area
Landholdings of 5 - 20 ha incl.	- - -	31.8% of the total land area
Landholdings of 20 - 100 ha incl.	- - -	9.9% of the total land area
Landholdings of over 100 ha incl.	- - -	43.0% of the total land area

The figure of 43%, representing the share of the large estates in the total land area in Poland, is the premise on which the author based his analysis of the structure of land distribution and the prospects of agrarian reform. However, for a complete picture of Poland's agrarian structure in 1921, two sets of figures should be given: those of the total areas of landholdings, given in Mr. Kagan's article, and those regarding land used for agricultural purposes only. The latter should include: arable land, pastures, meadows, gardens and orchards. Forests, ponds and lakes, building plots, courtyards, roads, cemeteries and barren land, while undoubtedly part of the total "landholdings" and, as such, included in the set of figures given by Mr. Kagan, are not used for agricultural purposes and should, therefore, be considered separately and, for some purposes, altogether eliminated.

The table giving the full picture for 1921 should read as follows:

TABLE 2
THE 1921 CENSUS

		percentages of the
	total area of	area of land used for
	land	agricultural purposes
Landholdings of up to 5 ha	- - - 15.3	25.1
Landholdings from 5 to 20 ha	- - - 31.8	37.9
Landholdings from 20 to 100 ha	- - - 9.9	10.3
Landholdings over 100 ha	- - - 43.0	26.7

The difference between the two latter figures of 43% and 26.7%, showing the respective share of large estates in the total land area and in the area of land used for agricultural purposes, is very important. It stems from the fact that forests, ponds and lakes, building plots, courtyards, roads, cemeteries and barren land constituted a considerable part of the total area of the large landholdings. In 1931, for which figures are available, such non-agricultural land constituted 32.5% of the total land area. Furthermore, these figures, showing the percentage of land owned by large landholders in 1921 (43% and 26.7%

respectively), include large areas of publicly owned land, such as estates belonging to the Republic of Poland and its political subdivisions, foundations and publicly-owned estates used as experimental agricultural stations, etc. In 1931, 16.6% of the total area of land was publicly owned (the greater part of this consisted of estates of over 100 ha); the percentage of publicly owned estates in the total area used for agricultural purposes was 5.7.

If the Polish agrarian problem is to be fully understood, it is essential to realize that most of the lands not used for agricultural purposes, as well as most of the publicly owned lands, cannot be considered as part of the land-pool available for parcelling. Even in the U.S.S.R., which certainly cannot be charged with laxity in carrying out agrarian reform, most of the lands not used for agricultural purposes and lands which were publicly owned were not parcelled out to small holders. In general, two facts should always be kept in mind in considering the pre-war Polish agrarian régime:

1. That the basic land-pool for parcelling comprises land used for agricultural purposes only, of which, in 1921, not 43%, but only 26.7% consisted of large landholdings. Furthermore, even this 26.7% must be reduced by deducting most of the publicly-owned estates, which should properly remain under public administration.

2. That forests, ponds and lakes, private roads, private parks and similar property, belonging to large landlords, should be expropriated, but title to them should be transferred to the Polish State or its political subdivisions. The share of the large estates in the total land area in 1921 (43%), included a substantial expanse of publicly owned land in these categories (certainly more than one fourth of the 43%—see above figures for 1931).

Let us now attempt to evaluate the figures for 1939 on the basis of the 1921 figures, which the author neglected to do. On p. 263 he pointed out that by 1939 more than 25% of the land belonging to large estates had already been parcelled and taken over by the peasants. Almost all of the area thus parcelled consisted of land used for agricultural purposes; the share of the large estates in the total area of lands used for agricultural purposes was therefore also diminished at least to that extent. On the basis of these premises, we should correct the figures of Table 2. Then, however, we shall obtain only the data on the distribution of land area among estates of 100 ha and over, and for small and medium estates. As a matter of record, it is not known in what proportions the area of the parcelled large estates was distributed among the various groups of small landholders.

TABLE 3
Estimate for 1939 on the basis of the 1921 Census.

	percentages of the	
	total area of land	area of land used for agricultural purposes
Large estates (100 ha and over) - - -	32.0	19.5
Small and medium holdings (less than 100 ha)	68.0	80.5

It should be pointed out here that the figures indicating the share of the large estate (32% and 19.5% respectively) include publicly owned estates (figures for 1931—see above). Thus the share of the privately owned large estates is even smaller than the above figures (smaller, particularly, than the figure of 32%, for a large part of the forests, ponds and lakes, roads, cemeteries and barren land was publicly owned).

Even the above estimate, however, (Table 3) is too cautious, as will be shown on the basis of the census of 1931, which, of course, provides a better basis for estimation than the census of 1921 (see Mr. Kagan's remark about the 1921 census—p. 247 of his article). But the census of 1931 was partly disregarded and partly inadequately interpreted in the "Agrarian Régime of Pre-War Poland".

The 1931 census does not divide landholdings into those of 100 ha or more and those of less than 100 ha. It divides all landholdings into those of 50 ha or more and those of less than 50 ha. Public lands are entered as a special category. Since the latter are here excluded from classification by area, they must be considered separately. The following table shows the relative percentages of area held by the various categories of landholdings in 1931:

TABLE 4
THE 1931 CENSUS

	percentages of the	
	total area of	area of land used for
	land	agricultural purposes
Privately owned medium and large estates (50 ha and over) - - - - -	25.8	18.0
Publicly owned land - - - - -	16.6	5.7
Small holdings (less than 50 ha) - - -	57.6	76.3

Let us now try to estimate, on the basis of the figures for 1931, the figures for 1939. In order to obtain correct figures for 1939, we must introduce a correction with regard to the 728,000 ha of land (mostly land used for agricultural purposes), formerly belonging to privately owned large estates, but parcelled out between 1931 and 1939. (We assume that the figures for publicly owned lands did not substantially change in that period). We thus arrive at the following table:

TABLE 5
Estimate for 1939 on the basis of the 1931 census.

	percentages of the	
	total area of	area of land used for
	land	agricultural purposes
Privately owned medium and large estates (50 ha and over) - - - - -	23.9	15.2
Publicly owned land - - - - -	16.6	5.7
Small holdings (less than 50 ha) - - -	59.5	79.1

The differences between the figures of Table 3 and Table 5 may be explained by the following facts:

1. In Table 3 large estates of 100 ha and over are given separately, and the small and medium estates are considered together, while in Table 5 large and medium estates (of 50 ha and over) are considered together, and small holdings of less than 50 ha are given separately.

2. In Table 3, the publicly owned lands are included in the classification by area, while in Table 5 the figures for publicly owned lands are given separately.

The figures of Table 5 are, of course, more accurate than those of Table 3, for the census of 1931 was more complete and better organized than that of 1921, which did not cover the entire territory of Poland. Moreover, the period of time which elapsed between the taking of the census and the year for which we are trying to obtain an estimate (1939) is shorter in Table 5 than in Table 3. Furthermore, Table 5 is more convenient for our purposes than Table 3, because a separate set of figures is given for publicly owned lands, most of which are not subject to parcelling. From the point of view of land reform, the classifications in Table 5 are also better than those in Table 3, because medium estates, which should also be parcelled under a far-reaching agrarian reform, are considered together with large estates.

The article on the "Agrarian Régime of Pre-War Poland" does not present either the figures of Table 3 or the more accurate figures of Table 5.¹

It is clear, even on the basis of the corrected data, that Poland must complete her agrarian reform, providing for the distribution of land used for agricultural purposes to the peasants, and for the taking over of other lands by the public authorities. This reform is being prepared by the Department of Agriculture of the Polish Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Shipping in London. This Ministry is now headed by Mr. Jan Kwapiński, pre-war Chairman of the Polish Agricultural Workers' Union.

Unfortunately, on the basis of the corrected figures (Table 5, and even Table 3), the prospective results of agrarian reform are less promising than would appear from Mr. Kagan's analysis, primarily because Poland was to a far lesser degree a "land of big landlords" than his figures would indicate. Thus, the solution of the problem of so-called "superfluous" rural workers becomes more complicated; agrarian reform must be supplemented by a good measure of industrialization if the phenomenon of "superfluous" agricultural labor is to be abolished.

I should like to add here that, in my opinion, for reasons of tradition and history, the intellectual and psychological influence of the large landowners on the ruling groups of pre-war Poland was stronger than their proportion in

¹ All figures given above are quoted from, or estimated on the basis of, the *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland* for 1939 (pp. 68-73), which is listed as No. 9 in the Bibliography at the end of Mr. Kagan's article.

land ownership might indicate. It was, however, negligible among the Polish people, who, on the whole, were free from these influences.

The Underground "Program for a People's Poland", quoted at the end of the article on the "Agrarian Régime of Pre-War Poland", is fully conscious of the Polish agrarian problem and its social implications. It demands sound agrarian reform, industrialization of the country, and the eradication of the landed gentry's traditions from Polish public life.

NEW YORK CITY

WŁADYSŁAW R. MALINOWSKI

CORRIGENDA. On p. 400, the first line of Professor Valentin's article should read: Edward Lasker (1829-1884) was born in Jaroczin, province
On p. 403, l. 16, for Bluntschl, read: Bluntschli
On p. 474, insert after Professor Odložilík's paper on Czechoslovak Historiography; Mrs. Arthur P. Coleman: "Problems of Polish Historiography"

BOOK REVIEWS

HALECKI, OSCAR, *The Crusade of Varna. A Discussion of Controversial Problems*. New York: Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences. Monograph No. 3. Pp. 96. \$1.50.

The battle of Varna (November 10, 1444) has variously been called the end of the crusades and the beginning of Europe's concerted struggle against the Ottoman Turk. It has generally been overshadowed by the more spectacular fall of Constantinople, for which it paved the way, and has consequently not received as much attention as it might have. But in recent decades there has been a revival of scholarly interest in the battle and its political and diplomatic antecedents which should set this last crusade in its true perspective.

Out of this revived interest there naturally arise new problems, but, not less obviously, the need for a serious and documented reconsideration of some hitherto generally accepted notions. It is into this part of the process of revaluation that Professor Halecki's brief but acutely argued monograph so usefully fits.

Wladislaw Jagiello of Poland became king of Hungary in January 1440. The Ottoman pressure on Hungary's southern border was then increasingly serious. Acting on the king's orders, the leading Hungarian noble, John Hunyadi, in alliance with George Branković, the Serbian Despot, was able, in 1443, to deal the Turkish forces several minor and one major military defeat (at Niš, November 3, 1443). Early in 1444 the Sultan sent intermediaries to arrange a truce. Negotiations followed, and early in June a meeting took place at Adrianople between the Sultan and representatives of Hunyadi and Branković, at which a truce of ten years was sworn to by the Sultan. It was anticipated that the Hungarian king would ratify it at a later date. On August 4 the king issued a manifesto from Szeged, proclaiming his decision to expel the Turks from Europe. He was urged to this decision by Cardinal Cesarini, sent to Hungary by Pope Eugenius IV. The king gathered his insufficient forces, marched south and was defeated and killed by the Sultan's superior numbers on November 10. It has been customary, since the fifteenth century, to accuse the king of perfidy in violating a solemn peace with the Sultan made only a few months previously. It is of this charge that Professor Halecki sets out to clear both the King and John Hunyadi. The argument is, in the nature of the case, very involved, based chiefly on some contemporary evidence not hitherto taken into adequate account, if, indeed, noticed at all. Nine *pièces justificatives*, not generally accessible, add to the great value of the study.

The core of the case, as Professor Halecki argues it, is that there is no real evidence that the King ever ratified the truce of June 12, that this lack of ratification was generally known at the time, and that not even the Turks accused him of perfidy. Of Cesarini's consistency from the very first in opposing peace with the Turk, there never was any doubt. It is perhaps therefore pointless to charge him with perfidy. John Hunyadi is probably less blameless, as he was

a party to the June 12 truce. But he was not then a free agent, but a representative of the King. The Turks would have been less acute than they should be given credit for if they believed that Hunyadi would not fight them at the slightest excuse. His record was clear on that point.

Professor Halecki has performed a very useful service in bringing all this relevant evidence before us. But the reader should be warned that it is not easy going. The detailed examination of incomplete documentation, evaluating all the possible undertones and overtones of connotation demands very close attention. Most of the literature to which Professor Halecki makes reference is virtually unknown, even in specialist circles, in America. But that is our loss, not his fault.

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S. HARRISON THOMSON

SCHWARZ, HENRY F., *The Imperial Privy Council in the XVIIth Century*. *Harvard Historical Studies* 53. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1943. Pp. 479. \$4.50.

Since A. F. Pribram—around 1900—turned away from XVIIth century history and dedicated himself to that of the recent decades, not much has been done for the history of Austria in the first mentioned period. The more welcome is such a thorough study, based on extensive archivistic research as is that presented by H. F. Schwarz on *The Imperial Privy Council in the XVIIth Century*.

The author gives more than the title promises—and that is certainly a very pleasant surprise for the reader: the book comprises not only the clearly elaborated history of an office, very interesting because of its double character, being partly an Institution belonging to the Roman Empire and partly a properly Austrian one, but it depicts the politico-intellectual background and in presenting short biographies of the members of the Privy Council, unveils a highly interesting section of Austrian social history.

As one may expect from what happened in the same century in France and Prussia, in Spain and to a large extent also in England, so also in Austria the conflict between monarch and estates which developed into the Thirty Years war, is not primarily—and even less exclusively—a religious struggle, but rather in its essence a clash between the old privileged classes and the new political form of the rising monarchy.

It is not possible to list here all the discoveries which throw new light not only on Austrian and Central European History of the XVIIth century, but which provide also a necessary and interesting background to understand the rest of the history of Austria down to 1938, especially in the social sphere. The truly cosmopolitan composition of the new office as well as of the Austrian nobility since the XVIIth century is brought into full light, and so far as the reviewer is aware, this is done for the first time (cf. pp. 396, 403, 410). A supplement, "The Social Structure of the Imperial Privy Council, 1600-1674", draws the full conclusions from the material elaborated in the book.

In comparison with the importance of the carefully presented new material and the substantial insights gained by it, a few scruples of the reviewer would seem not to be irrelevant.

The main question would be why the author did not avail himself of the source-material kept in the Hofkammer-Archiv in Vienna; it contains important undiscovered treasures for Central European History from the XVIth to the XIXth century. The use of some private archive—in addition to that of the Schwarzenberg in Krumau from which the author quotes, might also have been worthwhile; e.g. that of the Dietrichstein family in Nikolsburg.

In the evaluation of the *Annales Ferdinandeï* by Khevenhüller, Schwarz puts the blame on their author for trends which are the very characteristics of XVIIth century historical writing in general.

A heavy inconsistency seems to prevail in rendering the orthography of XVIIth century documents, especially in the use of capital letters. This inconsistency is aggravated by the fact that Schwarz in quoting from publications made by others, scrupulously follows all the different ways which these historians used. For his own inconsistency the reader may compare the system he chose to adopt e.g. on pages 81 and 197: in the latter where he apparently uses majuscules only for proper names and titles, he prints nevertheless at the end: "... dero Schlisslichen schuldigkeit". The reviewer, well aware of the difficulties existing in rendering documents of that period, can not help thinking that the American reader will hardly enjoy the lack of one underlying system.

P. 343 (on Slawata) proves unsatisfactory: there are and were no "minor vows" to be taken in the Society of Jesus. It seems that in earlier centuries a kind of non-formal "vows of devotion" occurred on occasion as those mentioned by Schwarz. What the author relates of the activity of a P. Gladich S.J., was at no time in accordance with the teaching of the Church. This does not mean that a single father may not have held and taught erroneous views. But the author fails to give any references at this point and the reviewer was unable to discover anything concerning a P. Gladich S.J.

Furthermore, the reviewer wonders whether the author does not overestimate Wurzbach's *Biographische Lexikon* as a historical source, indispensable as it may be; unluckily nothing better has yet been substituted for it.

There are a few misprints in Italian, e.g. on pages 227 and 240.

Catholic University

FRIEDRICH ENGEL-JANOSI

BANE, SUDA LORENA, and LUTZ, RALPH HASWELL, ed., *The Blockade of Germany after the Armistice, 1918-1919. Selected documents of the Supreme Economic Council, Superior Blockade Council, American Relief Administration, and other wartime organizations.* ("Hoover War Library Publications," No. 16) Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1942. Pp. viii, 874. \$6.00.

Although few will ever read this volume of documents through, it could

be studied with profit by those who are to play important rôles in the relief and rehabilitation of Europe after the present war. The difficulties and complexities in any such program are clearly revealed in these documents. A considerable part of the book is devoted to the pressing problem of feeding Europe, particularly Germany, at the close of the First World War. There seems little doubt that the continuation of the Allied blockade after the signing of the armistice increased the difficulties which would have been great enough anyway. But the Allied statesmen believed that the blockade was their chief weapon for insuring Germany's signing of the treaty and therefore, despite the repeated efforts of the United States Food Administrator Herbert Hoover and others to secure its relaxation, continued it in its essential form until Germany ratified the Treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless, the widely held view that the Allies obstinately refused to make any concessions is not true, for the restrictions on German fishing boats in the Baltic were modified and in March, 1919, German ships under 1600 tons gross were permitted to engage in coastal traffic and in traffic to Denmark, Holland, Norway, and Sweden, provided their cargoes were limited to foodstuffs. (p. 313).

The armistice of November 11, 1918, stated in the article on the blockade that the Allies "contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the armistice as shall be found necessary" (p. 4). But in less than ten days Lloyd George in England was pointing out that the "revictualling of Germany can only be considered as part of the larger problem of revictualling all the nations in need of supplies" (p. 9), and almost simultaneously Hoover in the United States was pointing out that of the 420,000,000 people in Europe only about 40,000,000 in Denmark, Hungary, and South Russia had sufficient food to last until the next harvest (p. 637). One of the obstacles in the way of feeding these millions in Europe was the lack of adequate shipping. Accordingly, when the armistice was renewed with Germany on January 16, 1919, a new clause stipulated that all German passenger and cargo ships other than those excepted by the Allied commission were to be placed immediately at the disposal of the Allies with a view to increasing the world tonnage from which the tonnage required for the supply of foodstuffs to Europe including Germany could be drawn (p. 41). Hoover agreed that though there was sufficient food in the world, the difficulty of making it available was one of transportation (p. 307), and further agreed that the food situation in Europe required the immediate use of the German mercantile fleet (p. 196).

And this is where the Germans contributed to their own starvation. Although the German delegates had accepted the new armistice clause and had agreed that its fulfillment was a condition precedent to the importation into Germany of a certain quantity of food, other Germans continued to haggle and to delay its execution for more than two months. Representatives of the German steamship companies and some German labor leaders demanded that their government should under no consideration whatsoever turn over the German shipping. In the words of one German delegate, these people "in their endeavor

to protect the German shipowner and the sailors, were willing to wreck Germany before giving in on this point" (p. 186). Not until March 21, 1919, were German ships dispatched to the Allies, and according to Hoover they would be unable to arrive in Germany with food before June 1 (p. 278). In the meantime, however, on March 25 the Allies began their deliveries of foodstuffs to Germany from supplies in England and France.

The volume is organized in three parts: "American Efforts to Raise the Blockade," "Censorship," and "Public Opinion." The documents were selected mainly from the archives of the American Relief Administration in the Hoover Library and are arranged chronologically within each of these parts. Part III on "Public Opinion" (pp. 629-805), consisting of editorial and news items from the press in the United States, Great Britain, and the various Continental countries, is undoubtedly the most readable portion of the book. It reflects the divergent viewpoints among the countries and among different groups within the same countries. At the end of the volume a very helpful section, "Notes on Allied Organizations" (pp. 809-841) identifies the various organizations mentioned in the documents and clarifies their exact functions. There is a satisfactory index. The editors are to be congratulated on their work.

Indiana University

F. LEE BENNS

STIRK, S. D., *The Prussian Spirit. A Survey of German Literature and Politics, 1914-1940*. London: Faber and Faber, 1941. Pp. 232. 12s 6d.

Dr. S. D. Stirk, the author of this book, we are told, is a Yorkshireman who has lived much in Germany and possesses a wide and deep knowledge of German life and literature. He holds a doctoral degree from the University of Breslau. The principal point that he makes in this book is that Hitlerism and National Socialism are at bottom merely a continuation of Prussianism, and that it is this Prussian spirit which must be broken if Germany is to be led and kept to the road of peace after the war.

The author is at great pains to demonstrate by documentary evidence what this Prussian spirit is and how it developed and was finally inherited by the National Socialist party. Frederick the Great, Bismarck (whose contributions to such fields as social security and universal male suffrage are not properly evaluated), Moeller van den Bruck, Spengler, Wilhelm Stapel, Walter Flex, Fritz von Unruh and Ernst Jünger figure prominently, of course. It is not an exclusively Prussian characteristic any more, geographically, but can be found in all German-speaking regions. Whether it has ever spread, or now exists, in other countries of the globe, too—perhaps less articulately than on German soil, is an interesting question which the author, who is more scholarly, more cautious and less blatant than Emil Ludwig in pressing his thesis, does not discuss.

Stirk's final summation, on pages 231-232, is as follows:

Finally, it must be realized and never lost sight of that in political affairs Germany has been for several decades past, and is likely to remain for several

decades to come, the 'Sick Man of Europe'. From 1871 to 1933 the disease was Prussianism; after 1933 it took on a more serious form, and developed into Hitlerism. The result has been that what is potentially one of the finest nations in the world has become one of the most tormented, one of the most tragic, and with good reasons one of the best hated. *Corruptio optimi pessima*—there is nothing so bad as the best gone wrong. Unless and until the German nation can cure itself of its 'disease' and develop a sane, healthy, and decent political outlook and practice, this unhappy state of affairs is likely to continue, to the serious detriment of Germany itself, and indeed of Europe and the whole world. And the sad verdict of history may then well be: that the great German contributions to civilization and culture in the fields of religion, philosophy, music, literature, and science were overwhelmed and nullified in a welter of political crimes, fruitless revolutions, and internecine wars, and that Luther, Kant, Beethoven, Goethe and Robert Koch were relentlessly persecuted and even finally murdered by Hitler, Bismarck, and Frederick the Great.

The reviewer must confess that he is skeptical, not only concerning Stirk's thesis, but also as regards his conclusions. Prussianism, as the reviewer sees it, is merely German Jingoism, worse than American, British, French Jingoism, to be sure, but worse perhaps only because it has been nourished from within *and without*, and given free rein. To the reviewer the German problem is essentially a problem of right-minded political education and of proper leadership. If this were not the case, how are we to explain the presence of thousands upon thousands of ex-Prussians (in Stirk's connotation) and their descendants in the United States today who have become fine American citizens?

University of Cincinnati

EDWIN H. ZEYDEL

KAECKENBEECK, GEORGES, *The International Experiment of Upper Silesia*. London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1942. Pp. xxxix, 859. 42s.

Among the most difficult settlements to be reached by the peacemakers in Paris in 1919 was that of the Upper, i.e. Prussian, Silesian tangle. During the nineteenth century, what had been through the ages an uninviting and thinly populated landscape was turned into the most densely occupied area in this part of Europe, serving the first region of heavy industries to be created east of the Rhine. The indigenous population provided the labour. It was Polish in speech and Catholic in faith. The captains of industry and those who backed them, i.e. the banks and the state agencies, were all German. What was to be done about the clash that resulted?

Controversy raged. The one party argued that only those who had effected these momentous changes were fit to carry on the industries: the other, that the land and its treasures properly belonged to the people who had dwelt there and tilled it from time immemorial. More precisely, the German view maintained that the whole industrial structure of the Reich would be wrecked if robbed of Upper Silesia; while the Poles argued that their new state had a juster claim,

since it had almost no other heavy industry. There were many like Lloyd George who held that the Poles had no experience and would only bungle things if allowed to take charge of such tremendous enterprises.

As everyone knows, a compromise settlement was reached, after a plebiscite had been taken. It gave the larger part of the Industrial Triangle to Poland, drawing a most difficult frontier line right through the complex of mines, foundries and factories, and leaving Beuthen as a German outpost, surrounded on three sides by Polish territory. In view of the expected dislocation of public and private affairs, an interim period of 15 years was ordained, during which emergency measures were to prevail. These allowed an exchange of goods across the frontier, and the passing to and fro of workmen on a scale not to be found elsewhere in Europe. Offices of the League were set up to supervise this machinery, and to deal with difficulties as they arose. It is notable that these two agencies, the Tribunal of Arbitration and the Mixed Commission, had nothing save moral authority behind them.

The former was given the task of adjusting all property and legal claims, e.g. that of domicile, raised by former residents. The latter had to smooth out the differences and problems concerned with the cultural life of the two peoples, indeed with everything except purely legal problems. In charge of the two Offices were Dr. Georges Kaeckenbeeck, a Belgian with an Oxford L.L.D. degree, and the much older Swiss Ex-president M. Felix Calonder. The former has now given us this book, having been given by his colleague the necessary materials for the work. It is a masterly account of the work done during 15 years, of the spirit that animated it, and of the results obtained. In a footnote, the author has mentioned my volume, *The Drama of Upper Silesia* (Stephen Dare Press 1935, Williams & Norgate 1936) as a useful introductory study to his own.

As one looks back now, after 10 years and more of Nazi barbarism both at home and abroad, and of the general demoralization of international ethics, one cannot but wonder at the faith of those who projected this Upper Silesian plan, and it must be said that their faith was not disappointed. During 15 years this difficult frontier was never closed, and the life of the two million people affected was far less disturbed than might have been expected. It turned out that the material, i.e. business and industrial complications, adjusted themselves with surprising promptness; while the real difficulties were found rather in the field of things cultural and social. It is to the credit, not only of the two advisers from outside but also of both nations involved, that this change of conditions in the process of formation since 1742 did not bring even to the council of the League more than minor anxieties. Not only this but a great deal was done to re-orientate both the material and moral elements at work on both sides of the new frontier.

As published, the book is encyclopaedic in character. It begins with lists of the cases dealt with by the two League Agencies, and of the chief statutes and ordinances involved. This is followed by a brief historical introduction, and an account of the way in which Prussian law continued in force. We then pass

to longer studies of the protection of individual rights and property (Chap. III), and of changes of nationality, and residential rights. Chapter V deals with the vexed Minorities' Issue in all its aspects, Chapter VI with the needs and rights of labor. Chapter VII describes the technical machinery set up to meet the changes demanded both of industry and of the worker; while in Chapter VIII we are told of the organization of the Tribunal and the Commission, and their procedure. After a section dealing with Sources of all kinds, there follow three hundred pages of Appendices. Of these by far the larger part contain the full text of the Geneva Convention of 1922—the charter on which the Agencies based their work—a document longer than the Treaty of Versailles.

This is not a book for beginners, nor will the average student of history find it easy reading. Written with scrupulous care by an international lawyer, it is essentially a sort of guide-book to the principles on which most, if not all, international disputes and differences might be resolved. The author stands for the liberal tradition, which wants the rights of the individual sustained, so far as may be, when they clash with the claims of the state. In his *General Conclusions* (Cap. IX) he breaks more than one lance in defence both of the spirit and the machinery of the League of Nations; knowing, of course, full well, that neither the one nor the other can avail if nations and states refuse to cooperate. His book reveals to what an extent, unless the atmosphere is poisoned from without, the right kind of mediation by neutrals can render service. In his own field he always insisted that cases investigated by the Tribunal (on which sat jurists of both nations interested) should keep politics of all kinds at arm's length. Only so could one get verdicts that can stand the test of history.

How far we have got today from the spirit in which these men worked; or the spirit in which, though representing rival interests, the neighbor governments cooperated! One wonders when we shall recapture that disposition to view things dispassionately, indeed whether our generation will ever see it. We venture the hope, and do not hesitate to say that this book will be an indispensable vade mecum for those who may be charged with carrying out various kinds of settlements in post-war Europe.

Neither the Germans nor the Poles liked the Geneva Convention. In particular, the latter as the time went on found themselves hampered in various ways in dealing with matters that needed attention; and they rejoiced when in 1937 the interim period ended. It is no doubt true that the Nazi régime used the four years 1933-1937 to prepare the ground for what followed in 1939. On the other hand, the outside observer may be allowed the view that the price paid for the settlement was not unreasonable: and had the League been able to deal with the wider question of security as it should have, the good work done during nearly twenty years would not have been sacrificed in the present holocaust of war.

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W. J. ROSE

Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, 1943. Pp. 311. \$1.50.

The full story of what has happened to European Jewry under Hitler and the rule of the Axis cannot be told at this time. Some of its most terrible pages are still being written, from day to day, wherever the power of the Axis has not been broken. An interim balance is possible, however, of the effects of Hitler's war against the Jewish people since January 30, 1933, and more especially, since September 1, 1939, when his armies invaded Poland. That balance sheet is presented in the volume under review. It is the result of the coöperative researches of the members of the Institute of Jewish Affairs and several outside contributors. It is based on an examination of Axis and other sources collected by the American Jewish Congress, the World Jewish Congress, and the Institute of Jewish Affairs. These materials include the official law gazettes of all Axis and Axis-dominated countries, decrees of the occupation forces and of the puppet régimes, official newspapers of the Axis-supervised Jewish communities, reports of diplomats and foreign correspondents from European lands, Axis-dominated as well as neutral, published and unpublished documents of the governments-in-exile, the underground press, including documents and letters smuggled out of occupied Europe, as well as eye-witness reports. All Axis and Axis-dominated countries are covered. Each of them receives a chapter of its own, organized however according to a common scheme. Under the heading "Background", in more or less detail, a historical survey is presented of the general cultural development and political as well as legal status of the Jewries in the various states, prior to 1933. It is supported by demographic and statistical data which, in turn, serve also to explain to what extent Hitler-domination affected Jewish life and culture. Then under headings differing from country to country the path of destruction and horror taken by the Nazis is briefly described. All phases in their attempt to annihilate modern civilization as reflected in acts of warfare (even before the outbreak of the war) or effects of "legislation" come here to light. The sum-total is given in a "Summary" the first paragraph of which we quote:

Some 3,000,000 Jews of Europe have perished since the war began four years ago. In the areas occupied or dominated by the Axis, there now remain a little over 3,300,000 Jews, compared to the former Jewish population of 8,300,000. Some 1,800,000 have been evacuated into the interior of the Soviet Union, and about 1,800,000 have emigrated. But 3,000,000 are dead. They have been destroyed by deliberate means: by planned starvation, forced labor, deportation, pogrom and methodical murder in the German-run extermination centers of Eastern Europe.

Explanatory statistical tables appended supply telling illustration.

This book is remarkable for its calm presentation of facts and figures, events and developments, causes and results. The Jews had been the first victims of the most recent outbreak of the *furor teutonicus*. For a long, all

too long a period, the abolition of the rule of law with regard to the Jews was considered either as an internal German problem or a purely Jewish affair. Neither the League of Nations nor any individual nation realized what was going on in Germany at a time when this trend could have been stopped with comparative ease. Hitler's ten-year war on the Jews as documented in this work gives evidence that it was only the beginning of the greatest and most fateful assault upon civilization in human history. This book will be of good service to the historian, sociologist, and statesman, but should be read by everyone interested in the survival of modern civilization.

Jewish Institute of Religion

GUIDO KISCH

LOHE, WERNER A., *Roosevelt America*. Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Franz Eher Nachf., München 1939. Pp. 253.

This is a product of the Nazi party's official publishing house, which is personally owned by Adolf Hitler. For this reason, regardless of its shortcomings, it is significant, showing as it does the official concept of the party regarding the United States, a concept which, as a matter of fact, the German public was supposed to embrace. Full of half-baked ideas it is the typical performance of one of the *Halbgebildete* who were so important as exponents and apostles of Nazism. That fact is reflected, for instance, in the book's pretentious language characteristic of the "half-educated" German. If one compares it with the older works of Dibelius on England or of Curtius and Bergsträsser on France the decline of the intellectual level in Nazi Germany becomes evident at first glance.

The book begins with a historical introduction in which, as so often in Nazi sponsored literature, truth and falsehood are strangely mixed. Speaking of Colonial America, for example, the author claims that the "great colony" owes its origin to the initiative of the English crown (p. 8), and he distinguishes in the same era between the "Puritan North" and the "Catholic South (Maryland)" (p. 11). Or to give another example, he apparently thinks that Thomas Paine was born in America (p. 30). According to the author, the result of the historical development down to the Revolutionary War was a nation characterized by the following traits (pp. 30-49): It is free from tradition, in "Oppositionsstellung gegenüber Europa," i.e. opposed to everything that is European, which attitude is at the root of America's strength. It is filled by the desire to dominate, or, in other words, North America is inhabited by a conqueror nation fortunate enough to have had open spaces instead of civilized neighbors at its back door. When these open spaces had been conquered there was so much land and natural wealth available that America could afford to be peace loving; for she needed peace to develop her own resources and to become a unified nation. Therefore America abstained from foreign adventures until a hypertrophical economic growth made her forget her noble tradition and

become aggressive.¹ The conquest of the North American continent created the geographic basis for the emergence of a new nation out of immigrants of different stock. From these immigrants America requires "Kopf und Geist," roughly expressed by: the whole personality. She does not allow them to retain any loyalty toward Europe and rather forces upon them a hostile attitude toward the old world: (the headline of p. 41 reads: *Das totale America.*)

The unsuspecting and ignorant German reader will from this description gain the impression that the Americans are a nationalistic conquering *Herrenvolk* and that the United States are the "modern edition of the ancient Roman empire." He will learn that the main drawback in this national set-up is the fact that America, because of the uninterrupted chain of successes in her history, has developed a boundless overestimation of her abilities, power, and importance, as expressed in the saying: 'America can lick the whole creation'.

After the Civil War, according to the author, the ideals for which America had fought in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries disappeared, for there came "ein langer, böser Friede, der zersetzender wirkte als jeder Krieg" (a long bad peace which resulted in more disintegration than any possible war). After 1865 the American nation was no longer what it had been: rather a new nation had come into being, American in behavior, but not American at heart; a nation of working bees, of exploiters of soil and men; a nation of very rich and very poor, of men fighting each other, without any "sentimentality", for the wealth of the country. Economic progress was tremendous, but it was the speed of that progress which became a danger. The whole national life became commercialized, capital concentrated in the hands of the trusts, and the spirit of America thus took a different form from that of any European country.

America, according to Herr Lohe, started her career by giving her citizens the maximum of freedom, but to her misfortune some of them abused this freedom to make large parts of the population economically dependent. The same powerful businessmen who committed that sin gained also control of the government. Thus boundless freedom of the individual on the one hand and the inability of government to control the economic forces on the other became the determining factors of American development after 1865. In the minds of the American people the freedom of the individual was so sacred that government, even if it had wanted to, could not interfere in the interest of those who needed protection against the abuse of power by the monopolies. These monopolies dominate American agriculture, just as they control American industry, and channel the fruits of the soil and of the farmer's labor into the pockets of those who deal in agricultural products. They have destroyed the independent manufacturer and have bought up their competitors as well as

¹ The significance of the Monroe Doctrine, the authors of which Herr Lohe admires and envies, is seen in the first instance as establishing the whole of the American continent as a sphere of interest of the United States and as developing later into a creed capable of an aggressive meaning. See pp. 49ff.

the government, so that finally both government and capital became identical. In other words, the free republic became a plutocratic oligarchy. As a consequence of this development the so-called personal freedom of the individual became an absurdity existing only in theory.

Such development, in Lohe's opinion, was possible because after 1865 the American nation gained another "rassische" (racial) aspect. Millions of immigrants, ignorant of the traditions of true Americanism, poured into the country driven exclusively by the craving for wealth. For these men freedom meant the right "dass ein jeder tun und lassen konnte was ihm beliebte in persönlicher und wirtschaftlicher Beziehung." (p. 78) In consequence thereof discrepancies arose between a formalistic political democracy and the economic rule of a minority (or in other words, between a theoretical democracy and exploitation) and between political pacifism and economic expansion (imperialism). The American government coöperated with the powerful economic minority which in turn was controlled by the Jews. This set-up led to the participation of America in World War I. Because of the ignorance of the masses Allied propaganda could poison the minds of the American people, persuading them that a victorious Germany would not respect American rights. Of course, the war did not bring any advantages to the lower classes. They paid for participating in it with the break-down of the national economy while profits accrued to the ruling capitalistic minority. The latter made America appear to have saved civilization, freedom, and international law. Actually, however, "diese Gloriole tanzte weniger um die Köpfe der gefallenen Soldaten, als vielmehr um die feisten Schädel der 'big bosses', der Demagogen der Industrie und des vertrusteten und verjudeten Handels." After the war the country came completely into the hands of the Jew-controlled oligarchy ("Judoooligarchie"), because the millions had forgotten that there was a government and the government had forgotten the millions. (pp. 61-113)

Thus came the break-down of the 1930's and Franklin D. Roosevelt became President. He promised to become the savior of the ruined country through a revolutionary program with government for the first time in a century exerting strong influence on business. However, at the first concentrated attack of the capitalistic oligarchy he was routed. His mistake consisted in his attempt to restore social peace, whereas the solution of the national crisis lay in a radical and uncompromising break with the Jew-controlled capitalistic groups and in bringing into line political and economic life. For that purpose it would have been necessary to overcome the above mentioned discrepancy between political pacifism and economic imperialism by abandoning the latter. But the President could not go the logical way for he is "a man who needs popularity like the babe needs the milk bottle," (p. 128) and thus he was satisfied with making speeches and actually became the exponent of the pharisaical, bigotted, Jew-infected dollar diplomacy. (p. 146) Therefore true Americans are not back of Roosevelt. They know that it is not Germany, Italy, and Japan which are the real enemies of America but "Juda" (i.e. the Jewry), whereas the Jew-controlled oligarchy

persecutes "Fascism" with its hatred. As the agent of that oligarchy Roosevelt is systematically preparing a war against Germany (the book was written in 1939!) and follows a policy which is palpably contrary to American tradition. A whole array of American isolationists are quoted to prove these assertions (pp. 244ff.). But Mr. Lohe, the spokesman of the Nazis, looks forward to the day when Roosevelt, the "quack", will no longer sit in the White House. Then, according to him, the farmer will again be able to sell his wheat and the planter his cotton, prosperity will return, and the whole of America will be able to work peacefully.

It is hardly necessary to comment further on this book or to criticize in detail the picture which it presents. The book consists of two parts very different from each other in character. In the first part America is pictured; but, of course, the author has not understood this country, and the reviewer suspects that he has never read an American book. Thus the result is typical of Nazi presentation of historical and political material. Only one line of the country's development is described as representing the whole development. Defects are seen with the *Scharfblick des Hasses* and overstressed. This fact, strange emphasis, and queer interpretation result in a grossly distorted but consistent picture, almost a cartoon. However, the oversimplified aspect of America will appeal to a simple, ignorant mind, already prepared by propaganda. This sort of literature deserves, of course, the strongest condemnation, (but are we free from the sin of presenting similar pictures of our enemies?)

The second part of the book, however, has no counterpart outside of the authoritarian states. Beginning at page 114 and covering about 135 out of 250 pages it contains only nonsense, and it is hardly possible even to discover a coherent line of thought, except wild attacks on the President, constant Jew-baiting, and consistent defense and praise of Nazism. It is propaganda in Göbbels' style and could be considered as part of a softening-up campaign if the book was intended to be read in America. It would be interesting, therefore, to know whether the F.B.I. has found copies of it in the possession of Bund members and Nazi agents.

Cambridge, Mass.

FRITZ REDLICH

SINGER, KURT, *Duel for the Northland*. New York: Robert M. McBride, 1943. Pp. x, 212. \$2.75.

"The War of Enemy Agents in Scandinavia" is the subtitle of this journalistic product of a Viennese emigré who found a refuge in Sweden until coming to the United States in 1940. In this book he has collected considerable data on the espionage and sabotage activities of the Communists and Nazis in the Northern Countries. While there is some new information, the careful observer of recent Scandinavian affairs will not discover very much factual material that has not been made public in Denmark and Sweden. He will find catalogued, however, many rumors circulated in Stockholm and Copenhagen—with little or

no attempt to discriminate between fact and rumor. He will find, also, many errors of fact and interpretation, much exaggeration, and a sensationalized presentation hardly consonant with sound journalism.

In Part One the author introduces "Europe's Master Spies". That Stalin and Hitler should have considered Scandinavia sufficiently important to assign them to that region is surprising. That Mr. Singer "first heard the name of Ernst Friedrich Wollweber . . . Europe's greatest spy and saboteur" in 1937 is also surprising. That "Canaris, the master, and Pflugk-Hartung, the disciple, won the Battle of Norway" is far too facile an explanation. That the latter (now "the disciple of Mata Hari") "prepared Denmark for invasion, prepared it so thoroughly that he was able to deliver the country to the German army without a struggle" is a similar perpetuation of the "fifth column" theory of events which will be a major subject of "debunking" as historians more carefully examine what happened in Denmark and Norway. That Pflugk-Hartung's father "was the most famous German historian under Kaiser William II" will be news to American students of Germany.

A similar disregard for facts may be found in the other parts of the book. Singer is perhaps most objective in his treatment of Norway, but becomes progressively less so as he examines Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. In his appraisal of the latter country there is little deviation from the established propaganda line of the extreme left. Even the position of Iceland is described erroneously.

To cite a few further examples. There is no evidence that Premier Stauning "foresaw the fate of Denmark"—and certainly not as early as 1937. That the country's secret plans for military defense should have been found in the unguarded and open headquarters of the Social Democratic party instead of the General Staff was hardly a sign of "foresight", if true. Stauning died on May 3, 1942, and was succeeded by Buhl, not Scavenius. The latter did not become the head of the government until November 10th, and, whatever may be the final appraisal of his rôle, he cannot now fairly be described as the "Quisling Prime Minister of Denmark".

The treatment of Sweden is full of innuendo and does not present a balanced picture of that country's position in the war. It is true that Swedish warships convoy iron ore shipments through Sweden's territorial waters. It is not true that they convoy such ships to Germany or Finland. There is likewise no solid evidence of the "deliveries of munitions" to Germany or to Finland, save during the winter war. We do not know that "the Nazis had, of course, transported a good deal more than one division over the Swedish railroads to Finland", nor does Singer present any evidence that Bofors is now working for Nazi Germany. There have been very few Swedes fighting for Finland during the present war and to state that without Swedish assistance "Finland would scarcely be able to fight on" again is not in accord with the facts. "A third of all Finns" are not "of Swedish extraction" and the number of Swedish-speaking Finns is not more than eleven per cent.

The author's observations on the Swedish judicial system cannot be accepted by a student of government, and his story of the "confiscation of liberal books" is misleading. Nils Flyg and Hakon Meyer, whose spotted careers are described in the chapter on "Labor Traitors", are greatly overrated by the author. The influence of either was never very great. At its peak, the Socialist Party in Sweden polled 132,564 votes out of a total of two and a half million and elected six deputies out of 230. Such figures do not justify speaking of it as growing "by leaps and bounds", as the "once great party", or the "proud and powerful Socialist Party". Flyg himself died on January 11, 1943, a fact ignored by Singer.

The present work was first announced for 1942. Plans for it were then abandoned by the publisher on the ground that Mr. Singer's experiences in Scandinavia were not important enough for a book. A careful examination of the volume leads the reviewer to believe that this original judgment was correct.

University of California

ERIC C. BELLQUIST

MICAUD, CHARLES A., *The French Right and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939: A Study of Public Opinion*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1943. Pp. 255. \$3.50.

In 1933 the French Right was militant and hostile to Germany; the Left was pacifist and conciliatory. By 1938 the rôles were reversed; the Right began to preach pacifism and the Left to urge resistance. The volume under consideration seeks to show by a study of the French press and parliamentary debates the way in which this transformation came about.

The first indications of change may be seen when Laval succeeded Barthou at the Quai d'Orsay in October, 1934, yet the new attitude was only incipient, for the Franco-Soviet Pact of May, 1935, had the general support of the Right. But in the Ethiopian crisis the Right took a pro-Italian stand, began to denounce the League, and opposed sanctions. Clear signs of a basic anti-communist position now emerged. Thus, although the public at large probably did not realize it, the Right was no longer in a position to resist the growing demands of Germany. Such facts are worth rehearsing, for one of the striking features of this study is the clear evidence of the early date at which the Rightist shift began.

The author divides his Rightists, perhaps a little too neatly, into three groups: (1) the Traditional Nationalists such as Reynaud, Mandel, and De Kerillis to whom Germany was always the enemy; (2) the Resigned Nationalists such as Déat, Flandin, Bainville, and Doriot who were convinced that Germany could not be resisted in eastern Europe; and (3) the Conditional Nationalists, an unhappy group who for a time comprised the majority of the Right and tried to live by the formula, "*Ni pour Berlin ni pour Moscou*." Perhaps the real value of such a formulation is that it enables the author to show how the Resigned Nationalists gradually took precedence over the other two groups.

Could Germany be stopped? In the author's opinion, and this reviewer would agree with him, the decisive moment came in March, 1936, when by a superb piece of timing Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland. France failed to act. Although certain of the moderate Rightists such as De Kerillis sounded warnings the Right as a whole ignored them. In the lamentable cycle which followed—Spain, Austria, the Sudetenland—the Right had no other recourse than to build up a specious justification for its acquiescence. The Resigned Nationalists had the field. When in April and May, 1939, a determination to resist began to reappear it was too late. Such determination as there was could never surmount the Right's hostility to the Soviet Union.

A study such as this obviously can give no more than a partial analysis of French policy. One feels at once the need for a complementary study of the French Left. How is it to be explained, for example, that apart from the Communists only two deputies in the Chamber voted against the Munich Pact? Within the limits which he has set himself the author has done a painstaking piece of work. Yet studies of "opinion" tend to be somewhat bloodless products, divorced from the passions of men, and this book is no exception. Lord Vansittart's account of a luncheon with Laval brings more reality to the atmosphere of French politics than a dozen extracts from *Le Temps*. Speeches and editorials may be neatly catalogued and shrewdly summarized, but we want to know more of the type of people by whom they were composed, and why.

In justice to the author it should be said that he does more than simply catalog and summarize. Although individual Rightists do not come to life, a definite and acceptable thesis is presented as to the nature of Rightist policy. With the increase in German strength France tended more and more to give up her policy of maintaining the territorial *status quo* of the treaties. She leaned increasingly upon the English. England's frontier, however, may have been the Rhine, but (at least until April, 1939,) it most certainly was not the Vistula. Faced with this fact France had either to give Germany a free hand in eastern Europe or to strengthen her ties with the Soviet Union. The latter she would not do, and for this decision the Right, with its profound fear of social revolution at home, has a heavy responsibility to shoulder. "Fundamentally," the author writes, "the passive stand of the Nationalist Right, which made them refuse to take the bold steps necessary against German ambition, may be attributed to fear of the political and social consequences of a major war. Their reluctance to fight was not only a sign of a high level of civilization, but also of a diseased political and social order, whose defenders had lost confidence in its worth and vitality."

The volume has several useful appendices and a bibliography containing a most valuable *aperçu* of the French press. It is a monograph which so ably summarizes a scattered mass of evidence that the historians of these troubled years will find it indispensable.

Wheaton College

E. J. KNAPTON

BRICKNER, RICHARD M., *Is Germany Incurable?* New York: Lippincott, 1943. Pp. 318. \$3.00.

"Is Germany incurable?" For fifteen chapters Doctor Brickner writes as if his answer were "yes"; then in his final chapter, as if loath to close on so sad a note, he answers his own question with a rather unconvincing "no". The reader is left with the uncomfortable feeling that if the first fifteen chapters are sound the sixteenth must be unsound or, at best, extremely optimistic.

As a psychiatrist, Doctor Brickner presents an authentic description of paranoia. The reader readily recognizes manifestations of the disease in most of the Nazi leaders, in many other Germans, in some of his own associates, and occasionally even in a friend in one of his more petulant moments. The paranoid is the ultimate in egoism. He is always right, but despite the purity of his motives he is often misunderstood and maligned. Others are jealous of him and seek to thwart him; he readily resorts to violence, even murder, to "protect" himself, imputing to others the intention of doing to him as he knows he would do to them if he could. So as to seem always to have been right, he resorts to retrospective falsification, producing a revised version of his history, in which all of the revisions are in his own favor. He constantly demands what he calls "reasonable" concessions, but is actually insatiable; every concession is followed by a more exorbitant demand. When checked he may be violent and dangerous to others; when appeased he becomes a megalomaniac. He can be handled only by the strong and the wise,—firmly, kindly, intelligently. Often a cure can be effected by finding those "areas" in which he is still sane, encouraging him—and letting him know it will be more profitable—to behave in a normal fashion, and substituting sane for paranoid values as well as behavior.

If one can properly assume, as the author seems for all practical purposes to have assumed, that Nazi and German are synonymous nouns and that Nazi and paranoid are synonymous adjectives, then clearly the German people have for many years been developing or indulging in an aggravated case of paranoia. Dr. Brickner seems less well informed about his patient, however, than about the disease with which he finds the patient to be afflicted. For his knowledge of the behavior and thought patterns which he says are "typical" not only of the Nazi but of most Germans, not only now but normally, he has depended very largely upon such sources as Coole and Potter's *Thus Speaks Germany* and William L. Shirer's *Berlin Diary*. His mistranslation of *Wirklicher Geheimrat* (p. 242) suggests that if his knowledge of the Germans is to be measured by his familiarity with the German language it still leaves something to be desired. While one may concede that the German people has, as he says, come nearer than most to "achieving consistency", there will be those who will find themselves unable to accept some of his broader generalizations.

The "clear areas" in the German people as a whole are those individuals and groups not addicted to paranoid behavior. It is by finding and supporting these sane and reasonable Germans and encouraging them to assert themselves

as leaders and to lead in the right direction, and by treating the paranoids with the right combination of correction and kindness, that the psychiatrist would "cure" Germany.

University of Wisconsin

CHESTER V. EASUM

HEIDEN, KONRAD, *Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1944. Pp. viii, 788. \$3.00.

This is a long, closely written, detailed account of the life of Adolf Hitler and the rise of the Nazi Party. It is the most complete and authoritative volume covering these two inter-related subjects that has yet appeared or that is likely to appear in the near future. The author has drawn from his two earlier volumes, *A History of National Socialism* and *The Life of Adolf Hitler*, but much new material has been added and it has all been poured into a fresh mold so far as organization is concerned. But the new volume brings the story no nearer the present than the earlier books; it stops with the blood-purge of 1934. Approximately 200 pages are devoted to the period down to and including the Beer Hall *Putsch* of 1923; nearly 350 pages are given to the years between the *Putsch* and Hitler's appointment as chancellor in January, 1933; and about 225 pages are used to cover the ten months intervening before the blood purge of June, 1934. In general the treatment is chronological, with occasional chapters or sections interspersed to give the historical background in Germany or Europe. The volume is exhaustively thorough and in some places not particularly readable, but it will doubtless become the standard reference work on the subject, a book out of which the searcher may dig an almost limitless number of facts regarding Hitler and the Nazi Party. Its value for historians would have been further enhanced, however, if it had been documented so that the sources of the author's information could be known. There is no bibliography and, although some sources are cited in the text itself, the reader is left in the dark as to how the author could have secured access to them.

Hitler's early life is not covered in great detail but enough information is given to show that at thirty years of age he was a "human nothing", a "gray personality", a "homeless derelict from the Viennese melting pot", an "*agent-provocateur*", an "unsavory tool of the political counter-espionage". But in post-war Germany, when all sorts of people were making speeches and organizing political movements, Hitler's ability to sway audiences enabled him to emerge from obscurity and to place his foot on the lower rung of the ladder which was to carry him to his dictatorship. He was given a boost up that ladder by the military. Tens of thousands of junior officers, although forced out of the army by the Treaty of Versailles, remained officers at heart and sought to find a demagogue whom they could use. They found him in Hitler. They sent him through the country on speaking tours, used him to write press releases, sent him into political meetings to hear what he could hear. Finally, as propaganda orator for the German Workers' Party, Hitler apparently found his niche in the world. The author shows how Hitler was further aided directly or indi-

rectly in his upward climb by a score of others who certainly constitute a motley group—Röhm, Hess, Göring, Goebbels, Streicher, Feder, the Strassers, Frick, Haushofer, Ludendorff, Thyssen, Papen, Meissner, Ley, Hugenberg, Schacht, Himmler, Hindenburg. Considerable attention is given also to the influence of Alfred Rosenberg and "The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion" and to the English expatriate, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, "the father of Aryan supremacy". Two of Hitler's most notorious tenets seem to be derived, in part at least, from these men. But Hitler's rise was facilitated not by men and ideas alone. His final success was in large part the result of the lingering effects of the wild inflation of the early twenties and the deep despair born of the economic depression of the early thirties.

The volume is a valuable contribution to our knowledge and interpretation of the Nazi movement, but the physical brutality, moral corruption, lust for money and power, scheming and deceit, bargaining and intrigue which finally brought Hitler and his gang into power make a dreary story. There is no spark of inspiration for the individual, no faintest gleam of hope for the world in this account of the forces of nihilism and chaos. Although the reader may accept Heiden's conclusion that Hitler as a political mind is "one of the most tremendous phenomena of all world history", he will probably lay the book down with a feeling of horror that the world is so constituted that one of his type can rise to a position where he can threaten all mankind.

Indiana University

F. LEE BENNS

WEAVER, DENIS, *Front Page Europe*. London: Cresset Press, 1943. Pp. 256.

This volume takes its place as one of the better-written chronicles in the growing library of journalists' accounts of happenings in the past few years. Mr. Weaver saw the things he describes in his capacity as special correspondent for the *London News Chronicle*. The theme of the book is a description of "the impact of German nationalism upon the rest of the world". After traveling through many countries during the several crises preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, Mr. Weaver came to some interesting but hardly novel conclusions. He believed that Hitler's thirst for *Lebensraum* would lead him onward to ever more spectacular coups; that the common man in most lands was anxious for peace but "half resigned to war"; and that the democracies were lagging behind the dictatorships "in energy and swiftness of action".

Much of the interpretation of the pre-war and war years seems to be based on the confidential remarks of intelligent foreign friends of the author. Generally the informant appeared only too glad to unburden his heart and mind before an outsider in whom he could confide. Most of the comments sound reasonable, though many of them seem colored by hindsight. The author's own judgments are often acute and always well phrased. He certainly "has something" when he declares, for example, that "what Hitler did was to inflate the Germans' vanity and truculence, organize and canalize them, arouse their worst and most aggressive instincts, make violence popular—and make it *pay*." The most

interesting chapter in the book is the one describing London during the Battle of Britain. Here again there is little that is new, but the telling is effective and the story is glorious enough to bear apparently endless repetition.

The time covered in the volume is the seven-year period from the re-occupation of the Rhineland by the Nazis in March 1936 to the Soviet triumph at Stalingrad in February 1943. Throughout, as might be expected, Mr. Weaver misses no opportunity to extol the rôle of the newspapers in presenting information and warnings to the people of the democracies. Although the book fortunately is free of the arrogance and boasting that mar others of its type, even Mr. Weaver could not forego including such a sentiment as this, that in the midst of certain circumstances in 1936, he "sat down in Paris to untangle the threads of French affairs"!

Mr. Weaver certainly speaks truly when he maintains that the preservation of democracy requires as one of its pillars "an independent daily press." And, to judge from this book, he must be regarded as one of the best representatives of such a press.

Union College

WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM

ETTLINGER, HAROLD, *The Axis on the Air*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. Pp. 318. \$2.75.

Propaganda is not new; probably all societies have made use of it or had it thrust upon them in some degree. It is only since the industrial revolution, however, with its tremendous impact upon our systems of communication, that propaganda has been so extended in application and so sedulously developed as to transcend the limitations of an art and to become virtually a science.

The modern world, especially since World War I, has been made increasingly aware of the existence of propaganda. Unfortunately, it has not attained an equal degree of discrimination or perspicacity as to its nature, techniques and modus operandi. In *The Axis on the Air*, Harold Ettlinger discusses one important phase of contemporary propaganda, the offerings of the Axis to the world by means of the radio.

The propaganda aims of the Axis Ettlinger lists as five-fold: to convince us that the Axis is invincible, that Germany has no aggressive aims towards us, that the real threat to America is Communism, that we do not really need to fight vigorously, if at all, either because we have already lost or have practically won, and that the various rumors and misinformations spread by her agents are gospel truth.

From this premise the author proceeds to cite numerous illustrations of specific items or situations, such as Goering's fruitless boasts, the sometimes ludicrous outbursts of Radio Tokio, and Mussolini's desperate use of propaganda in his last hours as Il Duce. Interspersed with these reports are occasional discussions of such provocative problems as the Freedom Stations, the Axis satellites, and the United Nations' propaganda emanating from Moscow, London, and the

United States. A propos of the latter, Ettlinger remarks only too truthfully on page 280, "we still have a fundamental weakness which must be overcome before we can compete in the propaganda fight on even terms. That weakness is a lack of concrete policies either for the post-war settlement . . . or in the choice of psychological and political weapons to use against our enemies now."

This book has faults, but it is nonetheless important. On the debit side is the fact that it is journalistic and episodic, going not much more deeply than the average account to be found in current picture magazines. It fails in the sociological analysis needed for a scientific and conclusive account. And it omits mention of the work done by other propaganda analysts, one of whom, Siegfried Wagener, was first in this new field and contributed much to public enlightenment. On the credit side is the fact that within its limitations the book is very well done, providing a startling eye-opener to the naive and a blunt challenge to complacency.

University of Colorado

WILLIAM S. BERNARD

BASCH, ANTONIN, *The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. xvii, 275. \$3.50.

This careful and well documented book is a part of studies of the "Trade Regulation Project" directed by Professor J. B. Condliffe and sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. The author has succeeded in providing a vivid picture of the economic history of Southeastern Europe in the years between the two World Wars.

Professor Basch deals with the hyper-protectionist policies of the Danubian countries as if they were an accidental and unforeseen outcome of the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian customs union. However, it is a fact that the predominantly agricultural linguistic groups of the Habsburg Empire aimed at political independence precisely because they were eager to foster domestic manufacturing by tariffs. (We are setting aside the purely political motives involved in the nationalist movements). Imbued by Listian ideas, the Poles, the Magyars and all the rest considered themselves "exploited" by the highly developed processing industries of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and some parts of Austria. It is true, they did not wish to see their agricultural products barred from access to the markets of Czechoslovakia and Austria. Thus, since the early twenties, they began to talk of the need for economic cooperation and the demolition of trade barriers. But what they had in mind was always only the abolition of protectionism in other countries. All endeavors for some kind of regional organization were doomed to failure because the predominantly industrial countries were not ready to abandon tariffs for cereals, meat and cattle and because the predominantly agricultural countries were no less intransigent with regard to their tariffs for manufactures.

What happened in the Danubian Basin was not different from events in other parts of the world. All nations, big and small, rich and poor, have

adopted policies of radical economic nationalism. The particular feature of Southeastern Europe is only that the disastrous political consequences were bound to appear sooner in this area.

Neither Professor Condliffe nor Professor Basch falls prey to the illusion that the economic problems of Southeastern Europe could be disposed of by a regional solution. The political cooperation of all these small linguistic groups is needed to safeguard their political independence. But in this age of international division of labor every nation must, as Professor Condliffe says in his Introduction, "become part of a democratic world trading system".

New York City

LUDWIG V. MISES

BORSKY, G., *The Greatest Swindle in the World: The Story of the German Reparations*. London: New Europe Publishing Co. Pp. 78. 1s. 6d.

The London Ultimatum of the Allied Governments demanded 132 billion gold marks as reparations from Germany. The actual payments from 1919 to 1932, as estimated by the Reparations Commission, amounted to 20.8 billion gold marks. It seems that this remarkable discrepancy between claims and actual payments, and its lessons for the future, has led the Czechoslovak Research Institute to request the study under review.

Mr. Borsky compares the national income and cost of war for the various countries, gives a brief account of the three periods of reparation payments, and summarizes Germany's foreign loans during the twenties. None of the data presented are new. They are used to support the author's thesis: The Allied claims were justified by the cost and losses of the war; Germany tricked herself out of these obligations through luring 23.8 billion gold marks as loans into the country. This "deceit" of American and British banks, who received such lucrative commissions for the placement of these voluntary loans, is named "the greatest swindle in the world". The lesson to be learned is clear: Germany shall be burdened with the cost and losses of the present war, not mollified by foreign loans, so as "to teach the German people that aggression does not pay".

This emotional approach to reparations is extremely poor economics and politics. It disregards completely the defeated country's capacity to pay, and the victors' readiness to receive reparations. For, as Professor Viner has aptly stated, "countries relish the abstract idea of receiving reparations much more than they do the reparations themselves".¹

A realistic approach to reparations has to break down this "omnibus" term into its components. It should be made clear whether payments are a restitution of requisitioned properties during war, a compensation for military destruction and damages, a reimbursement of the victors' cost of war, or a tribute imposed as a punishment. If priority is given to restitution and compensation, and payments are made in kind, as Viner suggests, then cost of war and tributes are necessarily precluded by the capacities to pay and receive reparations. What

¹ Jacob Viner, "German Reparations Once More", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1943, p. 667.

shall the United States do with German machines? Pay a dole to her unemployed steel works?

University of Wyoming

ARTHUR SCHWEITZER

JORDAN, W. M., *Great Britain, France, and the German Problem, 1918-39. A Study of Anglo-French Relations in the Making and Maintenance of the Versailles Settlement.* Foreword by C. K. Webster. London: Oxford University Press, 1943. Pp. xii, 235. 15s.

The title of this scholarly book appears misleading. The author is concerned with the difference in outlook, and therefore in approach to the German problem, as shown by Great Britain and France in 1919 and in the years immediately following the Paris Peace Conference. Nowhere does he look beyond 1936, hardly ever does he go beyond the early twenties. The misnomer seems the stranger since this work has been compiled, from 1936 to 1942, under the auspices of Chatham House. To make a clean breast of the technical criticism, let us add that its Index too is quite insufficient: Eden, De Gaulle, Mezes, Seeckt, all referred to in the text, are a few of the missing names—whereas Danton and "Richelieu, Cardinal" are faithfully chronicled.

In spite of such obvious limitations, in scope and in presentation, the book should prove useful for both the historian of Europe in the inter-war period and the politician who will have to shape, or judge, the next peace settlement. Ranging from documents to this *JOURNAL*, there is very little published material that is relevant and that has not been scanned by Dr. Jordan. While new documentary publications like the State Department's volumes on the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 must affect the picture, this study represents a valuable guide through the maze of material available down to 1942. Dr. Jordan traces with diligence the difference of opinions between Britain and France. It is this clash of opinions, and the actions flowing from it, which overshadowed the inter-war period in Europe. The Treaty of Versailles had not been able to bridge this gap. The work of Paris in 1919 was an uneasy compromise with a double face: one, as the expression of the victor's triumphant force, was turned backward; the other, hopefully speaking of the League, the mandatory system and disarmament, was turned towards the future. Britain's aim in Europe was a settlement which would, in the long run, allow of agreement between all the parties concerned, a settlement which would lead to contentment and thus prevent another war. France, on the other hand, aimed at military security through the destruction and, if possible, the dismemberment of the enemy, through overwhelming power in her own hands the moment the next war came. Stated in these terms the story of Europe after 1919 seems almost "reasonable". Dr. Jordan who has limited himself to Anglo-French relations, really shows us the story of the French continental outlook on the one side, and of the extra-European Powers on the other hand. When he speaks of Britain he could, equally well, speak of the other Powers which, unlike France, are not exclusively steeped in the continental mind. The difference between Versailles

and the next settlement ought to be found, strikingly so, in the fact that this time none of the three decisive Powers—the United States, Britain, Russia—is limited to European interests only.

Dr. Jordan, always painstakingly fair to the French point of view, draws the conclusion that French power "rested not on a natural but on a conventional basis—on the discriminatory restrictions imposed on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles". He shows that "Great Britain was impotent in European affairs", the French army being without a rival on the Continent. He notes the odious Anglo-French naval discord, asking: "Why should France have turned to a policy of naval assurance against her former ally?" The author could have added that the same was true of the two air forces, Britain suffering repeatedly from air scares when she watched the comparatively much stronger French air force just across the Channel. The reason for this rivalry, he states in the terms of power politics, was the fact that, "till 1925, French policy towards Germany clashed with that of Great Britain".

The author discusses some aspects of this clash, particularly with regard to the Reparations and the Disarmament question. These pages make sordid reading today, and it seems that Dr. Jordan inclines, perhaps under the impression of the present War, to the French view; this has always been much nearer to the attitude of the so-called "realists" who believe in armed force, and nothing else, as Clemenceau did. To the author the hope for general disarmament "was an afterthought, and on the whole an unhappy afterthought. This verbal homage to Wilsonian aims advanced the cause of general disarmament by hardly an iota." Such a statement, worded almost like a sneer at Wilson's great experiment, has no place in a scholarly study. It betrays, I fear, a misreading of history and a fallacy all too easily made by continental politicians. Admittedly the settlement of 1919, in spite of its admixture of great ideals and high principles, failed in preventing the recurrence of war. To conclude that, therefore, we must throw overboard those principles of self-determination and collaboration, that we must go back to say the rules of power as applied e.g. throughout the eighteenth century, such a conclusion is utterly wrong. Instead, a factual survey like Dr. Jordan's ought to teach us that the admixture of the new principles was too small, that the regard paid to the continental point of view as represented by Clemenceau was too big to allow the Great Experiment to succeed. It is up to the reader of this book to supply these pertinent conclusions. He might, with profit, turn to the consideration of the following statements: there is no hope, said Britain in 1925, of applying sanctions, and making the peace machinery work, "in opposition to the views of the United States as they might be entertained by its people when a contingency arose. . . ." And: "The Dominions, unconscious consumers, like the U.S.A., of the security generated by the French army. . . ." Replace the national army of one continental power, of the France of 1919, by an international force on the lines now evolved; replace the French-British-American clash of 1919-20 by the collabora-

tion of Russia, America and Britain—and the history of the future will differ from the history of the inter-war period.

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Buxton, Derbyshire, England*

F. W. PICK

SALVEMINI, GAETANO, and LAPIANA, GEORGE, *What to do with Italy*. New York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce, 1943. Pp. xxii, 301. \$2.75.

Our first task is to win the war. But victory is no more than a preliminary step toward the solution of the larger undertaking of organizing the peace. Quite rightly, in the West at least, Germany is considered the chief enemy and what to do with her the main single problem of the peace. Italy is often derided for her rôle in the war. Yet it is well to remember how important she has been—even if negatively—as a military factor: not until the fourth year of the war has the Mediterranean been secured. More important still, although Italy is not a major power in her own right, her real strength carries appreciable weight in the international balance. Witness her crucial share in the events between 1935 and 1939. Moreover, Italy being the first enemy to suffer invasion and defeat, our handling of her will be subject to especially close scrutiny; inescapably, present deeds imply commitments to the future. The qualifications and standing of the authors of this book—distinguished Italian historians who have adopted America as their country—raise it far above the level of just one more blueprint for the future.

To be sure, events have caught up with the book written before the Italian collapse. The subtle plot hatched between our own State Department and the Vatican, through the intermediary of Monsignor Spellman, and designed to retrieve the Fascist régime, has evidently not materialized. The authors might of course say that the plot miscarried. This illustration suggests the obvious but pertinent observation that in dealing with current or probable future developments one is bound to abandon the ground of scholarship: a good part of the book is a lawyer's brief—a skilful brief to be sure. The extent to which it is clear, for example, that the British Tories are the authors' particular *hête noire* does not always strengthen their case. In spite of such shortcomings, their critique is valuable and timely; our actions ought indeed to be questioned, especially when there is danger of their achieving results opposite to our professed ends.

The authors perform a great service by their discussion of the position of the Vatican. How accurate their assertions are in regard to the Vatican's present policy and dealings, the future will tell. But there can be no doubt about the desirability of clearing the misconceptions so widely current on the rôle of the Church in the so-called Catholic countries. That the two chief Protestant countries should, in some respects, have become the mainstay of the Vatican's political influence is not one of the least curious twists of history. It is a gross oversimplification to identify the political views of the Vatican as an organiza-

tion with those of individual Catholics, or even of Catholic parties, as witness for example the history of the *Partito Popolare* in Italy itself.

The discussion of Italy's domestic prospects is excellent. The authors recognize such facts as that the older generation of exiles is not likely to provide the leadership of the future; that, in the course of twenty years of power, Fascism has brought about changes that cannot be merely undone, changes which in some cases represent responses to fundamental economic trends of our time. They are perhaps overoptimistic about the possibilities of economic and financial stabilization, or the solution of Italy's population problem.

Their attempt to dissociate the Italian people from the Fascist régime is understandable. The fact remains that large sections of the Italian people, be it common sense or cynicism on their part, responded to the régime in terms of what appeared its success or lack thereof at a particular moment. Likewise, there is reason to fear that the doings of Fascism will have exacerbated the nationalism of Italy's neighbors for some time to come. It is doubtful, for example, that the attempt to equate Mussolini's Fascism with Pétain's National Revolution coming *after* defeat—a defeat to which Italian policy before 1939 made a substantial contribution—will hold a great appeal for the French people. But on the general subject of the future position of Italy among nations, her boundaries, her colonies, the authors express eminently sane and moderate views.

In sum and taken as a whole, this book is a clearly thought out and well organized discussion that presents as reasonable a program as anyone is likely to produce. It is a worthwhile contribution to the solution of the ills of our time that deserves careful consideration.

Queens College

RENE ALBRECHT-CARRIE

STETTINIUS, E. R., JR., *Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory*. New York: Macmillan, 1944. Pp. 358. \$3.00.

It was a happy thought to publish this volume and Mr. Stettinius is certainly one of the best qualified men to give a first-hand account of the activities of an agency which will go down in the history of this war as one of the most constructive measures ever undertaken by a warring nation. In five parts the former administrator of the lend-lease provision tells the story of the accomplishments of the Administration from the very inception of the program down to June 30, of 1943. The book is more than the enumeration of lend-lease statistics. In many ways it is the history of World War II itself, told in a simple and dramatic language, easy to understand by the average non-technical reader. Had not the notion of morale been so often abused, *Lend-Lease* might rightly be classified as one of the best morale-building volumes on behalf of the cause of the United Nations in general and of the United States in particular.

To many people the book must be a revelation, for without betraying any military secrets its author succeeded in establishing a direct link between the lend-lease supplies, and the individual successes in the fields of battle. Mr.

Stettinius makes some effort in the second part of his volume to convince the reader of the vitality of lend-lease operations to the defense of America. If such proof is necessary, the subsequent chapters provide it in a degree that leaves no room for doubt. The millions of Nazi soldiers dead or in Russian prison camps, the Nazi tanks reduced to scrap on the battlefields, testify to the return for whatever aid could be shipped to the Soviet Union, "a return far beyond any measurement in dollars or tons". Altogether, by the middle of 1943, Russia received from the United States alone, 4,100 planes, 138,000 trucks, 912,000 tons of steel, 1,500,000 tons of food, and large quantities of many other war supplies. To that date, the total lend-lease aid amounted to \$12,900,000,000 worth of planes, tanks, guns, ships, trucks, raw materials, food, seeds, factories and various essential services. The average American might rightly say that this is a lot of money. It is only by comparison with the total annual war expenditures of \$100,000,000,000 that the relative inexpensiveness of the lend-lease arrangement can be fully appreciated. In the over-all picture, the lend-lease slice of American food has been only six per cent in 1942 and ten per cent in 1943.

The chapter on lend-lease in reverse is equally instructive. It appears that the total construction program alone, executed by England for American forces, will cost the British \$600,000,000. The nations of the British Commonwealth gave aid to the United States forces worth \$7,175,000,000 "not counting the blood of the British, Russian and Chinese men and the tears of their mothers which can never be estimated nor compensated for in terms of materials or services."

One would have wished that the present Under Secretary of State had concluded his meritorious work by suggesting some of the ways in which the lend-lease could be used when the time comes for the war economy to change to the economy of the transition period and of later long-term reconstruction. All he does is to refer to the text of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement which provides that the settlement of the lend-lease account shall be one which will not shut the door to new opportunity, but will, on the contrary, open the door much wider. It is understood that lend-lease has been passed as a measure of war for pooling the economic resources of the United Nations for victory. It has never been intended as a way of doing business in peace. Yet it is important for future economic cooperation among nations, if the principles of mutual aid in mutual self-interest are projected into the post-war era and thus the lessons learned through carrying out the lend-lease program are employed and fructified in the cause of the improvement of trade relations in the time of peace. No one is more aware of this than the author himself. "It will be for Congress and the people to decide later, what, if anything, in the war-time machinery of Lend-Lease itself may be of permanent value." The volume contains sixty little known and interesting illustrations, maps and pictograms covering varied and far-flung objectives such as the U. S. Caribbean Base, American tanks in Egypt, Australian Tank crew, supply route to China,

gun-maker factory in India, food from New Zealand, planes for Russia at Iranian airports, American cheese on English barges, etc. The appendix includes the text of the Lend-Lease Act, the Soviet Master Lend-Lease agreement and the Reciprocal Aid agreement with the United Kingdom.

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

JOSEF HANC

ROBINSON, JACOB, et al, *Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure?* New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, 1943. Pp. xvi, 349. \$2.00.

At the end of World War I great hopes were put in the international system for the protection of minorities. The Minorities Treaties were appreciated as one of the cornerstones of an international peace structure based on a League of Nations whose members were supposed to respect their international obligations. That structure is now in ruins. The present work is an evaluation of this epoch in the history of minorities. It deals with the official discussion concerning international protection for minorities prior to and during the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and when the Minorities Treaties were being framed, analyzes the general principles of the Versailles system and the causes for its breakdown.

Let it be known that here we have the best available survey of the problem—in spite of several outstanding weaknesses of the treatment. In particular, the authors must be congratulated for their dispassionate appraisal of the material available to them, and especially their conclusions. The authors assert: "although broad purposes were not always attained and injustices were often committed, the system achieved many notable results apart from the redress of individual grievances." They are just in pointing out that "the failure to apply the doctrine of equality of states, by exempting not only Italy, France, Belgium and Denmark which obtained territorial gains and new minorities under the peace treaties, but even defeated Germany from the international minority provisions could not but create ill-feeling on the part of the countries bound by the Minorities Treaties," and that "there were minority groups that allowed themselves to be exploited as political pawns by enemies of the state in which they lived, and looked to their co-national state rather than to Geneva for their salvation."

But the authors have consciously refrained from presenting the very intricate political, economic and social background of majority-minority relationships in Europe—a self-imposed restraint which, however, is apparent to a noticeable degree because the authors have depended mostly on a legalistic approach. Yet, to the reviewer the sociological aspects of the majority-minority social dynamics have been and always will be the backbone of the whole problem which no legalistic view will properly clarify. In addition, the authors can be very seriously criticized for their bibliography of "special works regarding individual states" (pp. 272-3). Although a considerable number of references can be located

in the more than 800 footnotes, and although we are promised that Jacob Robinson's *Das Minoritätenproblem und seine Literatur* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1928) "will soon be ready in a completed version," the bibliography is not only incomplete but irritating; most references are in German (and thus one can predict the tone of these works towards the states subject to the states induced to sign the Minorities Treaties) and the most important studies, including those in English, are not noted. To illustrate: Czechoslovakia is not included here at all and Joseph Chmelar's *National Minorities in Central Europe* (Prague: Orbis, 1937), together with his several other valuable studies, are forgotten; Poland is given two references (August Koza, *Der Minderheitenschutz in der polnischen Verfassung und Verwaltung*, Oppeln, 1934, and Dr. J. Rappoport, *Die polnischen Minderheiten und ihre Rechte*, "Nation und Staat," July-August, 1931), but S. J. Paprocki's *Minority Affairs and Poland* (Warsaw: Nationality Research Institute, 1935), although less fair and more nationalistic than Chmelar's booklet, is ignored—together with numerous others which could be cited.

A minor weakness of the volume is the placing of the footnotes at the end of the publication by chapters, "sections," etc. The search for proper references is an exhausting process which seems to lead to results only in the case of the first and last chapters. But these shortcomings do not prevent the study from being the best available introduction to its field.

Hofstra College

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

WILLIAMS, WYTHE, and VAN NARVIG, WILLIAM, *Secret Sources*. New York: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company, 1943. Pp. 326. \$2.50.

In view of the wide-spread net of American news-supplying agencies and reporting on foreign affairs one would be tempted to conclude that the American people must be the best informed audience in the world. There can be no doubt that they are. In the technical and organizational sense, no other reading public has so many advantages at its disposal, often at a very high cost to the newspapers and the radio companies. When it comes to the question of whether the Americans are the best enlightened people on international affairs, the reviewer may be allowed to have his doubts. Gathering and publishing news is one problem, while reading, digesting and evaluating reports is another. Too often the American reader wants to know the "inside" of everything even though he has hardly managed to know the "outside". Too often he wants to know the secrets without appreciating fully the significance of the easily obtainable and supposedly generally known facts. For that reason books with allegedly inside or otherwise inaccessible information are bound to be in great demand while important but unglamorous works are restricted to professorial desks. To put it bluntly, Americans like sensations and are led on to run after them. Whether this is a fault or why, is not the concern of this review. After reading *Secret Sources* one cannot help remarking, however, that much of what is supposed to be rare or exclusive here, might have become the general knowledge based on

regular supply of news from normal agencies provided the general public cared to take note.

This is not to belittle this interesting and in many places extraordinarily vivid work. The veteran newspaperman Wythe Williams did succeed in building up his personal machinery for getting news from totalitarian Europe while sitting quietly at his editor's desk in the office of the *Greenwich Times* in Connecticut. Furthermore, the account of the events is frequently unusual and human. At the same time it is open to doubt whether the book, together with many other similarly "secret" or "inside" narratives published so profusely in the last decade or so, can be regarded as primary source material and a permanent contribution to a permanent purpose.

Subject to this qualification, *Secret Sources* is a book full of mild excitements. A certain Bavarian called Gottlieb, "in the Gestapo but not of it," Clara, whose husband was among those purged by Hitler, and who had "access to virtually all documents that are executed by Hitler", and William Van Narvig, formerly a Russian officer who joined Mannerheim in Finland to land eventually in this country as a naturalized citizen, were among William's reporters. There was also Linda who sent an illuminating report on the then forthcoming Nazi-Japanese alliance and German aircraft production, and Wolfgang whose father was done away with by the Nazis out of spite, and others. These super-spying reporters had a solid educational background, wide acquaintances and a keen sense of actuality. They worked at the risk of losing their lives and smuggled in reports of more than usual timeliness and accuracy. These reports, plus his own experiences and imaginative mind, helped Wythe Williams to set up a radio news service in the United States which was superior to anything we have been accustomed to.

With precision Wythe Williams proceeded "to pull one news rabbit after another out of his hat", to quote from Lowell Thomas' enthusiastic preface to the book. Many of Wythe Williams' prophecies of future moves in Europe came true. Sometimes he erred. But he was always factual and refreshing. Many listeners were astounded and could not believe. However, this was often to be accounted for less by the incredibility of the professed facts than by the extent to which the public was being misinformed about the nature of the world in the making. The authors themselves refer to this "blatant misinformation that was the order of the day": "Not a little of this misinformation was the work of refugees from the German intellectual class . . . voicing their personal convictions and . . . out of deference to current American sentiment they preferred to paint Hitler as an overstuffed political buffoon rather than the potent menace to world democracy that he actually was".

Fletcher School of War and Diplomacy

JOSEF HANC

SHORTER NOTICES

PLUTYNSKI, ANTONI, *We are 115 Millions*, Foreword by Douglas Reed. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1944. Pp. 138. 7s. 6d.

The number of books, wise and foolish, written in the course of the past five years, on the subject of federation and union between great and small nations, must run into the hundreds. For the most part they can be dismissed as conceived in despair at things as they are, and dedicated to the strange proposition that if we lump together all our troubles we will hardly feel any single irritation. Plutyński's book differs from most of these Utopias by being firmly grounded in the figures and motives of economic and social forces and animated by a conviction that, for their own security, the lesser states of Central and Eastern Europe must subordinate their differences to the need for united planning and action.

He shows that, aside from iron and steel, the area between the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean could regard itself as an exporting region and could thus take a strong position in a revived world trade. The book is published in 1944 as it was written three years ago. He then regarded Germany as more likely than Russia to attempt to control this middle area. In his comparative calculations of resources he groups Austria with Germany, explaining that the Central Europeans would hardly expect war to take place between these two peoples who speak the same mother tongue. He does not, apparently, accept the rather commonly held thesis that if Germany is in Austria the defense of the rest of Central Europe is impossible. He would also seem to ignore the obvious fact that Austria has fought Germany rather more often than any other country.

He is greatly concerned with the problem of defense, both economic and military, against Germany, and would closely integrate military and technical training for the boys of the next generation. What he suggests is a strong Alliance, implemented and cemented by a customs union, monetary and transport unification, a central credit bank, a common and unified defense command, and industrial rationalization, all, of course, on a voluntary basis. He does not minimize the obstacles, nor indeed does he claim that the millenium would be reached in the twinkling of an eye, but he argues that greater liberty, a more real security and a more fruitful life for all the peoples of Europe and America would be won if these 115 million will think and work together in an organic unity. There is much to challenge thought in this very smoothly and coolly argued little book.

P. F.

The Polish Land. Ziemia Polska. An Anthology in Prose and Verse, compiled by Klub Polski of Columbia University, ed. by Marion Moore Coleman. Trenton, N. J.: White Eagle Publishing Co. Pp. xiii, 127. \$2.00.

Here is admirable pabulum for sensibilities dulled by facts and figures. The seeker after the soul of a people must ultimately turn to its lyrics and legends. Much of Poland's most revealing poetry is here translated or adapted by a number of hands, and grouped around various landscapes, shrines and cities of that memorializing nation. Attached to the mountains and the plains

are the intimate folklore and the historical glories which have so often inspired Polish poets. And from the collection rises the Pole's fierce and exquisite love for his homeland, for Pomorze and Warsaw, the Tatras, Silesia, the Vistula, Cracow, Sandomierz and the Eastern Provinces.

The selections, ranging from the sixteenth century to the year 1943, include many proud legends and no few laments. The voice of exile is a dominant one in Polish literature. Many excerpts and short lyrics are suitably introduced by a brief historical commentary. The Romantics predominate, but there is a fair representation of the poetry of the Second World War. The famous *On Taking Flight* of Karpiński is included in a lilting translation. Rhythm and rhyme are generally respected throughout, and quite frequently the notable poignancy of Polish lyricism is preserved.

R. D. T.

MACHRAY, ROBERT, *The Polish-German Problem*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1942. Pp. 56. 3 maps. 3s. 6d.

MACHRAY, ROBERT, *East Prussia Menace to Poland and Peace*. Chicago: American Polish Council. Pp. 112, 9 maps and diagrams. \$.75.

The earlier of these two studies is largely a historical review of the ebb and flow of Germanism and Polonism between the Elbe and the Vistula and in East Prussia. The perennial German desire to exterminate or Germanize the Polish population in these areas is emphasized. The evidence is taken from German sources, which can hardly be said to be pro-Polish. There were several devices by which the German census-takers of 1910 made the Polish population seem less than it was. They invented two new languages—Cassubian and Masovian, both obviously Polish (as who should say: "I speak English and Brooklynese), and a "bilingual" category, by which a Pole who spoke German was not classified as Polish. Yet Germans who spoke Polish were not classified as "bilingual". The resultant figures are shown to be palpable falsifications of the facts by a comparison with the statistics of the language of the school-children in the same year. In the last section of this brochure, written in 1941, Mr. Machray suggests that not only the western provinces and a larger portion of Upper Silesia than before 1939 must be Polish, but also that East Prussia must be given to Poland in order to protect her, and with her the rest of Europe from the threat of German aggression.

This theme he develops in greater detail in the second book. The argument is partly historical, showing that the Germanism now in East Prussia is grounded in pure aggression, partly demographic, showing that the German population in East Prussia, by emigration and a lowered birth-rate, is failing to maintain its racial solvency, and partly strategic, pointing to the fact that East Prussia has been used by Germany either as an outpost against all Slavdom or as a springboard for attack on Poland. The interesting facts that landed property in East Prussia is more heavily mortgaged than elsewhere in Germany, and that a larger proportion of the population is non-productive, i.e. pensioners, than elsewhere in Germany, are made clear. The documentation is all from German sources. *Ex ore suo condemnati*.

In one respect Mr. Machray might be said to err on the side of conservatism. He puts the total Polish population of East Prussia at about 440,000. It

should be nearer double that figure. Here, as in Upper Silesia, if an outsider, in conversation with a native who seemed to be German, were to break into Polish, in a surprising number of cases he would get a positive and friendly reaction. Centuries of Germanization have had only a superficial success.

S. H. T.

OSTEN, MICHAEL, *Führers Must Fall*, trans. by E. W. Dickes. London: W. H. Allen & Co. Pp. 160. 7s. 6d.

To say that "führers" or dictators, or whatever else we may choose to call these wielders of power that stalk giant-like across the pages of history from time to time, must fall is to utter a truism. History proves it conclusively. From Caesar down to the last Roman dictator that has been their ultimate end. It will also be the end of Hitler.

This slender volume is, however, much more than a summarization of the careers of dictators. It is an inquiry into the ever-perplexing and never more pertinent question of the essence of power. Whence comes this power by which one man rules over and tyrannizes millions of men? To some it comes by inheritance. To some, like Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte, it comes by right of conquest. They "won it with the sword". Others like Augustus and Napoleon III, the author calls the "exploiters of opportunity". Still others, like "... Mussolini and Hitler talked themselves into power, with the spoken no less than the printed word, as demagogues of subtle genius. . . ." We know, of course, the apparent political and economic causes for the rise of such men. But the author probes deeper into the matter, and points out that the worship of power is the first condition of power. Until men can divest themselves of this primitive urge to worship power in their leaders or rulers, "führers" will not cease to rise.

To the author the "conqueror of power" is the most dangerous of all criminals, and it is a dangerous foolishness to regard him as otherwise. "The crimes of power," says the author, "must be combatted by cutting off their source—by dealing with the budding power-criminal. The time will come when the community, with deeper psychological insight and with scientific methods of character study, will be able to recognize the genius for power in earliest youth; it will not deceive itself as to the dangerousness of the type, and it will know how to prevent by beneficent means the growth of the lust." It is to be hoped that this sanguine view of the author will be realized.

Without doubt the author has raised here a question of compelling interest and pertinence—one which cannot be lightly cast aside. Obviously, the subject is much too large for the book before us, but an excellent beginning has been made.

Eastern Oregon College of Education

EDWIN J. WESTERMANN

SAWICKI, TADEUSZ (ed.), *Rocznik bibliograficzny*. Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd. I (Sept. 1939 - Dec. 31, 1941), 1942, pp. 1-68; II (1942), 1943. Pp. 69-140.

The amount of publishing by and about Poles, in Polish and other European languages, since the beginning of the war is quite formidable. Mr. Sawicki lists in these two Bibliographical Yearbooks from September 1, 1939 to the end

of 1942 1158 items. Some of them are only brochures, others are periodicals that have been in existence for many years, others are substantial works of a scientific and cultural interest. As Mr. Sawicki points out in his foreword, the Polish authorities have, from the first days of the war, realized the probability of great destruction by the Germans of Polish cultural monuments, literary, educational and artistic, and have consciously planned to build up a backlog of copies of the classics of the native literature for immediate use when their land is again free from its oppressors. These items are all listed here, with full bibliographical apparatus and frequently a short four to eight line description of the work. Each number is fully indexed. This is a very useful handbook which should be in the hands of every reference librarian in America.

P.

Lund Humphries & Co. of London (12 Bedford Sq., W. C. 1) have begun to publish a series of Modern Language Readers under the general editorship of B. Schindler. There have thus far appeared three of these readers, Russian, Polish and Greek. Stechert's in New York have a supply of them on hand. The selection presupposes a beginner's knowledge of grammar and vocabulary, but the readers could be used early in the first year of the language. Each selection is accomplished by a vocabulary and notes, on the same page as the reading, and arranged in the order of appearance of the words. There does not seem to be any graded principle applied to the apparatus, as it is about as elemental at the end of the book as at the beginning. The selections lean to the classics. A sprinkling of modern or journalistic prose would have been useful.

PH. PH.

LILIEN, ERNEST, *Dictionary Part I: English-Polish*. Fasc. I a - aglossia. Buffalo: Wydawnictwo Slownika Liliena. Pp. 48. \$1.00.

There is certainly need for a modern and comprehensive Polish-English English-Polish dictionary. Those generally available on the market are usually unrevised reprints of dictionaries twenty to fifty years old, and all the technical terminology of the various scientific disciplines of the past generation is unregistered. Mr. Lilien's ambitious undertaking is therefore timely and welcome. At the present rate, the English-Polish part will run to about 1600 pages of three-column fine print and will cost about \$40.

To judge from what one finds in this fascicle the help of an expert American lexicographer would both simplify and make more exact the finished work. There are unnecessary luxuries: 'abrenounce' and 'abrenunciate' have separate entries. It would be interesting to hear a Polish distinction between these two obsolete words that would not be inventive of meanings that English does not know. Separate entries for normal derivative adverbial forms, such as 'additional', 'additionally', or again a double entry such as 'aghost' as adjective and 'aghost' as adverb, would seem to add to the printing cost without corresponding gain in clarity. Few libraries even would be able to purchase a complete dictionary at \$80. The user of an advanced dictionary must be assumed to know something of both languages.

T.

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THE BALTIC PROVINCES SOME HISTORIC ASPECTS AND PERSPECTIVES

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THE far-reaching decisions which today are implied in the fate of the North-Eastern corner of Central Europe conjure up many historical memories. The small provinces, the so-called "Baltic provinces" Courland, Livland and Estland, which for two decades (1919-1939) formed the core of the independent States of Estonia and Latvia have played a part in history which seems quite out of proportion to the size of the countries and the number of the peoples concerned. Throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Baltic provinces were a battleground over which Poland, Sweden and Russia contended; a good deal of what is called the "dominium maris Baltici" hinged on the possession of these small but strategically located territories. Only after the conquest of Livland from Poland could Gustavus Adolphus enter upon his great historical career. And it was only with the conquest of the Baltic provinces that Russia, under Peter the Great, was opened up to the West and became a European power. Decisions like these clearly transcended local and territorial interests. And they were associated with others which again and again raised questions of principle and true international importance. In view of a long standing tradition a Russian Governor General, in 1870, said to some Baltic Germans: "You can maintain the glory of these provinces which have always been a battleground of fundamental ideas in politics."

These implications have revived in our days. The old Baltic provinces have been a battleground in the most literal sense and are fatally bound to play this role again in the last stages of the war. In addition the problem of their future, though limited in scope, is certainly fraught with "fundamental ideas in politics." It involves a potential clash of principles, the solution of which bears heavily upon the policy of the United Nations.

The same, of course, can be said of the problems of Eastern Poland

and of Lithuania. But each of these questions has also a distinct aspect of its own. The Eastern regions of what was Poland in 1939 are of a very complex ethnographical and social structure. Poland has never been a "nation state" or a democratic state, for that matter. In most disputed areas she can claim "historical" rather than "national" rights. The Eastern frontier of Poland, as drawn in 1921, was due to a successful war; it seems possible to redraw it in terms of a political compromise.

As to Lithuania her situation has much in common with that of Latvia and Estonia. The three of them were organized as peasant republics with racially distinct features of non-slavic character, the Lithuanians being akin to the Letts or Latvians and the old Prussians, while the Estonians are kinsfolk of the Finns. In Estonia, according to the census of 1934, the Estonians numbered 88.1% of the population of 1.1 millions, while only 8.2% were Russians. There was no sizable number of Estonians outside the national state. The same holds true for Latvia, though in the southeastern corner, in Lettgallen (Latgalia), which was added to the old provinces of Livland and Courland, the ethnographical picture is less clear cut. In Latvia as a whole, according to the census of 1935, the Letts numbered 75.5% and the Russians 12% of the population of roughly 2 millions. Lithuania could also present a good case from the angle of national self-determination, particularly when supported by the large number of American Lithuanians. But on the spot she found herself in a less fortunate position. There was a bitterly contested area, the district of Vilna (Wilno), in which the ethnographical and historical claims of the Lithuanians were clashing with, and subsequently defeated by those of the Poles. After the high-handed seizure of the district by General Zeligowski in 1920 the problem of Vilna remained an open wound in the Eastern zone of Central Europe. Today it affords a good opening to the Russian conception of the national questions involved. Moreover Lithuania's position differed also in other respects from that of the three historic provinces of Courland, Livland and Estland. Lithuania was landlocked; for more than a century she had been incorporated into a number of inner Russian governments, whereas the three Baltic provinces maintained a separate status and were essentially maritime, bordering the Baltic and closely connected with East Prussia and Scandinavia. In addition most of the inhabitants of Lithuania were Roman Catholics, whereas most of the Estonians and Letts (except those in Lettgallen) were staunch Lutherans, like the other Baltic peoples. It is often not realized that in the Eastern zone of Central Europe the religious factor, together with political and social factors, very effectively rivals, and cuts through, linguistic and

ethnographical frontiers.¹ Thus the Roman Catholic inhabitants of the Russian bulk of Lithuania were sharply divided from their Protestant conationals: i.e. the Lithuanians in the Memel territory and East Prussia. They were separated from the West by a cultural frontier as distinct² as the one which runs along the River Narva and Lake Peipus, roughly separating the Estonians and Latvians from the East. Thus the problem of Lithuania appears in some respects less "fundamental."

In spite of these differences, there can hardly be any doubt that the fate of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will be a common one and spokesmen of the three countries have fully realized this interdependence.³ And yet from the historical view point, as well as from the angle of some principles involved, it seems proper to deal separately with the Baltic provinces. This is all the more true because of the different role which the German factor has played in Estonia and Latvia on the one hand and in Lithuania on the other.

The German settlements in Lithuania as far as they survived until 1919 were comparatively recent in date and mostly composed of peasants and artisans. On the other hand the history of the so-called Baltic Germans, who settled in Courland, Livland and Estland, goes back to the "dark ages" of medieval Europe. Through centuries the Baltic Germans have preserved more of feudal traditions than has any other group of Germans abroad. These traditions seem utterly remote from today's problems. As a matter of fact, the aristocratic groups of Baltic Germans formed only small minorities within the national states of Estonia and Latvia (in 1934/35: 1.5% and 3.2% respectively). Eventually they were "withdrawn" by Hitler's order in 1939. And yet they have left deep marks upon these lands. And they have

¹ See C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (1934), pp. 8-10 and part I, Ch. III; also the present writer's "Das Problem des Nationalismus im Osten" in *Deutschland und Polen*, ed. Alb. Brackmann 1933, pp. 259-70 (English translation by S. Miles Bouton, Germany and Poland 1934.)

² The Extraordinary Commission which in 1923 reported to the Conference of Ambassadors about the Memel territory came to the conclusion: "La limite orientale du Territoire de Memel qui est l'ancienne frontière russo-allemande marque véritablement le passage brusque et sans transition d'une civilisation à une autre. Un siècle, au moins, sépare la première de la seconde! C'est la vraie frontière de l'Occident et de l'Orient, de l'Europe et de l'Asie." (République de Lituanie, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Question de Memel*. Ier vol. No. 51, p. 106). The same could be observed by everyone who crossed from Estonia into Russia.

³ Evidence of this can be seen in the *Revue Baltique, Organ de la Collaboration des Etats Baltes*, which began to appear in February 1940 under the joint editorship of an Estonian, a Latvian and a Lithuanian. The same line continues in the publications of the Latvian Legation in Washington, the Lithuanian National Council, *ibid.*, and the Lithuanian Cultural Institute in Chicago. See also W. F. Reddaway, *Problems of the Baltic* (1940), ch. 2, and most recently F. W. Pick, "The Baltic Nations," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, III (1944), 416-440)

contributed largely to some specific aspects of "Baltic" History as well as to some "fundamental ideas in politics." No discussion, therefore, of the perspectives implied in the fate of Estonia and Latvia can easily dismiss this factor.

Viewed from a certain angle the contribution of the Baltic Germans is very obvious and can hardly be disputed in its positive results. It has expressed itself in beautiful monuments and lasting institutions. When the vanguard of the Lübeck merchants first appeared in Livonia (Livland) at the end of the twelfth century, they were attracted, of course, by valuable raw materials and the rivers and ports that opened up a large continental hinterland. But the expansion of commerce merged with the expansion of Christianity. The merchants were followed by the missionaries and the "Knights of the Sword" who became later a branch of the "Teutonic Knights." After a century and a half (by 1346) the order had virtually completed the subjugation and christianization of a region where polygamy and human sacrifices had hitherto prevailed. In fact, it was the German branch of the warring medieval church that decided upon the frontiers which Western civilization and Western Christendom would reach in the Northeast.

For many generations the Livonian order defended this vanguard position of Central Europe against military competitors. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Russians from Plesk and Plosk, christianized by Byzantium, had attempted to occupy the Baltic provinces. Early in the thirteenth century Denmark conquered and held the North of Estland for a period of time. When the Russians had freed themselves from the yoke of the Mongols new invasions followed from Novgorod and Moscow. They were warded off and eventually the Master of the Livonian Order defeated the Moscovites in a great battle in 1502. It took two hundred years (in Courland a third century) before the Russians gained full control of what to them no less than to Central Europe appeared as a natural borderland.

In the meantime, however, European institutions and impressive symbols of the common European heritage had stamped the Baltic provinces with an indelible imprint. The country was covered with Gothic churches, with the castles and mansions of a landholding aristocracy, with the town-halls and guild houses of an urban patriciate. To the present day the older parts of cities such as Reval (Tallinn) and Riga show in the whole setting as well as in all details a thoroughly German architecture, while here and there a Russian cathedral, added in the nineteenth century, stands out as a strikingly alien element. The Russian and the German "Fortress Ivangorod" and "Herman's castle" that face each other on the borders of the river Narva guild houses of an urban patriciate. To the present day the older parts of

may appear as symbols of two different conceptions of life. The conception which took root in the Baltic provinces was based upon the principles of medieval group life, upon self-governing bodies of guilds, towns and aristocratic corporations. The state of the Livonian order itself was loosely knit: a federative unit ruled by estates; it represented the fundamental ideas of corporative variety and autonomy on the very brink of the seething masses of the East.

The Livonian state collapsed in 1561 and was partitioned between Poland and Sweden. Both countries, Sweden in particular, left their mark on the Baltic provinces. To our days the tradition of the Swedish policy, benevolent as it was towards the peasants, has been a cherished memory among the Estonians and the Letts. But in general the social forms of life and the political forms of aristocratic and corporative autonomy were not altered before the Russian period. Political independence, however, was lost. In vain had the Livonian order tried to avoid this fate by following the example of the Teutonic Knights and turning Protestant. While this move proved futile in the political sense, it deeply and permanently influenced the interrelationship of the nations around the Baltic. The Baltic provinces became a link within the Protestant "International" of the Northeast. This link was put to the test, when the re-catholicized Polish kingdom, under Sigismund III, made an attempt to conquer Lutheran Sweden, an attempt coinciding in its historical perspective with Phillip II's assault on England. The onslaught of the Counter-Reformation in the East suffered its first reverse on Livonian ground. One may well say that this again was a decision in fundamental ideas; a decision for variety against uniformity. While the Baltic provinces became a German-Protestant barrier in the East, they witnessed in many ways the affinity of the Lutheran creed to the ideas of national, or at least cultural, autonomy.

II

There are other aspects in the history of the Baltic Germans which are much less positive, overclouded as they are by national and social animosities. The Germans had conquered the Baltic countries and established their rule over a numerous peasantry of foreign stock. They appeared clearly as oppressors and lazy exploiters of subject races. In fact, the Baltic provinces were a "paradise" of large landholders as the American South was in the eighteenth century. It was naturally against their "masters" that the movement of the "Young" Latvians and Estonians rose in the latter half of the nineteenth century, a movement of social as well as of national emancipation. This antagonism has been handed down to the

national states. It has revived in recurrences of suspicion and resentment on the one hand, of arrogance on the other. Thus far the German past was clearly a negative heritage.

Moreover, while the Baltic Germans maintained as long as possible the position of a ruling class, socially exclusive and nationally distinct, they were divided among themselves by class barriers. In the Livonian diet of the eighteenth century, though the city of Riga was represented, it had no more votes than any single member of the *Ritterschaft*. The noble privilege of holding estates actually persisted up to the sixties of the nineteenth century. The urban patriciate on the other hand was no less a closed corporation. They ruled over the cities and kept strictly distinct from the German professional groups as well as from the petty bourgeoisie of the natives and the Russians. The whole country was permeated with the spirit of privilege and exclusiveness. This feudal tradition, as it were, lived on under Russian rule. The Baltic Germans felt themselves bound by homage to the Czars rather than to Russia. Due to their faithful service and other qualities of an old aristocratic stock they enjoyed a certain preference at the court of St. Petersburg and in the Russian administration and army. The last Czarist ambassador to Great Britain came from a Baltic noble family. And the German patrician bourgeoisie of the Baltic provinces had almost as good a chance to rise to prominence in the Russian hinterland. Quite a few members of the Petersburg Academy hailed from the Baltic borderland. Todleben, the defender of Sevastopol in the Crimean war, was the son of a burgher of Riga.

There was much in this position of a national and aristocratic minority that contrasts strikingly with the categories of the nineteenth century. Throughout Western Europe the "Baltic Barons", in particular, were looked upon as representatives of narrow class interests. And the opinion of German liberals was hardly less critical of the "Super-Junkers". From another viewpoint a liberal like Heinrich von Treitschke gave a very harsh verdict on the remnants of an older historical structure. He could see in them but strange relics, morally corrupted by the conflicting allegiance to both the Russian Czars and German culture, and therefore lacking in national ethics.⁴ From the point of view of middle class nationalism the Baltic German position appeared as a sheer anachronism.

⁴ See Treitschke's essay on "Das Preussische Ordensland" in his *Historisch-politische Aufsätze*, II, pp. 21-23, 67, 69. Treitschke was opposed by the Baltic German journalist J. Eckardt, who had himself fought against the exclusiveness of aristocratic rule in his home country and became an exile. Yet from the harder won experiences of an Eastern German he defended the principles of Baltic life against a misleading liberal and nationalist interpretation. See his "Open letter to Professor H. v. Treitschke" (*Baltische und Russische Charakterstudien*, 1869).

It is in view of the very experiences to which nineteenth century nationalism has led that the "bimetallism", as it were, of the Baltic Germans reveals a very different aspect. Seen in this light the fact gains in importance, even in "ethical" significance, that they were neither Germanizing nor submitting to Russification. Their attitude implied something vastly superior to the "naturalist" program of both, national uniformity and state centralization.⁵ In transforming aristocratic into cultural autonomy they created a tradition which has revived in the states of Estonia and Latvia and for some time promised to play a vital part in the consolidation of the whole Eastern border zone of Central Europe. This achievement seems at least worth a necrology.

It was undoubtedly linked with economic and social interests that defy any "ethical" interpretation. What determined the setting of the Baltic provinces was the basic fact that no peasants and only a trickle of artisans, teachers and other small people emigrated from Germany into the remote Northeastern borderland. As a consequence the lower social strata were of one nationality, the landlords and patricians of another. There were obvious social and economic advantages which made it advisable for the masters to maintain this cleavage by abstaining from any systematic attempt to Germanize the native peoples. Otherwise the German minority might have been swamped. It is also obvious that the racial difference aggravated the duress of the manorial system. In addition the devastating wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries led to a deterioration in the status of the peasants. They had been *glebae adscripti* before; now they became salable even without the land. Only slight improvements were made during the Swedish period.

One may add, however, that the Baltic landed aristocracy was of some "Eastern broadness" and fond of leisure, very different in that from the exacting Prussian type; nor did they enter upon a full-fledged capitalistic system of farming that would have led to an increase in the services of unfree labor. Moreover, in a gradual development from the end of the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, the peasants were freed and obtained the right of free property. This reform was effected not by monarchical

⁵ For this and the following see the present writer's studies: "Reich, Staat und Nation im Deutsch-Baltischen Denken" (*Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse* 1930, 7. Jahrgang 4, pp. 219-240) and: "Das Baltische Deutschtum in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart" (*Königsberger Auslandsstudien* III, 1931, pp. 31-62). An extract of these views is given in "Russians and Germans in the Baltic" (*Contemporary Review*, Vol. 157, 1940). For the broader implications see the critical study on "Recent German Literature on Mitteleuropa" by Paul Sweet. (*Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. III, pp. 10-12.)

intervention, as in most parts of Central or Eastern Europe, but mainly on the aristocracy's own initiative. Under these regulations the Letts and the Estonians produced a number of prosperous peasant proprietors who formed about two-thirds of the whole native population. It is estimated that in 1914 between 40 and 43 per cent of all the available land was peasant property.⁶ But the racial difference continued strictly to coincide with the difference between large and small landholdings.⁷ While a great part of the *indigènes* were landless laborers, in Courland nine noble families owned one-fifth of the land. It was not unusual to speak of an "Eastern Ireland".

But this parallel has very definite limits. In particular there was among the Baltic Germans no trace of a policy of racial intolerance or eradication. Upon this attitude the Lutheran Reformation had an important bearing. As preaching in the mother tongue was a capital point in Lutheran doctrine and the only way to make the gospel understood by the people themselves, the Reformation out of its innermost impulses led to a positive appreciation of national variety. The Baltic German pastorate generally responded to this impulse. It was through the Reformation that the Estonian and Latvian tongues became literary languages and some Baltic pastors were so devoted to this task that the Livonian *Ritterschaft* complained about their being unable to preach in German any longer. The first Lettish catechism was edited by five German Baltic pastors in 1586 (printed in Königsberg), while the translation of the Bible into Lettish (completed at the end of the seventeenth century) had to wait for much preparatory work. Important steps were the "Lettus", a "phraseology" which the Courland pastor Mancelius edited in 1638 and his fellow parson Heinrich Adolphi's first Lettish grammar of 1685. The record of the elementary schools which the *Ritterschaft* and the church maintained in the Baltic provinces compares also very favorably with the best contemporary standards.⁸ In 1776 G. F. Stender dedicated his fables and tales (*Pasakkas* and *Stahsti*), a first contribution to Lettish *belles lettres*, to the Courland pastorate, "the educator of the peasantry". And in the preface to the first

⁶ *Peace Handbook* issued by the Historical Section of the Foreign office (London 1920, No. 50), p. 55.

⁷ It can be disregarded, in this connection, that some small colonies of German peasants were established by Catherine the Great and again at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the first case the settlers came from the Palatinate; in the latter from Volhynia and the Volga region.

⁸ The most recent studies, based on broad source materials, are, for Latvia: Heinrich Schaudinn, *Deutsche Bildungsarbeit am Lettischen Volkstum des 18. Jahrhunderts*. München 1939, for Estonia: H. Speer, *Das Bauernschulwesen im Gouvernement Estland vom Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Russifizierung*. Tartu (Dorpat) 1936.

Lettish Dictionary (1789) he wrote: "My favorite occupation has always been to educate this well-deserving nation."

This attitude of not only tolerating and preserving but fostering and developing a foreign nationality was strengthened by the humanitarian interest of the enlightenment and the wave of German pietism which radiated from Herrnhut. It reached its climax with Herder and the Romantic movement. When the East-Prussian Herder came to Riga in 1765 he was deeply impressed by two facts. In the first place he noticed the survival of medieval corporate life, the variety of corporations and self-governing bodies, communal, and aristocratic, which seemed to him to contrast favorably with the levelling centralism of the absolutistic monarchies and particularly the bureaucratic and "policed" atmosphere of Prussia. His philosophy of life stood for organic and spontaneous growth as opposed to artificial standardization and equalization. He also discovered on the spot another source of unspoiled spontaneity: the Lettish folk dances and folk songs.⁹ He appreciated these manifestations of a people's original self as "holy runes" through which something extremely venerable was speaking. "The best culture of a people", Herder later pointed out, "cannot be expressed through a foreign language; it thrives on the soil of a nation most beautifully, and I may say, it thrives only by means of the nation's inherited and inheritable dialect."¹⁰

It is hardly necessary to recall the general bearing which the new appraisal of popular self-expression in language and art has had upon the national revival in the whole Eastern zone of Central Europe.¹¹ To the romantic writers, who followed Herder and conceived of poetry as the "original language" of mankind, one tongue was equal to the other, all being sacred before God. Denationalization was sacrilege. In the Baltic provinces this conception merged with the Lutheran tradition. It stood the test when with the emancipation of the peasants the question was raised whether it would not be more "human" to let them take part in the riches of the German language and culture. In fact, individual Letts and Estonians had been assimilated again and again, as the result of social advance as well as through the channels of the preaching and teaching professions.

⁹ Stavenhagen, *Herder in Riga*, 1925, pp. 13-14. When Herder compiled his "Voices of the Peoples", he had before him no less than 78 Lettish songs which had been sent to him mostly by Baltic pastors (Schaudinn, l.c. p. 165, note 125.)

¹⁰ *Erster Brief zur Beförderung der Humanität* (Riga 1793), cit. and transl. in Carlton J. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, pp. 53-54.

¹¹ See Oncken, *Deutsche geistige Einflüsse in der europäischen Nationalstaatsbewegung des XIX. Jahrhunderts* (Congrès international des Sciences historiques. Résumés des communications, 1928, p. 195ff); K. Bittner, *Herders Geschichtsphilosophie und die Slawen*, 1938.

There was never a strict racial barrier or a "blood line," nationality being a matter of individual choice and cultural allegiance. But to advocate a systematic policy of assimilation ran against a deeply set trend of thought and not only that of social exclusiveness. In 1819 a Conference of Baltic pastors and barons discussed the problems involved. The almost unanimous opinion was that Germanization would impoverish rather than enrich the native peoples, while alienating them from themselves and violating their most human rights. Or as a follower of Herder put it, to deprive a race of its language would be nothing less than "spiritual murder".¹²

No ideology that is valid has ever been void of very concrete interests. It has been mentioned that economic and social viewpoints stood against Germanization. But they would hardly have been strong enough to discourage the nationalist tendencies of the nineteenth century.¹³ More important were the political interests involved which truly touched upon fundamentals. The whole position of the Baltic aristocracy made them necessarily antagonistic to the rising wave of nationalism as well as to the spread of the centralistic state concept. Thus in defending their aristocratic privileges the Baltic *Ritterschaften* defended also principles of a very general scope. They stood against the *cuius regio eius religio* of the sixteenth century as well as against the *cuius regio eius natio* of the nineteenth century. They could not oppose Pan-Slavism without opposing Pan-Germanism at the same time.

It is this coincidence which makes the Baltic *Kulturkampf* of the nineteenth century memorable. When a high Russian official, as mentioned above, admonished the Baltic Germans to maintain the "glory" of their provinces, he had this very viewpoint in mind: the political privileges of the Baltic aristocracy were in fact linked with fundamental ideas in poli-

¹² Cf. Herder's: "To deprive a people of its speech is to deprive it of its one eternal good" (Hayes l.c.). The Discussion of 1819 was organized by the "Kurländische Gesellschaft für Literatur und Kunst".

¹³ In the discussion of 1819 one speaker already pointed out that a policy of Germanization would be the only way to make the position of the Baltic Germans "secure". When liberal nationalism was at its height throughout Western Europe, in 1863, the Superintendent General of Riga, F. Walter, opened the diet with a sermon, in which he regretted "the omission of the past". He declared that instead of making the country thoroughly German, "tribal fragments" had been preserved for reasons of a vague sentimentality. Walter's appeal, however, was not heeded by the diet. The official spokesmen of the country rejected his viewpoint. This fact, together with the Pan Slavist reaction, forced Walter to resign. See H. Thimme, *Kirche und nationale Frage in Livland während der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (1938) chs. VIII, IX. In the second half of the 19th century the educational and linguistic activities of the Baltic pastors were continued and enlarged by the "Lettisch-literarische Gesellschaft". The society flourished and for some time offered a platform of useful Letto-German cooperation. But with the rise of the Lettish intelligentsia the paternal attitude on the part of the Germans and their conception of nationality as being only *one* expression of human and Christian values were increasingly resented. See: J. v. Hehn, *Die lettisch-literarische Gesellschaft und das Lettentum*. (1938)

tics. They contained not only the principle of provincial and local self-government but also the essence of cultural autonomy: freedom of the Church and the rights of the German language in education, jurisdiction and administration. Peter the Great, when conquering the provinces, concluded formal treaties with the Baltic estates by which he confirmed their privileges. Nowhere else on Russian soil was there anything comparable to the spirit of autonomy which pervaded the Baltic provinces. But in the course of the nineteenth century the policy of "one Czar, one faith, one language, one law" advanced until it reached the climax under Alexander III and Pobiedonostsev. It was a fateful development, we may say today, even from the Russian point of view.

In this crisis the Baltic Germans stood firmly for cultural and national decentralization, for the concept of a federalistic and multi-national empire.¹⁴ They suffered many defeats. In vain, and probably too late, they tried to broaden the basis of representation by extending it to the German middle class and the *indigènes*. These plans had to be shelved in view of the fact that any attempt of reform would have paved the way for the Pan-Slavist assault. Nothing was left save to cling strictly to the remainders of the historic self-government.¹⁵ The Young Letts and Young Estonians who for some time placed hope in the Slavophil movement were soon disappointed as the policy of Russification turned against them no less than against the Baltic Germans. Repeatedly the Orthodox Church entered upon a campaign of conversion among the Letts and Estonians; several German pastors were persecuted. But the resistance did not break down and in the religious field the Russian successes remained small. Russian censorship, however, was established, the Russian language was enforced within the provincial administration, and a Russian officialdom brought in which was largely inferior in competence when compared with the honorary office holders of the past. Eventually the struggle concentrated on the basic questions of language and education. The University of Dorpat (Tartu) was russified (except its theological faculty); as was also the Technological Institute at Riga. The "Dom-und Ritterschule" at Tallinn, "older than Eton", had to close its doors. In high and elementary schools the Russian language was generally introduced.

¹⁴ As one of them, Prof. A.v. Oettingen, put it in 1892: "Es gibt nur ein Mittel, das wahrhaft helfen kann, dass statt des krankhaften Nationalismus ein liberaler Freiheitssinn Raum fände, das grosse Reich wieder Vertrauen wecke in den Untertanen aller Nationen, dass es sich als *Staatenbund* gerire."

¹⁵ When finally in 1908 the Estonian Diet agreed upon a draft law which provided for equal representation of large and small landholders in the "circles", the Russian government vetoed the reform.

In opposing these measures and partly defeating them the Baltic *Ritterschaften* and towns fought not only for particular interests, but for the country as a whole and for the *three* nationalities residing therein. Quite a few of those Letts and Estonians who became leaders of the national states have acknowledged their indebtedness to the unconditional resistance of the Germans in the struggle over the national languages. It was unconditional because it was not based upon a merely opportunistic and egotistic attitude but derived from principles, from a conception of nationality in which Herder's notion of culture was still alive. With the Baltic Germans nationality was a spiritual and cultural rather than a political and biological fact, it was not an end in itself but an indispensable vehicle for expressing the human and eternal.¹⁶ This conception stood against every brand of fanaticism, against political as well as biological "naturalism". Nationality, as a Baltic German¹⁷ significantly put it, ought to be "light" not "flame", it should not smell of blood.

The *Kulturkampf* which was fought over these principles did not end by undermining the political loyalty of the Baltic Germans. Small groups of them left the country in despair and went into the German "exile". But among the rank and file there was no trace of irredentism or of the desire to join a "nation state". They remained up to the very end true servants of the Czars while the socialist "New Movement" among Letts and Estonians sided with the Russian proletariat. After the revolution of 1905 even a closer relationship was re-established between the ruler and the Baltic aristocracy. From one point of view they may appear as merely reactionary allies. But this view would also imply the acknowledgment that there was no other way of solving the problems of the Eastern zone of Central Europe than complete social revolution or the nationalist clash and nationalist oppression one way or the other. There is every reason, therefore, to pay attention to the various multi-national experiments going on in Central Europe before 1914. It was the special "mission" of the Baltic Germans to demonstrate that the cleavage between "fatherland" and "motherland" could be overcome, one term indicating the Western and political, the other the Eastern and cultural concept of nationality. Out of their tradition as an autonomous group they were well on the way to reconcile a divergency which was to spread in the Eastern borderlands

¹⁶ In a pamphlet of 1870 Baron E. H.v. Tiesenhausen wrote "Nationalität ist ein hohes grosses Wort, dem die Idee der Menschheit, welche alle Nationen umschlingt, zu Grunde liegt. Wo aber das Nationalbewusstsein von Rassenhass gegen fremde Nationalitäten erfüllt ist, da herrscht ein grober, particularistischer, alles auf sich selbst beziehender persönlich-nationaler Egoismus vor. Fest im Auge zu behalten ist, dass das Ewig-Menschliche höher steht als das Nationale."

¹⁷ Victor Hehn, the well known scholar and biographer of Goethe.

of Central Europe after 1918; the divergency between loyalty towards the State and affection for a culture which differed from the "State culture". From this angle the Baltic position was far from being anachronistic and reactionary. It was a prelude to problems which were to be a common fate of all national minorities and anticipated solutions which depended on a fundamental abandonment of the policy of *cuius regio eius natio*. In accordance with a long historical process it was the peculiar merit of the Baltic Germans that they not only withstood this policy when it turned against them but also withstood any temptation to apply it on their part.

III

It has been said that the fundamental Baltic problem is the struggle for dominance, latent or active, between Russia and Germany.¹⁸ The fate of the two small peoples, hemmed about in the corner between two great nations, seems realistically summarized in this sentence. But up to 1914 the history of the Baltic provinces was never faced with a clear-cut Russo-German alternative, and the tradition of being "something in between" reasserted itself after 1918. From the geographic and economic viewpoint the connection with Russia would appear as the more natural; it had replaced the old Hanseatic tie. Undoubtedly in the nineteenth century the Baltic provinces profited largely from belonging to a vast hinterland: they were Russia's famous "window" to the West. Riga, Reval and Libau handled a huge percentage of Russian foreign trade; Riga, actually Russia's first port, shipped in 1913 about 39 per cent of her total export in hides and skins, while Reval and Libau accounted between them for 55 per cent of the Russian import in chemicals.¹⁹ Since the high tariff policy of Count Witte (1896) Western firms established branches in the Baltic provinces; they helped to make them again a nucleus for the "Westernization" of Russia. Industry developed rather rapidly. Riga rose to a city of 560,000 inhabitants, of which about 100,000 were factory workers. The country prospered economically while suffering culturally from the levelling influence of Russification. The political structure, however, preserved definite features of a separate status and the Russo-German alternative remained suspended. To put it more precisely: the Baltic provinces did not become completely Russian because there was no tendency, latent or active, to make them politically German.

In fact they had never belonged to Germany proper, they stood outside

¹⁸ S. H. Thomson in a review of W. F. Reddaway's, *Problems of the Baltic*. (*Journal of Central European Affairs*, I (1941), 112.

¹⁹ For these and other statistical data see: *Peace Handbook* l.c.

the old German empire and the Bismarck Reich had no ambition to incorporate them.²⁰ This fact is the complement, as it were, to the "bimetallist" attitude of the Baltic Germans and may serve to round off the perspectives implied. In general one may say that the foundation of a strong German national state in Central Europe reacted inevitably upon all Germans living abroad. It might strengthen their national consciousness, but it also placed a heavy burden upon them: it put them, particularly those contiguous to the Reich, under the suspicion of irredentism and evoked centralistic or nationalistic countermoves. All national problems of the Eastern zone of Central Europe proved closely interrelated. In the development of the Habsburg monarchy after 1867 this fact is most conspicuous; it bore also upon the relation of the Baltic provinces to Russia. As one of the Baltic Germans put it after Sadowa: "This revolution affords one more reason for breaking our necks."²¹ It is no mere coincidence that one year later, in 1867, the first ukase was issued which introduced the Russian language into the Baltic administration. "We have to complete our work in the provinces before Germany is definitely established", said a Pan-Slavist journalist in 1869.

Bismarck was well aware of this interplay and of the fundamental problems involved.²² As long as he was only Prussian Prime Minister he tried to alleviate, through diplomatic channels, the plight of the Baltic Protestant church. As chancellor of the Reich, of a German national state, he strictly abstained from showing even the slightest interest in the *Kulturkampf* which was going on in the Baltic provinces.²³ He personally appreciated the good qualities of the Baltic stock, their sense for local independence, their tradition of honorary service which made them appear akin to the English country gentlemen. In his view the suppression of these useful elements would run very much against the Russian interests themselves.

²⁰ For the following see, apart from the present writer's studies: H. Muskat, *Bismarck und die Balten* (1934), dealing mainly with the personal connections, and from a broader viewpoint: H. Schaudinn, *Das baltische Deutschland und Bismarcks Reichsgründung* (1932, *Koenigsberger Historische Forschungen*, vol. I.)

²¹ A.v. Oettingen. See note 14.

²² For the larger framework of his ideas and his conservative views regarding the problems of nationality in the East see the present writer's: *Bismarck und der Osten*, 1934.

²³ In a dispatch of April 15, 1870 Bismarck wrote to the German Minister in Petersburg: "Es ist . . . natürlich, dass wir die Bestrebungen der deutschen Bevölkerung, ihre Nationalität und namentlich ihre Sprache zu bewahren mit Teilnahme verfolgen; wir dürfen aber niemals vergessen, dass wir ihnen unsere Sympathie nicht besser betätigen können, als dadurch, dass wir sie nicht zeigen. Es mag hart scheinen, dass wir uns vollkommen gleichgültig verhalten; es ist dies aber in der Tat der beste Dienst, den wir den Balten leisten können. Ihnen selbst gegenüber wäre es ein Unrecht, durch Beweise von Teilnahme, die nur in Worten bestehen könnte, Hoffnungen auf Beistand zu erwecken, welche immer Illusionen bleiben müssten . . ." (Bismarck, *Ges. Werke*, VIa, pp. 316-17. For much other evidence see: *Bismarck und der Osten*, p. 24-28, 81-83.

But he knew well enough that he could do the Baltic Germans no greater disservice than to take an interest in them or to intervene on their behalf. He did all he possibly could to give to the Russian Government convincing evidence of Germany's total disinterest.²⁴ Only so could he hope to stop the advance of Pan-Slavism, which for many reasons he believed to be a fateful trend. This attitude, of course, is bound up with his Russian policy in general, with his view that in the sphere of real interests no vital conflict existed between the two great countries and that only uncontrolled popular emotions or naturalist forces could lead to a clash between them. Consequently the German minorities in the East aroused no missionary or demagogic impulses in Bismarck; he took a strictly conservative stand. But he did so for much more fundamental reasons than those of expediency or diplomatic opportunism. It is often not realized that he was as far from Pan-Germanism and the use of biological and racial arguments in politics as anyone could be. Being an Eastern German himself he did not submit to the Western theory of the "nation state" or apply it in practice. The main evidence of this is, that, for many reasons, he did not want to incorporate the Austrian Germans by destroying the multinational Habsburg empire. Pseudo-national states following upon this disruption in the East, he held, would be a source of permanent political and social unrest. As to the Baltic provinces he fully realized that a German annexation would result, geographically and ethnographically, in an entirely untenable situation.²⁵ From a more general viewpoint he was inclined to see in the intermingling of peoples in the Eastern border zone of Central Europe an asset rather than a liability, a nucleus for a federal organization; he even spoke of the racial multiplicity of "riches willed by God". Thus in the last analysis his conservative conception of what nationality meant in the East and his political abandonment of the old stock of colonists corresponded to the attitude of the Baltic Germans themselves. Their position, as well as that of the new German Reich, depended upon resisting a unitary state concept and keeping the naturalist forces of race integrated within the framework of the historic states.

These Bismarckian principles were not relinquished in the period of William II, though they lost, as in other fields, something of their fundamental character.¹ While the new economic imperialism led to conflicts

²⁴ In a specific situation (1879!) he said to Saburov: "Once in a while there is talk about the Baltic provinces in order to disunite us. I feel always unhappy when I hear that Russians call them German provinces. Please call them Lettish provinces or anything else if you grudge them the character of Russian provinces."

²⁵ *Ges. Werke*, VIa, p. 526; VII, p. 221.

with Russia in the Near East as well as in the Far East, the Baltic provinces never became a political issue. As to Russia there were widespread anti-Czarist feelings among German Liberals and Socialists but no evidence can be found²⁶ of any actual tendency of annexationism or even a lively political interest regarding the Northeast. The Baltic Germans had no sympathizers within the ranks of German Leftists and the Prussian Conservatives would have shuddered at the idea of having Latvians and Estonians participate in the elections to the Prussian diet. The writings of an exiled Balt like Rohrbach were entirely ineffective up to 1914.

Thus when the war broke out Germany was in no way prepared for the situation which was to arise in the East. The so-called *Randstaatenpolitik* which eventually evolved shows all the characteristics of an improvisation; it was ill-devised and followed the military events through confused stages and in a very gradual development. In the summer of 1915 Courland was overrun. While the German authorities treated the remaining inhabitants, whether Lettish or Baltic German, "with unexpected impartiality",²⁷ Letts and Baltic Germans alike fought in the Russian ranks. Neither of them envisaged a detachment from Russia when the war opened. The Baltic Germans, in spite of the gravest test, followed their old line up to the eclipse of Czardom. They were torn, to be sure, between their two allegiances. While living in a constant atmosphere of suspicion and denunciation a considerable number of them were imprisoned or deported, and the public use of the German language was forbidden. Yet they continued their "ridge walk" without faltering in political or military loyalty. For the Letts the situation was hardly more promising at the outset. They suffered severely from war and occupation while national independence seemed far from being a practical goal. The Lettish National Party confined itself to a policy aiming for reforms and a certain measure of autonomy by means of negotiation. A Latvian Refugee's Committee was formed at St. Petersburg, but it did not obtain any definite concessions from the Czarist government. In Estonia, which was spared military operations for more than three years, the development was even slower.

The whole situation changed with the two Russian revolutions. The Kerensky government granted local autonomy to Estonia and a National

²⁶ In the vast material which Mildred S. Wertheimer gathered for her study on the "Pan-German League" there is not a single reference to the Baltic provinces. Otto Tannenbergs book *Grossdeutschland* (Berlin 1911) which, according to Gregory Meiksin's (*The Baltic Riddle*, 1944, p. 32), set forth plans for a German settlement in the Baltic provinces, has not become known to the present writer. It was certainly not published "with the approval of official institutions" (*ibid.*)

²⁷ W. F. Reddaway, *Baltic and Caucasian States* (London 1923) p. 102.

Council was elected. After the Bolshevik Revolution had declared itself for the right of "self-determination", the Estonian National Council under Paets made use of this right. On November 28, 1917, it proclaimed the complete political independence from Russia. The same step was taken by the Latvian Provisional Council under Ulmanis. But these actions were a mere prelude. The Red soldiers in Tallinn dissolved by force the Estonian government. With the disbanding of the Russian armies anarchy spread and self-determination remained only on paper. For one fateful year the real alternative was, in fact, that between German and Bolshevik domination. Up to September, 1917, the Russians, effectively supported by Lettish regiments, had succeeded in holding the Dvina front. Then the Germans conquered Riga and occupied most of Livland. For the Baltic Germans this seemed the hour of choice. With the fall of the Czars they had felt their allegiance to Russia dissolved; since November, 1917, they were faced with extinction at the hand of Russian and native Bolsheviks. All their hopes turned to Germany, and they appealed to the German government for help.²⁸ Some groups of national Letts and Estonians, however, were no less afraid of the threatening régime of social terror.²⁹ Finally the German High Command decided to continue the advance northward. In February, 1918, the rest of Livland and the whole of Estland were occupied.

But even at the time of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk (March 3, 1918) the policy of the German Reich was still very undefined as far as the Baltic provinces were concerned. Courland was separated from Russia with the provision that its future should be decided in harmony with the wishes of the population. As to Livland and Estland the Bolsheviks recognized a temporary German "police occupation" until peace and order should have been restored. It was only in an additional agreement of August 27 that the R.S.F.S.R. renounced its sovereign rights over Estonia and Livonia. Meanwhile rather confused negotiations went on regarding a personal union of the Baltic provinces with the Prussian crown, to be realized in a "federation" of one form or another. But who was entitled to speak for the country? Eventually, under the leadership of the *Ritterschaften*,³⁰ a

²⁸ In return they placed a third of their landed property at the disposal of a Colonization Fund. It was the first time that the idea of systematic German colonization came to the fore.

²⁹ In December 1917 300 Letts asked the German government for protection of the country and the Lettish people. In Estonia, according to Mr. Kaarel R. Pusta (*Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. III, p. 274) the leaders rejected in early January 1918 the German offer to proclaim independence under German protection. According to G. Meiksins (*loc. cit.* p. 44), however, Mr. Paets sent a delegation to the German Commander of Oesel Island asking for armed assistance.

Regency was established composed of four Baltic Germans, three Letts and three Estonians. This happened on November 7, 1918, two days before the German collapse. With Germany's military defeat the episodic schemes of annexationism and irredentism melted away.

IV

However short-lived the German rule over Latvia and Estonia in 1918 was, it proved consequential and showed the provinces again in the role of a European testing ground. As the *Survey* prepared by the Royal Institute of International Affairs puts it:³¹ "In spite of the devastating economic effects . . . the German occupation probably saved the Provinces from irretrievable submergence in the Soviet Union, and, as things turned out, by keeping the Bolsheviks out, made independence ultimately possible."

For one more year, however, the provinces remained a battlefield in the literal sense as well as in view of conflicting principles which again involved decisions far beyond the territorial and national interests concerned. At the outset Latvia and Estonia were not regarded in the light of Wilsonian self-determination but rather in that of the *cordon sanitaire*; they were a rampart in the socio-political struggle between West and East. While after the German collapse the Red Armies overran both countries, the Allies, paradoxically enough, made provisions according to which they could use the remaining German forces to stem the Bolshevik advance. They reserved to themselves the decision as to when Germany had to evacuate the Baltic provinces. This ambiguous policy not only caused a good deal of confusion but also led to a revival of German designs carried on by General von der Goltz and his "Baltikumers". At the same time, and under Allied patronage, the Baltic provinces became an operational basis for the interventionist policy of the Russian "Whites".

It is very much to the credit of the Estonians and Latvians that they successfully extricated themselves from this policy. They did their full share, to be sure, in averting the Bolshevik penetration into the border zone of Central Europe. In this part of the struggle the Baltic Germans also stood by their old tradition of defending Western Civilization. While the Estonians with the aid of Finnish volunteers and the German "Balten-regiment" cleared the country, Latvian troops side by side with the Corps

³⁰ The legal argument was that the old *Ritterschaften* had concluded the treaties with Russia in 1721 which were still regarded as the basis of a quasi-international position.

³¹ *The Baltic States. A Survey of the political and economic structure and the foreign relations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania* (London 1938) p. 21.

of von der Goltz and the German Baltic "Landeswehr" recaptured Riga, the latter incidentally bearing the brunt of the counter-attack. Then came a phase in which the Estonians and one section of the Lettish troops turned against and defeated the Landeswehr. The German troops finally had to retire. But the Baltic German contingent, re-organized under the English Colonel Alexander (the present Allied Commander in the Mediterranean), continued to play an important part in clearing Latvia. The Landeswehr was small in man power and suffered heavy losses, but practically everybody joined it who could carry a rifle. Being socially and culturally a conservative element the Baltic Germans contributed in an appreciable and, in fact, appreciated way to the foundation of the new states whose very existence depended on the closing of the revolutionary crater. In domestic affairs Latvia and Estonia became strictly anti-communistic. In foreign matters, however, they soon liquidated the interventionist policy of the Whites and tried to normalize their relations with Russia. After the failure of General Yudenich's offensive his army was dissolved on its return to Estonia. In February and August, 1920, peace treaties were agreed upon between the new states and the Soviet Union which included the *de jure* recognition of the independence of Estonia and Latvia.

The recognition by the Western powers was slower to come. They did not envisage a "dismemberment" of Russia as long as they maintained the hope that the Soviet system eventually would break down. And even with this hope fading they were not particularly enthusiastic about the rise of small nations in the Northeastern corner of Central Europe. Great Britain and France accepted the new order belatedly in January, 1921. The United States did not follow until July, 1922. They then qualified their action by declaring that it did not imply an "alienation of Russian territory" because the government of the Baltic States was set up by "the indigenous populations."

The road of domestic reconstruction was even thornier than that which led to international recognition. The countryside was thoroughly ravaged, a large part of the industrial equipment had been evacuated and the cutting off from the Russian hinterland deeply affected the economic structure. The result was a shift to agrarianism and a decline of Baltic urban life. Riga's population in 1931 numbered almost 200,000 less than in 1913, in the same period the workers engaged in heavy industry decreased from 22,000 to 10,000 and from 45,000 to 25,000 in Estonia and Latvia respectively. The Baltic provinces fell back into a "semi-colonial"

economy, as a pro-Soviet critic of their political independence puts it.³² In fact they lived largely from the export of their agricultural surplus (especially butter, bacon, flax, timber) to the United Kingdom and later to Germany. Attempts to re-open the Russian trade (Latvian-Soviet agreement of 1927) were of little avail and, if Mr. Meiksins is correct,³³ were opposed by Great Britain. But within the given conditions economic progress was very considerable. To give one instance: The production of butter more than doubled in Estonia between 1925 and 1930 and almost trebled in Latvia.³⁴ The cooperative system gained greatly in importance and the growth of the Estonian oil shale industry was another evidence of the care devoted to the development of natural resources.

In the political field the task was no less difficult. After profound social changes and without any previous experience in democratic processes the system of proportional representation did not work too well. Eventually parliamentary government broke down and ended in semi-fascism. But it can be said that in view of the prevailing conditions Latvia and Estonia show a record that compares not unfavorably with that of other new democracies. On the whole they abstained from the dangerous game of power politics while placing emphasis on internal consolidation and particularly on education. It is not the intention of the present writer to substantiate this statement in detail. The pros and cons in the balance of Latvian and Estonian independence have been amply put before the public by interested authors.³⁵ And there are also a number of very positive accounts by neutral observers.³⁶ There is one aspect of the whole picture, however, which connects the phase of Latvian and Estonian independence with the other traditions of the Baltic provinces which may be stressed. The new states broke away from the Western conception of nationality or rather kept to the distinction between political and cultural nationality. Their attitude differed remarkably from that embodied in the Versailles

³² G. Meiksins, *loc. cit.*, p. 31

³³ *ibid.*, pp. 80-82

³⁴ *The Baltic States*, p. 113

³⁵ See the essays by Mr. Pusta and Dr. Bilmanis in this *Journal* (vols. III and IV). See also the pamphlets edited by the Latvian Legation in Washington (L. Ekis, *Latvia, Struggle for Independence*, 1942; idem, *Latvia, Economic Resources and Capacities*, 1942; A. Bilmanis, *The Baltic States and the Baltic Sea*, 1943; idem, *What Latvia wishes from this war*, 1943.) and A. Pulleritis, *Estonia*, Talinn, 1937. From a pro-Soviet angle a severe criticism is offered by Mr. G. Meiksins in the book cited before.

³⁶ In addition to the studies of Professor Reddaway and the *Survey* of the Royal Institute reference may be made to the article by Mr. Pick in this *Journal* (vol. III, 4) as well as to: J. H. Jackson, *Estonia*, London 1941; Hobson, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Latvia*, London 1938 and H. G. Wanklyn, *The Eastern Marchlands of Europe*, London 1941, (ch. III, IV).

treaties for the protection of national minorities. The very idea of "protection" implied some abnormality which had to be tolerated for political reasons yet at the same time was contrary to the "natural" forms of political life.³⁷ The Estonian, and to some extent the Latvian, legislations regarding national minorities went farther. They relinquished the theory of the *nation une et indivisible* and the principle of *cuius regio eius natio*. There were various reasons for this progressive policy. One obviously was that the minorities were small in percentage, the Germans in particular being decimated and impoverished by drastic agrarian laws and other measures of expropriation. They were past assimilation but no longer a danger. Another reason was that the Estonian and Latvian middle classes, the specific carrier of nationalism, were also small in number, the agrarian parties did not care very much for the national issue, the land question once being settled in the form of German expropriation. But it is also apparent that the leading national groups in the new states accepted the idea of cultural autonomy, from which they had benefitted themselves and saw in it something like a glory of the country. The author remembers an Estonian statesman saying that this piece of legislation was a kind of "visiting card" put by the newcomers before the eyes of Western Europe.

That the Baltic Germans favored cultural autonomy needs no explanation. It was the very heritage they had handed down and one may well say that both their traditional appraisal of personal nationality and their abstention from a Germanizing policy now came to a late fruition. In fact the last phase in the history of the old colonial stock is not without a deep significance. They had lost all privileges which had been concomitant with aristocratic autonomy. Their numbers had almost been halved by deportation and executions, by losses in the war and by emigration to Germany. But about 80,000 stayed on.³⁸ They clung to the small slices of land which had been left to them and continued to cultivate the very uneconomically shaped "residual estates" (*Restgüter*) of 50 ha.³⁹ They often accepted a semi-proletarian existence in what, after all, was their home country too. Though handicapped and restricted in many ways they proved loyal citizens of the new states and took active part in political life.

³⁷ The parallel to this was in the religious field that phase of practical or legal toleration during which *cuius regio eius religio* was still a valid principle and the three main denominations still upheld the theory of "one faith".

³⁸ According to the census of 1934-35: 16346 in Estonia and 62,144 in Latvia. At the end of the nineteenth century the total had been about 150,000.

³⁹ A sympathetic description of some realities of the Baltic Land "Reform" and of the living conditions of the "Barons" after 1920 can be found in A. Ruhl, *New Masters of the Baltic*. New York, 1921.

They did so to the degree granted by the system of proportional representation and with the advantage of a firm tradition and a high cultural level. It was the German party in the Estonian diet which, in line with the promises of the Constitution of 1920, drafted the Cultural Autonomy Law and eventually put it through in 1925.⁴⁰

The law provided for the self-government of any cultural entity of no less than 3,000 persons who were prepared to undertake this responsibility. The criterion of membership within such a group was a merely subjective one: it consisted solely in a personal registration regardless of descent or any blood test. Here ideas came in which before 1914 had been advocated by Austrian socialists like Renner as a solution for the problems of a multinational state with mixed populations. As in a case like this the establishment of provincial self-government along national lines was impossible, the creation of abstract and merely personal "communities"⁴¹ was suggested, to be composed of those who registered for a certain nationality. It is obvious that in the Baltic provinces the ground was well prepared for these ideas and was fertilized by the continuance of a spiritual notion of nationality and by the survival of medieval forms of group personality. The previous struggle against the unitary state concept had also its bearing upon the consolidation of national issues along federal lines. What was achieved in the Estonian Law had the effect of "disestablishing" nationality, as Macartney puts it very aptly.⁴² He adds the following interpretation: "With cultural autonomy, each national community within a state becomes the master of such of its affairs as genuinely concern itself alone, in its national-cultural life, while joining with the other nationalities for the conduct of those political and economic activities which interest all equally."

This disestablishment was exercised by granting to the national minorities in Estonia the right to choose Cultural Councils which administered churches and schools and other cultural and charitable institutions and levied taxes upon their own members. The Jews and the Germans availed themselves of this opportunity, whereas the Russians, nearly five times as numerous as the Germans, were not on a level to do so. It is generally agreed that the law operated very satisfactorily. Far from creating a state within the state it kept a large amount of national and cultural divergency

⁴⁰ The best discussion of the legislation in English is found in C. A. Macartney, *National State and National Minorities*, pp. 407 f., 469.

⁴¹ A parallel under very different conditions may be seen in the program of "communism" within the British Commonwealth. See: W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, vol. I, *passim*.

⁴² *Loc. cit.*, p. 469. Just as *cuius regio eius natio* was a parallel to *cuius regio eius religio* the disestablishment of nationality repeats on a broader scale that of the churches.

out of Parliament and political life. The solution reached in Latvia (Law of Scholastic Autonomy) was also of a progressive type though not of the same fundamental importance as the Estonian "model" law. National animosities, of course, did not disappear altogether but the edge was taken off them and a reconciliation between the two loyalties, the political and the cultural, was made possible.

The implications of this settlement, as indicated before, pointed towards a much more comprehensive goal than that of merely stabilizing and pacifying the domestic life of two small Baltic states. They had been again a "battleground of fundamental ideas in politics", and the Estonian solution was praised by a large number of national groups, whether German or non-German, who were faced with the same problem of a double allegiance. Cultural autonomy, to be sure, did not fit the conditions of economically weak and backward or of outright irredentistic minorities. It offered no panacea. But the principle involved was generally regarded as a new hopeful departure, particularly so in the unsettled Eastern zone of Central Europe. In 1926 it was warmly and unanimously recommended by the "Congress of European Nationalities".⁴³ And it is a symptomatic fact that within this movement, which was based on the acknowledgment of a common cause and a mutual obligation, Baltic Germans played a prominent part. They were once more in the vanguard. The first meeting of the Congress of European Nationalities, whose gatherings became an important annual feature, was due to the initiative of the Germans in Estonia. The permanent secretary was a Baltic German and much of the theoretical study on the subject of "State and Nation" was done by Baltic authors like M. Schieman, the liberal leader of the Latvian Germans, and Professor K. Stavenhagen in Riga.⁴⁴ The front of this movement turned against the materialist conception of the sovereign state, against state centralization and national uniformity. Nation and State were widely recognized as separate entities which had coincided in some cases but did not necessarily do so and whose coincidence was by no means the definite and ideal norm for a stable organization of Europe. On the contrary a great step in human advance could be taken by finding a way of dissociating the two spheres in principle. The minorities felt that, far from being a liability, they had a European mission. They looked forward to the day when

⁴³ *Loc. cit.* p. 469. See the comprehensive list of members (including about 20 non-German groups) *ibid.* p. 394, note 1.

⁴⁴ Cf. M. Schieman, "Volksgemeinschaft und Staatsgemeinschaft", *Staat und Nation* (Sept. 1927) and K. Stavenhagen, *Das Wesen der Nation*, (especially ch. 72: "Staat und Nation im mitteleuropäischen Völkerstreugebiet.")

nations could organize themselves independently of political frontiers along the same lines as churches had done. It seems safe to say that this international movement held out the hope of peace between nations following upon and making real the peace between states.

V

The rise of totalitarianism in its various forms and particularly of the Hitler movement was a deadly threat to this perspective and eventually ruined the basis for any organic and conservative solution of the minority problems. Etatism of the fascist type was extremely anti-federalistic and denied the very idea of cultural autonomy. Even more disastrous was the impact of National Socialism with its materialistic interpretation of race and blood. In theory and practice Hitler did precisely what Bismarck had always refused to do, and the proclamation of a national "biologism" was the exact opposite of the old Prussian idea of the state as well as the German Baltic conception of national culture. Although in the National Socialist view nations were genuine racial entities and hence a policy of assimilation and denationalization appeared absurd and against nature, this position no longer had anything in common with Herder's appraisal of national spontaneity and a basic equality before God; it rather meant a total reversal of all Christian values and a crude naturalism. Theory and practice taught that while non-German minorities within the Reich could never become full-fledged citizens, German minorities abroad were valuable only to the extent of their integration into the totalitarian political system: one leader, one nation, one Reich. In strange contrast to its imperialist aims National Socialism was obsessed by the idea of national "purity", again in contrast to its criticism of nineteenth century politics it submitted totally to the conception of the nation state, even to the extent of proclaiming for its completion the "remedy" of transplantation and exchange of minorities. No more mechanical method of solving a problem can be thought of; it was to prove most destructive of the historical conditions of life in Central Europe, particularly when handled autocratically.

Fascist and National Socialist ideas and practices spread to the Baltic provinces, to the leading groups in the new states as well as to the Baltic Germans. It is still too early to write the tragic history of the Germans abroad in the period of Nazification. As to the Baltic Germans⁴⁵ it is

⁴⁵ The following brief analysis is mainly based on personal observations and conversations. Reference may be made to the article on "Deutschhalten und baltische Länder" in *Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtums*, 1936, III, pp. 104-241. Besides a large amount of valuable factual information the article is interesting as a contemporary source

obvious that some aspects of Nazi ideology appealed to them, such as the glorification of the soil (*Boden*) to which they clung so desperately. For the first time, as it were, they felt that they were not a forgotten and dispensable outpost. The claim of Germanic superiority could not but attract a group which actually had been a "master-race" through centuries. Moreover a certain sense of guilt, of a faulty aristocratic exclusiveness, made the Baltic Germans susceptible to demagogic criticism and awoke the longing for a broader popular community. The Baltic youth in particular, deprived of many features of their traditional life, embarked with undeniable idealism upon the "socialist" aspects of the program; they joined with great zeal the labor camps and a voluntary land service envisaging the realization of a true and classless *Volksgemeinschaft*. In addition a more trivial motive worked: since the economic crisis the cultural autonomy of the Baltic Germans had become more and more dependent upon financial subsidies from the Reich. On the other hand, however, there was much grumbling and also a very deep-set opposition to Nazism among the Baltic Germans. They had never received orders from Berlin, nor leaders who had been trained outside the country. In spite of all ostentatious sympathy which they were shown many of them saw clearly enough that the "Third Reich" was as opposite to their own political and cultural traditions as anything could be, and that the Pan-Germanist and totalitarian propaganda was a boomerang threatening their very existence. In particular the genuine Lutheranism of the provinces which had never been diluted by nineteenth century liberalism and secularism reacted sharply against the New-Heathenism of Rosenberg's followers. It would be entirely misleading to see in Alfred Rosenberg, because he was a middle-class man from Reval, a "typical Baltic German." He was no more so than Houston Stewart Chamberlain was a typical Englishman.

While this struggle went on the spectre of the expansion of Fascism and Nazism was certainly one factor⁴⁶ in determining the Soviet attitude towards the Baltic provinces. Again and in a very fatal sense they became a "battle-ground of fundamental ideas in politics". It is generally known what role they played in the abortive Moscow talks of the summer of 1939.⁴⁷ Chamberlain and Daladier refused to agree to concessions which would have

mirroring the rising tensions within the Baltic ideology. (cf. esp. "Wesen und Kräfte des baltischen Deutschtums" by R. Wittram, pp. 194-200, and "Jugendarbeit und Erwachsenenbildung" by A. Frh. v. Taube, pp. 217-18).

⁴⁶ In Mr. Meiksin's presentation it would appear as the only one. But there can hardly be any doubt that the Soviet renunciation of their "window" in 1920 had never been regarded by them as a definite solution of the Baltic problem.

given to Russia practically a free hand in the Baltic states. Hitler, however, was prepared to pay this price.

The establishment of "spheres of influence" in Eastern Europe, however provisional it may have been meant on the part of the National Socialist government, certainly put a definite end to Baltic German history. The Russo-German pact of August 23, 1939, was followed by the withdrawal of the old stock of colonists. In October the transfer began. The evacuees from Latvia numbered between 47,000 and 49,000. Those from Estonia between 11,000 and 13,000.⁴⁸ Only the old and sick and those who nursed them remained. It was formally a voluntary exodus but with all the well known characteristics of "volunteering" which have become common in German life. Another stimulus, naturally, was the fear of communist occupation. The transfer appears to have been carried out with great efficiency and thoroughness; it was officially hailed as a happy homecoming (*Heimkehr ins Reich*). But no high-sounding slogan or comforting pageantry could conceal the fact that the Baltic Germans had lost their home and, as it were, their face too. Their settlement in Western Poland, forcibly organized by a central authority, was like a caricature of the old German colonization in the East which had a religious and cultural rather than a nationalist meaning. As far as the Baltic Germans were concerned this throwback violated all principles for which they had stood in history.⁴⁹

This may seem to be a small matter, after all. And did not the removal of the Germans simplify the problems of the independent Baltic states by finally eliminating an alien element? Shortsighted nationalist groups in Estonia and Latvia may have taken this view. In reality the eclipse of the Germans was an index of what was in store for the Baltic states. The German withdrawal though, of course, not the cause, was concomitant with the eclipse of the political independence of Latvia and Estonia themselves. In September and October, 1939, treaties of mutual assistance

⁴⁷ David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1939-42* (New Haven, 1942) p. 9, 13, 32, 40, 41, 93. Cf. G. Meiksin's suggestive comment: The Moscow talks slipped "on the banana peel" of the Baltic problem. There was, of course, more to it than that.

⁴⁸ Cf. H. Wachenheim, "Hitler's Transfer of Population in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1942, and E. C. Helmreich, "The Return of the Baltic Germans," *American Political Science Review*, Aug. 1942. No German sources were available to the present author.

⁴⁹ How many returned after the outbreak of the Soviet-German War and the new German occupation of the Baltic provinces is not known to the author. The slogan of the "return of the Barons" certainly does not fit into the picture of the Nazi *Ostpolitik*. Those Baltic German elements who were permitted to come back are likely to have been selected from a small, thoroughly indoctrinated group. (Cf. G. Meiksins, p. 193 who, however, in this respect largely contradicts himself, and J. Joesten, "German Rule in Ostland", *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1943, p. 146). Dutch and Danish Nazis were also admitted.

were forced upon them which included the cession of military bases to the Soviet Union. Moreover with the evacuation of the Baltic Germans the broader problems of an intermediate and uneasy border zone bearing upon a definite settlement in the East were accentuated rather than alleviated.⁵⁰ A factor disappeared which had always been a nucleus of cultural conservatism and a link between the provinces and Western Europe. Its elimination was, as it were, part of a de-Westernization; it weakened, paradoxically enough, the national structure, i.e. the middle class basis of Latvia and Estonia. If it simplified their internal problems, it did so with the effect that the political issue was overshadowed by the social issue between the agrarian and industrial proletariat on the one hand and the prosperous peasants, the so-called "grey barons" on the other.

This conflict came into play in the summer of 1940. It is agreed that up to the end of the Finnish War (March 12, 1940) the Russian occupational forces abstained correctly from interfering in domestic matters of the Baltic states.⁵¹ Even an underground communist movement was discontinued. Tension, however, grew. Then, after the fall of France, the Red army rolled into Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. If this act of aggression may appear to some extent justified from the viewpoint of security, it clearly also meant the beginning of a social revolution. Events moved rather rapidly. Under the pressure of short-termed ultimatums the Baltic countries accepted pro-Soviet governments, composed of local sympathizers. In July, 1940, elections were held, in the presence of the Red Army and in the true totalitarian style of a single-list system. On July 21 the diets which resulted from these manipulated elections proclaimed "triumphantly", as the official Soviet comment puts it,⁵² "the establishment of Soviet power, i.e. the dictatorship of the proletariat." They also voted to petition for admittance to the Soviet Union. This request was granted by the Supreme Soviet in August 1940. One may well say that the policies of *cuius regio eius religio* and *cuius regio eius natio* were succeeded by one of *cuius regio eius ordo socialis*. In the Soviet view a "plebiscite" is only legitimate if the

⁵⁰ From a European viewpoint, therefore, the transfer of the Baltic Germans seems to be of much greater importance than the simultaneous one of the more numerous Germans from South Tirol. The latter, though as anti-historic and mechanical as the former, concerned only the German and the Italian peoples.

⁵¹ Bilmanis, *Latvia in 1939-42*. p. 22; Meiksins *loc. cit.* p. 115f.

⁵² Cf. the article on the Constitutions of the Baltic Soviet Socialist Republics (transl. from Russian) in *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, publ. by the American Russian Institute, vol. IV, 1 (April 1941), p. 28. Excerpts from the Latvian Constitution in Appendix to A. Bilmanis' article in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, IV (1944), 44-60. About the procedure of admittance to the Soviet Union see: *The American Quarterly*, vol. III (Nov. 1940), pp. 101-04.

influence of the ruling group is excluded and but one program presented to the masses; a plebiscite then implies essentially the "choice of a social system"⁵³.

This does not mean that Latvia and Estonia were sovietized outright in the same radical way as would have been the case in 1919. In the intervening 20 years a lesson had been learned and a more flexible policy adopted. Though the "Constitution of the Baltic Soviet Socialist Republics" followed closely the pattern of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. important exceptions were granted in order to effect a "gradual transition from socialism to communism."⁵⁴ Nationalization did not extend to small industrial and commercial enterprises and to small apartment houses, nor was a system of collective farming enforced. Though the land was declared state property in principle it was left to the toiling peasants for "use in perpetuity" provided the individual share did not exceed the standard size of 30 ha. A new land reform raised the small farmers and agricultural workers to this standard. It was towards their basic interests, and against those of the "grey barons," that the new social system was mainly directed. In addition large industries and houses of a certain size, institutions of banking and transportation, hospitals and drugstores, cinemas and theatres were nationalized. In Estonia this happened to a large percentage of enterprises, but it is pointed out that the socialist sector did not amount to more than 10% of the economic total. In the Baltic provinces, as again the official Soviet comment says,⁵⁵ "the state of workers and peasants had not the same meaning as in the rest of the U.S.S.R. where the exploiting classes were already liquidated." It would appear, however, that in the one year of Soviet rule the process of liquidation made considerable progress. The details are controversial. While Mr. Meiksins only admits a number of "voluntary emigrants" to Russia, large lists have been drawn up of those members of the middle class and particularly the intelligentsia who are reported as executed or deported.⁵⁶ It seems that the Baltic churches also suffered severely.⁵⁷

The Soviet rule came to an end with the German conquest in July

⁵³ David J. Dallin, *Russia and Postwar Europe* (New Haven 1943), pp. 129, 138-39.

⁵⁴ *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, vol. IV, p. 30

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ About the liquidations in Latvia see: A. Bilmanis, *Latvia 1939-42*, pp. 28-30 and lists (pp. 120-21) showing a number of more than 20,000 persons exiled and a total loss of 34,000 persons. The details are obtained from the International Red Cross. For Estonia, K. R. Pusta in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, III (1943), 286, even speaks of more than 60,000 deported persons and an intention to scatter the whole population. There seems to be no evidence for this view.

⁵⁷ Cf. Adolph Keller, *Christian Europe today*, pp. 53-54

1941. Again it is controversial whether and to what extent the Germans were hailed as "liberators." According to information available in this country, it appears that "cooperation" in Latvia and Estonia was more passive than in Lithuania.⁵⁸ Throughout the Baltic area the issue was clearly divided between social and national viewpoints. While middle class men in Latvia and Estonia or some groups among them may have expected social protection from Nazi Germany they were hardly under any illusion as far as their national aims were concerned. In fact the amount of home rule which was accorded to Latvia and Estonia has largely remained on paper. And it is obviously the Red Army to which in turn will fall the task of liberating the Baltic countries from the German rule.

But it is also obvious that this liberation will differ fundamentally from that of other occupied countries. As everyone knows, the Soviet policy claims that the fate of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is a purely domestic affair and it strictly opposes any scheme of federal union in the North-eastern zone of Central Europe. Here a clash of principles becomes apparent, and it would serve no sound purpose to veil this fact. Neither the historic nor the economic basis of the Soviet claim is convincing. The one appeals to the title of Czarist conquest which, however, never resulted in a full incorporation of the Baltic provinces. Moreover this historic claim runs against the whole trend of the last historic phase. No more does the other basis of the claim justify political incorporation since the economic needs can obviously be complied with in less cogent forms. The weakest basis of the claim, however, is the insistence upon the *fait accompli* as evidenced by the "plebiscites" of 1940. For perfectly good reasons this *fait accompli* has so far been denied international recognition. On July 23, 1940, Mr. Sumner Welles publicly denounced the "devious processes" by which the political independence of the Baltic States was to be eliminated. And whatever the character of the events in detail, by no means can they be interpreted as following from the "freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned" or being in accord with the second and third principles of the Atlantic Charter.

Thus it appears that the Baltic Provinces again have become a "battle-ground of fundamental ideas in politics." The issue may be shelved for the sake of convenience or in view of the merits or the power of the Russian ally or the necessity of cooperation. It nevertheless exists and its outcome, far from being a merely domestic affair, is of undeniable international importance. By the small nations the solution will be regarded as a test

⁵⁸ Cf. J. Joesten, "German Rule in Ostland", *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1943, p. 143.

case. Moreover it will largely reflect upon the strategic situation in the whole Northeastern zone of Central Europe. The final incorporation of the Baltic Provinces into the Soviet Union would make them again the basis for a newly established *dominium maris Baltici* and at the same time an ideological outpost: the one example (nearest to Central Europe) of a social re-interpretation of nationality. In accordance with its federal structure the Soviet Union has abstained from any policy of Russification; its component parts have even the formal right of secession and have been recently promised autonomy in the military and diplomatic field.⁵⁹ If in view of the strength of party and bureaucracy this may appear theoretical the principle of cultural autonomy has certainly to be taken very seriously. Reversing the previous Baltic position this principle is now proclaimed from the East: *ex Oriente lux*. In fact, the Soviet Union excels in a complete tolerance of linguistic and cultural varieties and the keen interest which is devoted to folklore almost recalls Herder and his followers. But it serves a different purpose, that of a social awakening, and its tendentious meaning, its polemic turn against the older conceptions of nationality is summarized in the programmatic words: "national in form, socialist in content." That is to say: national tolerance is only possible on the basis of a socialist society. For the application of this claim the Baltic countries have already been a testing ground. In October 1939 Vilna was returned to Lithuania by voluntary cession on the part of the Byelorussian Republic. "Such an example of an amiable solution of a territorial problem," says the official comment,⁶⁰ "is inconceivable in the capitalist world." In fact, borderlines and minorities are of no importance among Soviet republics and nationality itself appears "disestablished" in a new sense while subordinate to the choice of a new social system. Only by departing from capitalism do nations become truly "independent" and fraternally united. Here then a program of "salvation" is offered to the West which may appeal in particular to a zone where the middle class is weak or has been weakened, or is in process of liquidation. This perspective too is implied in the fate of Estonia and Latvia; it makes the future of the Baltic Provinces again a fundamental issue.

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⁵⁹ The announcement of this promise by Foreign Secretary Molotov linked it expressly with the "idea of the multi-national state". For the reality of "secession" and the comparison with the British Commonwealth, see the characteristic comment of W. K. Hancock (*Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, vol. I, p. 500): "The right of secession is acclaimed in the U.S.S.R. but it does not exist there. One is almost tempted to say the right exists in the British Commonwealth but is not acclaimed there."

⁶⁰ *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, vol. IV. 6, p. 38.

TRAINING FOR CITIZENSHIP IN THE AUSTRIAN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS DURING THE REIGN OF FRANCIS I¹

by R. John Rath

From 1792 to 1835, the ruler of Austria was Francis I. Like his progenitors in the Habsburg family, Emperor Francis envisaged the heterogeneous people constituting his empire as forming one big family wholly subject to his imperial will. In his opinion, the monarchy and all its inhabitants were nothing but a proprietary possession of the Habsburg family, over which God's divine sanctification and the right of primogeniture gave him the prerogatives and responsibilities of a paternalistic overlord. Francis always spoke of "my state," "my army," and "my people;" never of "the Austrian state," "the Austrian army," or "the Austrian people." His political outlook was strictly dynastic and personal. In his opinion, the very existence of Austria always was inextricably interwoven with the subsistence of the Habsburg dynasty. To him the monarchy was never a concern of the people who constituted it but a problem of the dynasty and the higher state officials. He felt that he himself personified the empire, and he could never separate his own person from the state. Under these conditions, it was inevitable that such patriotism as existed in Austria was dynastic and personal and that the main bond tying the various peoples of the empire together was devotion to the person of the monarch.²

The pillars upon which these lofty notions of the omnipotence and ubiquitousness of the reigning Habsburg monarch rested were the bureaucracy, the Church, the army, and the nobility. After the administrative reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, an all-embracing but unwieldy and poorly articulated bureaucracy supervised, under the emperor's perpetual surveillance, all phases of public life in the non-Hungarian lands of the sprawling monarchy. The bureaucracy was a pliant tool which Francis I and other Habsburg sovereigns were able to use to enforce their will over the variegated inhabitants of the Austrian polyglot.³

¹ Most of the material on which this article is based was collected by the writer in 1937-38, while he was studying in Vienna as a pre-doctoral field fellow of the Social Science Research Council.

² Meynert, Hermann, *Kaiser Franz I. Zur Geschichte seiner Regierung und seiner Zeit. Nach Originalmittheilungen und ungedruckten Quellen* (Vienna, 1872), pp. 40-1; Srbik, Heinrich Ritter von, *Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch* (Munich, 1925), I, 432, 446; Jászi, Oscar, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago, 1929), pp. 33, 135, and 433; Brunner, Otto, "The Political Ideas of the Hapsburg Monarchy," *International Studies Conference, Tenth Session, Paris, June 28-July 3, 1937*, p. 4.

³ For a revealing and critical analysis of the nature of the early nineteenth century

The Roman Catholic Church played an unusually important rôle in supporting the monarchy in the early part of the nineteenth century. It "put at the disposition of the Emperor without reserve its own spiritual, moral, and political forces."⁴ Francis I was particularly grateful for the support which the altar gave him, and at every turn he aided the clergy in strengthening their religious and moral influence over the Austrian people. He believed that the possession of deep religious convictions by his subjects was indispensable for the subsistence of an upright, peaceful, and contented citizen body.⁵ He associated unbelief and skepticism with that perilous revolutionary spirit which had engulfed France in a maelstrom of chaos and horror⁶ and was convinced that religion provided the only secure basis for the existing social order. Holding such views, Emperor Francis gave the greatest possible encouragement to the efforts of the clergy to instill a feeling of fervent piety in the hearts of the Austrian people.⁷

The Church supported the monarchy through words and moral influence; the army fought for the emperor on the field of battle. The army was viewed as the exclusive property not of the Austrian Fatherland but of the ruler. To the last days of the empire, it was one of the main props of the dynasty.⁸ The nobility functioned, at least in the eyes of Francis I, as the mighty defender of the principles of stability and absolute monarchism and served as an intermediary between the crown and the people. The highest positions in the army, the administration, and the Church were reserved for them. The leading noblemen had enormous powers and highly valued social and political prerogatives, which the Habsburg emperor zealously guarded against attack and impairment.⁹

Austrian bureaucracy, see Anonymous [Adrian-Warburg, Viktor], *Oesterreich und dessen Zukunft* (Hamburg, 1843-47), I, 21-66.

⁴ Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 155.

⁵ Kropatschek, Joseph, *Oesterreichs Staatsverfassung vereinbart mit den zusammengezogenen bestehenden Gesetzen, zum Gebrauche der Staatsbeamten, Advokaten, Oekonomen, Obrigkeiten, Magistrate, Geistlichen, Bürger und Bauern, zum Unterrichte, für angehende Geschäftsmänner* (Vienna, 1794-?), II, 1-2.

⁶ Srbik, *Metternich*, Vol. I, p. 385; Beidtel, Ignaz, *Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung, 1740-1848* (Innsbruck, 1896-98), Vol. II, p. 278. Also see Metternich to Tsar Alexander, Troppau, Dec. 15, 1820, Metternich-Winneburg, Richard, *Aus Metternich's nachgelassenen Papieren* (Vienna, 1880-82), Vol. III, pp. 406-7.

⁷ Srbik, *Metternich*, I, 383-84; Beidtel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung*, II, 102, 277-78; Gross-Hoffinger, A. J., *Leben, Wirken und Tod des Kaisers [Francis I] Ein Charakter- und Zeitgemälde* (Stuttgart, 1835), p. 21.

⁸ Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, pp. 141-42, and 436; Srbik, *Metternich*, I, 385.

⁹ Gross-Hoffinger, *Leben, Wirken und Tod des Kaisers*, pp. 142-43; Srbik, *Metternich*, I, 380; Beidtel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung*, II, 13 and 42; Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, pp. 150-51.

Thus the emperor regarded the bureaucracy, the Church, the army, and the nobility as the foundation-stones of the monarchy. The middle class he viewed with suspicion, for he feared that such hated revolutionary and liberal doctrines as were being proselytized in Austria were chiefly nourished and forwarded by them. To keep bourgeois "Jacobins" from infecting the "good" elements of the population with their revolutionary views was the duty of the large and omnipresent police and censorship administrations which were so highly perfected during Francis I's reign. The emperor was not the least bit alarmed, however, about the opinions of the Austrian peasants and workingmen. He felt that their sole interest in life was in making a living for themselves and in protecting such property as they possessed. They wanted only peace and quiet and were innately opposed to radical changes so long as their own material interests were not threatened by the *status quo*; hence Emperor Francis believed that nurturing the material welfare of the Austrian peasants and the working classes was to be one of the first cares of his government.¹⁰

Stability and peace were the emperor's immutable watchwords. The tribulations which he had suffered during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras had given him an almost hysterical fear of the revolutionary spirit. He was able to see in the French Revolution nothing more than a horrible attempt to overthrow all law and order. Liberalism, democracy, constitutionalism, (and nationalism he associated with revolutionary anarchy, terror, and libertinism. He was firmly convinced that the devotees of these radical "isms" had no other intent than to destroy everything which legally existed and to overturn all public morals, customs, law, and religion. Francis I had lost all faith in new ideas. His sole aim was to preserve the old Austrian system.¹¹

Possessing such highly conservative political and social views, Emperor Francis insisted on having a citizen body which would be unfailingly obsequious to the clergy, the bureaucracy, and the monarch. All his

¹⁰ Srbik, *Metternich*, I, 380-82; Beidtel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung*, II, 77; Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 76.

¹¹ See especially Gross-Hoffinger, *Leben, Wirken und Tod des Kaisers*, pp. 117-18, and 146-47; Srbik, *Metternich*, I, 364-65, 445, 449; Meyner, *Kaiser Franz I*, p. 45; Bermann, Moriz, *Oesterreich-Ungarn im neunzehnten Jahrhundert. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung aller wichtigen Vorfälle in der Geschichte, Wissenschaft, Kunst, Industrie und dem Volksleben* (Vienna, 1884), p. 419; Bibl, Viktor, *Kaiser Franz und sein Erbe* (Vol. I of his *Der Zerfall Oesterreichs*) (Vienna, 1922), pp. 358-59; Schlesier, Gustav (ed.), *Briefe und vertraute Blätter von Friedrich von Gentz* (Mannheim, 1838-40), III, 54-9, and 68-9, and V, 90-3; Metternich to Tsar Alexander, Troppau, Dec. 15, 1820, *Aus Metternich's nachgelassenen Papieren*, III, 399-420; Metternich to Tsar Alexander, Laibach, May 6, 1821, *ibid.*, pp. 474-76; and Metternich to a foreign representative, Laibach, May 12, 1821, *ibid.*, pp. 482-83.

subjects were to be permeated with religious and moral precepts and saturated with the traditions of the monarchy. Each inhabitant of the empire was to consider his own station in life as ordained by God. Every resident of the Austrian polyglot was to perform his work, whatever it was, peaceably and industriously, to pay his taxes and other obligations honestly and cheerfully, to attend mass and confession humbly and submissively, and to serve his emperor loyally and obediently. Every Austrian citizen was to consider politics as none of his concern but as the divine privilege of his emperor.

Mindful that the Austrian schools could play a portentous rôle in helping to mould a citizenry with such characteristics and attitudes, Emperor Francis from the first days of his reign made public education one of his principal cares. In 1795, he appointed an imperial school revision commission to examine all educational institutions in the empire with the aim of suggesting desirable reforms. In 1802, gymnasiums were reestablished in the country districts and a separate director was appointed for each gymnasium in the monarchy. A little later, new school laws were decreed which carefully prescribed the textbooks to be used in all schools in the land. Early in 1804, the German elementary schools in Austria were completely reorganized. A much closer connection between education and religion than had formerly prevailed in the elementary schools was effectuated and the clergy were given greater influence over the schools. Much non religious material was cut out of the curriculum, and the greatest care was taken to insure that no matters of radical political nature were taught to the pupils. Furthermore, an attempt was made to give elementary education a much more practical character than it had ever had before, and teacher training was required of all persons who intended to teach. Finally, in 1808 an imperial school commission was established in the imperial chancellery to supervise all Austrian educational affairs. The set-up initiated by these enactments was not substantially modified until after Emperor Francis' death.¹⁴

Both before and after the inauguration of these reforms, Austrian schools were classified into two categories: higher schools and elementary schools. The higher schools included the gymnasiums, lyceums, universities, and the special technical schools and institutes. There were several types of elementary schools. Perhaps the highest in standing were the higher

¹² Gross-Hoffinger, *Leben, Wirken und Tod des Kaisers*, pp. 191-93; Beidtel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung*, II, 106, 132-34, and 140-41; Strakosch-Grassmann, Gustav. *Geschichte des österreichischen Unterrichtswesens* (Vienna, 1905), p. 158

elementary schools (*Real*—or *Bürgerschulen*), of which there were only five in the whole empire: in Vienna, Prague, Cracow, Innsbruck, and Padua. In them, students were trained chiefly for such pursuits as commerce, business, and accounting. On a somewhat lower plane were the normal schools (*Normal*—or *Musterschulen*), the principal schools (*Hauptschulen*), and the community schools (*Trivialschulen*). There was only one normal school in each province. It served as a teacher training institute and as a model for all the other schools in the province. There was at least one principal school in each administrative district in the empire. In them, pupils were instructed in the lesser arts and crafts. At the minimum, one community school existed in every community where there was a parish church. Here were taught all school children who were not being prepared for a particular craft.¹³

In the elementary schools the chief objective was not to improve the minds of the pupils but rather to mould the children into upright, God-fearing, obedient subjects of the emperor. An unusual amount of stress was placed on moral and religious training. In the study plans and method books, Austrian teachers were enjoined time and time again to utilize all available means to instill true Christian moral principles in the youngsters under their tutelage. They were ordered to make the students well versed in the basic principles of Christianity and to infuse in them a deep feeling of piety and religiousness. Not only were religion and morality to be taught in the classes in religion, but all school activities were to be permeated with a religious and moral atmosphere. No subject was to be touched upon which would not advance the religious and moral training of the schoolchildren.¹⁴ The teachers were admonished never to forget that "the formation of a good moral character is the chief aim of education."¹⁵

The emphasizing of religious and moral training was deemed indispensable to the schooling of a desirable citizenry, but there were other planks in Emperor Francis' citizenship training program. In the schools,

¹³ Kropatschek, *Oesterreichs Staatsverfassung*, III, 11-13; Emperor Francis to Ugarte, Vienna, Jan. 21, 1824, Weiss, Anton, *Geschichte der österreichischen Volksschule* (Graz, 1904), I, pp. 213-19; *Elementarbuch der Geographie und Geschichte* (Vienna, 1813), p. 20.

¹⁴ Strakosch-Grassmann, *Geschichte des österreichischen Unterrichtswesens*, p. 159; Kropatschek, *Oesterreichs Staatsverfassung*, III, 1-2, 164; Emperor Francis to Ugarte, Vienna, Jan. 21, 1804, Weiss, *Österreichische Volksschule*, I, 214, 219-20; *Methodenbuch oder Anleitung zur zweckmässigen Führung des Lehramtes für Lehrer in Trivial- und Hauptschulen* (Vienna, 1823), pp. 2-9; Milde, Vincenz Eduard, *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Erziehungskunde im Auszuge* (Vienna, 1829), especially I, 183-84, and II, 30-1, 43, 61, and 100-6.

¹⁵ Milde, *Erziehungskunde*, Vol. II, p. 43.

the students were to be inculcated with respect for the emperor and his officials and were to be reared to accept cheerfully their own station in life. They were to be imbued with attitudes proper for people of their particular rank in the social order, and they were to be instructed in such practical matters as would help them to earn their daily bread. All subjects that did not contribute to the fulfillment of their objectives and all topics that were theoretical were to be kept out of the schoolroom. Above all, nothing was to be taught that might make the pupils the least bit politically conscious.¹⁶ Austrian schoolchildren were not to devote those "precious years dedicated to their training as good citizens to empty and venturesome argumentation" about disturbing matters "totally unsuited for preparing them to make an every-day living."¹⁷

In order to fulfill these aims surprisingly few subjects were taught. Reading, writing, arithmetic, and religion were the basic courses in all the elementary schools: community schools, normal schools, principal schools, and higher elementary schools. In the community schools located in country districts, the pupils were also tutored in the basic principles of private morality and domestic economy.¹⁸ In addition to the "three R's" and religion, a course in geography and history was taught to all youngsters in the normal, principal, and higher elementary schools. In the normal schools, children who were preparing themselves to teach were given several courses in methodology. Those who intended to make their living in agriculture or the handicrafts were instructed in such courses as the principles of domestic and agricultural economy, natural history, art, surveying, and mechanics. In the principal schools, pupils were trained in such vocational subjects as the teachers in each particular school were capable of teaching. In the higher elementary schools, in the last year such specialized courses as business, commercial law, bookkeeping, higher mathematics, and chemistry were taught.¹⁹

Vocational subjects, like mechanics, art, and bookkeeping, were obviously ill-suited for citizenship training purposes. They could aid only in meeting the emperor's desire to bring up a citizen body that would be useful and contented. It was otherwise with the classes in religion,

¹⁶ Emperor Francis to Ugarte, Vienna, Jan. 21, 1804, Weiss, *Österreichische Volksschule*, Vol. I, pp. 214-16; *Methodenbuch*, p. 9; Beidtel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung*, Vol. II, pp. 106, and 136.

¹⁷ Schlesier, *Gentz*, III, 28-9.

¹⁸ Emperor Francis to Ugarte, Vienna, Jan. 21, 1804, Weiss, *Österreichische Volksschule*, I, 214; Kropatschek, *Oesterreichs Staatsverfassung*, III, pp. 46-7, and 53.

¹⁹ Kropatschek, *Oesterreichs Staatsverfassung*, III, 44-6, and 51-3; Emperor Francis to Ugarte, Vienna, Jan. 21, 1804, Weiss, *Österreichische Volksschule*, I, 217-18.

geography and history, and reading. The very nature of their contents made these courses suitable instruments in the hands of those who were charged with carrying out their monarch's citizenship training program. Religion, geography and history, and reading were, in fact, the three main props of the whole design.

As prescribed in the study plans, Austrian schoolchildren began their religious training by learning the catechism. The second year they devoted their attention to studying special sections in a reading book especially designed for their spiritual edification. The third year they continued their work in the reader, and took up Biblical history, the moral teachings of Christianity, and the gospel. In the fourth class, most of the time was spent on the foundations of religion.²⁰

A casual perusal of the first part of the *Large Reader for the German Normal and Principal Schools*,²¹ and the *Handbook for Catechists, Teachers, and Students*,²² two of the required texts, will give some indication of the material presented to the schoolchildren in their courses in religion. In these works, the aims and values of religion, the creation of the world, the origin of sin, and the life and teachings of Jesus are elucidated. The religious philosophy of the Catholic Church, the precepts of Christian morality, and the principles of Christian justice are gone into in considerable detail. There are, furthermore, rather lengthy explanations of the sacraments and the ten commandments.

Most of the contents of the books are of a strictly religious nature designed to make good Christians of the Austrian youth. The authors of the texts do not neglect, however, to utilize every favorable opportunity to preach citizenship. The pupils are told that since political authorities owe their subjects the same obligations which parents owe their children, God has commanded all rulers to keep their subjects "faithful to the true religion, to dispense justice to them, and to protect them against arbitrariness and injustice."²³ The children are admonished that citizens "are obliged to manifest the same attitude to their superiors and magistrates

²⁰ Kropatschek, *Oesterreichs Staatsverfassung*, III, 44, and 54-63. Also see Weiss, *Österreichische Volksschule*, II, 666-67.

²¹ *Grosses Lesebuch für die deutschen Normal- und Hauptschulen in den kaiserl. königl. Staaten. Ersten Theil: Religionslehre* (Vienna, 1826). The writer has been able to make use of various textbooks and works on teaching methods used in Austrian schools in the early part of the nineteenth century largely because of the kind cooperation which various employes of the *Bundesministerium für Unterricht* accorded him. He wishes to express his gratitude for their generosity and kindness.

²² *Handbuch für Katecheten, Schullehrer und Schüler zu dem in den k. k. Staaten eingeführten Katechismus* (Vienna, 1798).

²³ *Grosses Lesebuch*, Pt. I, p. 85.

that children show their parents":²⁴ they must always love and serve them.²⁵ Only if they do so, can the authorities "look after the order and security of the whole land in the same way that a father looks after his family."²⁶ Austrian schoolchildren are reminded that Jesus Himself taught obedience to the orders of the sovereign,²⁷ all of whose powers come directly from God,²⁸ and cautioned His followers to pay their taxes willingly and faithfully.²⁹ As true Christians, the pupils are advised, Austrian subjects must be genuine patriots and must strive to promote the welfare of their country. They must demonstrate their patriotism by loudly proclaiming their love for the emperor and the Fatherland, by carefully observing all laws, by willingly paying all taxes, by contentedly doing their daily work, by being always ready to serve their country, particularly in time of war, by fervently praying for the well-being of their homeland and of its ruler, and by generously supporting such institutions as the Church, the schools, and the army.³⁰ By cramming the pages of the required texts in religion with statements like these, an attempt was made through the courses in religion to instruct the Austrian youth about their duties as Christian citizens.

Religious training was one of the foundation-pillars of Francis I's citizenship training program. The course in geography and history, given to all students in the normal, principal, and higher elementary schools, served a similar purpose. The text used in this course after 1813³¹ was the *Elementary Book in Geography and History*.³² The book begins with an account of the creation of the world, which closely follows that in *Genesis*. Then there is a discussion of the origins of government and civil society. In colorful terms, the author points out that in the original state of society there was such perpetual anarchy and insecurity that people soon found it necessary to appoint one of their numbers, who through his superior intelligence and ability had obtained their respect, to act as their leader, judge, and lawgiver.³³ Once they had chosen such an individual, they agreed to follow all his advice and teachings. "From this

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

²⁶ *Handbuch für Katecheten*, p. 61.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

³¹ Weiss, *Österreichische Volksschule*, II, 718.

³² *Elementarbuch der Geographie und Geschichte* (Vienna, 1813).

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.

moment, such advice and teachings were commands, orders, and laws,"³⁴ and the person who gave them was called a sovereign or a monarch. Those under his charge were called subjects. Ever since government and civil society have been established, subjects who obey their sovereign "willingly and vigilantly and who faithfully" fulfill their "obligations to the state" have been designated as patriots or good citizens. On the contrary, those who keep only their "personal interests or comforts" before their eyes have been dubbed bad citizens.³⁵ Persons who endanger "the personal security of the sovereign," seek to change the government by force, or give aid and comfort to their ruler's enemies have been called traitors.³⁶

After this bold essay at impregnating the Austrian youth with a ready willingness to obey their emperor, the author of the text turns to a social and economic history of early peoples. Then he enters upon a discussion of education and religion, not neglecting to warn the pupils that badly brought up children always become bad citizens and to inform them that "without doubt religion contributes more than anything else to the moral" and citizenship training of people.³⁷ Next, he explains the geographical changes in the earth's structure and the factors that effect alterations in human society. He points out to his young readers that tyranny, war, the ruination of morals, the fall of religion, and revolution are the paramount reasons for the fall of people.³⁸ This discussion is followed by an elementary description of the chief rivers, mountains, cities, states, and continents in the world.³⁹ The rest of the book is devoted to a brief history of ancient and medieval times. In studying this section, the pupils could not help getting the impression that all historical events were merely the personal acts of monarchs and their chief servants.

The classes in religion and in geography and history thus played an important part in giving training in citizenship to Austrian schoolchildren. Neither of these classes, however, fulfilled the purpose nearly as well as did the required courses in reading. It was in the reading courses above the first grade level that the most ambitious attempt was made to mould the Austrian youth into the type of subjects which the emperor wanted. During the first year in all Austrian elementary schools the text used was

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-9.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-81.

the so-called *First Reading Book*.⁴⁰ This book includes only the "A, B, C's" and simple little stories on such matters as how God made the flowers, what the farmer does to make a living, and what a father does. There is nothing at all in the *First Reading Book* that directly served the purposes of citizenship training.

With the reading texts studied in the second and third grades in the normal, principal, higher elementary, and larger community schools and in the second class in the smaller community schools, where only two years of schooling were given, it was an entirely different matter. In these classes two different reading books were used.⁴¹ One was the first part of the *Large Reader for the German Normal and Principal Schools*, which, as we have already seen, served as one of the textbooks in the courses in religion.⁴² The aim of this book was "the training of good Christians."⁴³ The purpose of the second part of the reader, the other text used in the second and third grades, was that of making "the youth into good citizens" and of instructing them "in the principles of integrity."⁴⁴ Different editions of the second part of the reader were used in the town⁴⁵ and country schools.⁴⁶

The second part of the reader for the town schools begins with a section on "the uprightness of students," the obvious intent of which is to teach the Austrian youth to be perfectly content with their particular rank in the social order. The young students are advised that in school children learn those things that will make them happy people.⁴⁷ They are informed that not only "kings, princes, nobles, and other notable personages" but people in every social class can have happiness.⁴⁸ Likewise,

⁴⁰ *Nahmenbüchlein zum Gebrauche der Stadtschulen in den kaiserl. königl. Staaten* (Vienna, 1812). A special edition of this text was used in the country schools, but the writer was unable to find a copy of it. Also see Kropatschek, *Oesterreichs Staatsverfassung*, III, 164.

⁴¹ See the study plans in Kropatschek, *Oesterreichs Staatsverfassung*, III, 79-111.

⁴² This text was used in the larger elementary schools. In the smaller community schools, another text, called *Das kleine Lesebuch*, in which some of the sections in the *Large Reader* were omitted, was used.

⁴³ Kropatschek, *Oesterreichs Staatsverfassung*, III, 164.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Lesebuch für Schüler der deutschen Schulen in den Städten und grösseren Märkten der kaiserl. königl. Staaten. Zweyter Theil: Anleitung zur Rechtschaffenheit* (Vienna, 1825). The 1825 edition of this text differs from the 1808 edition chiefly in that the new school laws were included in it. See Weiss, *Österreichische Volksschule*, II, 712. Also compare the table of contents of this text with Kropatschek, *Oesterreichs Staatsverfassung*, III, 164.

⁴⁶ *Zweyter Theil des Lesebuches für die Landschulen zum Gebrauche der Schüler* (Linz, 1796).

⁴⁷ *Lesebuch für Schüler in den Städten*, Pt. II, p. 6.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

people from all ranks, whether highborn or commoners, can be unhappy. Often the richest and most important persons are the unhappiest, while the poorest workers live in the greatest state of bliss. God has arranged the world in such a manner. Devout people "who are satisfied with their class," who conduct themselves intelligently in all their doings, and whose hearts are "good and free from inordinate desires" are the people who lead the most felicitous lives.⁴⁹ But how unfortunate are those who are "godless, dumb, and dissatisfied" and who are "tortured with passionate desires"!⁵⁰ If the pupils are to avoid the fate of these miserable wretches, they must be trained to hate everything that is wicked and unjust, to be happy with their place in society, to follow the principles of right conduct, and, above all, to love and please God and always do His will.⁵¹

The second section of the textbook for the town schools is really an early nineteenth century Austrian book of manners. In it, uprightness, the cardinal virtue of every decent and self-respecting person, is defined as "the inclination and the striving to satisfy the obligations of one's class as well as one's obligations to God and man."⁵² The students are cautioned that reputable Austrians are always industrious⁵³ and thrifty, not covetous and miserly.⁵⁴ They are again reminded that happy people are always grateful for what they have.⁵⁵ After all, titles and high social positions are only vanities",⁵⁶ and "poverty itself is often commendable."⁵⁷ Accordingly the Austrian schoolchildren are advised always "to show a proper respect towards all persons, according to differences in rank, age, and position, and to treat nobody with contempt."⁵⁸

The obvious intent of the first two subdivisions of the second part of the reading book for the town schools is to train the Austrian youth

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-6.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 56. To drive home this point, on p. 57 there is the following stanza:
Geniesse, was dir Gott beschieden.
Entbehre gern, was du nicht hast.
Ein jeder Stand hat seinen Frieden,
Ein jeder Stand hat seine Last.
Willst du zu denken dich erkühnen,
Dass Gottes Liebe dich vergisst?
Er gibt uns mehr, als wir verdienen,
Und niehmals, was uns schädlich ist.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

to be contented members of the particular social class to which they belong. The aim of the third section, on society and social duties, is to make them respectful and obedient servants of their overlords. Here the pupils are made acquainted with the fact that four different types of societies have been ordained by God. The first of these, existing between man and wife, results from marriage. The second, the fatherly society, develops as soon as children are born.⁵⁹ The third kind has subsisted since the time of Noah and the Flood. It is the seigniorial society "between rulers and subjects, landlords and servants."⁶⁰ The last and largest society created by God, it is explained to the pupils, is civil society.

In discussing the third type of society, the seigniorial society, the author of the text takes pains to point out, through deftly chosen quotations from the Bible, that "rulers and landlords must keep their subjects and servants away from wickedness and in the path of goodness." Above all, they must make them attend Church services regularly.⁶¹ As for servants, they must love, respect, and obey their overlords, and they must always be satisfied with their pay.⁶²

It is in his treatise on civil society, however, that the writer waxes the most eloquent on the obligations of citizens to their monarchs. Rulers "command or forbid that which each and every subject himself would do or refrain from doing if he were able to perceive the general continuity of conditions, and if he, at the same time, had enough discernment to choose that which would insure his permanent well-being,"⁶³ the composer of the reading book tells the schoolchildren. Those who wield all sovereign powers, he continues, know "what is advantageous for the state, their subjects, and the whole civil society."⁶⁴ They know how to guarantee the security and felicity of those under their tutelage, for had not God Himself appointed them?⁶⁵

In order to merit the beneficences so gratuitously handed to them by their rulers, the students are told, subjects are obligated "to revere" their kings, "to pray for them,"⁶⁶ and to obey all their laws and orders, even

⁵⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 90-5.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 98-9.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* At this juncture there is, in a footnote, the following quotation from the Bible: "For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Romans, XIII, 1."

⁶⁶ In a footnote, this injunction is reinforced with the following quotation from the Bible: "I exhort, therefore, that, first of all, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving

when they have to suffer by doing so."⁶⁷ They must gladly and willingly pay all their taxes, "without which the rulers cannot maintain the general well-being and security" of their country.⁶⁸ In time of war it devolves on them to help their monarchs to defend their homeland.⁶⁹ At all times they must cheerfully and industriously use their God-given talents to make a living for themselves.⁷⁰

The fourth section of the reader deals with domestic economy.⁷¹ In it the students are taught the proper way to manage a household. This topic obviously does not lend itself readily to citizenship propaganda, but it is otherwise with the fifth and last portion of the book: the section on patriotism. The theme enables the writer to finish his manual on citizenship with a loud crescendo. He introduces his subject by asserting that a patriot is a person who cherishes his Fatherland, who finds "genuine pleasure in its well-being," and who does not "remain indifferent in cases of misfortune and danger" but gladly gives what he can "to improve, aid, and save" his country.⁷² Moreover, "an honest patriot must be pre-possessed in favor of the state, its form of government, its magistrates, and its laws," and must "recognize the good in his Fatherland" and "praise it to others at all favorable opportunities."⁷³ In fulfilling his obligations as a patriot, according to the author, a citizen demonstrates nothing more than the fact that he is a true Christian, for "the Christian religion demands from subjects the same thing that patriotism demands from patriots, namely, that they submit themselves to magisterial power."⁷⁴

Having plunged into his subject by explaining the main attributes of a patriot, the composer of this second and third grade text proceeds to list the patriot's duties to his Fatherland. Since peace and happiness can be assured only if the government of a country rests on a secure foundation, the first obligation of a patriot, he maintains, is never to say

of thanks be made for all men; for kings, and for all that are in authority; that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty. I Timothy, II, 1-2" *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* The students are admonished that "a subject must regard disobedience against every law as the greatest possible evil of society, since thereby the blessings which the sovereign seeks to preserve are obstructed." *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-3. Again, in a footnote, the pupils' attention is called to these words in the Bible: "Therefore, pay taxes also, for they are God's ministers. Render, therefore, to everyone his dues; tribute to whom tribute is due." Romans XIII, 6-7. *Ibid.*, p. 103. This quotation in the reader can not be translated exactly as it is in the King James version of the Bible.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-25.

⁷¹ See pp. 129-40.

⁷² *Lesebuch für Schüler in den Städten*, Pt. II, p. 141.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-47.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

or do anything the least bit detrimental to the régime in power. Also, it is incumbent on him to obey all the laws and orders of his sovereign, to have complete "trust in the intelligence and integrity of the ruler,"⁷⁵ and to hold himself ready "to serve the state with all his abilities and possessions" whenever his monarch commands it.⁷⁶ The last but by no means the least important requirement of a patriot, it is explained to the schoolchildren, is that he must always love his ruler. In the ruler "the will and power of every single member of the state are united."⁷⁷ He looks after the welfare of his subjects and protects them against injustice and attack. Like "the loving father of a great family" that he is, he "gives up his own peace, pleasures, and comforts just to provide for the peace and comforts of his subjects."⁷⁸ Citizens who do not love and respect such a kindly and magnanimous provider are not only unpatriotic wretches but ungrateful malefactors deserving eternal damnation!

In the opinion of the author of the reader, the foregoing are the patriotic responsibilities of all citizens, no matter to what rank in the social order they belong. Each class, however, has its own special patriotic obligations. The common people, "the lowest class of citizens," must demonstrate their patriotism primarily through obedience and industry," by willingly paying special wartime taxes and requisitions, and by gladly permitting soldiers to be chosen from among them for the emperor's army.⁷⁹ The middle class can bear witness to their love for the Fatherland chiefly by making "good and indefatigable use of their intellectual powers" to instruct their fellow-citizens properly in regard to their duties to the state.⁸⁰ The nobility, the highest order in the social hierarchy, have more privileges than other people, Austrian students are reminded, but they also give much more to their country than persons from the common and middle classes. They have much greater responsibility and perform much more dangerous and difficult work for their ruler than the commoners and bourgeoisie.⁸¹ The soldiers, who comprise a fourth class of citizenry, give even more to their Fatherland than the nobility, for they must always be ready to sacrifice their "comfort, health, and freedom" and their lives.⁸²

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 163-64.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 164-66.

To train Austrian schoolchildren to be completely satisfied with their social rank, to be loyal and obedient subjects of the emperor, and to perform willingly and faithfully all the tasks demanded of them by their ruler is the undisguised intent of the second part of the reading book used in the town schools. The second part of the reader for the country schools seeks to impregnate the peasant youth with similar attitudes. Instead of beginning with an obtuse polemic on the moral uprightness of students, as does the text for the town schools, this book contains in the first section a collection of little stories, most of them between one-half page to a page in length, designed to instill in the young peasant children a desirable code of morality. The pupils are told contrasting tales of the neglectful and wicked schoolboy who dies a horrible death and the good schoolchild who grows up to lead a happy life. They are made acquainted with the wind-fall that befell "the good servant," whose master gave him his only child in wedlock, and with the terrible fate which overtook the "wicked peasants" who strayed from the path of righteousness. Through these and dozens of similar stories, the author of the country school reading text strives to convince the children of the advantages of goodness and integrity and to enlighten them about the dire consequences of sin and prodigality.⁸³

The next part of the country school reader presents the Austrian school laws to the peasant youth and instructs them in the rules of proper behavior for schoolchildren.⁸⁴ The third section deals with household economy.⁸⁵ The fourth division, on the principles of "uprightness for the peasant class," gives the writer of the text full leeway to sermonize to the students on the necessity for landsmen to be content with their lot. Although farmers frequently complain about the great heat, cold, rain, and hard labor which they have to endure, he moralizes, they must not forget that people who live in towns and cities have to suffer similar burdens.⁸⁶ Peasants must forever be mindful of the fact that they will never improve their conditions merely by whining and groaning about their supposed discomforts. They can better themselves, the peasant schoolchildren are told, only by increasing their knowledge of farming techniques, by turning into more genuine and pious Christians, by becoming more refined and temperate in their living habits,⁸⁷ and by being more honest

⁸³ *Lesebuch für die Landschulen*, Pt. II, pp. 5-45.

⁸⁴ See pp. 46-53.

⁸⁵ See pp. 54-68.

⁸⁶ *Lesebuch für die Landschulen*, Pt. II, pp. 74-5.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-4.

and punctual in discharging all their obligations to their overlords.⁸⁸ Peasants inclined to bemoan their plight must never forget that everything in the world exists precisely as it is only because God Himself has organized the world in such a way.⁸⁹

The fifth section of the reading book takes up farming methods. In it the youngsters are taught how to raise various crops. The sixth and last part is an appendix on the duties of subjects to their monarchs. This concluding portion of the book, composed in the form of questions and answers and profusely illustrated with appropriate quotations from the Bible, gives the author a remarkable opportunity to dwell on the officially sanctioned concept of citizenship. Just as the children in the town schools are told in their textbooks in religion and in their reader, the children in the country schools are informed that all rulers, even those who are heathen, receive their powers directly from God and that they are all nothing less than God's own representatives on earth.⁹⁰ Since all rulers are vicars of God, all their subjects, as God Himself has prescribed it, must honor, revere, and love their rulers, must be obedient to all their orders, and, above all, must regularly pray for their happiness and well-being.⁹¹ Since "God has put a sword" in their rulers' hands, subjects must fear them, not because they have the power to punish them, but, "as children fear their fathers," because they want "to take care not to offend them."⁹² People "who wish evil to their rulers, who murmur against them, who despise them,"⁹³ "who betray" them "or leave" them "in need,"⁹⁴ or who are disobedient to them⁹⁵ are execrable sinners condemned to eternal punishment. Those subjects, however, who fulfill all their obligations to their sovereigns will be rewarded by God with earthly blessings and eternal joy.

Not only are good and faithful subjects obliged to demonstrate the proper devotion, loyalty, and obedience to their emperor, it is explained to the students in the country schools, but also they must love and cherish their Fatherland no less than they love their own fathers and mothers. Just as "devout children love their parents more than their neighbors," a true patriot loves his own homeland more than any other country.⁹⁶ He is zealous to utilize such talents as he possesses to help increase the pros-

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Appendix, pp. 4-5.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

perity, riches, and glory of his Fatherland, and, in time of need, sacrifices all his property and even his life in serving it.⁹⁷ He will be rewarded with "fame, praise, and honor before God and mankind."⁹⁸

In none of the textbooks used in the Austrian elementary schools appears any word which could serve to make the pupils the least bit liberal in their political and social views. The words "democracy" and "republican government" are mentioned once or twice in one of the second grade reading books but only disparagingly. References to such terms as "the spirit of the people," "national desires," "nationalities," "liberty," "equality," "popular sovereignty," and "constitution" are carefully omitted from all the books read in the schoolroom. There is not a single allusion to "the rights of the people." Instead, in every book the ever recurring theme is that only rulers have rights; subjects have duties and obligations. Nowhere in the whole curriculum is there any statement that might give the school-children the slightest inkling that ordinary people have ever produced anything worthwhile. On the contrary, no pains are spared to impress the pupils with the idea that all political developments and all historical events are merely the personal acts of monarchs. Harboring an almost hysterical fear of the revolutionary spirit, and confusing such ideas as liberty, democracy, constitutionalism, and nationalism with the overthrow of existing law and order, Emperor Francis spared no pains to insure that the Austrian youth would not learn such dangerous ideas in the classroom. He saw to it that they were isolated from the pernicious radicalism which had been generated in the West by the French Revolution.

The greatest care was taken to insure that Francis I's program of citizenship training, so panegyric of the emperor and of the monarchical and hierarchical principle, was not sabotaged by unpatriotic or ungodly teachers. Soon after the outbreak of the French Revolution, the whole educational organization was placed under the superintendence of the police, and elementary school teachers were ordered to exert a military discipline over those under their care.⁹⁹ In 1804, all Austrian elementary schools were put under the supervision of the clergy. The local priest was made responsible for looking after the conduct of the teachers and the morality of the students in the schools situated in his parish.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, the teachers were ordered to follow closely the officially prescribed

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-2.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁹⁹ Strakosch-Grassmann, *Geschichte des österreichischen Unterrichtswesens*, p. 144.

¹⁰⁰ Emperor Francis to Ugarte, Vienna, Jan. 21, 1804, Weiss. *Österreichische Volksschule*, I, 219.

textbooks and method books and to make no deviations from them, no matter how minute, without first obtaining permission to do so.¹⁰¹

Closely regimented and policed as the Austrian educational system was, it left practically no room for freedom of thought. The minds of both teachers and students were crippled. Instead of learning to think, understand, and create, Austrian schoolchildren confined their efforts to memorizing the biased, officially prescribed moral, religious, and political formulas designed to make them into politically reliable subjects. Certainly nothing new or creative could come out of schools so regulated. In fact, the pupils were not even exposed to the main currents of nineteenth century intellectual thought. The important new political, economic, and philosophical ideas arising in western Europe, like constitutionalism, nationalism, liberalism, and even "Kantianism," were kept with painstaking care from the schoolroom. Instead, the students' attention was concentrated on learning the practical routine of earning their daily bread, absorbing dull and often meaningless religious and moral precepts, and imbibing a seventeenth century philosophy of the omnipotence of sovereigns and the imperious need for subjects to obey them trustingly and submissively.

The Austrian elementary schools of the early part of the nineteenth century apparently succeeded quite well, for a time at least, in helping to mould the kind of citizenry desired by Emperor Francis. The liberal revolutions which plagued so many other countries of Europe in 1820-21 and 1830-31 passed by Austria without causing more than a faint ripple on the political horizon. And the Austrian revolution of 1848, which threatened the destruction of the Habsburg empire, was largely the work of one group of people, the middle class, a large number of whom had completed their education in the higher schools of the empire. During this upheaval, the large majority of peasants and workingmen, precisely those people whose education was limited to that given in the elementary schools, remained loyal to the emperor.

MISSISSIPPI STATE COLLEGE FOR WOMEN

¹⁰¹ Kropatschek, *Oestreichs Staatsverfassung*, III, 140-41, and 296-97.

THE GERMAN EXILES AND THE "GERMAN PROBLEM"

by Kurt R. Grossmann and Hans Jacob

NOT even the Nazis have the slightest doubt that the United Nations are going to win this war—militarily. Politically, the situation is quite different. The vital problem of the day is a political problem; it is at the same time the nucleus of different opinions held by London and Washington on one side and Moscow on the other; it is the German problem, so often summed up in the question: "What to do with Germany after the war?"¹

There is the Atlantic Charter, magnificent, but vague, and the formula of "Unconditional Surrender" which can be considered as the expression of British and American political intentions toward the vanquished. Moscow, on the other hand, seems to have expressed its policy by setting up a National Committee of Free Germany and Stalin has declared that Soviet policy is not to destroy the German nation nor to disarm Germany completely.²

Efforts have been made to synchronize or melt into one these two conceptions. But there are not only the United Nations; there is Germany itself and first of all those Germans who, outside of the borders of the Third Reich, never ceased to warn other nations against Hitler when there was still time, and never ceased to fight Hitler and Hitlerism after it was too late to avoid war. It is useless to raise the question as to whether there was or is "another Germany;" the question now is whether, and what, the German exiles can contribute to the solution of the German problem. It is important for the future to know whether or not these people represent a political factor, what they have in mind and what they are able to do.

The emigration from Germany started the day after the Reichstag fire, February 28, 1933, and it has not stopped since that day. The stream

¹ The Moscow Conference has not decided this question so far. The Atrocities Statement signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Premier Stalin clearly indicates that the perpetrators of the crimes will be dealt with, but it is rather vague regarding the question as to whether the German people as a whole should be held responsible for this war or whether the German people shall again be given a chance to become democratic.

² "It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia, but the Hitlerite State can and should be destroyed, and our first task, in fact, is to destroy the Hitlerite State and its inspirers," declared Stalin in his address of Nov. 6, 1942 to the Moscow Soviet, published by the *New York Times* in its Nov. 7, 1942 issue.

of refugees first invaded "the neighbouring countries of Germany—Czechoslovakia, France", Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, England. The oversea countries did not accept many refugees during the first years after Hitler had seized power in Germany. The more the political pressure grew inside Germany, the more the Nazis struck at the underground resistance against the régime, the more cruelly and ruthlessly the anti-Jewish legislation was enforced, the more Hitler's intentions for world conquest became apparent (and were realized), with realization increasing step by step, the more, of course, the stream of refugees increased.

It is important to establish at once the fundamental difference between two categories of people driven from Nazi-Germany and at the same time to distinguish between two different types of Nazi victims outside Germany. The "refugees" are those who were forced to leave Germany more or less illegally for political, racial or religious reasons because their lives or their freedom were endangered. The "émigrés" are those who left Germany under the pressure of general conditions with the full knowledge of the Nazi authorities and in accordance with the legal dispositions.

There are others who fall into the category of "refugees": those who were connected with the Protestant *Bekennniskirche* or the Catholic Church and who opposed the national-socialist régime. It is much more difficult to give an exact definition in the case of Jews fleeing from Germany. Not all of them left Germany for political reasons nor are all of these cases entirely unpolitical. The danger of actual annihilation forced many Jews to flee, although they were never politically active. It is true, however, that some who left Germany quite legally have since that time played an active part in the anti-Hitler movements abroad. As long as those persons remained inside Germany, they could remain in the dark. Many became politically-minded only because of the misfortunes which they had suffered; once their freedom of action was recovered, they developed into political refugees. Political refugees, on the other hand, under the pressure of economic conditions very often became mere émigrés who had left Germany for economic reasons only. It is, therefore, difficult to give exact figures which take into account these influences. The following table—based on data by governmental agencies and organizations engaged in assisting refugees—tries however to give at least a general survey as of December, 1937.^{2a}

^{2a} "Five Years! Flight—Need and Rescue" Report by the Democratic Refugee Committee, Prague, 1938, p. 38 ff.

THE GERMAN EXILES AND THE "GERMAN PROBLEM" 167

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Non-Jews</i>	<i>Total</i>
Denmark	1000	150	1150
Sweden	800	280	1080
Norway	300	170	470
England	4000	500	4500
France	6000	5000	11000
Luxembourg	200	50	250
Holland	5000	1000	6000
Austria	1500	--	1500
Yugoslavia	450	--	450
Italy	2000	--	2000
Czechoslovakia	2000	1500	3500
Other European countries	9800	8000	17800
<hr/>			
Europe—Total	33,050	16,650	49,700
North America	15,000	1,500	16,500
South America	21,000	600	21,600
South Africa	4,000	--	4,000
Palestine	43,000	--	43,000
Other parts of the World	2,000	300	2,300
Emigrés from Eastern Europe going back to Eastern Europe	20,000	--	20,000
<hr/>			
Total: (America, Africa, Australia, Asia and Eastern Europe)	105,000	2,400	107,400
<hr/>			
Total World Figure	138,050	19,050	158,100

Since then, the picture has considerably changed. We know that about 400,000 Jews have left Germany; 119,647 came to the United States. To this figure we must add another two or three thousand refugees who found a haven in the United States without being able to secure an immigration-quota visa. They are technically "visitors." Between 1933 and 1940, 50,342 Jews were permitted to enter Palestine, and an additional number of Hitler victims have tried to get into Palestine illegally. We believe the following figures come as close to the actual situation as possible; the table

gives an approximate picture of the refugee movement between 1933 and 1941.³

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Jewish Refugees</i>	<i>From Germany</i>	<i>Non-Jewish Refugees from Germany</i>
France	50-55,000	25,000	6,000
England	60-65,000	35,000	4-5,000
Belgium	25-30,000	12,000	8,000
Holland	30-35,000	25,000	600-700
Other European Countries	50-70,000	25-30,000	2-3,000
Argentina	45-50,000	20-25,000	1,000-1,200
Brazil	15-18,000	8-10,000	5-6,000
Uruguay	6- 7,00	4- 4,500	200
Bolivia	10-12,000	7- 8,000	500
Chile	13-14,000	8- 9,000	300
Other South and Central American Countries	15-20,000	10-11,000	600-800
China	20-25,000	15-17,000	100
South Africa	7- 8,000	4- 5,000	50
Australia	8- 9,000	4- 5,000	200
Canada	7- 8,000	5,000	100
Other countries: Hungary, Switzerland, Yugoslavia Czechoslovakia, etc.	40-50,000	25-30,000	2-2,500
U. S. A.	170-200,000	120,000	2,000
Palestine	100-110,000	50,342	--
Total	671-786,000	401,342-430,842	31,750-35,750

The rate of non-Jewish refugees is about 8 percent of the total number of emigrés and refugees from Germany.

It is true that many Jews were forced to leave Germany. If there had been no threat to their lives, they might have remained. Others were too old or they feared the struggle for existence in a country whose language they did not know; others lived under the illusion that the national socialist

³ The table is the result of studies of this problem undertaken by Dr. Arie Tartakower and Kurt R. Grossmann, and will appear in their book on the question of Jewish refugees which is to be published, in the near future, by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York.

régime in Germany would not last because the democracies of the world would not tolerate it. This attitude—inasmuch as it can be considered a collective phenomenon—was not limited to Germany or exclusively to German Jews. It was another outgrowth of appeasement psychology and general political blindness.

Those who left Germany for definite political reasons do not exceed twenty per cent of the total of those who left Germany. There are between 362,—387,000 "émigrés" as compared with 71,—78,000 "refugees" from Germany.

The émigrés, most of whom left Germany only after the program in November 1938, belong, economically speaking, to the middle classes. There are a few very rich individuals who were able to transfer their fortunes to the United States or England and who have started there industrial or business relations. These "upper ten," with some exceptions, have successfully avoided sharing the usual fate of the refugees. The "upper ten"—not only among the refugees from Germany—have nowhere shown any sign of solidarity with other refugees in misfortune. These happy few like to get together with the representatives of their class, the "smart set", rather than with those whose fate they might be expected to share.

Broadly speaking, the masses of refugees have developed into an asset for the immigration countries. This is true especially for countries overseas where the social absorption of immigrants has been easier than in Europe, where there was much less economic freedom of movement. Alien legislation in Europe—to put it mildly—did not give the refugees very much of an opportunity to start a new life. The worse the situation inside Germany grew, the more the countries neighbouring on Germany tried to close their borders by increasingly prohibitive alien and immigration legislation, as if it were possible to stop the eruption of Mount Vesuvius by promulgating new rules for the Fire Department. No general solution for the refugee problem on a true international basis has even been tried. The significance and far reaching consequences of this problem have been misunderstood or have not been understood at all because the world misunderstood, or preferred to misunderstand, Hitler's true intentions. The Bermuda Conference was a fiasco.

Such is the statistical picture of the German emigration and at least a general picture of its economic and ideological structure. It is obvious that there are ideological contrasts between émigrés and refugees. The political events of the last years have not only influenced numerically the movement of those who fled Germany or left it legally (deportations,

immigration into countries overseas, deportation to Africa and Poland, death—violent death), but the ideological fluctuations also became much more violent. This development was not the consequence of any action; it was brought about by the inexorable logic of events.⁴

The political emigrés reflected from the very beginning of their life in exile the disunity which was characteristic of the movements and political trends inside Germany before the fall of the Republic. These representatives of different political parties went into exile with the same anger, the same prejudices, and the same stubbornness which they had displayed in Germany's political affairs before national-socialism was able to take over.⁵

In exile these political refugees represent only about a fifth of the Jewish emigration, although they were much more publicized in the countries where they found a haven. Especially during the first years after Hitler came to power, they seemed to be a political factor—or at least a political factor of which one could take advantage—while the Jewish-economic-refugees were considered an unpleasant by-product.

As far as their political leanings are concerned, the exiles who have crossed the borders of foreign countries during the past ten years belong to almost all camps: Democrats, Social-Democrats, Communists, members of the trade-unions, Pacifists, members of the League for the Rights of Men, followers of the *Bekenntniskirche*, members of the dissident groups of the major political parties as Socialist workers, Communist-Party-Opposition, Trotskyists, members of the *Freidenkerbund*, and even of the right-wing ex-service-men association *Stahlhelm*, and of the National-Socialist Party as well as the small circle around Otto Strasser, leader of the "Black Front," a Nazi minority. Among the Jews, the Zionists were the most constructive. Because the dream of assimilation seemed to have been smashed once and for all, they are the only ones who have had definite plans for the future.⁶

⁴ From the very beginning we established the difference between the "refugee" who fled Germany for political reasons, and the "emigrant" who left Germany legally. The former was recognized for years by the refugee committees in Prague only if he could prove that he had to leave Germany because of endangerment to his life, health or liberty. However, after November of 1938 when the Nazis had thrown all of the Jews into concentration camps, this distinction was, of course, discarded.

⁵ The laborite parties in Germany, the only possible political block with some strength to oppose the onrushing Nazi hordes, were constantly feuding amongst themselves, and although we cannot decide at present which party was the most guilty, the Hitlerites were able to gain comfort from this historical fact.

⁶ The Zionists, because of their ideology, found it psychologically easier to leave Germany than did the Jews who had lived "as Germans of Jewish faith." The sudden change from the status of a German citizen to that of an outcast from their mother nation was a marked defeat for the Jewish assimilants. The Zionists not only recommended Palestine as the solution to

The present position of German emigrés all over the world cannot be understood without a short history of their activities and failures during the last ten years.

The political activity of the politicians in exile depended upon the attitudes of the countries where they found haven. No political group in exile would have been able to open offices in any country or send agents into Nazi Germany or distribute illegal literature inside the Third Reich without enjoying at least the tacit consent of the country from which it was operating.

The movement of refugees to Czechoslovakia was politically motivated to a large extent because of its nearly two thousand mile border with Germany which makes possible all kinds of "exchange." The Executive Committee of the Social-Democrat opened headquarters in Prague and developed an intense literary and propaganda activity. It published valuable reports about the situation in the Third Reich and, for a time maintained a very effective underground activity inside Germany. But politically the Social-Democrats were a failure. Deeply entangled in bureaucracy, the Social-Democrats⁷ were not only unable to bring about a united front with all other political groups opposing Hitler and national-socialism, but they could not even maintain unity among their own ranks and file. The opposition within the party, instead of decreasing, increased year after year. With an energy which could have been used to better purpose the Social-Democrats fought the "Revolutionary Socialists" who opposed the old time bigwigs in the Executive Committee and were especially antagonistic to the "New Beginning" group. This group of young Social-Democrats worked together very effectively and built up a working underground organization inside Nazi Germany. They are the most valuable influence in the regeneration of the old social-democrat movement. With much less money than any of the other political movements the "New Beginning" group has done a remarkable job. Its *spiritus rector* is Paul Hagen, now in the United States and Research Director for the "American Friends of German Freedom." "New Beginning" recognized that it must work on the basis of

the plight in which the German Jews found themselves but initiated an extensive retraining program for crafts and agriculture. The Jewish youth especially were enthusiastic about the Zionists who at least had a program to offer, notwithstanding the fact that Palestine had accepted more than 50,000 Jews from Germany. It is only too tragic to note that the far-sighted endeavors of the Zionists were nullified by the British Government which closed the gates to the Holy Land.

⁷ Formerly a party with more than one million members and eight million voters. The leadership in exile was not able to adjust itself psychologically to the new situation. They were under the impression that they had just moved their office from Berlin to Prague.

concentrated conspirative activity. At first the movement was sponsored by the Social-Democrat Party but later it became independent and now the group, after long and unpleasant internal feuds, has been excluded from the Party. The group has established the "Inside Germany"—reports which are the best in the field. There were other groups, but they had no political significance—except to show that there was no unity between the different political groups outside Germany.

The Communists developed a very strong activity everywhere with the strongest groups working from France and Czechoslovakia. But everywhere this activity was more or less illegal and underground. There were also independent publications and smaller movements, but they all shared the ups and downs of the foreign policy of the countries in which they lived as exiles. This was particularly true in France from 1933 to 1939. It is characteristic that nowhere were the refugees and emigrés able to build up even a sufficient united front to protect their interests as exiles. In France, where the collaborationists had taken over long before 1939, as e. g., the French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet, the incident of the editor of *Le Temps* and the Nazi agent Otto Abetz, the actual declaration of war resulted in the internment of almost all refugees.⁸

There were, and still are, German language newspapers and magazines in this country, in England and elsewhere, but they have never played a decisive political role. They were not able to establish true unity and solidarity. There were many individuals who fought Hitler—such as the German writers and scientists, scholars and publicists like Heinrich and Thomas Mann, Albert Einstein (the last two being Nobel Prize winners) and others. They were welcome in all the countries where they found refuge—especially in the United States—but not one could ever rise above the circumstances of his individual case, and in the broad picture of emigration they never became an asset. The German intellectuals are a failure so far as the moral transformation of the German nation is concerned.⁹

⁸ As early as August 26, 1939, a few days before the actual outbreak of hostilities, it was decided that the refugees were not to be exempt from internment. In September, 1939, placards appeared in all French cities ordering all German and Austrian men between the ages of 17 to 65 to assemble at certain designated places, bringing with them food rations for two days and blankets. Fifteen thousand aliens, most of them enemies of Hitler, were confined to sixty internment camps (the so-called *centres de rassemblement*) under military control.

⁹ Some of the most prominent exiled writers committed suicide. (Stefan Zweig, Ernst Toller, Kurt Tucholsky). The others did not even attempt to organize the masses of political refugees. They were famous before they were forced to leave Germany and so it was rarely necessary for them to apply to a refugee committee for aid, in any country. The period of fear and need, as lived through by some of them, was often too soon forgotten. They had never been professional politicians and were not fit for the work of organizing the political exiles. Moreover the intellectuals of most of the countries received them with open arms,

Their scientific and literary performance is beyond criticism: but there is no work or act which could be compared with Zola's "J'accuse" and his brilliant fight which determined the outcome of the Dreyfus-affair in France. On the contrary, most of the intellectuals became "isolationists" and escapists. They deny, however, that their newly-won positions abroad cannot be dissociated from what we must call their political past.

The lack of security and the hard living conditions of the refugees are creating a kind of psychosis which, as proven by the history of *all* political emigrations, is characterized by the fight of one leader against another. The fight starts with hair-splitting ideological discussions and ends with denunciations. As soon as the economic difficulties are settled, these symptoms will disappear. But for the time being the refugees, products and victims of given economic conditions which they cannot escape, are still fighting each other. The German refugees, too, must suffer from this disease. The German political refugees, therefore, were and still are in a rather unfavorable position to contribute constructively to the solution of the German problem. Leaders of the past—men like the Ex-Chancellor Heinrich Brüning or the former conservative cabinet member Treviranus or the ex-Nazi Hermann Rauschning—cannot be considered political allies of the German refugees. They represent frustrated elements of a Germany that prepared itself to conquer the world. If anybody should care to fight side by side with them, he should be prepared to give up the principles that mean the "democratization" and disarmament of Germany. Brüning, Treviranus, Rauschning and even Strasser are representatives of the principle of "order" and "property," but none of them is a champion of a moral revolution to teach the German people that they are entitled to become a member of the family of nations only if they help to create the guarantees making another aggressive war by Germany impossible. Brüning, Rauschning and the others disapprove of Hitler's methods, but not of the aims of this policy. They represent the most vicious danger to peace because they are cleverly camouflaged as friends of democracy.¹⁰

even honoring them with citizenship. Because of these facts, they were unable to discern the urgent need of the economically as well as politically disrupted refugees, expecting only to be asked, very politely, to lend their name, to speak, or to act. Occasionally, one of them differed from the rest, because he recognized that the old parties and their leaders had lost their significance.

¹⁰ The unfortunate and dangerous rôle played by Dr. Heinrich Brüning has been revealed by Bernhard Menne in his illuminating booklet, *The Case of Dr. Brüning* (Hutchinson Co., London, New York). Menne, a student of German politics and a well-known writer, describes Dr. Brüning as being "the German Chancellor until he coquetted with Hitler and made way for that devil incarnate to wield his will upon the German population—

In England, one group of German emigrés is the "Union of German Socialist Organizations in Great Britain." Its members are: the German Social-Democrat Party as formerly represented in Prague, the Socialist Labor Party, the "ISK," and the group "New Beginning." The group is supported by the Union of German Trade Unions in Great Britain and represents a unification which has not been achieved in other countries, not even in the United States.¹¹ (In November 1943 discussions however started in New York, initiated by Thomas Mann for a united German Free Movement. In these discussions not only the various Social-Democratic groups but also Communists took part).

A statement on the international policy of German Socialists has been issued by the "Union of German Socialist Organizations" in Great Britain on October 24, 1943, as reprinted in the *New Leader* of Nov. 27, 1943.

The manifesto, emphasizing the need for an international order and

especially on the youth of Germany—and tried to pave his way to wield his will upon the rest of mankind." The following statement appeared in the September 1942 issue of *Fortune*.

"Dr. Heinrich Bruening, the only German ex-chancellor living in exile, does not believe in a future for political refugees who openly turn against their country, and keeps carefully aloof from all political activities. So do the U. S. Germans by and large, but their indifference has different motives. Even if they sincerely dislike subversive activities, at the bottom of their hearts the majority of our Germans doubtless consider German spokesmen for German defeat as true outcasts and 'Volksverraeter'."

Gotfred Reinhold Treviranus, who was a member of the German-National Party for many years, left this party to become the leader of the very small Conservative Peoples' Party. He became a member of Bruening's Cabinet. Treviranus is an old German officer and, as such, was liked by the late Reichspresident, von Hindenburg. He belongs to the Bruening circle and in all the years of exile (since 1934) he has never expressed openly his shame for the occurrences in Germany.

Herman Rauschnig should certainly be given due credit for the various books he has published, although his most important book, "Hitler Speaks" was published very late. A German exile with inside knowledge about Danzig makes the following conclusions concerning Rauschnig:

"Rauschnig, according to his own testimony, worked in close collaboration with Hitler for four years. He was well aware of what Hitler thought and what Hitler planned and yet with this knowledge he did not leave Hitler, even though, as he tells us, he knew the inside story of the Reichstag fire. The Roehm affair (June 1934) also did not make him sever relations with Hitler. It was only when Gauleiter Forster deprived him of his function in Danzig that he started to speak, and, even at this time, very hesitantly. It took him four years to disclose the story about the Reichstag fire. We have every reason to treat him with the greatest reserve and scepticism."

¹¹ The leading figures in England of this movement are Hans Vogel, a former member of the German Reichstag and an old executive member of the Social Democratic Party and Ernest Ollenhauer, a former leader of the Socialist Youth Movement in Germany. Other members are Paul Sehring, who played an important role in the Socialist Student movement in Germany, and Richard Eichler, a former Social Democrat who turned out to be a very thoughtful and serious writer and now leads the International Socialist Association which propagandizes the ethical socialism, taught by the late Prof. Nelson. The mandate of these organizations derives not from any formal conventions but from the political past of the leading figures. They believe that they should speak for the silenced German people.

the destruction of the economic bases of German fascism, is important for it represents, according to the *New Leader*, the opinions of the strongest democratic elements in Germany.

The declaration issued by Hans Vogel, chairman of the Union of German Socialists, is signed by the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the largest democratic party in the republic; the Socialist Worker Party (SAP); the International Socialist Fighting Group (ISK); and the New Beginning group.

The statement follows:

1. As international socialists we aim at an international order that will eliminate the causes of armed conflict.

The international labor movement and the other democratic movements, above all of the peasants and the intelligentsia, are in our opinion the decisive forces for the achievement of this aim.

We desire the closest co-operation of the organized workers of all lands in a new international organization, with the task of working out a common policy for the socialist labor movement and putting it into practice.

2. We advocate a federation of all peoples of Europe, because full national sovereignty is no longer compatible with the economic and political condition of Europe.

It is a vital interest of German democrats and socialists, and indeed of the democrats and socialists of all Europe, that the peace of Europe should be given a stable foundation through the co-operation of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the United States of America. A free and united Europe can only develop in friendly co-operation with all of these powers, not by leaning to one or the other side only.

Federations which comprise only groups of nations we regard as a guarantee of peace only if they are integrated in and subordinated to an international organization.

3. The first objective of the post-war international policy of German socialists must be to integrate a democratic Germany into this international order.

It is essential for the success of such a policy that the principles of the Atlantic Charter should be applied to a democratic Germany in their full extent.

We German socialists recognize the need for real guarantees of security felt by the nations attacked and oppressed by the national-socialist and fascist aggressors. At the same time, we are convinced that all technical guarantees of peace can have lasting effect only if they form a part of a truly international system of security. This system must combine a strong executive capable of holding down aggressors with far reaching powers of arbitration

for the peaceful solution of conflicts. Such a system will also guarantee the peace and security of a democratic Germany.

The first contribution of a democratic Germany to such a system will be its immediate military disarmament.

We are convinced that it is not enough to destroy the German military machine. We are determined to break the strongholds of the social power of the economic and political forces behind German militarism by the expropriation of Germany's war industries and the big landed estates and by the democratic rebuilding of the administration from the lowest units upward.

We recognize it as a duty of honor for the coming free Germany to help with all her strength in the reparation of the injustices inflicted on other peoples by Hitlerite Germany and in the rebuilding of Europe.

It will be one of our main tasks to create the moral and mental conditions for the pursuit of a consistent policy of peace and understanding by the new German democracy by a thorough-going reform of German education.

Lasting success in winning the German people for such a policy will largely depend on whether they are given a chance to follow their own initiative in shaping their internal political, social and cultural life.

Above all it would have fatal consequences for Germany's internal development if conditions were imposed which would cause lasting mass unemployment and prevent an effective policy of social security.

4. Even after the Hitler dictatorship has been overthrown, we shall have to fight against strong reactionary forces at home for this international policy. We hope that the confidence and the active support of the international labor movement and of the forces of peace and progress in all nations will be with us in this struggle.

Another important center around which German anti-Hitler forces are grouped is the "Fight for Freedom Committee." This committee¹² does not recognize that there is "another Germany." Even if a minority is responsible for this war, Germany as a whole must be punished. This

¹² (Composed of Englishmen such as James Walker J.P., M.P., Political Secretary of the Iron and Steel Trade Confederation and member of the National Committee of the Labour Party; Alfred J. Dobbs, National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives; Charles Dukes, L.B.E. General Secretary of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, Member of the General Council of the T.U.C. etc. The leading German exiles are: Dr. Curt Geyer, formerly on editorial Staff of the *Vorwaerts* (Berlin) and Editor of the *Neuer Vorwaerts*, Prague and Paris. Walter Loeb, Hon. Managing Director, former President of the State Bank of Thuringia, Weimar, and Deputy Member of the Reichsrat, Member Frankfurt City Council; F. K. Bielgk, formerly on editorial staff of the Social Democratic *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, Member of Leipzig City Council; Kurt Lorenz, formerly Manager of the Social Democratic *Oberschlesische Volksblatt*, Gleiwitz; Bernhard Menne, formerly editor of the *Schlesische Arbeiterzeitung*, Breslau.)

committee is against any "soft" peace and is asking for all guarantees of security to avoid another war. It gives absolute priority to this consideration.

The "Union of German Socialist Organizations in Great Britain" is supported by some British trade unions and the Labor Party. The "Fight for Freedom Committee" is supported by other trade unions and by parts of the Labor party, but also by some governments-in-exile and by Lord Robert Vansittart. During the last few months especially it has played a more important part and is growing in influence. The last convention of the Labor Party in June 1943 cast a majority of 1,083,000 votes against 720,000 votes in favor of the ideas of the "Fight for Freedom" committee.

There were only a few refugees and emigrés in Soviet Russia. Communist party members, quite naturally, found a haven in the Soviet Union. Recently, the Soviet government sponsored a German political movement, and this movement, whose expression is the "National Committee of Free Germany," issued a manifesto in the last day of July 1943 which stirred up speculations about Stalin's postwar intentions toward Nazi-Germany. The New York Times published, in its issue of August 1, 1943, the full text of which we quote later the most important part.

To sum up: there are three centers where German emigrés could be considered as potential political factors for the future: in the United States, in Great Britain and in the Soviet Union.³¹ The most recent manifestations of the thought of these groups are:

The statement of the American Friends of German Freedom, published January 1942 and sent in mimeographed form to the members, shows the political point of view of the New Beginning group. It reads as follows:

"Only through the complete and crushing military defeat of Hitler can the victims of Nazism be liberated.

Among these victims of Hitler must be counted a goodly portion of the German people themselves. No one can say, at this moment, what proportion of the German people follow Hitler willingly, and what proportion are compelled to acquiesce in the Hitlerian system of terror and world conquest by the brutal force of the Gestapo. But of one thing there can be no doubt, and that is that in Germany, even today, even in the midst of war, there are men and women who hate Hitler and Hitlerism, and who have fought him with the only weapons at their command: with bravery and nobility and fortitude.

³¹ In Sweden there are also a great number of political refugees from Germany. As stated by the *New York Times* of Nov. 6, 1943, twenty-three "well-known former German citizens had sent a message to the Free German Committee in Russia" and to other countries, "warning that Germany can be spared annihilation only if all peace-loving Germans unite to destroy Nazism while there is still time."

Germany's concentration camps were filled with them before Hitler marched into Poland; they have remained filled throughout the war.

It is upon these brave men and women, and upon these who would follow them if opportunity allowed, that a new free Germany can be built after Hitler-Germany has been crushed.

With the progress of the war it became clear that the liberation of the German people was inseparable from the liberation of all Europe and therefore required the military defeat of Germany. This conviction was expressed in a declaration of policy adopted by the American Friends of German Freedom on June 11, 1941, stating that ". . . without a military defeat of the Nazis, it is impossible for the democratic forces in Germany or the conquered countries to throw off the Nazi yoke. Such a defeat in the present circumstances is inconceivable without expanded American aid to those countries and forces now opposing the Nazi efforts at world conquest.

Only a Germany that is free and democratic can be counted upon to strive to keep the peace and to participate in a cooperative world order. These forces in Germany, therefore, which believe in democracy and freedom must be encouraged to become the directors of Germany's destiny after the Third Reich has been defeated. The longer the war lasts, and the greater the brutality inflicted on the nations of Europe by the Nazi rulers of Germany, the more difficult will it be to approach dispassionately the problem of bringing forth an emergent democratic Germany."

On July 3 and 4 1943 a group of former German Social-Democrats met for a two days' conference in New York City. With regard to Germany's integration in a new Europe, the representatives developed ideas similar to those expressed in the above-mentioned statement. In their political resolution they condemned all Nazi crimes. In their appeal to the German people the conference stated:

"The Nazis try to convince you that the world is out to destroy you. That's nonsense. The world is out to crush Hitler's power. It must conquer it to save itself and its freedom. The world wishes to have a peace-loving and democratic government. Such a Germany can be admitted again into the peaceful community of all the other nations. German people—make up your mind—liberate yourself from tyranny—for peace and freedom."

On September 1, 1939, the executive of the German Social-Democratic party in London appealed to the German people as follows:

"A peace repairing Hitler's acts of violence, putting an end to the totalitarian system and giving back justice and freedom to the German people as well as to all the other conquered peoples, is the aim of our policy."

The manifesto by the Free German Committee in Moscow of July 1943 a mélange of representatives of existent or non-existent German political

parties, obviously backed by the Russian government, stressed its political line of a national re-birth of their German "fatherland" in a far stronger way when it states:¹⁴

"This means strong democratic power that will have nothing in common with the helpless Weimar regime; a democracy that will be implacable, that will ruthlessly suppress any attempt at new plots against the rights of free people or against European peace.

"It means the annulment of all laws based on national and racial hatred; of all orders of the Hitlerite regime that degrade our people; the annulment of all measures of the Hitlerite authorities directed against freedom and human dignity.

It means the restoration and extension of the political rights and social gains of the working press, assembly, conscience and religious beliefs. It means the freedom of economy, trade and handicraft; the guaranteed right to labor and to lawfully acquired property.

It means the restoration of property to the(ir) lawful owners, plundered by the fascist rulers; the confiscation of property of those responsible for the war and of the war profiteers; the exchange of commodities with other countries as a natural basis for insuring national welfare.

It means the immediate release of the victims of Hitlerite terror and material compensation for the damage caused them. It means the just, inexorable trial of those responsible for the war, of the instigators and their ring-leaders and accomplices who have buried Germany into the abyss and branded her with shame."

The foundation of the Free National Committee in Moscow which

¹⁴ Belonging to the Moscow Free National Committee are not only such communists as Erich Weinert (born 1890) who was well-known as a satirical writer, Johannes R. Becher (born 1891) an old revolutionary writer, Willi Bredel (born 1901) who in 1918 became a member of the Spartacus group, and Fried. Wolf (born 1888) a well-known medical doctor as well as a writer, but also political Communist leaders such as Karl Pieck, one of the founders of the Communist Party in Germany, his colleagues Wilhelm Florin, Erwin Hoernle, Walter Ulbricht, etc. The most astonishing fact is that German war prisoners are prominent figures in this Committee. I name Major Karl Hetz, Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, who is related to the old Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, and a Major Herbert Soessel. The latter in a speech published in *Free Germany*, Sept. 1943, a Communist periodical, referred to the German Army as "a valuable instrument which must be preserved at any cost and in full. We are opposed to fomenting demoralization in the 'Wehrmacht'. We do not intend to incite the soldiers to abandon their armies and retreat in disorder—We must avert at all costs any repetition of the events of 1918." It is interesting to know that in September, 1943, "more than 100 German generals and other officers who lost the battle of Stalingrad formed a 'Union of German Officers' and called upon their countrymen to overthrow Adolf Hitler and establish a government having the confidence of the people and strong enough to bring about peace"—as reported in the *New York Times* of Sept. 21, 1943.

According to David Anderson (*N. Y. Times*—Sept. 26, 1943) 400 free Germans convened in London and formed under the leadership of Robert Kuczynsky, the German statistician, who was a former leading figure in the German League for Human Rights, a movement on lines expressed by this group similar to those of the Moscow Committee.

played an important role in the discussion at the Moscow conference of the three foreign ministers of the United States (Cordell Hull), Great Britain (Anthony Eden) and the Soviet Union (Molotov) has led to the set-up of similar organizations, not only in London but also in Sweden.

In Sweden the participation of former German Social Democrats is very strong. According to the *Sozialistische Mitteilungen* ("News for German Socialists in England" "Nos. 58-59, 1944: January-February, p. 22) the Committee is called "Freier Deutscher Kulturbund in Schweden." The organization wants to give opportunity to "all liberty-loving and democratic Germans living in Sweden to be recognized as representatives of a true German culture and to give them the possibility to work for their reconstruction." The chairman of the association is Max Hodann and to its Board of Directors belong: Rosalinde von Ossietzky, the daughter of the late Carl von Ossietzky, who received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1936, Fritz Tarnow, a prominent leader of the former German trade union movement, Otto Friedländer, Max Seydewitz and many others. The participation of Max Seydewitz would guarantee that this association will work together with the Free National Committee in Moscow.

In the United States, the discussion about the creation of an association of democratic Germans has been very lively during the past months. Under the leadership of Professor Paul Tillich and with the participation of Communists, Social Democrats and others, a "Council for a Democratic Germany" is in preparation.^{14a} The essence of the program of this group is that they believe "that it is impossible to base the reconstruction of Europe on the enslavement of the German people." A declaration of the New Council for a Democratic Germany was formulated. We quote from this declaration:

The solution of the German problem is a part of the solution of the European problem. The claims of all the nations of Europe for reconstruction and for security must be met. In reorganizing Europe and in solving the German problem, conditions must be created which will forestall a third world war. It is inevitable that the German people will have to bear the consequences of the war into which Hitler has driven them. It is, however, self-evident that a last solution of the European question is only possible if there is a creative solution of the German question.

I.

The prerequisite for any such solution is the defeat of Nazism, the

^{14a} In the meantime the "Council for a Democratic Germany" has been created and its foundation brought up a wide discussion on the question how to deal with Germany. The new organization was not favorably received by American opinion.

destruction of those who brought Nazism to power and the obliteration of its spirit in Germany and throughout the world. This will be accomplished in the battle for the liberation of Europe, by the coming liquidation of the Nazis by the Germans themselves, and in the prosecution of the war-criminals. But in addition, those groups which were the bulwarks of German imperialism and which were responsible for the delivery of power into the hands of the Nazis must be deprived of their political, social and economic power. This applies particularly to the large landholders, the big industrialists, and the military caste whose political concepts and influence have had repeatedly a disastrous effect on German history. If, therefore, the German people will decide to dissolve large landholdings, to control heavy industry, to eliminate militarism and to remove those civil servants, judges and teachers beholden to these groups, they ought not to be impeded from the outside.

A disarmed Germany, together with the rest of the nations of Europe, must be fitted into the framework of a system of international security. It is taken for granted that Germany must return all conquered territory and that she must make good the damages she has caused to the limit of her ability. But it must not be forgotten that the first victims of National Socialism were numbers of Germans who dared to oppose Hitler, and who did not want this war. The opposition of Germans against Hitlerism is now forcing the Nazis even more to augment their terror organization and to maintain strong military units of occupation inside Germany. Policies leading to an enslavement of the German people and their pauperization must, therefore, be regarded as unwise and unjust. It should, furthermore, not be overlooked that to abandon the principles of the Atlantic Charter in *one* decisive case, means to abandon them in general.

It would be disastrous for the future of Europe if Germany were to be dismembered and split up economically and politically. This would create fertile soil for new pan-Germanist movements. It would prevent Germany from assuming responsibilities for the moulding of her future and shift this heavy burden to other nations. It would create an irredentism which might well become the greatest such movement of all times. Useful energies of the victorious nations would be consumed in the permanent task of suppressing this irredenta.

II.

It is essential for the economic future of Europe and the world that Germany's productive power be conserved. If it were destroyed, the economic conditions would become hopelessly depressed in all countries of Europe, and trade between Europe and other continents would be reduced largely. Moreover, millions of Germans would become permanently unemployed and condemned to an involuntary parasitic existence. Thus a constant source of unrest would arise in the very center of Europe.

Germany's productive strength should be integrated in an international

system of production and consumption. Such a system would make possible the economic cooperation of the European peoples and would lessen the significance of political boundaries. Only in this way can Germany fulfill her obligations and make material reparations on a large scale, and only thus can Germany, with the rest of Europe, be protected against the threat of economic chaos. Germany's economic hegemony and the danger of a rearming of Germany would be eliminated.

III.

If Germany is to develop a democracy it is necessary that the military and civil representatives of the United Nations give political leeway from the beginning to those who might best be able to create a new democracy. Moreover, it is necessary that all who shared in the responsibility for the rise of Nazism should be excluded, even if it would be expedient to deal with them. On the other hand, all those must be considered who resisted Nazism, for instance the presently nameless men and women now in the Gestapo prisons and the concentration camps, trade unionists and workers of the labor movement, those who resisted in the churches and in intellectual circles, in the middle class, in the cities and in the country, and other qualified individuals. The German democracy of the future will depend on all these people. With their help, preparations must be made for the inauguration of an independent German government. Guarantees for the establishment of the basic civil rights and liberties of the people must be given without delay. Racial laws must be abolished immediately. Religious and intellectual liberties must be restored. Freedom of the press, of assembly and of organization must be reestablished. No obstacles should be placed in the way of the rebuilding of a labor movement. The institutions set up by the Nazis must be removed. Social and democratic institutions which the Nazis abolished must be recreated.

An attempt of the German people to stamp out Nazism root and branch through a mass movement, and to prepare the ground for democracy should be welcomed by the United Nations, and should not be prevented or impeded under any circumstances. Only if the German people free themselves from National-Socialism through such an act of their own will they be entirely free. The victory of the United Nations will break the external hold of Nazis over the German people. But only the German people can free themselves spiritually. For this reason the German people should be given a peace which is constructive and gives them hope for the future, in spite of all burdens it must impose. Only this will enable Germany to develop and maintain a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

IV.

The education of the German people in democracy must spring from their own historical experience. There are signs that such a development is already

under way. They are to be found in the older generation which was never entirely taken in by Nazism. They are to be found even among those who have been educated under the Nazi system. They are found to a lesser degree in the generation that brought Nazism to power and which is now bled white on the field of battle. Even in this generation, however, resistance is not lacking.

In connection with this education of the German people through the historical events, German youth must be educated by German democrats who have grasped the meaning of these events. Education by foreigners is psychologically impossible. It is, however, desirable to reestablish quickly and on a large scale cultural and scientific exchange between Germany and other countries. Facilities essential to intellectual life, such as universities, schools, textbooks, public libraries, theaters, movies, must be freed of all taint of Nazism. The German people must again be given the freedom to express and to develop their spiritual and cultural forces.

It must be emphasized most vigorously that no education is worthwhile whose principles are belied by the social conditions. Education for democracy without an attempt to actuate democracy will only create resistance and cynicism. The prerequisite for any successful education of the German people, and especially of the German youth, to democracy and international cooperation, is a society which guarantees to all groups social security and the opportunity to lead a purposeful life.

The undersigned are convinced that it is impossible to base the reconstruction of Europe on the enslavement of the German people. A new democratic Germany must be protected against the forces of reaction within and without. This need will be urgent from the moment hostilities cease. German democracy secured will prove to be Germany's main contribution to the peace of Europe and the world.

APRIL 1944, NEW YORK, N. Y.

In connection with the signing of this declaration there has been within the circles of the old Social-democrats considerable controversies, since prominent Social-Democrats, as the chairman of the German Labor Delegation, Siegfried Aufhäuser, the former Prussian Minister of the Interior, Albert Grzezinski, Horst Baerensprung and other full-fledged Social-Democrats are ready to sign the declaration although Communists are participating in this organization prominently. The whole creation of the Council for a Democratic Germany has instigated a passionate discussion within the circles of the German exiles, proving that they are unable even to play a role in any advisory capacity, not to speak of their more important possible role as acting figures in a future Germany.

The views expressed by these groups are strongly opposed by many

refugees, the most prominent of whom is Professor Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster. The only organized voice which tries to disillusion the world and to prevent any repetition of appeasement is the Fight for Freedom Committee in London, the political statements of which are nearly unknown in the United States. They were published in the "Declaration on the Tenth Anniversary of January 3, 1933." We quote from the declaration:

"With a view to making clear what led to January 30th and leaving no room for illusions, the undersigned, who have spent their lives as active members of the German working class movement, declare:

1. The 30th January was not a breach with, but the result of, German political development for at least three generations. It was, in particular, a consequence of the policy of cowardice and treachery to the ideals of Democracy pursued by the German Republic in the fifteen years of its existence.
2. The appointment of Adolf Hitler as Reich's Chancellor and the entrusting to him of the formation of a Reich's Government of "National Unity" was in accordance with constitutional practice. On March 5th 1933 this Government of extreme German Nationalism received a clear majority of the Reichstag elections, a majority against Democracy and peace.
3. The German Republic went down not in battle but in shameful capitulation. On March 23rd 1933 with a two-thirds majority of all the elected deputies the new Reichstag gave to the Reich's Chancellor Adolf Hitler full power to enact laws without parliament and without the Reich's President, even if such laws were not in accordance with the Constitution.
4. This suicidal attitude on the part of Germany's political parties was in the main line of the nationalistic and militaristic development of the German peoples' will, as evident in all the decisive situations which have arisen in German politics during the past eighty years. Hitler was carried to power by the biggest people's movement in German history.
5. Hitler's acts of aggression (in 1935 the re-introduction of general compulsory military service; in 1936 the tearing up of the Locarno Treaty and the military reoccupation of the Rhineland; in 1938 the annexation of Austria and the attack on the Czechoslovakian Republic) were carried out with the approval of an overwhelming majority of the German people.
6. The still unshaken majority-basis of the Hitler régime is shown in the fanatical readiness of the German soldier to lay down his life at the front, a circumstance on which all reports of representative Soviet writers have been unanimous for months. A second indication is the silence of the German people against the oppressed peoples and against the Jews of the whole continent.
7. We pay our deepest respect to all those Germans who have risked their lives in the struggle against the German war Moloch, but we solemnly declare

that they represent only a very small and isolated minority which, unfortunately, has not produced any political movement.

The undersigned consider it their duty as Socialists, Democrats and friends of peace to warn the fighting youth of the United Nations against illusions to the effect that a simple return to January 29th 1933 would be sufficient guarantee for a change in Germany, and therefore a guarantee against a third world war.

The coming of a German revolution, not because Hitler's government began war, but because the Germans lost it, would not be a guarantee of peace.

No Democratic Germany can arise without the cooperation and without the protection of the United Nations.

Only upon this condition can the tasks of spiritually regenerating Germany, reorganizing its internal State machine, destroying its war potential, and introducing and maintaining its unilateral disarmament, lead to the absolutely necessary destruction of all germs of future nationalism and militarism."

As a whole, the German emigration has not been very successful. Despite some remarkable individual achievements, the German emigrés as part of German politics have not been able to deduce the logical conclusions from their defeat. The political leaders lost power, but they did not resign or disappear. Their political leadership in Germany had been an uninterrupted chain of blunders, and of fatal mistakes. But even in exile, after their defeat, they have continued to defend their political credos.

But the emigrés and the refugees were unanimous and consistent in their denunciation of the danger Hitler represented for the whole world. Some never ceased to raise their voices to warn the nations which had received them that the whole German people cannot be branded as a nation of criminals, but that the whole German people must, nevertheless, pay its share of political collective responsibility for the crimes of the national-socialist régime which tolerated and accepted. Total disarmament, all needful guarantees against another aggressive war, and a moral regeneration of the German nation are the fundamental prerequisites for a lasting peace as well as for the rehabilitation of the German people themselves. Only after these guarantees have been created with the active help of the Germans, can they demand and be granted equality of rights.

It is difficult to say whether this is the opinion of a minority or a majority inside Germany. A true change can only be brought about by the democratic Germans inside Germany. Those abroad can help them now and in the future, can support the liberal political trends in the countries where they have become citizens, and thus redeem themselves for ten years of failure, fratricidal feuds and dangerous illusions.

NEW YORK CITY

THE AUSTRIAN QUESTION AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

by Irwin Abrams

IN 1878 Albert Sorel predicted that once the Eastern question were solved, "the Austrian question will be posed inevitably before Europe."¹ Already by the end of the century it seemed that his prophecy was to be fulfilled. Austrian affairs were in a parlous state. The Badeni language ordinances of 1897, granting the Czech language a certain equality in official usage in Bohemia, touched off the long-standing antagonism between Czechs and Germans. The measure threw into opposition most of the German parties, while a small but militant group of extremists, convinced that the Austrian Germans were struggling no longer for predominance, but for "our very existence as a people,"² began openly to look beyond the borders of the monarchy for their deliverance. They inaugurated the *Los von Rom* movement, an ambitious attempt to stampede the German Catholics of Austria into the Protestant fold in order to make them more palatable to Protestant Germany, and in the Reichsrat they were among the first to begin that policy of obstruction which made parliamentary government in Austria a farce and a disgrace in the eyes of Europe. To contemporaries the nationalist clamor in the Reichsrat and in the provincial diets, the riots which broke out between Czechs and Germans, the noisy proclamations of the German separatists, the Magyar propaganda for independence, the collapse of ministry after ministry like so many houses of cards—all seemed signs of a disaster which was inevitably overtaking the Dual Monarchy.

In 1898 there was ominous talk in the English press of "a dissolving empire" and "a general breakup."³ By 1901 there had developed a full-fledged Austrian question, which was one of the most discussed topics of the day. M. de Blociszevsky, Vienna correspondent of *Le Temps*, wrote in July of that year:

Never has opinion been more occupied with Austria-Hungary than at this moment. On one hand they say, "Austria is disintegrating"; on the other, "It is on the verge of dismemberment"; and, as nothing could get along without pretty theories, learnedly deduced, there has already been

¹ A. Sorel, *La question d'orient au XIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1878), p. 309.

² Karl Türk, *Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien* (Munich, 1898), p. 48. Türk was a prominent German National deputy in the Reichsrat.

³ Francis Hirst, "A dissolving empire," *Fortnightly review*, LXX (1898), 56-71; *National review*, XXX (1898), 679-680.

formulated the theory of *dissolution* and the theory of *partition*—take your choice.⁴

The theory of dissolution was simply that the disruptive forces of the empire would tear it apart after the death of the aged Francis Joseph. When observers looked upon the hodge-podge of quarreling nationalities living in the Hapsburg realm, they could see only one source of stability and order, the person of the emperor. Charles Benoist returned from an investigation of conditions on the Danube to report:

The clearest idea brought back from a trip of study in Austria is, without paradox, that there is no Austria—it is only a diplomatic expression, *une formule de protocole européen*. . . . [Francis Joseph] is, after all, the only center of attraction for so many centrifugal forces.⁵

And for this venerable monarch, as one writer put it, it seemed as though fate had reserved the role of Romulus Augustulus.⁶ "After him," noted the *Review of Reviews* in 1900, "everyone says there will be the Deluge."⁷ While political commentators generally agreed that Austria-Hungary could not break up without precipitating a war, the belief was widely held that such a catastrophe was inevitable.⁸

Of course, there were those who echoed the famous dictum of Palacký. Benoist, while recognizing the internal weaknesses of the Danubian empire, declared that it was the perfect buffer state of Europe, as its existence prevented a gigantic Russia and a gigantic Germany from engaging in a mighty struggle in the heart of Europe. "If, therefore, Austria did not exist, Europe would have had to invent it. And since Austria does exist, Europe must do everything to preserve it." Many believed with the *Spectator* that Austria would hold together because of the dangers which would beset the various nationalities if they left the protection of the Hapsburgs.¹⁰ Francis Joseph himself liked to think of his dominions as "a place of refuge, an asylum for all those national fragments scattered over Central Europe which would

⁴ W. Beaumont (pseudonym), "Y a-t-il une question d'Autriche," *Revue de Paris*, IV (1901), 201-228.

⁵ C. Benoist, "La monarchie austro-hongroise et l'équilibre européen," *Revue des deux mondes*, CXLIII (1897), 770-793.

⁶ Anon., "Le rapprochement des races latine et slave et l'Autriche-hongrie," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, XXVII (1901), 245-269.

⁷ *Review of reviews*, XXII (1900), 218-219.

⁸ *National review*, XXXI (1898), 653; Sidney Brooks in the *Spectator*, LXXXVI (Jan. 19, 1901), 84-85; Edouard Driault, *Les problèmes politiques et sociaux à la fin du XIXe siècle* (Paris, 1900), pp. 43-67.

⁹ C. Benoist, "Europe sans Autriche," *Revue des deux mondes*, CLVI (1899), 241-261. The title alone was too much for the Austrian censors; they condemned the article without taking the trouble to read it. Benoist, *Souvenirs*, II (Paris, 1933), 431-432.

¹⁰ *Spectator*, LXXXVI (Feb. 2, 1901), 159.

inevitably lead a piteous existence if left to their own resources and become the playthings of their more powerful neighbors."¹¹

The prospect of Austria's disappearance from the European scene seemed to hold no terrors for the English. It was in vain that the *National Review* patiently pointed out that "the Austrian question, which excites so little interest in this country, owing to our constitutional inability to look even a month ahead, is the perpetual nightmare of Continental statesmen."¹² In France it was a different story. French publicists had long since become interested in the Slav nationalities as natural enemies of France's own hereditary foe and a barrier against German expansion to the east.¹³ It was taken for granted that if Austria collapsed the German provinces would fall to Germany, and as Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu pointed out in 1888, "The day when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy disappeared or was reduced to the land of the crown of St. Stephen would mark the end of French power."¹⁴ A decade later Alfred Rambaud, the Slavophil historian, warned of the impending danger in dramatic words:

Only a rope of sand, the life of a monarch of seventy years, holds Austria from the possibility of partition. If that should come about, it will not be for France a matter of facing the greatest danger she has run in a thousand years, but, and at a very near date, a question of life or death.¹⁵

More than once Paul Deschanel, president of the Chamber, stressed the importance of the Austrian question in public speeches; he hinted that France, supported by Russia, would insist upon a fair division of the spoils when the crash came.¹⁶ For such talk Deschanel was denounced as a jingo in the German press.¹⁷

¹¹ Freiherr von Margutti, *The emperor Francis Joseph and his times* (London, 1921), pp. 207-208.

¹² *National review*, XXXVII (1901), 325-326.

¹³ Ernst Birke, "Das Nationalitätproblem der Donaumonarchie in der Beurteilung der französischen slavophilen Publizistik" (1840-1854). *Jahrbuch für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven*, X (1934), 227-321; Louis Leger, "Souvenirs d'un slavophile" in *Le monde slave. Études politiques et littéraires*, I (Paris, 1897), v-xxii. See also the other writings of Leger as well as those of Ernest Denis and such works as Édouard Marbeau, *Slaves et Teutons* (Paris, 1882); Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *La France, la Russie et l'Europe* (2nd ed., Paris, 1888), Pierre Daresté, "La question tchèque," *Revue des deux mondes*, CXXX (1895), 654-675; Jean Bourlier, *Les tchèques et la Bohême contemporaine* (Paris, 1897); Chas. Loiseau, *Le balkan slave et la crise autrichienne* (Paris, 1898); André Lefèvre, *Germaines et Slaves* (Paris 1903).

¹⁴ Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

¹⁵ *Matin*, October, 1899, quoted in André Chéradame, *L'Europe et la question d'Autriche au XXe siècle* (Paris, 1901), p. 395. [Hereafter cited as Chéradame, *La question*.]

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. vii; Deschanel, *Quatre ans de présidence 1898-1902* (Paris, 1902), pp. 91-140, 189-195.

¹⁷ Noailles to Delcassé, Jan. 13, 1901; France, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914* (Paris, 1930), ser. 2, I, No. 22.

While the prospect of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and the consequent strengthening of Germany was hardly a cheerful one for the patriotic Frenchman, it seemed to be the general feeling in France that such was the inevitable course of events. As much was admitted by the partisans of the second of the two "pretty theories," the theory of partition, and they had to devote many pages to the proof that the Hapsburg empire was still viable. The foremost proponents of this point of view were the French publicists, René Henry, secretary and confidant of Deschanel, and André Chéradame. They held that Austria could be resuscitated by a reorganization along federalist lines, but this solution was blocked by the German government; moreover, in Berlin Pan-German schemes were promoted which involved the eventual annexation of Austria by Germany. The danger for France and Europe of such a dislocation of the balance of power was self-evident, but Germany's designs could be thwarted effectively by the determination of France and Russia to work together in close collaboration, proclaim the principle of non-intervention in Austria-Hungary, and help her win her own salvation through the adoption of federalism.¹⁸

It was Chéradame's outspoken book, *L'Europe et la question d'Autriche*, which did more than any other publication to place the Austrian question before the public. Its major revelation was that of the world of ideas of Pan-Germanism, hitherto little noticed in France. With a great display of scholarship Chéradame quoted copious extracts from the writings of Pan-German authors and reproduced many of their maps, showing their aim to be the union of all Germans and the expansion of Germany to the Adriatic. Such sentiments, he charged, represented the public opinion of Germany and were shared by responsible statesmen who secretly encouraged the movement.

Reviewers were duly impressed. One acclaimed it "a masterly work on a burning question."¹⁹ Another wrote, "The excellent work of M. Chéradame . . . concerns our patriotism even more than our curiosity."²⁰

¹⁸ Albert Lefranc [Chéradame], "L'empire allemand et les affaires autrichiennes," *Revue de droit public* (Jan., 1898); Chéradame, "Le mouvement pangermaniste," *Revue hebdomadaire* (March 17, 24, April 7, 1900); *idem*, *La question*, where there is reference to these articles; Henry, "La monarchie habsbourgeoise. Théorie de la dislocation et théorie du partage," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, XXIII (1900), 42-68; *idem*, "L'accord anglo-allemand," *ibid.*, XXVII (1901), 75-103. Henry later changed his point of view and declared in a book published in 1903 that it was to Germany's advantage to maintain Austria as she was, weak, subservient, and useful as the advance guard of German *Drang nach Osten*. See his *Questions d'Autriche-Hongrie* (2nd ed., Paris, 1903), pp. 79-156, 195-202.

¹⁹ *Revue politique et parlementaire*, XXVII (1901), 460.

²⁰ *L'Illustration*, no. 3030 (March 23, 1901), p. 190.

M. Rambaud gave the book his seal of approval in a lengthy review in the *Débats*. He concluded, "It is already, in itself, an event. It constitutes the first act of defense."²¹ Better informed critics recognized that Chéradame's proof of the German menace was based upon sensational effusions by German jingoes without any influence, and they refused to take the work seriously.²² Thus the Berlin correspondent of the *London Times*, by no means friendly to Germany, wrote in April, 1901:

If there is one charge of which the German Government may be entirely acquitted, even by its most merciless critics, it is the charge of countenancing, in any way, either the *Los von Rom* or the *Los von Österreich* movement. . . . The stronger the position of the Dual Monarchy, both at home and abroad, the better for Germany.²³

Nevertheless, the book created no little stir. It appeared just after Paris received news of the parliamentary gains of the German extremists in the Reichsrat, and the French press was already discussing the German danger to the Hapsburg monarchy.²⁴ Three editions were soon exhausted, a popular abridgement came out in 1902,²⁵ and Czech and Russian translations were published. Notices reached Vienna, where they evoked a "keen displeasure"; Francis Joseph himself was said to have heard about it and to have dismissed the book as the work of a journalist "looking for publicity."²⁶ Even the *Temps* carried an article which suggested that if the Danubian empire went to pieces, the German provinces should be allowed to go to Germany only if France were compensated by the return of Alsace-Lorraine. Such talk could not fail to arouse the Ballplatz. The Austrian ambassador at Paris protested against "the violent and spiteful attacks of certain French journalists,"²⁷ and one of his subordinates at the embassy was instructed to

²¹ A. Rambaud, "Le danger européen," *Journal des débats*, I (1901), 658-662. See also André Lichtenberger in the *Revue historique*, LXXVII (1901), 118.

²² Louis Eisenmann, "M. André Chéradame et la question d'Autriche," *ibid.*, LXXIX (1902), 96-103, polemic, *ibid.*, LXXX (1902), 318-326; B. Auerbach, *Revue critique*, n.s. LII (1901), 334-336; W. Beaumont [Blociszewsky], *op. cit.*: L. Dufougeray, "Une question d'après-demain," *Le correspondant*, CCII (1901), 1092-1101; A. de Saint-Valéry, "L'Europe et la question d'Autriche," *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, XI (1901) 679-685.

²³ *London Times*, April 22, 1901. Actually, Chéradame did not even present correctly the attitude of the *Alldeutscher Verband*, the leading Pan-German organization of Germany. The official demand of its members was for a customs union with Austria and the incorporation of the alliance in the constitutions of the two states. They supported a strong Austria—"to be sure, a German Austria, and not a Slavic Austria." Only in the latter extremity was annexation of the German provinces to be desired. *Alldeutsche Blätter*, June 15, 1901; Lothar Werner, *Der Alldeutsche Verband 1890-1918* (Berlin 1935), pp. 124-132.

²⁴ *London Times*, Feb. 5, 1901.

²⁵ Entitled *L'Allemagne, la France et la question d'Autriche*.

²⁶ Reverseaux to Delcassé, March 24, 1901; *Fr. Doc.*, ser. 2, I, No. 155.

²⁷ Delcassé to Reverseaux, March 25, 1901; *Fr. Doc.*, ser. 2, I, No. 156.

get an article into the *Temps* refuting the "absurd theory."²⁸ Moreover, as the French ambassador in Vienna suspected, it was no doubt the desire to show the world that the Austrian government suspected its ally of no ulterior motives which prompted the rousing welcome accorded the young German crown prince on his visit to Francis Joseph in April.²⁹

Echoes of the agitation reached England, where the Austrian question became interwoven with the press campaign being waged against Germany and in favor of an Anglo-Russian alliance.³⁰ This activity was just getting under way in 1901, and the exposure of Germany's supposed intentions toward Austria was used to sow further suspicion of that power. The *National Review*, a center of such propaganda, declared that England should never support Germany in her ultimate designs on Austria³¹ and that "in any event, it is high time that Englishmen give their attention to the greatest of European problems."³² Sir Rowland Blennerhassett, one of the most active of the Germanophobe writers insisted that the best way to save Austria from the Pan-German menace was through an Anglo-Russian alliance.³³ Another important article in the agitation for the alliance made the same point.³⁴ Moreover, the idea of Austria's vassal-like relationship to her ally was endorsed by the former English ambassador at Vienna.³⁵

From within the Dual Monarchy itself there sounded the voice of the Czech leader, Karel Kramář, signalling the German danger. In 1899 he had published a remarkable article on the Austrian question in the *Revue de Paris*. He explained how the nationality problem could be settled through a federalist re-constitution of Austria, and he went on to plead for an entente cordiale between Austria-Hungary and Russia, declaring that the German alliance threatened Austria's sovereignty, as it was pressure from Berlin which kept the Vienna government from taking measures to suppress

²⁸ Constantin Dumba, *Memoirs of a diplomat* (Boston, 1932), pp. 72-73.

²⁹ Reverseaux to Delcassé, March 24, 1901; *Fr. Doc.*, ser. 2, I, No. 155.

³⁰ Johannes Dreyer, *Deutschland und England in ihrer Politik und Presse im Jahre 1901* (Berlin, 1934), ch. ii.

³¹ A rumor was circulating that England had already agreed to give Germany a free hand in Austria. See Henry, "L'accord anglo-allemand," *loc cit.*; Hector Depasse, "Vienne, Rome, Madrid," *Revue bleue*, ser. 4, XV (1901), 194-196; Baron Pierre de Coubertin, "The problem of Central Europe," *Fortnightly review*, LXXVI (1901), 605-614.

³² *National Review*, XXXVII (1901), 325-326.

³³ R. Blennerhassett, "The Austrian anxiety," *National review*, XXXVII (1901) 357-369; *idem*, "The Pan-Germanic idea," *ibid.*, XXXIX (1902), 547-558. It is interesting to note that Blennerhassett had been able to write about the Austrian empire in June, 1900, without having to take account of an unduly ambitious Germany. See his article on "Great Britain and the Dual Monarchy," *ibid.*, XXXV (1900), 550-559.

³⁴ A. B. C. etc., "Some consequences of an Anglo-Russian understanding," *ibid.*, XXXVIII (1901), 513-525.

³⁵ Horace Rumbold, "An English tribute to the Emperor Francis Joseph," *ibid.*, XL (1902), 364-371; A Free Lance, "The problems of Vienna," *ibid.*, XXXVIII (1902), 854-870; see also Rumbold's *Final Recollections of a Diplomat* (London, 1905), p. 338.

the German separatists. This was a dangerous weakness, Kramář warned, for these extremists might convert their fellow Germans and create an irresistible demand for annexation to Germany, and with Austria's absorption by her neighbor, "Germany would become the sole mistress of the destinies of the entire world."³⁶ Three years later Kramář brought the same ideas before an English public in an article published in the *National Review*. Here he insisted once more that the Austrian question was simply the Bohemian question, for the Czech people formed a bulwark for the Hapsburg monarchy, whose existence was threatened by Germanism.³⁷ Meanwhile, he was active at home denouncing Pan-Germanism in public speeches. He proudly accepted the Pan-German taunt that the Czechs were "a thorn in the German flesh," and he declared that it was their great historic task so to be.³⁸

In all this talk of the German threat to Austria-Hungary, Professor Theodor Schiemann, writing in the Berlin *Kreuzzeitung*, recognized a "conspiracy" against his country. Taking part, he charged, were Chéradame, Henry, and other Slavophiles in Paris, Kramář and his Czechs in Bohemia and Austria, Russian Pan-Slavists, and Blennerhassett in England, and the aim was simply to weaken Austria and consequently Germany.³⁹

There is evidence to show that a concerted campaign was actually being carried on by at least some of those suspected by Schiemann. Kramář's private papers, confiscated at the time of his trial for treason in 1916 and published in the report of the proceedings, indicate his close relations with Chéradame and Henry. Chéradame met the Czech politician for the first time in September, 1897, just after he had begun the study of the Pan-German movement, and it was Kramář who introduced him to the leading Pan-Slavists of St. Petersburg in 1898. Chéradame's letters show that he was depending upon his friend for most of his information about the Dual Monarchy. In 1904 he wrote, "As you see, I am irreconcilably carrying through the program which I outlined to you several years ago." In May, 1901, shortly after the publication of his book on the Austrian question, Chéradame announced, "As regards politics, I can assure you that our ideas are penetrating everywhere more quickly than can be imagined.

³⁶ "L'avenir de l'Autriche," *Revue de Paris* (1899), pt. i, pp. 577-600.

³⁷ "Europe and the Bohemian question," *National review*, XL (1902), 183-205.

³⁸ Noteworthy were Kramář's speeches in the Reichsrat on Feb. 13, March 12, and Oct. 30, 1901. *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des österreichischen Reichsrathes in Jahre 1901*, 17. Sitzung, I, 299-304, II, 1228-1237, VII, 6257-6266.

³⁹ Theodor Schiemann, *Deutschland und die Grosse Politik* (Berlin, 1902-1915), I, 245-256, 268-274, 282-283.

The Germans in Berlin are simply raging." Later communications reflect the same spirit. Letters from Henry reveal that he, too, was relying heavily upon Kramář for his information about Austrian politics. In 1902 he wrote, "Your letter is the most certain proof that we are in complete agreement in our judgment of the situation of Central Europe and the policy to be pursued there." But their aims were not exactly the same, as Henry pointed out:

Both of us are undermining the work of Bismarck, each to the best of his ability and each in his own way. You attach the greatest importance to proving that the future will be shaped one way or the other, depending upon whether the Czechs or the Pan-Germans win out. On the other hand, I prefer to look upon the internal affairs of Austria-Hungary as a secondary matter, and what I ask myself is what decisions the Vienna government will have to come to, and whether it will break loose from Berlin.

In another letter Henry said, "Our hopes are closely bound up with your triumph, with the establishment of federalism in Cisleithania."⁴⁰

From this the aspirations of the "conspirators" are apparent. The French publicists had European politics in mind, and it was their intention to wean Austria away from the German alliance. Their propaganda proceeded along two lines: first, by revealing Germany's alleged plans for her ally, they hoped to arouse distrust in Vienna and a sensation elsewhere; and secondly, by agitating for a federalist remodelling of Austria, they were working for a reform which would have given the Slavs a prominent voice in the determination of the Hapsburg foreign policy. Kramář was also anxious to see Austria freed from the ties which bound her to Germany, but this only as a means to an end. His main object, and that of other Czech leaders as well, was a constitutional reform of the empire, giving legislative and administrative autonomy to the lands of the Bohemian Crown.

In support of this program Kramář was hoping to enlist the public opinion of western Europe by constantly stressing the European significance of the Czech struggle. He had influence as well with Lavino, the Vienna correspondent of the London *Times*, who later gratefully reminded him of "the pleasant conversations we used to have which did so much to introduce me into the complicated affairs of the monarchy." He called it "no less than a political education."⁴¹ A rumor that Kramář was the main

⁴⁰ Österreich-Ungarn, Armee, k.k. Landwehrdivisionsgericht, Wien, *Verkündigung des Urteils und Urteilsbegründung zum Kramář-Prozess, Abschrift* (Vienna, 1916), pp. 428, 431-432, 434-435.

⁴¹ *Kramář-Prozess*, p. 432.

inspiration of Blennerhassett found its way into a report to the foreign ministry in Berlin,⁴² but no such connection was brought out during the 1916 trial. The suspicion of the German ambassador at Vienna that the Czech politician was in touch with the French and Russian governments⁴³ was, however, not wholly without foundation, for in 1901 Kramář sent Delcassé a memorandum on the Bohemian question through the French ambassador.⁴⁴ But it should be noted that no matter what the natural leanings of the French government may have been, it maintained a perfectly correct diplomatic attitude toward the internal affairs of Austria-Hungary, and no official encouragement was given the Czechs.⁴⁵

Yet the makers of French policy could not remain indifferent to the many voices prophesying Austria's doom. It was, in fact, concern for Austria's future which provided the occasion for an important change in the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1899.

It was the Military Convention between France and Russia which put teeth in the alliance, and this agreement was to be in force as long as the Triple Alliance existed. But, thought Delcassé, what if the Triple Alliance should suddenly be dissolved, not voluntarily, but by the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy:

What if the Emperor Francis Joseph, who seems for the moment the sole bond of union between the rival and even enemy races, suddenly passed away, and if Austria were threatened by a break-up, which is perhaps wished elsewhere, perhaps furthered, and which, in any case, would be taken advantage of. What could be more capable of compromising the general peace and destroying the European balance of power? And what could make it more necessary for France and Russia not only to be in agreement as to a plan of action but even ready for its execution?

Now it is just at the precise moment when the Military Convention should come into play that it should cease to exist.^{45a}

These were the thoughts which Delcassé disclosed to the tsar during his visit to St. Petersburg in August, 1899. To his surprise, he found that Nicholas shared his views. The tsar had, in fact, already discussed the

⁴² *Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*, edited by Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme (40 vols., Berlin, 1922-27), XVII, No. 5019, note.

⁴³ Eulenburg to Hohenlohe, Dec. 16, 1898; *Ibid.*, XIII, no. 3488.

⁴⁴ Reverseaux to Kramář, April 28, 1901; *Kramář-Prozess*, p. 435.

⁴⁵ Reverseaux to Kramář, *loc. cit.*; Reverseaux to Delcassé, Dec. 12, 1901; *Fr. Doc.*, ser. 2, I, No. 561; R. Henry, *Témoignage pour les alsaciens-lorrains. Vingt-sept années d'enquêtes, de propagande et d'action* (Paris, 1925), p. vi.

^{45a} Delcassé to Muraviev August 9, 1899; France, Ministère des affaires étrangères. *Documents Diplomatiques, L'Alliance Franco-Russe* (Paris, 1912). No. 94.

question of the coming ruin of Austria-Hungary with one of his advisers.⁴⁶ The result of Delcassé's talks with the tsar was an exchange of notes which prolonged the Military Convention and extended the range of its application. The new agreement provided that the Convention was to last as long as the Franco-Russian Alliance, and the aim of that alliance was now declared to be the maintenance of the European balance of power.⁴⁷

This sounds innocent enough, and President Loubet's secretary objected that the alteration meant the consolidation of the Treaty of Frankfurt and final resignation to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine.⁴⁸ This is exactly what it did not mean. In December, 1899, the German ambassador at Paris picked up an interesting story. Count Muraviev was reported to have remarked during the course of a visit to the French capital that when Austria went to pieces on the death of Francis Joseph, and Austria's Germans became Germany's, whether she wanted them or not, then France would have to demand in compensation Lorraine with Metz, and she would be supported by Russia, who would acquire the Slavic parts of the defunct empire.⁴⁹ When Germany's representative at St. Petersburg taxed Muraviev with these utterances, he gave the impression of perfect innocence and passed off the matter as a great joke.⁵⁰ Yet such expressions were quite in accordance with the new terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the spirit in which they had been arranged.

There is no indication that considerations for Austria's future further influenced French policy at the turn of the century, but certain reports coming in to the ministry of foreign affairs must have given Delcassé cause for concern. There was, for example, news of German activity at Trieste, that Adriatic port so ardently desired by Pan-Germans.⁵¹ And a dispatch from Prague told of the suspicious conduct of the German consul there, Seckendorff, who was "acting as though in a conquered country." Just after Seckendorff returned from an audience with Emperor William, the indiscreet remarks escaped him:

⁴⁶ "Aus dem Tagebuch des russischen Kriegsministers Kuropatkin," *Berliner Monatsshefte* XII (1934), 327, 330-331.

⁴⁷ Muraviev to Delcassé, August 9, Delcassé to Muraviev, August 9, Delcassé to Loubet, August 12, 1899; *Documents Diplomatiques, L'Alliance Franco-Russe*, Nos. 93, 94, 95; Abel Combarieu, *Sept ans à l'Élysée avec le Président Emile Loubet* (Paris, 1932), pp. 33-34; Chas. W. Porter, *The career of Théophile Delcassé*, Philadelphia (1936), pp. 140-144. Professor William L. Langer believes that the initiative in this affair came from the Russians. See his *Diplomacy of Imperialism* (2 vols., New York, 1935), II, 597-599.

⁴⁸ Combarieu, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

⁴⁹ Bülow to Tschirschky, Dec. 7, 1899, *Die Grosse Politik*, XIII, No. 3550.

⁵⁰ Tschirschky to Hohenlohe, Dec. 13, 1899. *Ibid.* XIII, No. 3551.

⁵¹ De Laigue to Delcassé, May 26, 1902; *Fr. Doc.*, ser. 2, II, No. 266.

Germany is following with the greatest attention that which is going on in Austria. Events are likely to move faster than one thinks. We have a great, the greatest interest. *Yes, there is an Austrian question, which without doubt will make more of a stir than the Eastern question.*⁵²

Then Reverseaux was reporting from Vienna his suspicions that the German ambassador was interfering to a great extent in Austria's internal affairs and that support for the separatists was forthcoming from the German embassy.⁵³ True enough, Noailles reported from Berlin that the German government, "desirous of repudiating all solidarity with the Pan-German agitation, pretends not to be interested in the internal politics of Austria-Hungary,"⁵⁴ but that was not too reassuring. It was significant that in January, 1901, Belgium's foreign minister felt called upon to disabuse his representative at Paris of any notions of German designs on Austria.⁵⁵

The Austrian question also emerged during the ill-fated Anglo-German negotiations for an alliance in 1901. During the course of his remarkable feat of deceiving two governments, Eckardstein, the acting German envoy at London, represented Prime Minister Salisbury as being anxious for the alliance with Germany but hesitant partly because of the heavy responsibility England would have to assume for the maintenance of the crumbling Hapsburg fabric. At one time Eckardstein informed his foreign office that Salisbury had been concerned about Austria's fate for years.⁵⁶

Now it may well be that Salisbury did wonder a bit when he read the dispatches from Vienna. Certainly the thought of Austria's dissolution was no strange one in English circles. Bülow claims that Balfour mentioned it to him in 1899 and even suggested that in such an event the Austrian Germans would probably join the German empire.⁵⁷ And later, in 1901, Lord Wolseley reported from Vienna, where he had been sent to announce King Edward's accession, how uncertain the destiny of Austria-Hungary looked when Francis Joseph should die. "Beyond, all is cloud-land," he wrote.⁵⁸ But the Austrian question had nothing to do with the

⁵² De Valois to Delcassé, Oct. 30, 1901; *Ibid.*, I, No. 463. See also Chéradame, *La question*, pp. 251-253.

⁵³ Reverseaux to Delcassé, March 2, May 4, 1901; *Ibid.*, I, Nos. 119, 219.

⁵⁴ Noailles to Delcassé, June 22, 1901; *Ibid.*, I, No. 296.

⁵⁵ Foreign Ministry to Baron d'Anethan, Jan. 12, 1901; *Die belgischen Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges 1885-1914*, edited by Bernhard Schwertfeger (5 vols., Berlin, 1919), I, No. 32.

⁵⁶ Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, May 16, 18, 1901; *Die Grosse Politik*, XVII, Nos. 5005, 5008.

⁵⁷ Bernhard Fürst von Bülow, *Denkwürdigkeiten* (4 vols., Berlin, 1930-31), I, 319.

⁵⁸ Sir Sidney Lee, *King Edward VII* (2 vols., New York, 1925-27), II, 16-17.

failure of the negotiations, which were bound to come to grief for quite different reasons.⁵⁹

On the report which told of Salisbury's presentiment of disaster for the Hapsburg empire Bülow put question marks, and it was pointed out to the envoy at London that the best proof that Germany considered Austria viable was the fact that Germany had identified her interests with the continued existence of the Dual Monarchy in the Triple Alliance.⁶⁰ But the German statesmen could have been under no illusions as to the serious state of affairs in Austria-Hungary. Monts at Munich was writing pessimistically to Holstein about "the bankruptcy of the Danubian empire,"⁶¹ and Lichnowsky, then at the Vienna embassy, ended one mournful description of Austria's plight with the words: "It is the general process of disintegration, the agony of the state."⁶² Finally, a dangerous symptom was observed by the German military attachés at Vienna, who reported that the nationalist struggle was even making inroads in the army, the traditional stronghold of dynastic loyalty.⁶³

Such indications were enough to convince at least one high personage in Berlin, old Field-Marshal Waldersee, that Austria's doom was at hand, that "we must grasp our sword tightly," and prepare to carry through the solution of the German question, which had been left half solved in 1866.⁶⁴ Waldersee's journal reads in places like the writings of some Pan-German agitator, but he seems to have kept his opinions to himself, and certainly they had no influence upon those who determined Germany's policy.

It was clearly to Germany's interest that the Austro-Hungarian empire be preserved, and for considerations both of external and internal policy. With the removal of this power from the European picture, not only would Germany have become isolated, but the whole of the Balkans might have fallen under Russian influence. Then there was the fear of a return to the old Austro-Prussian struggle for headship in Germany. Prussia had not long before fought a war to secure that hegemony, and her rulers had no intention of endangering it by the addition of some nine million South German Catholics to the empire.

⁵⁹ The story is well told in Langer, *op. cit.*, II, 711-746.

⁶⁰ Richtofen to Hatzfeldt, May 18, 1901; *Die Grosse Politik*, XVII, No. 5007.

⁶¹ Monts to Holstein, Oct. 20, Dec. 21, 1898, March 31, 1899; Anton Monts, *Erinnerungen und Gedanken* (Berlin, 1932), pp. 374, 381, 386-387.

⁶² Lichnowsky to Bülow, June 17, 1899; *Die Grosse Politik*, XIII, No. 3512.

⁶³ Wolfgang Rudert, *Die Stellung des deutschen Reiches zur innerösterreichischen Lage 1890-1900* (Thesis, Leipzig, 1931), pp. 84-90.

⁶⁴ General-Feldmarschall von Waldersee, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, edited by Heinrich Otto Meisner (3 vols., Stuttgart and Berlin, 1923), II, 403-404, 407, 418, III, 215-216.

Bismarck had recognized "the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as a strong and independent great power" as a vital necessity for Germany,⁶⁵ and it was in the spirit of his master that Bülow wrote the following rebuke to Lichnowsky, who was showing undue sympathy for the German separatists:

Our political interest, to which all platonic sympathies must be subordinated . . . lies in the maintenance of Austria-Hungary in its present independence as a great power. This interest demands that we be on our guard against encouraging any disruptive tendencies in the Monarchy, whether they come from the Czech, Polish, or German side. The German Austrians should not remain in doubt that as long as their struggle for the German cause is animated by an effort to safeguard Germandom as a cement for the inner cohesion and further maintenance of the Austrian state in its present form, we follow their aspirations with the most complete sympathy, but as soon as this struggle has as its final aim the separation of the German provinces from Austria, and with a return to the *status quo ante* 1866 the German nationalists cannot count on the promotion of their plans from our side.⁶⁶

And it was to scotch the rumors of Germany's bad faith, with which Chéradame and others were filling the air in 1901, that the English were to be told to apply at Vienna, instead of Berlin, when Eckardstein led the Wilhelmstrasse to believe that England was willing to join the powers of the Triple Alliance. Germany planned to assign to her ally the leading part in these negotiations with one purpose in mind: to prove to the Vienna statesmen that the Germans based their political calculations upon Austria's ability to survive.⁶⁷

So Germany wished to preserve her ally. But she demanded that her ally keep her German identity. The Wilhelmstrasse well knew that if Francis Joseph let his Slavs direct the policy of his empire, it would not be long before Austria-Hungary would be found in the Franco-Russian camp, and Berlin was sensitive to any indication that the center of gravity in Austria was shifting from German to Slav.

In March, 1898, came news that the new Austrian ministry was to

⁶⁵ Bismarck: *Die gesammelten Werke* (Berlin, 1923ff.), XV; *Erinnerung und Gedanke*, pp. 412, 300. See also the account of Bismarck's interview with representatives of the Austrian German Nationals, *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), April 5, 1899, reprinted in the *London Times*, April 6, 1899. On this whole subject see Berthold Molden, "Das Deutsch-Osterreichische Bündnis und der Grossdeutsche Gedanke," *Berliner Monatshefte*, VIII (1930), 312-323.

⁶⁶ Bülow to Lichnowsky, June 18, 1898; *Die Grosse Politik*, XIII, No. 3475.

⁶⁷ Memorandum by Holstein, June 14, 1901; *Ibid.*, XVII, No. 5019; Richtofen to Hatzfeldt, April 14, 1901; *Ibid.*, XVII, No. 5001; General instructions of Holstein, May, 1901; Hermann Eckardstein, *Lebenserinnerungen* (3 vols., Leipzig, 1919-21), II, 344-347.

be supported by a Czech-Polish coalition. It was a sign that the tide was turning in favor of the Slavs, and Emperor William noted on the dispatch, "*Finis Triplicae*."⁶⁸ Nor was it long before such fears were given some justification. In November, 1898, Count Thun, the minister president, as a concession to his Slav supporters, protested in the Reichsrat against the expulsion of Austrian Polish laborers from Prussia and made a threat of possible reprisals.⁶⁹ The Germans in Berlin were both indignant and alarmed. They notified Goluchowsky, Austrian foreign minister, that such actions made it seem "doubtful whether the continuation of the Austro-German Alliance would mean more than a form."⁷⁰ Goluchowsky protested Austria's loyalty to the alliance, but Emperor William and Bülow let it be known that they would be satisfied with nothing short of an apology from Thun himself.⁷¹ In a speech before the Reichstag on December 12, Bülow advised the Austrian premier—although not in so many words—to think before he spoke, and on the same day Emperor William wrote a strongly-worded letter of reproach to his brother monarch, warning him of the serious consequences to the alliance of Thun's "ill-considered utterances."⁷² This brought reassurances from Austria's ruler and the publication of semi-official explanations in the Vienna *Abendpost* and *Fremdenblatt*, and with this the Germans had to be content.⁷³

No sooner had this difficulty been patched up than Kramář's article attacking the Triple Alliance was published in Paris. Now the worst fears of the Berlin statesmen seemed to be realized. Kramář was supposed to be close to the Czech Kaizl, finance minister in Thun's coalition cabinet; and the German authorities looked upon this article as representative of the opinions of the Austrian government.⁷⁴ To make matters worse, the Germans had had advance notice of its publication, and they had secured assurances from the Ballplatz that the article would be suppressed.⁷⁵ Kramář

⁶⁸ Eulenburg to Hohenlohe, March 1, 1898; *Die Grosse Politik*, XIII, No. 3471.

⁶⁹ Dr. Gustav Kolmer, *Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich* (8 vols., Vienna, 1902-14), VII, 152-154.

⁷⁰ Bülow to Eulenburg, Dec. 5, 1898; *Die Grosse Politik*, XIII, No. 3479.

⁷¹ Eulenburg to Hohenlohe, Dec. 5, Bülow to Emperor William, Dec. 10, Bülow to Hohenlohe-Oehringen, Dec. 19, 1898; *Die Grosse Politik*, XIII, Nos. 3481, 3490.

⁷² *Ibid.*, XIII, No. 3485, note; William II to Francis Joseph, Dec. 12, 1898; *Ibid.*, XIII, No. 3482.

⁷³ Eulenburg to Hohenlohe, Dec. 15, Francis Joseph to William II, Dec. 17, Eulenburg to Hohenlohe, Dec. 25, 1898, Bülow to Eulenburg, Jan. 1, 1899; *Ibid.*, XIII, Nos. 3486, 3489, 3494, 3496.

⁷⁴ Bülow to Eulenburg, ec. 21, 1898; *Ibid.*, XIII, No. 3491. Actually Kaizl disapproved of the article and thought its publication a blunder. See his letter to Skarda, Feb. 23, 1897, printed in German translation in the *Neue Freie Presse*, May 14, 1914.

⁷⁵ Eulenburg to Hohenlohe, Dec. 16, 1898, Bülow to William II, Feb. 3, 1899; *Die Grosse Politik*, XIII, Nos. 3488, 3500.

was, in fact, obliged to sugar-coat the pill, and the article was much altered when it finally appeared,⁷⁶ but the pill was still a bitter one for the Wilhelmstrasse to swallow. Bülow was greatly perturbed, and to William II it was no less than "a provocation."⁷⁷

Efforts were redoubled to bring Francis Joseph around to the right way of thinking. His Slavophil mood of the time was due to his vast displeasure with the German extremists, because of their antics in the Reichsrat and more especially because of their promotion of the *Los von Rom* movement, which made mockery of his most cherished religious beliefs. Knowing that it would embarrass Thun, whose task it was to put an end to this movement, the German government refused his request for an official declaration from Berlin denouncing it.⁷⁸ Meanwhile, Count Eulenburg, German ambassador at Vienna, was attempting to educate Francis Joseph in the thought that the Germans, after all, formed the bulwark of his state. His task was made immeasurably easier by the appearance of Kramář's article, for nothing annoyed the old monarch more than to have one of his domestic problems flaunted before the eyes of all Europe.⁷⁹ And when Aehrenthal, home from his St. Petersburg post, added his voice to those arguing that foreign and domestic policies should be brought into line, Francis Joseph was persuaded and Thun's fate was sealed. His departure from office finally came about in September, 1899, and his coalition cabinet was replaced by a cabinet of officials.⁸⁰

Repeated admonitions from Berlin and considerations for the German alliance prompted Francis Joseph to smile upon his Germans once more. Although the publicists were quite mistaken in their conjectures as to Germany's designs on Austria, they were not far wrong in their suspicion that Germany was meddling in Austria's internal affairs.

As the years passed interest in the Austrian question seemed to flag. Chéradame attributed it to the searchlight of publicity, which had exposed Germany's plans and so defeated them.⁸¹ A better reason was that as time went on the nationalist quarrels subsided somewhat in the era of "supra-national" ministers, and despite the prophets of disaster, Austria-Hungary still remained intact. Then, too, fairer and more optimistic books

⁷⁶ *Kramář-Prozess*, p. 428.

⁷⁷ Bülow to William II, Feb. 3, 1899; *Die Grosse Politik*, XIII, No. 3500.

⁷⁸ Bülow to Eulenburg, April 6, 1899; *Ibid.*, XIII, No. 3507.

⁷⁹ Eulenburg to Hohenlohe, Dec. 15, 1898, Jan. 11, March 11, March 27, 1899; *Ibid.*, Nos. 3486, 3497, 3503, 3505.

⁸⁰ Kolmer, *op.cit.*, VII, 335-339; Alois Freiherr von Cziedik, *Zur Geschichte der k.k. österreichischen Ministerien 1861-1916* (4 vols., Vienna, 1917-20), II, 218-222.

⁸¹ Chéradame, *La question d'orient* (Paris, 1903), p. 338.

appeared, revealing that all the excitement over the Pan-German peril had been merely "much ado about nothing" and tending to show that the polygot empire still had enough life in her to last a long time yet.⁸² Yet Pan-German ideals, preached only by the few in 1900, were to become an integral part of German nationalism, and the Austrian question was far from settled. When the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy finally did occur, the eventual results were not far different from what Chéradame and the others had predicted. Certainly the problem of the Central European peoples must be a major concern of the statesmen charged with the organization of peace after this war. It may even be as Palacký suggested long ago, that since Austria does not exist, Europe will have to invent it—not the old Austria, to be sure, but some new democratic federation to take its place.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

⁸² Louis Eisenmann, *Le compromis austro-hongrois de 1867* (Paris, 1904) esp. pp. 669-672; Georges Weil, *Le pangermanisme en Autriche* (Paris, 1904); Scotus Viator [R. W. Seton-Watson], *The future of Austria-Hungary* (London, 1907); Gabriel Louis-Jaray, "La question d'Autriche-Hongrie," in F. Charmes, et al., *Les questions actuelles de politique étrangère en Europe* (3rd revised edition, Paris, 1911), 109-171.

DOCUMENTS

The following statement was issued in London on April 25, 1944 by the Polish Minister of National Defence:

Twenty-one Polish soldiers of Jewish faith were tried last week by a court-martial of the Polish Army somewhere in Scotland, charged with desertion. The minimum sentence provided by the Polish military penal code for desertion—one year's imprisonment—was imposed upon seven of the defendants. The rest were sentenced to terms of imprisonment varying from one to two years. Only those who refused to return to the ranks were tried before the court-martial.

Two soldiers who, before the trial, declared their readiness to rejoin their ranks were not tried at all, one of them being given seven days' arrest for absence without leave. Both returned to their units. The defendants had their counsel, a Jew serving in the Polish Army, who is a barrister in civilian life. The verdicts were reported to the C. O. of the division in which they serve; he has the right to defer the verdicts until the demobilization of the men, provided they show sufficient good will.

The trial was ordered by the Polish military authorities after a stern warning against desertions which had occurred before under the pretext of joining the British Army. This warning was issued in the form of an Order of the Day by the Polish Minister of National Defence on March 13, 1944, after two groups of Jewish soldiers, 207 in all, were permitted to enter the British Army. This permission, granted in agreement with British military authorities, was understood to be exceptional, and not to create a precedent. The British military authorities declared at the time that they would not accept any more Jewish soldiers who wilfully relinquished service in the Polish Army.

Six cases of alleged offenses against Jewish soldiers are now being investigated. They refer to a period several months prior to the first cases of desertion. During the court-martial other cases of offences were reported by the defendants, and they were recorded by the court. These cases will be investigated and the offenders duly tried.

Polish courts-martial are, as a rule, held in camera. On this occasion, however, representatives of Polish Jewry were invited by the Polish military authorities to attend. Dr. I. Szwarcbart and Dr. Szerer, members of the Polish National Council, as well as Mr. J. Reiss, representing the Federation of Polish Jews, were present at the trial.

The majority of Polish soldiers of Jewish faith continue to serve in the ranks of the Polish Army, and have voiced no complaints. In the last six months, 37 Jews were commissioned—a comparatively large proportion considering the number of Jews serving in the Polish Army. Nine Jews were promoted to the rank of lieutenant, three to the rank of captain. During this war, two Jews received the *Virtuti Militari*, the highest Polish war decoration, 26 the Cross of Valour, and three the Cross of Merit. During his recent inspection of the Polish

Corps on the Italian front, General Sosnkowski, C.-in-C. of the Polish Forces, personally decorated two Jewish Commandos of the Polish Commando Unit.

* * * *

The following is the Text of the agreement entered into between the Czechoslovak and Soviet governments for the administration of territory of the former freed by the armies of the later from the common enemy. Signed in London, May 8, 1944.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring that the relationship between the Czechoslovak Administration of the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Soviet (Allied) Commander-in-Chief on the entry of Soviet (Allied) troops into Czechoslovak territory should be adjusted in the spirit of friendship and alliance existing between the two countries, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1.—As soon as Soviet (Allied) forces, as the result of war operations, enter Czechoslovak territory, the Soviet (Allied) C.-in-C. will possess the supreme authority and responsibility in all matters relating to the conduct of the war in the zone of war operations for the period necessary to carry out these operations.

Article 5.—As regard the zones under the supreme authority of the Soviet will be appointed, whose task it will be: (a) To set up and direct, in accordance with Czechoslovak law, the administration of the territory which has been cleared of the enemy; (b) to reconstitute the Czechoslovak armed forces there; (c) To ensure active co-operation between the Czechoslovak administration and the Soviet (Allied) C.-in-C., and in particular, to give local authorities appropriate instructions on the basis of the needs and wishes of the Soviet (Allied) C.-in-C.

Article 3.—The Czechoslovak troops comprised in the Soviet (Allied) armies when they enter Czechoslovak territory will immediately be utilized there.

Article 4.—To ensure contact between the Soviet (Allied) C.-in-C. and the Czechoslovak Government delegate a Czechoslovak military mission will be set up at the headquarters of the Soviet (Allied) C.-in-C.

Article 5.—As regards the zones under the supreme authority of the Soviet (Allied) C.-in-C., the Czechoslovak Government authorities and representatives in the liberated territory will be in touch with the Soviet (Allied) C.-in-C. through the Czechoslovak Government delegate.

Article 6.—As soon as any part of the liberated territory ceases to be a zone of actual war operations, the Czechoslovak Government will take over the full exercise of public authority there and will afford (Allied) C.-in-C. co-operation and assistance in all respects through their civilian and military authority.

Article 7.—All members of the Soviet (Allied) forces on Czechoslovak territory will be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Soviet (Allied) C.-in-C. All members of the Czechoslovak armed forces will be amenable to Czechoslovak jurisdiction. Civilians on Czechoslovak territory will likewise be subject to this latter jurisdiction, even in cases of penal offences committed in the zone of war

operations. In the latter case they will come under the jurisdiction of the Soviet (Allied) C.-in-C. Any doubts about jurisdiction which may arise will be settled by mutual agreement between the Czechoslovak Government delegate and the Soviet (Allied) C.-in-C.

Article 8.—A special agreement will be reached on the subject of financial matters, connected with the entry of Soviet (Allied) forces into Czechoslovak territory.

Article 9.—This agreement comes into force immediately upon its signature. It has been drawn up in duplicate, each copy in the Czechoslovak and the Russian languages. Both texts are equally authentic.

BOOK REVIEWS

FISHER, RAYMOND H. *The Russian Fur Trade, 1550-1700* Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1944. Pp. 275. \$3.00.

As early as the days of the Varangians, and even before their coming to Russia, the Russian Slavs were engaged in the fur trade. During the Kievan period the Russian furs were well and favorably known on the markets of Constantinople and Trans-Caspian Asia. The rise of Novgorod was due to the establishment of the enormous fur empire in the northern densely forested part of the Russian plain. A member of the Hanseatic League, Novgorod sent large consignments of furs to Lübeck and Hamburg and from there to London, Ghent, Bruges and even Genoa. In the second half of the fifteenth century, however, Moscow delivered a mortal blow to the trade of Novgorod and supplanted it as the chief exporter of the Russian furs.

In the sixteenth century there was a manifest increase in the demand for furs throughout Western Europe, while in Russia certain barriers were broken down which had blocked the path of its fuller participation in the world's trade. In 1514 the Russians captured Smolensk, a terminus of *die Hohe Landstrasse* through Poland and Silesia to Leipzig, the rising center of the European fur trade, while in 1553 the English discovered the route to the mouth of the Northern Dvina. The destruction of the Tatar Khanates of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556) not only opened the Volga for the trade with Asia, but it also removed the chief obstacle on the road to the immense fur resources of Siberia. The combination of these factors gave a tremendous impetus to the Russian drive across the Urals, and the period of 1550-1700, which is the chief subject of Dr. Fisher's study, was the period of greatest territorial expansion of Russia as well as the period of its most intensive trade in furs. There was a very close connection between these two phenomena. The fur trade was the most important single factor which "motivated expansion, paid its cost, and gave Russia an empire which promises to be the geographic and economic base of the Russia to come."

The main portion of Dr. Fisher's book is devoted to the story of the Siberian fur trade. The possibility of large profits quickly transformed the conquest of Siberia from what had started as a private undertaking into a State enterprise. The result was the establishment of a virtual State fur monopoly in Siberia, at least in so far as the more valuable kinds and qualities of furs were concerned. To obtain furs from the natives and from Russian trappers, to sort and ship these furs to Moscow, and to dispose of them to the best advantage of the State, the government introduced special administrative machinery. Meanwhile private acquisition of furs was placed under all sorts of restrictions and regulations, although due to a lack of effective means to enforce them, there was wide room for "smuggling" and "bootleg trade".

The furs obtained by the Muscovite government from Siberia played a very significant role in the State economy. A large portion of the total government revenue (up to 10% according to the author, although some earlier writers placed

it even higher) was derived from the State fur income. The State Treasury sold most of the furs, but furs were also used for a variety of other purposes, as rewards for distinguished service to the State, as gifts, especially to foreign ambassadors, as bribes at foreign courts, as a form of subsidy to the church dignitaries of the Near East, and finally, because of the Russian poverty in precious metals, as a sort of equivalent of the mercantilist "gold fund".

Dr. Fisher's book thus lifts a curtain from one of the hitherto little explored and exceedingly interesting phases of Russian history. The excellent bibliography shows the variety of sources from which the author has obtained his information. The evidence is cautiously weighed before acceptance. In view of a comparatively small number of monographs in English which cover the Muscovite period of Russian history, this competent and authoritative work represents a contribution of special significance. It is to be hoped that Dr. Fisher will extend his investigation to include the further study of the Russian fur trade which later resulted in the Russian penetration into the New World and the establishment of the Russian Empire on the three continents, Europe, Asia and America.

Wellesley College

GEORGE V. LANTZEFF

DULLES, FOSTER RHEA, *The Road To Teheran: The Story of Russia and America, 1718-1943*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. 279. \$2.50

The full story of American-Russian relations, from the remote days when Francis Dana cooled his heels in St. Petersburg in a vain quest for diplomatic recognition from Catherine II to the common struggle of today against the Nazi Reich, has never been narrated within the limits of a single volume. This task has been attempted by Professor Foster Rhea Dulles of Ohio State University, formerly a foreign correspondent in Peking and Paris and an editor of *The New York Evening Post*. Professor Dulles makes no claim to having made an original contribution to scholarship. He frankly concedes that his tale is based upon American sources and deals primarily with American policy toward Russia rather than with Russian policy toward the United States. Within these limits he has succeeded brilliantly in depicting the fascinating and troubled course of diplomatic relations between the two Powers from the American Revolution to the Teheran Conference. The bibliographical notes and index will be welcomed by all diplomatic historians. The narrative itself, which is exciting, highly readable and provocative without being partisan, should be welcomed and read by all in need of historical perspective on the relations between Washington and Moscow—and that would appear to include most Americans.

The thesis of *The Road To Teheran* is that the national interests of Russia and America in world politics have always been parallel rather than conflicting, despite ideological differences and recurrent frictions and misunderstandings; that this accounts for the fact that the two countries have never been at war but have often fought together against common enemies; and that a realistic appraisal of mutual interests can and should guarantee successful collaboration in winning the war and the peace. After a rapid but suggestive survey of early relations, the

Monroe Doctrine, the Alaska Purchase and the problems which followed the turn of the century, Dulles deals in more detail with World War I, the Revolution, Intervention and "The Great Red Scare." These are judicious and authoritative. The later chapters are of necessity more tentative because of the relative scarcity of documents and monographs, but they constitute the best review of Soviet-American relations during the past decade which has yet appeared. The analysis of the sources of American fears, suspicions regarding the U.S.S.R., is particularly valuable in clearing an atmosphere which has long been poisoned by ignorance and malice.

Dulles is soberly critical of many aspects of both American and Soviet policy, but comes closer to the historian's ideal of "objectivity" than most other writers in this field. He shows how and why Washington and Moscow were unable to act in unison against a common menace in the 1930's and thereby rendered World War II inevitable. Those who read these pages thoughtfully will perceive that American-Soviet solidarity is the price of victory and peace and the best assurance against a repetition tomorrow of the tragedies of yesterday and today.

Williams College

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

STRAKOVSKY, LEONID I., *Intervention at Archangel. The Story of Allied Intervention and Russian Counter-Revolution in North Russia, 1918-1920*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. vii, 336. \$3.00.

The Allied intervention at Archangel in 1918-19 is one of the least known episodes in the dramatic turmoil following the Russian Revolution of 1917. In regard to both Allied and Russian anti-Bolshevik forces involved, the struggle in North Russia was on a minor scale. However, the Archangel venture was not an isolated occurrence, being to a certain extent connected with Allied moves and counter-moves in other quarters of the former Russian Empire. It had its peculiar facets, the study of which may substantially clarify the picture of the movement as a whole. Thus, it is a convenient object for a cross-section case study of the Russian civil war and intervention and Dr. Strakhovsky has succeeded in presenting to the American reader this case with much lucidity in spite of the intricate nature of the subject. His present book is a companion volume of the one he published in 1937 (*The origins of American Intervention in North Russia, 1918*), in which he dealt with the intervention at Murmansk. Taken together his two books cover the whole ground of intervention in North Russia.

The participants of the Russian counter-revolutionary movement of 1918-20, as well as their foreign Allies, were inclined to identify their cause with that of Russia's national integrity, and to describe their opponents—the Bolsheviks—as traitors to that cause. With the advantage of our knowledge of subsequent developments and especially of the role of the Soviet government in the present war it is mildly amusing (to say the least) to read in the documents of the Russian Civil War references to the Bolsheviks as to "an infinitesimal minority of the population relying on the armed support of a rebellious army and navy" (the proclamation of the Provisional Government of North Russia, November 13, 1918), as to "tyrants and outcasts, mostly aliens stained with guilt of every crime,

and helped by the Germans" (General Miller's address, May 27, 1919), or to discover in Brigadier General Ironside's proclamation to the Allied troops in North Russia such statements as: "We are up against Bolshevism, which means anarchy pure and simple . . . The power is in the hands of a few men, mostly Jews, who have succeeded in bringing the country to such a state that order is non-existent". *Tempora mutantur* indeed.

Through the whole period of the Archangel venture there was hopeless confusion and disagreement between the Allies and the Anti-Bolshevik Russians as to the purpose and method of action, both in a political and a military sense. The Allied governments, their respective envoys in Russia (who had left Petrograd for Vologda and eventually emerged in Archangel), and the commanding generals,—each of them—had a policy of their, or his, own. Because of the opposition of the United States Government to an open war with the Soviets, and the pressure of the liberals and laborites in Great Britain, the intervention was started under the pretext of guarding the munition stores at Murmansk and Archangel against their possible seizure by the Germans. While the Germans, because of their participation in the Finnish Civil War and their agreement with General Mannerheim, were in a position to strike at Murmansk, there certainly was no danger of this sort to Archangel. Thus, there was obviously some insincerity in the purpose of the Allied intervention at Archangel from its very beginning, which naturally was felt by the troops and could not but affect their morale.

Furthermore almost each of the Allied representatives had his own Russian policy, and while the French and the American envoys insisted that the anti-Bolshevik government of North Russia be composed of socialists and democrats and supported the veteran socialist leader N. V. Chaikovsky, British generals preferred to deal with conservative officers. The result was bewilderment and confusion, of which the reader may find many a striking instance in Dr. Strakhovsky's book. Thus, when Chaikovsky's government decided to have both the Old Russia's tricolor and the red flag displayed sided by side, General Poole (at that time Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in North Russia) immediately gave orders to his troops "not to permit any display of red flags in Archangel". A month later "certain high-placed Allied officers" unofficially sponsored an attempt on the part of a group of Russian officers, headed by Commander Chaplin, to seize the power (on September 5, 1918), as a result of which Chaikovsky and all the members of his cabinet were arrested. It was only due to the intervention of the envoys that Chaikovsky and his colleagues were eventually released and the ring leader of the officers' plot deported on an English man-of-war "to escape the wrath of Chaikovsky's government."

According to the sub-title of Dr. Strakhovsky's book, the reader is offered the story of both Allied intervention and Russian counter-revolution. While Dr. Strakhovsky's book contains a clear and systematic account of the first item on his program—the intervention—, his treatment of the second item—the counter-revolution—is less satisfactory, at least in the reviewer's opinion. Dr. Strakhovsky's basic approach to the Russian counter-revolution is primarily from the

military point of view. Because of that, his sympathies are obviously with Chaplin and against the Chaikovsky government. But the Russian counter-revolution—as any counter-revolution—was much more than a mere military venture; moreover in every civil war the attitude of the people at large is at least as important for victory as the attitude of the staff officers of the army. Indeed in a civil war the morale of the troops depends on the morale of the civilian population even to a greater extent than in an international war. Chaikovsky may have been and probably was as inefficient a ruler as Dr. Strakhovsky portrays him. But to say that he “was foremost a socialist and a revolutionary guarding jealously the prerogatives of his authority for the furtherance of his party program” is hardly fair. Whatever Chaikovsky’s defects were, he was undoubtedly sincere in his attempt—Quixotic perhaps at that time and under the circumstances—to build up a democratic Russia. Incidentally, he was not a member of the Social Revolutionary Party; the political group to which he belonged, the so-called “Popular Socialists”, was not a well-organized party and had no rigid program. Actually, as Dr. Strakhovsky makes it plain himself, Chaikovsky’s government conducted no Socialist experiments, referring any important reform to the future Constituent Assembly. In any case, it seems that Chaikovsky’s government was at first trusted by the peasants, and it was only after Chaplin’s abortive *coup d’état* and the subsequent subjugation of the North Russian government to the Allied military commanders that Bolshevik moods began spreading among the people of North Russia and eventually undermined the morale not only of the troops but of the civilians as well.

It is regrettable that while Dr. Strakhovsky pays considerable attention to the political moves and counter-moves of the government officials and the members of the officers’ group, very little is said in his book about the attitude of the people at large. True, to study it is not an easy task and the materials for such a study are scarce, but it seems that the author has made no sustained effort to approach the task. Anyhow, the impression of the reviewer is that peasants and workers appear on the pages of Dr. Strakhovsky’s book only in case of some misbehavior or “sabotage” on their part and only as if to give the author the opportunity of commenting upon the viciousness of the Bolshevik propaganda. But the reasons why most of them eventually were affected by that propaganda have not been made sufficiently clear by the author.

Yale University

GEORGE VERNADSKY

BANE, S. L. & LUTZ, R. H., *Organization of American Relief in Europe 1918-1919*. (The Hoover Library on War, Revolution and Peace) Stanford University Press, 1943. Pp. 745. \$6.00.

At the beginning of this year the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was established as the united organization to undertake the enormous work of relief and reconstruction in all liberated countries. A central organization was formed comprising members of all countries willing to give and waiting to receive relief.

After the first World War, the Allies (President Wilson did not consider the United States an Ally but only an associated power) wanted joint relief through a commission where the majority would rule. President Wilson wanted to maintain control of all American food supplies (95% of all relief supplies) and therefore insisted upon an independent position of the U. S. Food Administration to which the whole American relief work during the Armistice period was entrusted. Although Herbert Hoover, the United States Food Administrator, left this country six days after the Armistice had been signed on November 11, 1918, and the American offices were already opened in Paris and London by November 27th, it has often been asserted that divergencies of opinion between the Allies and the Americans caused delay and prolonged sufferings and starvation among some hundred millions of people. (The delayed liftings of the naval blockade on the neutral and enemy countries evidently did great harm.)

The most instructive and most interesting part of this volume shows the great difficulties in creating concerted action among the independent powers and among the numerous offices of the various nations concerned with the intricate work of relief and reconstruction. An unending exchange of letters, telegrams, memoranda, instructions, statements, reviews, agreements, etc. was taking place. It will require a good memory on the part of the reader to keep in mind all the names of functionaries writing and receiving those documents, their part in the various actions and their individual points of view.

Certainly the best way to understand the manifold and complex problems connected with such a vast work embracing hundreds of millions of people spread over great territories is by studying what has happened and what has been done and how the problems were handled at the first great European relief action. A study of the documents diligently compiled in this book can serve as a useful guide through many complex situations. In any case, it will leave no doubt of the great advantage which the concentration of power, efforts and means in a united organization will give to the UNRRA.

Riverdale, New York

HERMAN H. BROWNE

CARDWELL, ANN SU, *Poland and Russia: The Last Quarter Century*. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944. Pp. xii, 251. \$2.75.

For the first time contemporary Polish-Russian relations are discussed not in an article or pamphlet but in a comprehensive book. Mrs. Cardwell is particularly well qualified to write it. She is an American who with her husband lived and worked in Warsaw from 1922 to 1939, and in 1936, after long preparation, made an extensive trip to Soviet Russia. She is, therefore, familiar with the countries concerned, without having any racial or religious connexion with either of them. Her judgment is free from any kind of prejudice and based upon serious and unusual experience: time and again she is able to say "I have seen it myself", a statement which certainly is the most reliable and convincing reference. She has not attempted to give a full bibliography, but the 75 notes at the end of the

volume are proof of careful reading, chiefly of official documents. Two of them, the final report of Mr. Grzybowski, who was Polish Ambassador in Moscow before and during the crisis of 1939, and Mr. Molotov's report to the Supreme Soviet, delivered on October 31 of the same year, are reprinted in the appendices. Three maps, showing the partitions of Poland, the so-called Curzon Line and other lines of 1920, and the settlements of deported Polish citizens, scattered over the whole territory of the Soviet Union, are very helpful illustrations of the text.

Written in January 1944 (p. 182), the book covers the whole period from the Russian Revolution in 1917 to the present. Most of it and—to say it at once—the best part is devoted to the four years between the German-Soviet rapprochement in 1939, traced back to the beginning of that year, and the second break of Polish-Russian relations, in 1943. This main section of the volume is preceded by a discussion of the background where the most important events are briefly recalled. In such an introduction some minor inaccuracies were almost unavoidable, but it seems to be merely a nerror of the printer that the paragraph concerning the partitions of Poland calls them an undertaking of Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa, without mentioning Catherine II and Russia's participation. How much research work still is needed in order to elucidate all the controversial problems of the crucial years 1919-1920, has recently been shown in the important article of Mr. Sworakowski, published in this *Journal* (vol. IV, No. 1). The chief lines of development are, however, very ably traced by Mrs. Cardwell whose readers will approach the decisive moment of 1939 with a thorough understanding of its antecedents.

After rightly emphasizing the fact that Poland even during the years when she had a non-aggression treaty with Germany, consistently rejected Hitler's proposals to participate in an attack against the Soviet Union, the author is in an excellent position to contrast that Polish policy and the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, which undoubtedly contributed to the outbreak of the war and included the plan of "a fourth partition of Poland". Speaking of the Russian invasion of Poland, on September 17, 1939, Mrs. Cardwell quotes the comment made the next day by the London *Times* which strongly condemned that act of aggression (p. 49). From these well-known events she passes to a description of Soviet rule in Eastern Poland which makes these two chapters (V and VI) an invaluable source of information about a tragic story which never before has been told with so many concrete details. Those concerning the "elections" which followed the military occupation and resulted in the "plebiscite" requesting admission into the Soviet Union are particularly illuminating. Even more tragic is the equally detailed information about the fate of the deported Polish citizens: this chapter (VII) makes extremely painful reading, but has the great merit of at last making known to the civilized world the sufferings of so many hundreds of thousands of people.

These problems, studied with a truly human approach, justify the title of chapter VII: "The Polish Government offers to forget". And it is not the author's fault that after a few pages on the Polish-Russian agreement which

immediately followed Hitler's invasion of Russia, she has to turn at once to new troubles between the two countries. The fate of the "lost" Polish officers, the execution of Erlich and Alter, and the controversy concerning the formation of a Polish army in the USSR, are clearly explained, but Mrs. Cardwell is again at her best in describing the second act of the tragedy of the deported Poles, when the relief work for these unfortunate people was stopped. Nothing is more revealing than the interpretation of Stalin's pronouncement in favor of "a strong and independent Poland", which was given immediately thereafter by the Comintern agents in Poland: he knew, they said, that the only way there could be a strong and independent Poland was for her to become a member state of the USSR (p. 154).

Studying the real cause of the break of Polish-Soviet relations, the author is perhaps too brief in her remarks about "the disputed provinces". She rather underestimates the Ukrainian movement and goes too far in saying that the White Ruthenians "were quite generally recognized as having no national consciousness". Brief also is the discussion of the situation which followed the break, but at that moment it was hardly possible to do more than to define the positions of both sides, and that Mrs. Cardwell has done in an excellent way. Most pertinent is also the information concerning "Wanda Wasilewska and her group", as well as the so-called Kościuszko Division. And no conclusion could be better than the words of the Polish labor leader, Dr. Adam Ciolkosz, who, having heard in London a suggestion that Poland should simply join the Soviet Union, answered: "After you, Sir".

There is only one thing which might be added from the point of view of general history. The tragedy described in this eloquent book, including both the sufferings of the Polish people and the danger menacing their country from the Russian side, ought to be considered against the background of Poland's ordeal under the Nazi occupation and the permanent danger she has to face from the German side. Only then will the picture of Poland's martyrdom be complete and the difficulty of her situation fully realized. But that is, of course, beyond the scope of Mrs. Cardwell's significant book.

Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences

OSCAR HALECKI

MEIKSINS, GREGORY, *The Baltic Riddle*. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1943, Pp. xiv, 271, \$3.00.

This book purports to be the story of the Baltic States and Finland from the end of the First World War to the present. By the jacket we are informed that it is "the first book published on the Baltic problem as a whole," that it "promises to be the standard" work, and that Max Werner says that it "is brilliantly written" and "deserves a wide American audience." The present reviewer finds the volume to be poorly written, badly organized, purposely misleading and completely worthless as history. The author paid little heed to the sources, has slight regard for the truth, and omits or distorts ascertainable facts which do not support his thesis. His account is filled with indiscriminate name-calling and dogmatic

generalizations which are quite unconvincing to anyone at all familiar with the region he treats.

Gregory Meiksins is described as a young Latvian lawyer, economist, and journalist who was obliged to flee in 1937 for his militant anti-Fascist views. He is said to have participated actively in the Latvian democratic movement" and to have "maintained unbroken contact with the democratic opposition movement in the Baltic States." His book is written entirely from the Kremlin viewpoint, however, and gives little indication of any understanding of or consideration for democracy. Even less does it show any appreciation for the region from which he sprang. To Mr. Meiksins the Baltic is an "insignificant strip of territory." It was divided into "lifeless microscopic state formations" in which prevailed "a morbid atmosphere of desolate despair." He writes of the "anemic Baltic economy" which was "exhausted by economic vegetation in the backyard of world economy." According to the author, "all four Baltic States, Finland and Latvia in particular, . . . inherited corrupt governmental cliques which converted their countries into colonies." "These wretched Baltic puppets who trembled before their own people and were frightened at their own shadows" led their countries from a "corrupt democracy to complete Fascism." This "narrow-minded clique of pro-Fascist and pro-German politicians" established "unbridled" dictatorship and "toward the end of 1938 and the beginning of 1939, Hitlerism had gained complete control of the entire eastern Baltic from Petsamo to Königsberg."

In June (not May), 1940, the Russian tanks rolled across the Baltic frontiers. "As a preliminary to the armed invasion the democratic-socialist opposition, cooperating with the local Communist parties, staged *coups d'état*." "Behind the new governments stood all the labor elements, the intelligentsia, and part of the bourgeoisie, motivated by national no less than social aspirations." "Public elections were held without hindrance" and "Soviet Russia exercised a restraining hand." "The transfer of power was a bloodless victory of the democratic forces, who were restored to the relative powers they had enjoyed prior to the Fascist coups." "The powerful economy of the U.S.S.R. provided means to solve pressing economic shortcomings without haste or delay." *The Baltic area was led to Bolshevism by the national self-consciousness of the people and by the peasants' attachment to their land*" (author's italics). "For their own countries the governments of Kirchenešteins, Vares, and Paleckis represent what de Gaulle is to France and what Beneš is to Czechoslovakia."

"Anyone who views the Baltic problem without hypocrisy . . . realizes that an isolated state existence is out of the question for the Baltic nations." "The independent existence" of the Baltic states was not only a mockery of independence. It could hardly be called an existence at all." "The outcome of a plebiscite is, therefore, predetermined."

The above quotations give a fair picture of Mr. Meiksins' argument and of the contents of his book. Space does not permit an analysis of the validity of the thesis but it is submitted that not a single one of the leading assertions quoted is supported by the facts. It is to be regretted that in times like the present so

unreliable an author can find a publisher for a work obviously designed to mislead the American public. The general picture which the author paints is false. His book is of value only as an instructive case study in propagandist distortion.

University of California

ERIC C. BELIQUIST

WHITE, D. FEDOTOFF, *The Growth of the Red Army*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. 486. \$3.75.

Within the limits the author has chosen, this is the most satisfactory of all books on the Red Army. It is free from the catchwords and false premises which are all too common, and the author is strikingly unprejudiced and unemotional in temper. He maintains a singular quality of fairness and poise even when coping with unsatisfactory sources, and when dealing with topics more or less devastated by partisan spirit and propaganda.

The chapters are not even in quality, and some of the material could have been arranged more clearly. Readers unfamiliar with the subject will not always find a clear path in certain parts of this survey. Yet, as most discussions of the subject tend to be much over-simplified, this one stands out in striking contrast.

The author defines his work properly as 'a study in military sociology'. He has avoided a narrative of campaigns, and deals only incidentally with the technical development of the Red Army organization. His interest lies above all in the social and professional and political character of the Russian forces, beginning with the Imperial army and tracing the transformations which followed. He makes clear that in the Civil wars the old army was a far more important element of the Red Army than is commonly supposed,—and he stresses the 'basic changes' the latter has undergone since 1918. It is usually presented as all of one piece—a piece designed quite arbitrarily on ideological lines. Actually, there have been sharp and drastic breaks—and ideology has not always been an important factor.

As originally conceived, late in 1917, the Red Army was to be the instrument for sweeping away what was left of the old army—then nominally under the orders of the Kerensky government. The dissolution of the old army went ahead much faster than the Red Army could be built up, and early in 1918 the Bolshevik regime found itself with no army at all—face to face with Ludendorff. To resist the latter, it was necessary to re-mobilize without delay the officers and men of the forces Lenin had broken down with such vim. It was this re-mobilized army—re-shuffled so as to ensure Bolshevik control, that carried through the campaigns of the Civil war period. At its close, Lenin found himself burdened with a pay-strength of about 5,000,000 officers and men.

The first 'purge'—that of 1921—expressed the immediate, practical necessity of getting rid of this quite unmanageable burden. There followed several years of marking time. The residue of the purged army was strong enough for the internal security of the Soviet régime, but an official inquiry stated bluntly the fact that it was of no military value.

The reorganization of 1924 marks the real beginning of the Soviet Army.

It was essentially a new creation: in a discerning phrase the author terms it 'Frunze's Army'. This was made up of almost thirty active divisions: i.e. less than half the peace time strength of the Imperial army in 1914. It provided garrisons on certain frontiers and critical 'home sectors'—but was not strong enough to defend any frontier against serious attack. There was no possibility of its undertaking a 'foreign war'. As second line troops, there were forty or fifty militia divisions with only part-time training, units certainly inferior to the Reserve divisions brought into the field of 1914.

Hitler's sudden expansion of the German army forced an abrupt expansion in Russia, beginning with 1934. On paper, the militia units were quickly transformed into active divisions and new divisions were created. But these strokes of the pen had no relation to the actual equation of trained officers and cadres required for such an effort,—and from that day to this, the outside observer has had no knowledge of the actual number of Soviet divisions. This hurried process of expansion was then shattered by the immense purge of 1937, which (by the author's reckoning) eliminated 'more than a score of thousands of generals, officers and political leaders of the armed forces'. All this at a time when it was desperately necessary to increase as rapidly as possible the trained personnel needed for the expansion. It was an army shattered by these counter-upheavals that offered Hitler the temptation to strike Russia down at one blow in 1941; these visible consequences of the purge at first led Hitler forward.

With the outbreak of war in 1939, there began still another large-scale expansion,—one that has been going on ever since. Together with losses in the field and the elimination of unsuccessful commanders, it has brought into being what is in effect a new army. Most of the rank and file of the Soviet forces today were not in uniform in June 1939; most of its present army and corps commanders were then unknown; the senior officers then in high command are now out of the picture. The tactics and methods then in vogue are by now swept away; and in effect, the officers and staffs and specialist personnel who now carry forward the battle are those who have learned the *métier de soldat* since the summer of 1939. (Since then, also, the American forces have become a new and quite different army.)

There is surprisingly little information for the period of expansion beginning in 1934, and even less for the still greater effort undertaken since 1939. The brilliant results achieved in the field are convincing enough, but we know little of the actual *modus operandi* of this later transformation. The army of 1944 is obviously a very different instrument from the forces defeated so badly in 1941. At no time since 1934 have we had accurate figures even as to the total number of Russian divisions. The author, accordingly, deals chiefly with the earlier periods for which more sources are available—above all, with the reorganization begun in 1924, and the building up of 'Frunze's army'. One of his most important contributions is his discussion of the long, and more or less inevitable, conflict between the Army and the Communist Party; very properly his discussion of the purge of 1937 is closely related to this. The forms and

terminology of this conflict are now changing, but we have not heard the last of it.

These matters the author treats with far more candor and sincerity than is now the fashion. No less honestly, he warns the reader of the extensive gaps in the record available; more commonly, they are bridged over with off-hand generalizations and extravagant praise. Much later on, these gaps may be filled. It is by no means certain; a continuing régime will hardly lend itself deliberately to the self-dissection involved in a proper historical study of such intimate and critical matters.

Cambridge, Massachusetts

T. H. THOMAS

WISE, MAURICE K., *Requisition in France and Italy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. Pp. ix, 207. \$2.75.

This book contains an excellent and very exhaustive historical description of the measures and techniques of requisition which were developed in France and Italy up to 1939. The choice of these two countries is fortunate. Both were theaters of active combat in World War I, and both developed far-reaching construction projects for defense purposes in the inter-war period. Thus, there is available a wealth of material which the author very skillfully collected, classified and interpreted. Problems of requisition are based chiefly on legal interpretations of the relationship between the rights of individuals and society. They involve an analysis of the legal safeguards of the individual on the one hand and urgent, highly immediate needs of the body politic on the other. Any description of the historical development of the body of laws centering around requisition is therefore largely concerned with an analysis of the particular institutions based on the views and practices as to the freedom of the individual held in various countries. French and Italian jurisprudence are based both on the Roman law and the Code Napoleon. But the philosophies of state of democratic France and of fascist Italy, though they are built on the same foundation, have produced vastly different procedures in a field in which the rights and the freedom of the individual in his relation to the state occupy an outstandingly important place. The book gives a clear outline of these differences of aim and procedure in the two countries. The author carefully supports his descriptive analysis with factual material and the book contains a comprehensive list of legal sources dealing with requisition. The chief emphasis is placed on problems of public administration and law, but there are also several angles of economic policy touched upon. Thus we find a discussion of methods and effects of price fixing, determination of fair price and the effects of compensation and de-requisition. The book contains in an appendix a list of French and Italian legislation and a good list of references. It is a competent treatment of a special topic of public administration which, especially now, should command great interest.

University of Chicago

BERT F. HOSELITZ

ALLEN, HAROLD B., *Come Over Into Macedonia*, New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1943. Pp. \$3.00.

Still insatiable in spite of the territorial gains of 1919, modern Greece launched a campaign (1920) to invade Asia Minor and take the Aegean coast section as traditional Hellenic soil. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, Turkey regained enough strength to repulse and inflict a terrible defeat on the Greek Army in the Autumn of 1922. The "Smyrna disaster" caused unspeakable hardship not only to the army but also to the Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor. With the retreating Greek Army, many thousands of the indigenous Greek population fled to the coast in order to escape the fury of the Turks' onslaught. Some of the Greek inhabitants who managed to escape settled in the nearby Aegean Islands and other places of New Greece.

By the Greco-Turkish Convention of Lausanne (January 10, 1923) and the more formal Treaty of Lausanne, the contracting parties agreed to "exchange" the undesirable portions of their population. More than one million Asiatic Greeks were brought to Greece. These refugees were settled in Western Thrace and the eastern part of Greek Macedonia. The already overburdened Greek government was now confronted with the problem of rehabilitation for its new citizens. Several international agencies hastened to the assistance of the Greek government. The Refugee Settlement Commission (created in November 1923) was assisted in the effort of reconstruction and rehabilitation by the Near East Relief.

It is his work as an official of the Near East Foundation, working among the Greek refugees in Macedonia, that Mr. Allen recounts in his book. Mr. Allen, a graduate of Rutgers University, and a member of its faculty, is a specialist in agriculture and agricultural education. He spent ten years (1928-38) in Greek eastern Macedonia working with the Near East Foundation to uplift farm families toward health and prosperity. "We faced the responsibility," writes Mr. Allen, "and enjoyed the privilege of taking raw human material and out of this moulding intelligent and efficient leaders." Among the thousands of refugees there were many who were obliged, for the first time in their lives, to make a living from the soil, "and were grateful for any practical information which would help them to help themselves." In the attainment of these objectives, a number of projects were successfully carried out: Training of natives for the organization and supervision of agricultural training program, education of the villagers, education of women in the care of children, and the introduction of modern methods of agriculture. Mr. Allen's efforts in this respect were not in vain. Many of his educational ideas were successfully applied with good results, only to be destroyed later by the avalanche of World War II that swept over the war-torn region of Macedonia.

Come Over Into Macedonia is not a book on history or international politics, for it does not treat adequately of either of these topics. It is rather a comprehensive report on the plans, organization, and educational activities of Mr. Allen's ten years effort in "uplifting a war-torn people."

Mr. Allen chose to use appellations of Macedonian rivers and valleys of 500 B. C. The inside cover maps fail to illustrate the text. The reader will seek in

vain to locate the "Azios" River (page 12) which is, however, shown on the inside cover maps as "Vardar River"; "Strymon" Valley (page 34) which, of course, refers to Struma Valley, is not shown at all on the incorporated maps; "Nestos" River is shown on the accompanying maps as "Vestos River." This use of the ancient classical names may show Mr. Allen's phil-Hellenism, but it is confusing to the modern reader.

St. Louis, Missouri

CHRIST ANASTASOFF

MAUGHAM, VISCOUNT, *The Truth about the Munich Crisis*. London: Heinemann, 1944. Pp. 76. 5s.

This would appear to be the first conscious attempt by any British politician to justify in print the policies and actions of Neville Chamberlain that culminated in the Munich "Accord" of September 29, 1938. It may not be the last. Viscount Maugham, as Lord Chancellor from March 1938 to September 1939, may be supposed to have had an opportunity to know at first hand the reasoning behind the decisions taken by the Chamberlain Government in these fateful days. In some degrees, then, this little book can be regarded as an official *apologia*. There is no evidence at hand to show that the views and explanations advanced by Maugham are at all widely held in Great Britain at this time, but it is of interest to see what line is taken by those who regard the Munich settlement as redounding to Britain's honour.

The argument proceeds approximately as follows: the "Germans" in Czechoslovakia, long ill-treated by the Czech majority, wanted to "return" to the Reich, and when Hitler took their side, it looked as if the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty would come into effect. Because France and Great Britain had an entente, it then began to appear that Great Britain would be at war with Germany to maintain the Czechs in power in Czechoslovakia. But France was militarily weak from 1935 on, and Great Britain was even less prepared for war against a rearmed Germany. Inasmuch as the unreliability of Hitler's promises was not certain in 1938 and the Sudeten Germans wanted to return to the Reich the British Government was perfectly justified in refusing to go to war to keep these Sudeten Germans in a state of which they had never wished to form a part. In any event it would have been a losing war and British public opinion would not have supported it.

If this reasoning seems either trite or weak, it is suggested that the reader follow the argument of the book. There is hardly a page that does not offer the reader some grievous historical error, a crucial confusion of fact or a misleading collocation in argument. On many pages the errors are multiple.

If we may judge from this little book Viscount Maugham's knowledge of Czechoslovakia is very limited. He speaks of the success of the "Czechist party" before the Great War in "measures to repress the German language in Bohemia." Count Badeni's language decrees (1897) placed Czech on a qualified equality with German in Bohemia, where almost 70% of the population was Czech. But

German opposition very quickly forced the withdrawal of these ordinances. Maugham calls pre-war Prague an "Austrian" city. The population then was about 90% Czech. He says the Czechs proclaimed their independence after the battle of Vittorio Veneto (October 26-30, 1918). But Czechoslovak independence was proclaimed on October 18, over a week before the beginning of the battle. He says that "few or none of them [the minority races] were prepared to resist the attack by Hitler when it came." (p.9). But it is a fact, well attested by neutral observers, that almost all Polish and Sudeten German reservists, to say nothing of the Slovaks, reported for duty on the two occasions when mobilization was ordered, the week of May 21, 1938 and on September 23, 1938, when war with Hitler seemed certain. He speaks of Henlein's Karlsbad demands as appearing to accord with promises made by the Czechs at the time of the Versailles treaty," (p. 13). One may reasonably doubt if Maugham has read and understood either the Karlsbad demands or Beneš statement at the Versailles conference. His authority for the latter is Lloyd George. It might be possible to find other and perhaps less forgetful sources in this case.

A more serious, because more insidious, fault is the omission of relevant facts and connections. He quotes Chamberlain as saying that "in response to a request of the Czechoslovak Government" Lord Runciman would go to Prague as an "adviser and mediator." But Maugham nowhere explains that the Czechoslovak Government was quite unaware that it had made such a request and that Chamberlain was guilty of a deliberate falsehood. In emphasizing French military weakness as a justification for France's reluctance to fulfil her acknowledged engagements to Czechoslovakia he nowhere remarks on the fact that Georges Bonnet gave to Lord Halifax a falsified version of Gamelin's analysis of the chances of the Eentente in a war against Germany. In his discussion of the military aspects of a possible war he nowhere mentions the simple fact that the Czechoslovak army, well trained and equipped, 1,500,000 strong, behind its heavily fortified mountains, would have constituted a serious obstacle to a quick German victory and have forced Germany to fight on two fronts at the same time. Military experts then and since have given much weight to these factors. In his brief treatment of Russia's possible participation in a war, in fulfilment of her obligations under the Franco-Russo-Czechoslovak treaties, Maugham stresses the fact that Poland was unwilling to permit the passage of Russian troops, but he does not mention the fact that Romania consented to the passage of Russian planes and troops to the aid of Czechoslovakia.

Hitler's account of the treatment of the Sudeten Germans by the Czechoslovak government is apparently accepted in its entirety. Maugham speaks of "turbulent German majorities whom Czechoslovakia had been unable in eighteen years of rule to reconcile to the Czech domination." All neutral observers, before and during the crisis, tell a different story. We are not told that the alleged turbulence was largely manufactured by Henlein's *Freikorps*, made up for the most part of Reich Nazis who were simply *agents provocateurs*, or that when Czechoslovak police showed up, these hoodlums, even when more numerous than the police, fled across the border to Germany as fast as they could, and the native

Sudeten Germans expressed their relief, and, in great numbers, thanked the Czechoslovak authorities for restoring order, making no secret of their admiration for the restraint and efficiency of the Czechoslovak officials.

Maugham regards the Munich terms as much less harsh than the Godesberg plan, for five reasons. But on all these five points the effect of the Munich arrangement was more drastic than the Godesberg terms. He chides Czechoslovakia for "being unwilling to invite active assistance from that great land" [Russia]. But surely he would agree that Beneš was wise in accepting the statesmanlike advice of the British and French governments—reenforced, of course by an ultimatum—in the matter of Russian help. "Both countries [France and Great Britain] in 1938 had to 'buy time' by every possible means except loss of honour." Daladier would appear not to have realized he had maintained the honor of France, or so at least we might interpret his bitter words, on returning to Le Bourget after the capitulation at Munich. Maugham refuses to discuss the important question as to why France and Great Britain had got into such a sad military and political situation that they were unable together to "stand up to Hitler." He mentions the engagement of the two western powers at Munich to give a guarantee of the new boundaries of Czechoslovakia, but he says nowhere that within a few days Chamberlain said on the floor of Parliament that this guarantee was not yet operative. It was in fact never given. Perhaps "honor" is not the proper word.

Maugham sums up his argument in five propositions, (p. 65). Four out of the five are either palpably false or based on false premises. The fifth one, No. 2, is misleading and irrelevant. The appendix, a discussion of the value of the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty in international law, might have been dispensed with. He argues that it had ceased to be binding on France. It is true that France did not in fact act as if she were bound by it; nevertheless she felt obliged to proclaim to the world that she thought she was bound by it up to a few days before Munich.

Facing the title-page Maugham has inscribed a quotation from Bolingbroke: "Truth lies within a little and certain compass, but error is immense."

University of Colorado

S. HARRISON THOMSON

CIANFARRA, CAMILLE M., *The Vatican and the War*. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1944. Pp. 344. \$3.00.

MORGAN, THOMAS B., *The Listening Post, Eighteen Years on Vatican Hill*. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1944. Pp. 242. \$3.00.

The flood of I-saw-it-happen books continues unabated with the appearance of two commentaries on Vatican diplomacy by Camille M. Cianfarra, former correspondent of the *New York Times* at Rome, and Thomas B. Morgan, last United Press representative there. These books concern themselves primarily with Church policy during the current war, and one can almost detect a faint odor of musk in the descriptions of the cassocked diplomatic monsignori who pad

along the passageways of the Vatican palace. Such figures as Cardinal Secretary of State Luigi Maglione, Master of the Chamber, of Monsignor Arborio Mella di Sant'Elia, Secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical affairs, Monsignor Domenico Tardini, Pope Pius XI and Pius XII, become familiar if not entirely comprehensible personages ere these two collections of history, anecdotes and gossip have been read. By their very nature the two works suffer a great deal. Both were hastily conceived and written to meet the demands of the current book market; both are for the most part potpourris of personal experiences, tidbits of information about the characters mentioned, with little critical analysis of men or motives. In most cases the authors do little more than reiterate accepted causes for events.

Cianfarra at least admits his limitations. He writes, "In the following lines I have attempted to submit some facts and an interpretation of them based on personal knowledge. But, far from being the work of an expert, this book is only a chronicling of a reporter's experiences, for I am aware only too well of how vast and complex an undertaking an essay on Vatican policy is." His is the better book. Of necessity Cianfarra intersperses a good deal of Italian history in his treatment of the Vatican and world affairs from the accession of Pius XII in 1939 to the beginning of 1942. It is possible to discern some outline in his account, which, until a scholarly work on the period is written, will provide a not entirely unusable survey. Here and there he reports not widely known data, for example, the visits during the first week of July, 1941, of Myron Taylor, President Roosevelt's personal emissary to the Vatican, and Taylor's assistant, Harold Tittman, to Pope Pius and Cardinal Maglione. The Americans called to suggest that the Holy See refrain from gestures which might be construed as favorable to the Axis "crusade" against the Soviets. Both Pius and Maglione were able to give Taylor and Tittman satisfactory assurances that their views on this topic corresponded with the opinions of the powers hostile to Germany. Cianfarra is at his best in describing the various attempts made by President Roosevelt and the Pope to maintain the peace in 1939 and prevent the Italian intervention in the war in 1940. In detailed fashion he traces the pleas for peace of the President and the Pontiff. On the other hand, his material on the Fascist invasion of Greece is poorly organized and seems to have been interpolated as an afterthought.

Morgan deals more exclusively with Church matters. He delights in recalling the methods used to "scoop" rival news services on the appointments of American bishops. His sketches of such prelates as Archbishop Mooney of Detroit and Bishop Hurley of St. Augustine are interesting. He confidently predicts that Archbishops Spellman of New York and Stritch of Chicago will be the next American cardinals. The excursions of Morgan into history are, however, unfortunate. By way of background he tries to summarize the entire history of the Roman temporality in the space of a few pages; then as a *tour de force* he adds a sketch of the diplomatic relations of the United States and the Papal States. This latter was apparently written without much attention to Father Stock's *United*

States Ministers to the Papal States, the standard work on the subject.¹ As a Church historian, newspaperman organ is entirely beyond his depth. Even the most casual reading will show large and small errors of fact and interpretation. Thus in writing of Pius XII's visit to King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy on December 28th, 1939, he says, "This had never been done before—that the Pope should pay an official call on a temporal sovereign" (p. 168). The journey of Pius VI to Vienna in 1782 to visit Joseph II, the Holy Roman emperor, is just one of the examples to the contrary which may be cited. The *Non Expedit* was not "issued" in 1874 (p. 66). It had been decreed on February 29, 1868 by the Sacred Penitentiary, and in an audience on October 13, 1874, Pius IX merely reaffirmed it, as it was reaffirmed on other occasions. The surname of Pius VII was Chiaramonti, not Chiaramonte (p. 56). And General Kanzler was not papal minister of war (p. 84). From 1865-1870, succeeding Monsignor de Mérode, he was *pro-minister* of war.

Both journalists tend to be objective in their reporting of the Church, though Morgan is more pro-Catholic than Cianfarra. One final criticism may be directed against *The Listening Post*. Though the book is a small sized volume and very cheaply printed, the rather excessive price of \$3.00 is asked.

University of Missouri

DUANE KOENIG

KEUN, ODETTE, *Continental Stakes. Marches of Invasion, Valley of Conquest and Peninsula of Chaos*. London: British Continental Syndicate, 1944. Pp. 135. 7s. 6d.

The Marshes of Invasion of this book stretch from the Pripet Marshes northward to Finland; the Valley of Conquest and the Peninsula of Chaos are the valley of the Danube and the Balkans, including Turkey. "If you are interested in the subject," says Mme. Keun, "you cannot do better than read me." Undoubtedly, she means what she says. If her book makes at times infuriating reading, her sincerity and almost touching frankness cannot be questioned. What Mme. Keun believes in she calls her "imperial opinion"—other people's opinions are, to her, "pure balderdash", especially if it should be doubted that Poland, the hero of her story, "got a skunk of a deal". In spite of all this bright and glittering make-up, the book deserves attention. It is the outcry of a frightened European, frightened of the advancing might of Russia. As such it gives voice to a feeling of fear all too often hidden under governmental complacency. Without sharing her fears one cannot deny its existence amongst many Europeans. Mme. Keun must feel relieved that she has been able to give vent to it.

Odette Keun, who introduces herself as the daughter of "a singularly intelligent (Dutch) diplomatist", surveys very rapidly the past of Poland and of the Baltic Nations. She is interested only in their fight with Germans on the one side

¹Stock, L. F., *United States Ministers to the Papal States: Instructions and Despatches, 1846-68*, Washington, 1933.

and with Russians on the other; and she thinks it surprising that Poland, "ruled by a conservative government, that of Colonel Beck" (Pilsudski is not mentioned), did not go over to the Nazi camp. The sketch of Danubian history she gives is slightly more comprehensive. She then turns to her argument which is—if ever the worst comes to the worst—that a coalition of European patriotisms will face Soviet Russia. She seems convinced that Russia is about to adopt a definitely imperialistic and annexationist policy. There seems nothing she is not ready to believe. Stalin, she fears, wants the whole dozen or so of his Central European neighbours to live in Soviet protectorates. This thesis, of course, is not new. What is new is the shrillness of its representation, born out of genuine agony of soul. Mme. Keun even believes that Soviet Russia wants the Skoda works in order to transfer the moveable plant to the Urals and to direct Czech skilled labor to the Russian interior. Every tenth Russian, according to her, is dying in a prison camp. The absurdity of this is apparent yet, as an indication of a certain trend of mind caused by the Russian policy directed against the independence of the Baltic nations, against any negotiations about the Polish frontier, it ought to be noted. At the same time the publication of this book at this moment is a great tribute to the independence of British publications and to that freedom of expression, whose essence Mme. Keun seems occasionally to doubt.

If I read aright the mind of those Europeans for whom Mme. Keun speaks (she herself says: "I am very representative of the general trend of Continental thinking"), their belief is this:—that no peaceful Europe can be established unless Russia's neighbors are allowed to live their own life in independence and according to their own lights; that another war will ensue if those nations are trampled under foot. To this belief I unhesitatingly subscribe. But I think that the Russian realists as well can subscribe to it only if it is universally realized that there is no other basis for American-Anglo-Russian collaboration. Russian foreign policy must, of necessity, become increasingly dependent upon Russian public opinion which, and this point even Mme. Keun grants, is developing as a partial consequence of the great campaign for literacy. Co-operation, our author rightly says, cannot be one-sided. If it is understood that general security can only be achieved on the basis of national independence for the small nations as well as for the large, all will be well. Russia, Mme. Keun reminds us, will need enormous material help after the war. This, assuredly, will come from America and Britain so long as the common basis, unequivocally enumerated in the Atlantic Charter, is secure.

Elizabeth College, Buxton, England

F. W. PICK

DALLIN, DAVID J., *Russia and Postwar Europe*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. Pp. x, 223. \$2.75.

While Dr. Dallin's work on "Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy", published in 1942, was rather an analytical diary of a studious publicist, the present book represents an essay of interpretation and even prediction, in spite of the author's assurance that his book "does not set itself the aim of making prophecies or of indulging in guesswork."

The policy of the Soviet Government, he says, was and has remained a Russian application of the policy of Communism. The Anglo-Soviet antagonism, the collaboration with Germany, the rapprochement with the United States, the pacts and treaties with France, the participation in the grand military alliance against Germany, the neutral attitude toward Japan, and, finally, the waging of a separate war within the united front of the Allies—all these twists and turns are but natural manifestations of the consistent policy of Communism (pp. 4-5).

To the Russian Communist, economic property is always the source of all evil. During the past fifteen years, roughly twenty million Russian peasants—with their families about one hundred million people—were expropriated. The enforcement of collective farming, which took millions of peasants away from their homesteads, cost the lives of eight million people. Not less than a million people of the huge administrative machinery worked to bring about the collectivization. They had to be ruthless in their task. By 1936 private peasant property was dead. The 'rightist opposition' of Bukharin and Sokolnikov, who advocated compromise with peasants and a policy of concessions to the non-Communists, was "liquidated" in 1937-38. Dallin does not share the wishful thinking of foreign reporters and political writers who try to prove that the Soviet Government has already gone through a great evolutionary change. "History knows no evolution of one kind of government authority into another taking place smoothly, imperceptibly, gradually, and without crisis" (p. 9).

Twenty pages are devoted to the relations between the Russian Army and the political party machine. The war was declared to be a patriotic war of liberation, a national war. The officers got shoulder straps, Kutuzov, Suvorov and Alexander Newski orders. But also the members of the 'Political Bureau' who perform non-military duties have been made generals and Stalin himself marshal. Soldiers are kept under the incessant control of the party cells, and the middle officer under the constant observation of the 'Deputy Commanders'. The generals work under the surveillance of resident representatives of Moscow. In this fashion the vast army lives and fights, held firmly in check in the elaborate party machine.

Britain and Germany have always been the main determinants in Soviet policy. "Of all possible international combinations only one has always presented and will continue to present a grave, perhaps a fatal, danger to Soviet Russia. This combination is an Anglo-German alliance . . . The gravest danger of all was implicit in the Munich combination of Britain and Germany. But it was dissipated by Germany's ambition to rule the world" (p. 49). England's principal adversary has always been the nation which for the moment was the strongest in Europe (p. 118). Therefore, a British project advocates a super-state federation of all the small and medium-sized nations between the Baltic and the Adriatic, with a population of about one hundred million. "While the war is on, Britain, Russia's ally, is naturally constrained in discussing the subject. As soon, however, as Germany shows definite signs of weakening, this problem will assume a central place in Britain's east-European policy" (p. 123).

As for the Soviet Government, it will not regard itself as secure by virtue

of treaties of friendship with neighboring Great Powers or of economic ties. The only thing in which it is prepared to believe is adherence to the Soviet Union. "For the slogan: the United States of Europe, we'll substitute the slogan: the federation of Soviet Republics of advanced countries and colonies which have fallen or are falling away from the imperialist system of economy" wrote Stalin in "Problems of Leninism". Thus, Dallin does not believe that the Soviet adherence to the Atlantic Charter's "basic propositions" means very much. The very instructive point-by-point comparison of the Atlantic Charter and the Soviet Declaration made by Maisky in London on September 24, 1941, shows indeed that the Soviets have their own charter, which differs very materially from the American-British document (pp. 135-143).

No less revealing for the public at large is Dallin's disclosure of Russia's territorial demands in the war of 1914-17 (pp. 168-173), which, had they materialized, would have been tantamount to a complete revolution in the European system. The Russian frontier would have passed within two hours by rail from Berlin, and in the south Vienna would have been only thirty miles from the Russian 'sphere'. Russian domination of the Black Sea, the new Russian province of the Dardenelles, adjoining Bulgaria and Greece, would have made Russia master of the Balkans and neighbor of Italy. Reading this, one could believe that the famous 'Tsar Peter's Testament', which was first revealed by a Frenchman, Chevalier d'Eon, in 1757 and much disputed since by official Russian historians, is not at all apocryphal. The concept of Russia as the saviour of "rotten" Europe is over two hundred years old and, since 1941, the old problems have reappeared as Soviet war aims.

World War III? It need not break out immediately after the victory over Germany, says Dallin. "But the tension will go on rising and the Soviet Union will be facing the greatest danger it has ever faced since its foundation . . . It will be the natural reaction of Europe to the expansion from the east". Open before Russia is another political course: recognition of complete and genuine independence of the small nations of central and eastern Europe; renunciation of large-scale territorial expansion; and limitation of armaments corresponding to the gradual slackening of tension in the European atmosphere. If the mortal fear of the red specter from the east vanishes in Central Europe, many problems which were baffling up to now will find their solution made easier, among them the problem of an economic alliance with the Baltic countries, the state allegiance of disputed eastern Poland, and the Finnish border question. A new Russian policy would give Europe one of the principal conditions for a long and lasting peace", concludes Dallin in this intelligent and honest book. This hope is based only on the "new moods and movements" in the vast majority of the Russian people and of the army, "people who have seen much, suffered much, and thought much". Their voices, however, do not as yet reach us from Russia. . .

Manhasset, N. Y.

KAAREL R. PUSTA

CHASE, GEORGE H., ed., *Greece of Tomorrow*. New York: American Friends of Greece, 1943. Pp. 92. \$1.00.

This little book consists of eight essays, written by different authors and dealing with various aspects of Greek life and history. George H. Chase discusses the significance of Greece in history, emphasizing in particular her struggle for liberty; Shirley H. Weber gives a brief résumé of the progress of modern Greece; Edward Capps writes of the relations of Greece with Bulgaria and Albania; Sarah Wambaugh traces briefly the history of the Dodecanese islands and urges for their union with Greece; John H. Young discusses the problem of the union of Cyprus with Greece; William M. Chadbourne discusses the importance of Greek shipping; Abbott P. Usher writes of the economic problems of post-war Greece and Stephen P. Ladas examines the question of government in post-war Greece.

Of particular interest in connection with the peace settlements that will follow this war are the essays of Wambaugh and Capps. Wambaugh has no difficulty in showing that the Dodecanese islands should go to Greece, and Capps shows conclusively the expansionist designs of the Bulgarian foreign policy. Behind the Bulgarian pre-war claim for a territorial outlet to the Aegean lay the greater ambition of acquiring Greek Thrace and eastern Macedonia. For this reason Bulgaria refused all friendly cooperation with the other Balkan peoples and thereby wrecked the Balkan league, as was admitted by her Premier, Mr. Bogden Filov, on November 9, 1941. In justice to Greece and Yugoslavia, who since the war have suffered so much at the hands of Bulgaria, she must be called to account and made to pay for the injuries which she has inflicted upon them.

Rutgers University

PETER CHARANIS

SUDJIC MILIVOJ J., *Yugoslavia in Arms*. London: Lindsay Drummond, 1942. Pp. 128. 6s.

In *Yugoslavia in Arms*, Mr. Milivoj J. Sudjić attempts to give a picture of the historical development of Yugoslavia, especially since the first World War, and to discuss its part in the present war. Instead of looking deeply into the national conflicts within Yugoslavia to find the cause of its instability, he finds a convenient scape-goat for all Yugoslav problems. For the assassination of King Alexander, he blames Berlin, Hungary, and Italy, and for the subsequent unrest, the League of Nations. For Yugoslavia's failure to preserve democracy he blames the Croats, and the other democracies of the world who did not come to her aid in her hour of need. In the present war the Nazis were able to defeat the official Yugoslav army because the Croats harbored fifth columnists.

The book contains a eulogy of General Mihailovich and his Chetniks, but does not mention that the Partisans, under Marshal Josip Brož (Tito), a Croatian, offered the main resistance to both Nazis and Italians for almost three years after the Nazi invasion. He denounces the massacres of the Serbs by the Croats, but

fails to mention that Italian commanders of the Fascist Army of Occupation in Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina armed and financed Serbian Chetniks to fight the Partisans, and to massacre Croats and Serbs suspected of giving Partisans food and shelter. General Roatta, the former Commander of the Fascist Army of Occupation in Croatia before Italy's surrender, admitted to Allied press correspondents that he had armed the Chetniks with 30,000 rifles to fight the Partisans.

Mr. Sudjić does not entirely conceal the purpose of his pro-Serb and anti-Croatian bias. On page sixteen of his book he claims that Serb territory is "the backbone of the Balkans." This is a repetition of an old geopolitical theory developed by Professor Cvijić, according to which the Serbs are best suited geographically, politically, and morally to control the Balkans. In line with these aspirations, Mr. Sudjić claims Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Slavonia, and Vojvodina for Serbia. He leaves practically nothing to the Croats, for, he says, even in the heart of Croatia, "there are numerous Serb communities." Official statistics, which he fails to quote, show that Macedonia is settled by Macedonians and Albanians, that the population of Dalmatia is 90% Croat, that only 41% of the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are Serbs, and that the Serbs are in a minority in Vojvodina, not to speak of Slavonia, which is purely Croat except in the eastern part (Srem).

Until the leaders of the Serbian nationalist movement realize that they belong to a small nation which must cooperate with other racial groups in the Balkans, instead of trying to rule them, the Balkans will remain an area of discontent and trouble. Unjustified national aspirations, no matter from what group they come, only contribute to make a complicated situation in Yugoslavia still more complex. Books like *Yugoslavia in Arms*, which forward these aspirations, do not help to clarify or solve the Balkan problem.

Indiana University

PAULINE STEINER

SHORT NOTICES

HARRIS, E. HOWARD, *Literature in Estonia*. London: Boreas Publishing Co., 1944. Pp. 75. 3s.

This is a short survey of the contribution to Western thought and literature made by one of the Small Nations of Europe. As such it is an unpolitical study. Yet, at a time when, for the sake of short-sighted expediency, the existence of distinct nationhood is being denied to the Baltic Nations, even a literary re-affirmation of the peculiar Estonian contribution to our common heritage might appear eminently political. The Estonian language is akin to Finnish and thus almost unrelated to any other western European language group. Mr. Harris, therefore, prints fairly full translations from Estonian writers. Since Estonian lyrics have not been rendered into English heretofore, he covers rather unexplored ground. He also prints a short story and summarizes, somewhat drably perhaps, a few of the outstanding novels. "Truth and Justice", Anton Hansen Tammsaare's novel—great by any standard—has been published in German under the title *Wargamäe* but has not yet found an English translator. Mr. Harris met many of the leading Estonian writers before the present war engulfed their country. While he is thus well qualified to picture the intellectual world of Tallinn and Tartu down to 1939, a world so closely akin to our Western trend of thought, one cannot help wondering what Estonia will be like after the occupying forces or her powerful neighbors have been withdrawn. Europe was undoubtedly the richer for Estonia's independent contribution to our common heritage.

F. W. PICK

NUNTIUS, Hoelle, *Hass und Liebe*. London: Einheit, 1943. Pp. 68.

KRAMER, THEODOR, *Verbannt aus Österreich*. London: Austrian P.E.N., 1943. Pp. 48. 2s. 6d.

The title of the first of these two books of poetry is not too fiery for its contents: guilt, hope, wrath, dream, love poignant and love vague storm through its pages, barely leashed by a loose and eager verse-style. This is the sincere and often touching work of a believer in God, Man and the Communist Way. The ever-present grief—for loss of life or liberty, loss of the beloved *Heimat* (Prague, the Sudetenland)—is a courageous, upstanding sort of grief, for the most part loud, but occasionally, as in the *Spanish Cradle Song*, a triumph of battle-scarred tenderness.

The trees and stones of Mother Prague, the Spring winds of a sweet land are remembered from exile with passion, with heaviness: *Wie ist der Morgen in der Fremde schwer*. But there is more talk of drum-beats than of nostalgic pains: *Du kannst nicht schweigen Poet! . . . Dein Vers sei Stahl!* Exactly. And many of these are trusty steel, glancing through a deal of rotten arras; words to build a new world; the word as a tool. To the hopeful these are days of haste, and words cannot always wait for their ordering, but tumble up incontinent. Nuntius knows that he sometimes builds a barracks instead of a perfect temple and since he is a true lyric poet at heart, he verges on apology for his impetuosities. The short passion play, in which *Der Böhmisches Mensch* is betrayed, crucified and resurrected, is perhaps deliberately naive. The intent lies in the author's identification of final

victory with the resurrection of Man into a new goodness, a blessed return to all homelands.

Theodor Kramer, Austrian poet in exile, writes bitter-sweet verses which often set the teeth on edge with their seachings and their poignancies. Lonely in London, he indulges in no vague sighing after the sights and sounds of Vienna, but broods painfully over the doom which may have killed or dishonored his friends beneath the *verbogner Kreuz*. These are very finished poems on unfinished, constantly recurring thoughts, tag ends of dangerous, uprooted emotions. Kramer does not seem to be one of the hopefuls; the *Heimat* for him is indeed lost; honor, gratitude to the dead, and a still delicate, fresh love for the luckless living remain.

R. D. T.

KINGSCOTE, FLAVIA, *Balkan Exit*, London: Geoffrey Bles, 1942. Pp. 180. 10s. 6d.

Balkan Exit, by Miss Kingscote, makes a plea for British and Allied aid to Yugoslavia. Miss Kingscote's book is a rather sentimental account of her journey out of Yugoslavia in 1941. As a travelogue in wartime, her faithful record of the incidents of interment, and of experiences with various petty officials, is not without interest. Her sallies into the political background of the country, of which it may be said to her credit that she does not make many, seem to have their basis in hearsay, and are purely personal observations by a traveller not well versed in politics. Her personal experiences seem to have given her a pro-Serbian bias. It may be taken *cum grano salis* as the natural reaction of a foreigner whose close friends have all been from one racial group. Miss Kingscote does not claim to be a political observer, and her book must be accepted for what it is, the personal experiences of an Englishwoman in her evacuation from Yugoslavia.

P. S.

Politická Knihovna "Čechoslávák" We have previously (July 1942, p. 228f. and January 1944, p. 465) noticed several numbers of this series, published by the *Čechoslávák*, the official Czechoslovak weekly in London, in Czech and Slovak, for the benefit of Czechoslovaks in Great Britain.

No. 9, *Československá zahraniční politika* (Czechoslovak Foreign Policy, (1942, pp. 66) by Hubert Ripka, acting Foreign Minister, is a restatement of the policies that guided the state of Masaryk and Beneš before Munich, and an insistence that it be recognized that Czechoslovak policy called for international collaboration, collective security, and the acceptance of Soviet Russia as an important partner in the councils of the nations, all during the twenty years' armistice from 1918 to 1938. These are the very ideals that are now so generally hailed as necessary for future peace.

No. 10, *Černá kniha Heydrichovu režimu* (The Black Book of the Heydrich Régime, 1942, pp. 112) by Jiří Hronek furnishes documentation for the Memorandum of the Czechoslovak government *On the Reign of Terror in Bohemia and Moravia under the regime of Reinhard Heydrich*, also published in 1942. Extracts from the Czech papers in Prague under Nazi control, releases from the Nazi-controlled "Czech Press Bureau" and official broadcasts from the Nazi station in Prague furnish the bulk of the material. It is instructive to learn on Heydrich's authority, that Czech art, music and literature have been German for the past thousand years. Part VIII of this booklet brings the texts of a number of broad-

casts to the Protectorate from London, by Czech, British and allied statesmen and officials.

No. 11, *Nacism a naše státní a národní tradice* (Nazism and our state and national tradition, 1942, pp. 54) by Jan Opočenský is intended to answer a number of questions of current interest to Czechoslovaks: St. Václav and the Germans. Are the Nazis the heirs of the Holy Roman Empire? Was Prague a German city? Were the Hapsburgs a boon to our nation? Was the Czechoslovak struggle during the last war a Jewish-Free Mason conspiracy? Was the independence of our state an accident? It might seem that the answers to all these questions were obvious, but the frequent repetition and occasional acceptance of false ideas justifies a historical treatment of the facts which Opočenský presents.

No. 12 *Usměrňované Slovensko* ('Gleichgeschaltet' Slovakia, 1942, pp. 91) by Vlado Clementis is a very significant study of the attitude of the Slovak people toward National Socialism. After showing that National Socialism *per se* can hardly be called a program, because it is essentially a means to power, he points out its basic inapplicability to Slovak social, economic and cultural conditions. It was the by-products of Nazism the leadership principle, anti-Semitism and wealth, that attracted Tiso, Tuka, Mach and their hangers-on. The rest of this fully documented booklet is devoted to an exposition of the fateful and tragic absurdity of the attempts made by the Slovak quislings to reconcile Nazism to Slovak Catholicism. The fact that Mach and Tuka follow one line of "explanation" and Tiso another adds only to the quantity of the cacophany. The quality remains undiluted—pure nonsense. Clementis, himself a *littérateur* of consequence in pre-Munich Slovakia, is particularly interested in the attempts of the Slovak quislings to nazify the academic and literary agencies, and the chapters on "Organization and adaptation of science" and "Literary Slovakia" are especially illuminating.

S. H. T.

PAVEL, PAVEL, *Transylvania and Danubian Peace*, with a Preface by R. W. Seton-Watson. London: New Europe Publ. Co., 1943. Pp. 64. 2s.

SETON-WATSON, R. W., *Transylvania: A Key-Problem*. Oxford, 1943. Pp. 20. 1s.

Dr. Pavel's work is a very meaty and significant booklet. He has set out to show, exclusively from Hungarian sources, that Hungarian claims to Transylvania, as a whole or in part, are untenable. Relevant historical, geographical, economic, and ethno-sociological facts are drawn upon with cumulative effect. But the farce of the 1868 "Law of Nationalities" which the Hungarians point to with such pride, as well as the "liberalism" of Deák and Eötvös, might have received more detailed attention. Perhaps the most interesting section of the whole study is that (pp. 46-55) in which the case for Hungary as presented by Count Bethlen in his 1933 lectures in London and Cambridge (published in 1934 as *The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace*) is shown to be cynical, deceptive and grounded in a manifold misrepresentation of history and statistics. The single fact that even according to Magyar figures, the proportion of Roumanian population of Transylvania in 1700 was perhaps even higher than that claimed by Roumanian statistics in 1930 adequately disposes of the Magyar claim that Transylvania has been recently flooded by "immigration" from Wallachia and Moldavia.

Professor Seton-Watson's pamphlet is differently focussed, and covers only in a very limited degree the ground covered by Pavel's study. After a brief

resumé of the place of Transylvania in Danubian history, particularly under Magyar domination from 1867 to 1918, the bulk of the discussion is devoted to post-Versailles Transylvania, the difficulties met in Roumanian administration, Magyar irredentism and the post-1939 tug of war between Germany and Soviet Russia over the well-nigh prostrate body of Roumania. The two problems of Transylvania and Bessarabia are shown to be inseparable. In the interest of an ultimately rational settlement, Seton-Watson calls for a two-point British declaration embodying (1) a refusal to recognize the Vienna award (i.e., acceptance of the principle that Transylvania is Roumanian), and (2) a recognition of "the necessity for frontier revision in favour of both Russia and Hungary on a basis of transfer of population" (p. 19). The pamphlet ends with a warning against any encouragement, even by diplomatic silence, to Hungarian reactionary tendencies.

T.

BEUER, GUSTAV, *Sudeten Deutsche Wokin?* London: *Einheit*, 1943. Pp. 42. 1s.

The left wing Sudeten Germans who were able to escape from their home since Munich have consistently waged a bitter fight against Nazism and Hitler's puppets among the Germans of Bohemia and Moravia. Beuer's incisively written pamphlet is both an indictment of these leaders who have sold their land to Hitler and those who have been befuddled and misled by them, and an appeal to his fellow Sudeten Germans, both at home and in the Emigration to aid in the destruction of the Nazi tyranny, to realize their need for unity, their place in the Czechoslovak state and to prepare now for the assumption of the responsibilities of collaboration with the Czechoslovaks in a free Czechoslovakia.

P. F.

LIGOCKI, EDWARD E., *Legends and History of Poland*. London: Thomas Nelson, 1943. Pp. 120. Illus. 6s.

Apparently intended for British schoolchildren this little book is an entertaining presentation of Poland's past. A people's legends may frequently convey as much truth as tomes of orthodox history, and Poland's legends are richly indicative of an imaginative and gallant people. In view of the limited aim of this composition it would be ungracious to point out errors in detail. They are rather numerous, but, in any given case not more serious than might be excused for the sake of brevity and simplification.

CRISP, DOROTHY, *The Future of Europe*. London, 1944. Pp. 36. 6d.

This little booklet is primarily an appeal to British opinion to realize its mission as the moral arbiter of the European revival. The burden of Miss Crisp's thought is that England has heretofore been too careless of her obvious responsibility toward a sadly perplexed Europe and must henceforth clarify her faith in justice and prepare to stand by that faith. Only then will the peoples of Europe accept her leadership. Inasmuch as the last two great wars have started in what she calls rather loosely Eastern Europe future security and peace can only be brought about by the maintaining of order in that area. The central factor in any such order, she contends, is a strong Poland, for whose independence Britain went to war in 1939. The argument, though forcefully put, is at no point very clear. There are, fortunately, in print a number of more effective statements of the case

for Poland in the present misunderstanding with Soviet Russia. The leading article in the June 1943 *Nineteenth Century* by F. A. Voigt is perhaps the best.

GRABOWSKI, ZBIGNIEW, *Creative Peace*. Glasgow: William Maclellan, 1944. Pp. 67. 2s.

A study, by a Polish scholar resident in England, of the deeper problems incident to the ending of the war and the establishment of a stable peace. The rise and present nature of German militaristic spirit is sketched, its deleterious effect upon the morale of the smaller peoples who live within her orbit is analyzed.

Grabowski then turns to Great Britain and emphasizes that in many ways she is a small power, and, with a diminishing birthrate, hardly likely to get out of that class. Britain's real greatness lies in her moral qualities. An important corollary of this observation is that Britain has maintained her leadership and prestige by the help and assistance of other small and smaller nations.

From this point (p. 18) on, Grabowski writes with a very sharp pen, weighing the stupendous blunders of the so-called Great Powers over against the sins of the small. "When a Great Power like this country follows a policy of cajoling Germany, it is called appeasement, or bidding for time; but when a smaller state concludes a pact of non-aggression with Germany, it is called pro-German" "When a Great Power speaks about its strategic frontiers, people regard this as a just claim. But when a small country speaks about strategic frontiers, such claim is treated with suspicion." (p. 25). "No reasonable writer or politician advances the theory that half of France, Sweden or Norway should be handed over to this or that country . . . As long as the same principles do not apply to the Eastern sphere of Europe, we can hardly expect stability to reign over the whole Continent." (p. 54). "It is rather fashionable nowadays to accuse the so-called small nations bordering on Russia of 'unfriendly feelings towards Moscow'. But the fact remains that those 'small countries' had agreements with Russia at a time when most Western European countries were reluctant to have any dealings with the Soviet Union." (p. 55) Human memory of uncomfortable facts is short, or at least distinctly under control. He also remarks on the fact that those who now blame Poland for her war with Russia in 1920 conveniently forget that that was not the first intervention in Soviet Russia. He further points out that the thesis that the small nations should be controlled by the Great Powers has found its most recent advocate in the Third Reich. It would be highly significant if the Defenders of Democracy should accept political tutelage from Nazi Germany.

S. H. T.

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THE POLISH PROLETARIAT AND SOCIALISM

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AS with individuals, so with social groups or classes: some of them have no character of their own, while others are picturesque, full of individuality, without necessarily being superior in any respect. They simply have specific, irreducible distinguishing features. Needless to say, the "individuality" of a group is not a hereditary or innate characteristic—it is the product of a pattern of behavior that results from the given group's history, economic status and social structure.

I

The Polish proletariat belongs to these distinctive groups. In the colorful amalgamation that is the European working class, the Polish workers have a color of their own, perhaps not so brilliant as that of some of the great Western workers' movements, but quite distinctive and attractive in its own way.

There are various reasons for this individuality. In the first place, Poland's social structure has features peculiar to itself. Poland is an industrialized peasant country. Thus it is different from the classical homeland of the industrial proletariat, England, where class divisions are doubtless more clearly marked than in other countries. The English social structure is based on three elements: the industrial proletariat, the middle class, and the capitalists. There are no peasants in England. And neither in France nor in Germany do the peasants play the same political and economic role as in Poland. Even in Czechoslovakia their influence is less strong and the country's industrial character is more marked. Poland falls somewhere between Czechoslovakia, which is more industrialized than Poland and yet retains a peasant character, and countries like Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, which are fundamentally peasant countries. Thus the orthodox Marxist's division

into two classes which was adequate for the conditions prevailing in England, is inadequate when applied to Poland, unless we limit ourselves to industrial and agricultural laborers. It does not apply to the large masses of the peasantry, nor to the numerous persons engaged in home industries, the small artisans and workers employed in small industries.

In the small processing industries and handicrafts, there is no rigid class division. The employer is a "capitalist" one day and a "hired laborer" the next. The journeymen in such industries, after a certain period usually become "masters" or employers; in Poland, only a small capital was required to found a workshop.

The relation of the *chalupnik*—a homemaker, that is a person engaged in home industry—to his "employer" is different from the relation of the salaried worker to the capitalist. The homemaker (*chalupnik*) works with his own tools and in his own home. To all appearances he is entirely independent; his "employer" merely supplies him with raw material and sells his product. The *chalupnik* is only a producer, but he is not a hired laborer. He has no "employer" in the ordinary sense of the word. And yet the homemaker as well as the worker in the small industries, belongs to the most exploited, most unhappy and most poverty-stricken groups.

Similarly, the small peasant who owns two or even five acres of land is neither a capitalist nor a hired laborer, although socially and economically he is worse off than a Silesian foundry worker who belonged to one of the best paid groups in Poland.

Any realistic analysis of the social structure of Poland must resort to the auxiliary term, social stratum. Here we will use this term to mean a group with a common social tradition, and well-defined cultural, economic and occupational features. In social struggles individuals belonging to the same social stratum display solidarity. In Poland, in addition to the proletariat, the peasants, landowners, the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia constitute such strata. Before passing to our main subject, the workers, it may be useful to survey briefly the other strata.

There is no doubt that the Polish *peasants* are a group apart, with their own tradition (serfdom and the struggle for land), and distinct cultural and economic characteristics. The peasants have similar needs: whether poor or well-to-do, their expenditures have, so to speak, a similar purpose. Unlike the intellectual, the peasants do not spend their surplus money on travel, improved housing conditions etc., but chiefly on the enlargement and improvement of their farms. Their methods of satisfying their needs are also different; their amusements are unlike those of the inhabitants

of the cities, although the city strongly influences the village. The peasantry has its own art, music, customs and even a characteristic language. Finally, in all social, political and economic struggles the peasants display unmistakable solidarity—a solidarity that is not a result of any inborn characteristics, but of a long historical development.

Just as the peasants cannot be identified with the workers, so the landowners in Poland cannot be identified with the bourgeoisie. The landowners are not only an economic group possessing land, but also a cultural group. They have their own social traditions and customs. To be a *ziemianin* or landowner it is not enough to own a large acreage. One must be born a *ziemianin*, one must have a real or imaginary noble origin. A member of the city middle class who buys land does not by any means belong to the *ziemianstwo*, and is not necessarily received in their circles on an equal basis.

The largest urban group is the proletariat, but as mentioned above, this includes not only wage earners, but also—and these are the most numerous—the homeworkers, (*chatupniki*) small artisans, workers in small industries, and even hawkers and peddlers. However, from the political point of view, not all the groups within the proletariat have equal importance. The dynamic element here is the class of wage laborers, especially the industrial workers—just as in every other country in the world. But in Poland, in addition to the industrial workers and miners, the building trades workers, the masons and bricklayers, are distinguished by special dynamism and activity.

The unemployed constitute a special category. I have in mind only the registered unemployed from among the industrial workers (that is, I exclude the rural unemployed who will not be treated here). Their number amounted to 440,000 in the 1930's, an imposing figure. The social and political importance of this group is enormous. There is a profound difference between the employed and unemployed worker. In the system of social relations, one of its important elements is the conflict between the wage laborer and his employer: it is between these two adversaries that the struggle for improved conditions, higher wages and a shorter working day is waged. The unemployed are not in conflict with the employer, but with the state; they struggle over the wages for public works, for relief, other forms of social assistance that have never been adequate anywhere. This is a fundamental conflict with a system that deprives the unemployed of an opportunity for regular work. Thus a change in the system of government is of fundamental importance for them, and they long for

such a change even when it is against the interests of the working class as a whole and their own.

As for the middle class, it is important to note that in Poland it never played the same active political role as in England and other western European countries. In the first place, the Polish middle class is numerically small—it is a very “thin” stratum. Throughout her history Poland has lacked a strongly developed merchant class. Nor did the Polish bourgeoisie go through a period of revolutionary social action as did the French and English middle classes. The English middle class grew strong in its struggle against the king, for personal and economic freedom, and by 1689 it had succeeded in restricting the king’s rights. Similarly, the French *tiers état* played a great part in the history of French social struggles, contributed actively to the overthrow of absolutism, the liberation of the French people from feudal fetters and the development of French democracy and parliamentary government. In the fields of trade and industry, too, the western European middle classes displayed great energy. The merchants of the past centuries combined an enterprising spirit with ruthless profit-seeking. They accepted every risk, did not hesitate to travel to remote and unknown countries, founded companies and cities overseas and crossed stormy seas in frail boats seeking trade, wealth and adventure. Marco Polo is typical of the thirteenth century merchant. And when the period of the industrial revolution came, the middle classes showed great inventiveness and a spirit of enterprise.

The Polish bourgeoisie lacks all these traditions of a bold sea-faring activity and a struggle against absolutism. In Poland, the struggle for the restriction of the royal power was waged by the magnates and the nobility, and until the period of the partitions Poland was a noblemen’s democracy with an elected king. Nor did the Polish middle class contribute to the development of Polish parliamentary institutions—the Diet was a noblemen’s representative body. Moreover, Poland before the partition lacked an adequate coastline and a merchant fleet. The sea did not play the same part in Polish economic history that it played in England or France. The Polish merchant did not seek distant markets nor sail in far-off seas—this was done much later by a few romantic intellectuals, like Joseph Conrad and Strzelecki. Finally, when machines and technological progress reached Poland, the country was exhausted by its insurrections against the foreign invaders, and lacked a numerous well-to-do bourgeoisie capable of developing the necessary initiative. There was none of that personal freedom and security, to which the English merchants and indus-

trialists owed so much. Industry in the Congress Kingdom was built after 1815 by the initiative of the state, by the gifted Lubecki and his government. Only in the forties and seventies of the nineteenth century did the large-scale capitalist appear in Poland. At that time industries grew at a rapid tempo, and foreign capital came in, usually in a form unprofitable for Poland, because these foreign investments were made for the purpose of realizing quick profits and were withdrawn later.

But even in the most recent times, the Polish bourgeoisie has failed to wield any great influence in their country. They remained a relatively insignificant stratum. Politically, they leaned toward the clerical and nationalist parties.

It was different with the Polish intelligentsia, which played a far greater political role than the bourgeoisie. No adequate social analysis of prewar Poland is possible without taking into account the white-collar workers, the professional class and the intellectuals. But before taking up this question with regard to Poland, a few general remarks on the intelligentsia are necessary.

Neither in the United States nor in England has this stratum had the importance it has had on the European continent, especially in its eastern regions. More than that, this stratum does not exist in the Anglo-Saxon countries as a separate entity: the "professional class" and the "managerial class" are completely integrated with the bourgeoisie or middle class. In eastern Europe the situation is different: the intelligentsia comprise the extensive group of all people who work intellectually, not physically, from the lowest civil servant through the liberal professions (lawyers, physicians, engineers), to the real intellectuals, that is to say, the scientists, artists and writers. All these categories belong to the same group, they display economic, social and cultural similarities. Even in legal respects the white collar workers, intellectual worker, had a privileged position: They had longer vacations, the discharge period, and better old age pensions than the manual workers.

Economically, the intelligentsia has an average standard of living higher than that of the proletariat. Individual intellectuals may be capitalists, or hired laborers, they may belong to different classes, yet because they belong to the same stratum they display common features. These features, because of their intimate relation to culture, are difficult to define scientifically. In one instance, however, it can be done; the nature of their expenditures. The intelligentsia for instance in general spend more on housing than

the workers do. This comparison of course has meaning only if the incomes are equal. This is only a detail, but it is characteristic.

In a sociological analysis of the intelligentsia the most important element is its social functions. The countries of continental Europe had numerous bureaucracies. Outside the cities the administrative system was based not so much on self-government as on a centralized bureaucracy with appointed civil servants. The relations of these civil servants to the state is different from that of the hired workers to the employer. As Marx justly says, the essence of the relation between capital and labor is power. The possession of capital gives the capitalist power over the hired laborer. But the civil servant who is hired by the state acquires power; he disposes of it, for in a country based on a bureaucratic system he is the ruler. Thus, in a bureaucratic system, government is an attribute of the intelligentsia; the popular masses at the most retain only ultimate, which may be remote control.

The professional intellectuals are also scientists, professors and teachers. They monopolize science and knowledge. They grant diplomas and the right to practice professions. As teachers, they also transmit knowledge and human experience, and as physicians, lawyers or engineers, they apply it. Journalism, radio, that is, information in the widest sense of the word, are also intellectual professions—thus the intelligentsia also influences public opinion.

Government, science (transmission and application of science), public opinion—these three essential social functions were thus concentrated in the hands of the intelligentsia.

The intelligentsia appeared as a separate stratum in continental Europe toward the beginning of the nineteenth century. Earlier, in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, the professions which today are represented by the intelligentsia were part of the middle class or the nobility. The nobility, the magnates and the court monopolized government power; science and the liberal professions belonged to middle class categories. After the overthrow of feudalism, and the French Revolution, modern administration arose in Europe, and with it the number of civil servants, especially trained for the job of government, began to grow. The introduction of compulsory education led to the creation of a large number of teachers. There was an increasing need for engineers, and the development of trade and industry was accompanied by a growing number of lawyers. Even new schools and universities trained an ever-increasing number of professional intellectuals.

By the end of the nineteenth century the development of this stratum

was more and more noticeable. Karl Kautsky called attention to the fact that between 1882 and 1885 in Germany the number of workers grew by 62% while the number of intellectuals grew by 118.9%.¹ This tendency has continued, and the number of intellectuals has constantly grown. The present stage of industrial development is characterized by automatization. Unskilled labor is being replaced to the acceleration of this process. The unskilled worker is less and less needed in mechanized production, while the number of highly qualified and intellectual workers is increasing. In the United States, the road builder who works with a shovel in his hands, is today almost a thing of the past. Numerous machines have taken his place, and for the production of these machines engineers, draftsmen, factory clerks, bank clerks, etc. are needed. And the mechanic who directs the machine is coming closer to the intellectual worker, because in this work the intellectual effort is becoming predominant. An analogous process of technical development is taking place in many other branches of an industrialized society.

In Europe, the dynamic and numerous stratum of the intelligentsia played a prominent political role. Controlling the political as well as the economic and educational apparatus, they were a decisive factor in shaping the ideology of several countries. It is doubtful whether Hitler's victory in Germany would have been possible without the fanatical masses of intelligentsia nourished for a century on Hegel, Fichte and Nietzsche, imbued with the Wagnerian myth and the legend of the "master race". In their fanaticism and belief in social myths, this was an obscurantist mass. Could Hitler have ruled Germany as he does without his Landrats and Geheimrats formed on the model of the Prussian police and Prussian army? The importance and extent of this stratum was underestimated by the Weimar Republic, just as they are underestimated by Hitler himself. There is every likelihood that this stratum may still play an important part in Europe.

The workers' movement took up the problem of the intelligentsia at the end of the nineteenth century. Kautsky tried to fit it into the orthodox class division, assigning part of it to the bourgeoisie and part to the proletariat. Valuable work was done also by Robert Michels, whose worth is not sufficiently appreciated, and who later changed his ideas. In the 1930's the Czech sociologist Arnošt Blaha attempted to define the functions of the intelligentsia, and recently Burnham in the United States has come to the conclusion that they are the future élite, the "managerial class." Lewis Corey

¹ Karl Kautsky, *Bernstein und das Sozialdemokratische Program*, Stuttgart, 1889.

outlined a constructive solution of the problem; the cooperation of the intelligentsia, "the managerial class", with the workers within the framework of an organized economic democracy.

The most radical formulation of this problem was made by the Polish Socialist Wacław Machajski, who advanced an antiintelligentsia class theory. Criticizing the socialist trends of his time, he asserted that the new emerging middle class was the intelligentsia, which monopolized education and exploited its privileged position in order to obtain higher pay through the indirect exploitation of the proletariat. Machajski considered the intelligentsia to be a separate class bound by its interests to the capitalists and opposed to the proletariat.

The European socialists waged a victorious struggle against these ideas, and the working class movement everywhere quickly recovered from "Machajskism." But the very existence of such a theory is characteristic, as well as the fact that its author was a Pole. In his writings Machajski constantly referred to the situation of the intelligentsia in the Congress Kingdom, that is in the part of Poland under Tsarist occupation.

The fact is that in Poland, along with the proletariat, not the bourgeoisie, but the intelligentsia, played a prominent role, although at the beginning of this century this role was not at all such as Machajski represented it to be. In contrast with the colorless and passive Polish bourgeoisie, the Polish intelligentsia was an active, dynamic and numerous group which was in no way inferior to the intelligentsia of Russia or Western Europe. Under the Tsarist occupation, the oppression of national minorities barred the way to a professional career. There was not even a Polish university in Congress Poland. This fact contributed to the radicalization of the Polish intellectuals. Many of them went abroad to study or to find work that satisfied their inclinations. There were many Polish students at all the European universities, and Polish scientists vied successfully with those of other countries. Marie Curie-Skłodowska completed the discovery of radium; Witkowski and Wróblewski liquified air, Mikulicz was the first to graft bones; Funk pioneered in the discovery of vitamins; Anigstein distinguished himself in the study of tropical diseases. In painting, aside from the great national artists such as Matejko, Chelmoński, Gerson and many others, several Poles were represented in the Paris school, such as Zak and Kisling. In music, from the time of Chopin to that of Szymanowski and Karłowicz there is a long line of Polish composers, performers and teachers like Paderewski, Leschetitsky, Lalewicz, Rodzinski, Rubinstein and Huberman. In the field of literature, Joseph Conrad, Klaczko and Sienkiewicz achieved

world fame. Bronisław Malinowski was one of the most prominent anthropologists and sociologists of our time. These are only a few of many possible examples.

From 1831 on Polish intelligentsia have played an important role in the political movement of the European continent. In 1848 they fought with the European workers on the barricades of many capitals. In 1871 they distinguished themselves in the ranks of the Paris Communards. They were also present in the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, and in the European revolutions after 1918.

The creation of an independent Poland in 1918 did not result in the elimination of Poles from the international arena, although their activity diminished in other countries as it became concentrated in Poland itself.

The influence of the intelligentsia in Poland was very great in all the political parties: the Socialist (PPS), the peasant party (*Wyzwolenie*, the radical fraction of the peasant movement), the nationalist (ND, the conservative nationalist Right). Before the war of 1914, the Polish intellectuals largely followed radical and progressive slogans, and especially under the Russian occupation played the part of a political leaven. They were closely connected with the radical working class Socialist movement that worked underground and whose militant and terrorist activity was permeated with romanticism. The Polish intellectuals ardently supported and enlisted in the nuclei of the future Polish army, formed under the Austrian occupation as riflemen's battalions and, later, Legions; from these legions the higher officers of the armies of independent Poland were later recruited. The Polish colonels and generals of the new Polish state were different from the high-ranking officers of other armies; they were for the most part ex-students of philosophy, law or medicine, and after 1926, when Josef Pilsudski rallied his former comrades from the days of the anti-Tsarist struggles and the Legions he succeeded in winning over a large part of the Polish intelligentsia.

During the 1930's in independent Poland, only an insignificant group of intellectuals joined the Socialist camp, and those who joined the peasant camp were even less numerous. A large fraction of the youth formed the backbone of Rightist, reactionary and often fascist organizations. The professional intelligentsia, too, largely followed nationalist slogans. But during the same period a growing democratic opposition began to form among the intelligentsia, the moderate university professors and members of the liberal professions in Warsaw, Wilna, Cracow and Lwów, and especially among the masses of teachers. Also a peasant intelligentsia began

slowly to emerge, professional intellectuals who came from the village, and maintained contact with it despite their urban occupation, and vigorously defended its interests. Although small, this group was influential. But in this period, too, a large majority of the Polish intellectuals followed Piłsudski or the nationalist camp, while only a minority joined the socialist, peasant and workers' camps.

The Polish intelligentsia as a whole controlled the bureaucratic state apparatus; and it must be mentioned here that a not inconsiderable part of Polish economic life was controlled by the state.

According to the census of 1931, the total population of Poland was 32.1 millions. The number of active intellectual workers, employed and unemployed, was 664,500, including 17,000 engaged in agriculture. If we add to this figure from 22,000 to 25,000 members of the liberal professions (lawyers, physicians, engineers), we will obtain a total of about 690,000 people. According to the same census, there were in Poland 4,217,000 workers active in their trades: 1,411,600 in agriculture, 2,805,400 in other occupations. 633,900 workers were occupied in large or medium industries; in 1939 the number of such workers reached 886,000. Finally, in 1931, there were 313,000 unemployed workers; their number was growing and during the first quarter of 1937 reached 470,000.

After this brief general survey let us return to the proletariat. We shall try to give a picture of Polish society from the point of view of the working class struggle; in doing this we must remember that the workers are not an isolated nor a static class, and that there is constant interaction among the various classes.

First of all, we must separate the industrial workers from the mass of the proletariat. The industrial workers in the large and medium industries constitute the dynamic, organized political force of the proletariat; the other strata are more passive. In 1931, the number of these industrial workers was 633,000; from 1935 to 1938 their average number was 670,000. Adding to them about 160,000 railroad employees (without intellectual employes) we have about 830,000 industrial and transportation workers. The average number of the unemployed between 1935 and 1939 was 440,000. The fluctuations in the numbers of the intellectual workers were smaller; we can accept an average of 650,000.

Let us for a moment limit our considerations to the cities, which are of decisive political importance. As we have seen the 830,000 industrial and railroad workers were flanked by 400,000 unemployed on the one hand, and 650,000 intellectual workers on the other. These figures are

basic to an understanding of the political situation in Poland in the industrial and urban centers. The industrial working class had no decisive numerical superiority. The unemployed who in Poland acted together with the employed workers (in contrast to Germany where many unemployed joined the Nazis) were nevertheless more interested in immediate change, in the immediate satisfaction of their elementary needs; their adversary was not the employer, but the state. The working class was thus compelled to adjust its tactics to the most urgent needs of its members. It was not always able to choose the most opportune moment for action. As for the intelligentsia, its solidarity had a professional not a class character; all organizational concepts broke against the individualistic tendencies of this group. And with some exceptions, of a few well organized groups, the intelligentsia did not cooperate with the workers in their political struggles. The cooperation of these three groups might have become the basis for a democratic system and many useful reforms.

Thus, in the cities, the situation of the workers was difficult, and they were handicapped in the political struggle, particularly after Nazi Germany became a threat to Polish independence.

II

The Polish social structure also influenced the ideology of the working class movement. When an independent Poland was created, about 75 per cent of its population lived in the villages. In the nineteenth century, this percentage was even higher. Thus the working class movement had first of all to adjust itself to the peasant population. The presence of a large stratum of intelligentsia was also a political problem. In its fight for political emancipation, in its everyday struggles against the employer for the improvement of the economic condition of the workers, the working class movement would not disregard these two important social strata. The peasants, emancipated from serfdom in the middle of the nineteenth century, were slowly maturing and taking a part in political life. They were the natural allies of the workers. The socialist movement extended to the countryside. In the part of Poland formerly occupied by Austria, it gained considerable influence. An agricultural program adjusted to Polish reality rather than to dogmatic requirements was necessary. In independent Poland, the radical fraction of the peasant movement always cooperated closely with the Socialists. After 1930, in the struggle for the democratic reconstruction of Poland, the unified peasants' movement worked closely with the working class movement. The Socialist Party accepted the same

premises as the peasant party in its agricultural program. For the only democratic solution of the Polish agrarian problem is the creation of small independent homesteads and cooperatives. The countryside would reject any other system. This fact influenced the Polish socialist program.

As for the intelligentsia, for many years the Polish progressive intellectuals were closely allied with the working class movement: during the entire period of subjection the Polish intelligentsia, suffering from national oppression, cut off from opportunities in government service, largely sympathized with socialism. But the creation of an independent Poland opened new fields for the intelligentsia, and, as I have mentioned before, they found themselves isolated, with only small groups of professional intellectuals sharing the fate of the peasants and workers. The majority were in conflict with the popular movements. The intelligentsia of independent Poland failed to create the vigorous progressive-democratic movement which was so vitally needed and there was no progressive democratic party capable of rallying the intellectuals. Only a few years before the present war the Democratic Club, and, a little later, the Democratic Party, were born and began slowly to organize the progressive intelligentsia. The Polish working class movement did not follow the path of Machajski, whose theories, incidentally, were not popular in Poland. On the contrary, Polish socialism probably recognized the need of extending its activity among the intelligentsia earlier than other European socialist movements. In the 1930's this need was taken for granted by many Polish socialist leaders and influenced them in the elaboration of their programs.

Poland's international situation also strongly influenced the ideology of Polish socialism. Long subjection to foreign rule and national oppression taught every Pole to value national freedom and independence. From the very inception of the socialist movement, the internationals supported the revolutionary struggles for the liberation of Poland. But even after independence was achieved, Poland was not secure. Her proximity to powerful and dynamic nations and the lack of a system of collective security influenced her internal policies. Thus the working class and peasant movement were limited in their struggle for the reconstruction of Polish democracy by their preoccupation with the protection of Polish independence.

Likewise, on the international arena, the Polish socialists sought solutions that would reconcile the preservation of national independence with the premises of international socialism. They supported all forms of international cooperation based on the equal rights of great and small nations. They supported the League of Nations and collective security. After 1933,

the Polish working class and peasant movements took a pro-French attitude and opposed the bilateral pacts. Today, when Polish political life has again gone underground, the ideas of federation, collective security, a world organization of the states, inspire the Polish working class movement and the whole democratic camp.

Tradition also plays a great part in determining the political behavior of workers in a given country. For instance, Spain reacted to Fascist counter-revolution in a manner different from Germany. Of course, the situation in Spain was vastly different from that in Germany, but history, tradition and experience played a decisive part.

The character of the Polish socialist movement, its dynamism and its combination of parliamentarianism and revolutionary dynamics were shaped by many years of struggles. The 150 years of Polish captivity, the iniquitous partitions, weighed heavily in all spheres of Polish life, including the development of the working class movement. This development followed different paths in the parts occupied by Prussia, Austria and Russia. Under Prussian occupation, the Socialist movement lacked the dynamism and importance it gained in the other two parts of the country. The causes for this are various and are beyond the scope of the present inquiry.

In the provinces occupied by Austria the working class socialist movement developed under constitutional conditions. Thus all the forms of European socialism were represented here. At the turn of the century, a mass socialist political movement arose. The Polish socialists carried on their activities within a constitutional framework: they took part in the elections to municipal bodies and parliamentary institutions. They organized powerful professional, educational, cooperative and health insurance societies. In the Vienna parliament, the representatives of Polish socialism soon gained prestige and influence among all the progressive and democratic groups. Party committees organized in towns and villages constantly supported the political activity of the movement. Thus at the beginning of the twentieth century in Galicia there existed a modern and excellently organized mass working class movement.

The conditions in the territory occupied by Russia, the so-called Congress Kingdom, were completely different. Here, ruthless oppression and lack of political freedom drove Poland's political life underground. The working class movement was compelled to follow the same path as that in Russia itself—illegal struggle. Thus, while in Galicia the Polish socialists imitated Western European constitutionalism and parliamentarianism, in Russian Poland they chose the path of revolution. Later, the Socialist

Party of independent Poland became a synthesis of these two currents.

Polish socialism under Russian occupation was not divorced from tradition; its ideology and tactics were strongly influenced by its heroic past: three tragic insurrections. Polish socialism was born before the Polish working class; its ideas were adopted by the insurrectionists who emigrated after 1831. Socialism as a working class movement appeared in Poland only in the 1880's, and from the very beginning, despite its international character, was full of "insurrectional traditions." Up to this day, insurrectionism has remained the original and characteristic feature of Polish socialism.

The Poles participated in every European struggle for freedom. They never forgot the insurrectional legend, and introduced their own ideas and insurrectional tactics into foreign countries.

The personality and actions of Ignacy Hryniewiecki, a Pole active in the Russian socialist movement who made a terroristic attempt on the life of Tsar Alexander II, is an excellent illustration of this. Hryniewiecki came from the small Polish nobility of the Grodno region. As a student at the Technological Institute in Petersburg he came into contact with the Russian revolutionary youth, although he also belonged to illegal Polish groups. Reproached by his colleagues for devoting so much energy to the Russian cause instead of giving all his strength to the cause of Poland, he replied: "When you take to the woods, I will be there, but now when you are not doing anything, I will work for the cause of Russian freedom." This incident, characteristically enough, was mentioned in the *Przedświt*, a Polish Socialist periodical published in Geneva, in its issue of 1883, which contained an obituary notice about Hryniewiecki. His words are typical of the revolutionary traditions of the Polish socialist movement. "To take to the woods," is an old insurrectional phrase which means to join a revolutionary detachment hiding in the forest, fighting with inferior arms from ambushes, and displaying all the courage that is required in a hopeless and heroic struggle.

For many Poles, the socialist movement in Russian-occupied Poland meant "taking to the woods," and the working class movement itself was another form of insurrectional activity. This was the attitude of people of the type of Josef Piłsudski, who came from the Polish Socialist Party.

From the insurrectional point of view, the struggle for independence is ideologically an integral part of the Polish socialist movement. Former participants in the insurrection often joined the first socialist groups. Thus the "Proletariat," the first socialist organization formed in Poland, despite its strongly pronounced international character, never forgot the insurrec-

tional tradition; this is evidenced, for instance, in an article entitled "1861-1881," published in its underground organ on the occasion of a clash with the Russian army (1861 is the date of the January Insurrection in Poland).

Later, the historical development of the socialist ideology in Congress Poland is marked by a split. The two opposing currents differed in their attitude toward the question of an independent Poland. One fraction, grouped around the Polish Socialist Party, considered the struggle for independence as the most fundamental problem. The other fraction, grouped around the Lithuanian and Polish Social Democracy, struggled only for the realization of social postulates, did not desire the separation of Poland from Russia, and conceived of Poland only as a member of a gigantic international organism. The fact that the problem of independence could split the Polish socialist movement is a proof of its importance. The Polish Socialist Party played a decisive part among the masses. All the great leaders of international socialism supported the independence of Poland: Marx, Engels, Liebknecht. And although the Polish Social Democracy joined the Comintern after the war of 1914 and became the Polish Communist Party, Lenin declared himself in favor of the classical thesis of Polish socialism, that is, in favor of Polish independence.

The insurrectional tradition also left its mark on the initial organizations of the socialist movement as well as on the technique of the underground struggle. For instance, in May 1878, when a handful of students, workers and intellectuals founded in Warsaw the first nucleus of the future Polish Socialist Party, they took for their model the decimal organization of the 1863 insurrection. The larger unit, the section, was in 1863 called the "district," and this name (in Polish, *dzielnica*) has persisted to this day in the Warsaw workers' movement. But this is only a detail. The insurrectional character of the struggle is clear also in its militant action. While the Russian socialists confined themselves to attacks on individuals, that is, to terrorist attempts, the Polish socialists developed actions that sometimes assumed the character of guerrilla warfare. Such was the famous attack on a train near Rogow, which was prepared and planned in a strictly military fashion. The demonstration in Grzybow Square in 1904 was in many aspects reminiscent of the demonstrations of 1861-1863, commonly called the January insurrection. Finally, the leadership of the Polish socialists sought a military form of organization. After the 1906 congress, they refused to become merely "a gang of public street cleaners constantly engaged in sweeping up Tsarist mud."

While individual terrorism was the chief method of the Russian

revolutionists, the O. B., the glorious Fighting Organization of the Polish Socialist Party, conceived its task differently. While not renouncing terrorism, this organization strove to prepare the greatest possible number of organizers of the future insurrection, the imminent armed struggle. This tendency, after the defeat of the 1905 revolution led to the formation, in Austrian-occupied Poland, of the military organization "Strzelec," and later to the "Legions," destined to fight for Polish independence.

The action itself had a character of its own, marked by boldness and dynamism. A relatively small group of fighters kept all the police of Congress Poland in check, and terrorized the Tsarist administration by sudden, well-organized attacks. On Bloody Wednesday (August 15th, 1906), simultaneous attacks were made on several dozens of provocateurs and police spies, terrifying and disorganizing the whole Russian police apparatus. There was also the famous escape from Pawiak prison in Warsaw. Ten political prisoners were being held there awaiting sentence, some of them threatened with execution. One morning a group of policemen commanded by an officer came to the prison and presented an order for the immediate transfer of the prisoners. Far outside Warsaw, the prisoners learned that their escort consisted of disguised members of the Polish Socialist Party.

Small wonder that so much heroism and romanticism strongly influenced public feeling. The best Polish writers of the time, like Zeromski and Brzozowski, devoted their talents to the cause of Polish Socialism.

I am not emphasizing the insurrectional features of the Polish working class movement because I believe they are the most essential, but because they give this movement, whose ideology and international action were based on socialism, a special character.

The Polish Socialist Party justified its tactical strategic and ideological "insurrectionism" by pointing to its social importance. Thus in the program of 1907 written by Feliks Perl, we read that "real" complete democratization, is impossible under conditions of subjection to a foreign country. Such subjection, we read further, "hampers normal social development, harms the interests of national culture and exposes the country and the people to intensified exploitation and oppression on the part of the foreign invaders. Only in a free and independent country can the working class develop freely, manifest all its strength, fully carry out the democratization of government institutions and the objectives of socialism. For that reason, the PPS (*Polish Socialist Party*) while aiming at a democratic republic, combines this goal with independence, and struggles for an Independent Democratic Republic."

Insurrectionism is not the only characteristic feature of the Polish working class movement. It is distinguished from previous insurrectional movements in many other fundamental respects. First of all, the Polish Socialist movement was not conspiratorial, was not based on an isolated group of conspirators or partisans, but was based on mass support and aroused mass sympathy. Although lacking (in Russian-occupied Poland) trade-union apparatus, the PPS was able to organize mass strikes and bring thousands of workers into the streets. Both in the leadership and the rank and file of this movement, the workers played a fundamental part. This is the essential difference between the socialist movement and the old insurrectionary movements. Kościuszko's insurrection (contemporaneous with the French Revolution) mobilized the peasants, and in Warsaw it was even led by a simple artisan, the cobbler Kilinski; nevertheless it was basically national and had none of the features of a people's uprising. For despite the Polaniec Manifesto, which treated the peasants in a friendly spirit, this insurrection did not attempt a solution of the agrarian problem. The insurrection of 1831 was military in character and perhaps for that reason had greater chances for victory than any other insurrection. The Cracow uprising of 1846 was purely local. The insurrection of 1863, despite the best intentions of its leaders, did not succeed in fully taking up the social problems of the country, especially the agrarian problem. The Polish socialist movement was the first insurrectional movement in Poland that connected the problem of social justice with that of national independence and succeeded in drawing in the masses of the people.

The Polish working class movement was also the first political movement based on permanently organized masses, masses of workers controlled by their leadership and controlling this leadership. While in Russian-occupied Poland, only a "vanguard" was organized, and the masses of the workers merely responded by action to the party appeals, under the Austrian occupation, where the movement was imbued with organizational discipline, and was based on strong trade unions, there were permanently organized masses to make sacrifices whenever the party demanded them.

After 1918 and the creation of an independent Poland consisting of territories previously occupied by three empires, there arose a great *legal* working class party—the PPS (Polish Socialist Party)—and powerful trade unions controlled by it. This party combined the dynamism, daring and courage of the party active under former Russian occupation, a party accustomed to underground struggle and to organizing mass movements, with

the ability to carry on parliamentary struggles, and to initiate social insurance and advance working class legislation, which the Polish socialists had acquired under Austrian occupation. As a result, the PPS, while displaying great organizational versatility and ability for constructive work, did not lose its special militancy and spirit of sacrifice.

The Polish working class thus had great organizational capacities. In the course of several decades the socialists and trade union movement had educated an army of local leaders, a kind of party "noncoms." Found in every little town, every factory, these "noncoms" formed the nucleus of the organization. They were workers loyal to the flag of the party, ready for every sacrifice. During periods of persecutions they lost their jobs and filled the prisons, but later returned to their posts. They also organized various local committees, distributed illegal literature, posted placards, spoke at meetings, lent their apartments for party gatherings and carried on agitation in the villages. These humble militants built the movement with their faith and self-denial, demanding little for themselves and giving everything.

Socialist influences spread beyond the movement itself. They manifested themselves in municipalities, social insurance organizations, labor courts, village arbitration committees, educational organizations, cooperatives, etc. Nor did the party remain silent on any important governmental questions. The working class movement also succeeded in protecting itself from political corruption of the movement. The Polish Socialist Party remained and still remains the center of the Polish working-class movement, and has never yielded to the Communists or other competitors who in their attempt to gain mass influence combated the Socialists. The splits caused with the help of the government in 1930 did not succeed in breaking the PPS. Although membership in the trade unions decreased somewhat and although several former leaders, loyal to Piłsudski rather than to the party, left, most of the workers remained.

The predominant ideology of the PPS was Marxian. Although a few prominent Polish socialists sought an ideological basis in a kind of humanism (Limanowski, Posner), such currents never attained the importance they had in France, for instance, where tradition and later the personality of Jean Jaurès lent great weight to non-Marxian tendencies in socialism. But even the Marxian elements in Polish socialism had a special character. Many socialist writers sought their own paths. One of these was Stanisław Brzozowski, an independent thinker who greatly influenced the Polish youth during the first decade of this century. Similarly Abramowski, the theoretician of the cooperative movement, and Krzywicki, show many original

features. Long talmudic discussions about the interpretation of the master's words were not carried on in Poland, and orthodox Marxism, alien to Marx himself, and more akin to religion than to science, did not gain many partisans in Poland.

III

Despite its insurrectional and patriotic feature, the PPS always retained International. And the Polish workers' movement was connected with the International. And the Polish workers movement was connected with the international movement.

These international connections, as we have seen, were not limited to slogans and words. During the Spanish civil war, many Polish workers fought in the international brigades. Polish socialism also supported other workers' struggles abroad, not only morally, but also materially, to the limit of its means. But even within the framework of an international organization, each socialist group preserved its individuality.

Thus, in England, the workers' movement was born from the trade unions, economic organizations which historically preceded the political movement. Although ideologically English socialism is very old, and there were many English socialists even at the time of Owen, socialism as a political mass movement is a rather recent phenomenon in England. The English Labor Party won its first parliamentary seat in 1906; but the PPS succeeded in having its candidates elected to the Austrian Parliament in the 1890's and had to work under much less favorable conditions.

In America, up to this very day, the workers' movement is first of all a trade union movement. Improved living conditions, higher wages, labor rights continue to be the exclusive, or almost exclusive, concern of the American trade unions. The CIO and AFL show little interest in problems of domestic or foreign policy, and the American Labor Party is for the moment local in character.

The Polish workers' movement is both a trade union and a political movement. The PPS has always had considerable influence over the trade unions, and the latter acted politically through the parties with which they were connected. For the historical reasons discussed above the working class movement directly influenced the political life of the country. Thus, the Polish movement was more like the French or the German movement than the English or American. But this comparison is not quite adequate. The French revolutionary traditions of 1848 and 1871 are very different from the Polish. France experienced revolutions that lasted months. But Poland

under Russian occupation experienced a state of permanent revolution that lasted several decades, and during that entire period, as in Russia itself, the revolutionists constantly waged underground battles, without any interruption or period of legality. And after 1871, the French workers enjoyed constitutions and democratic conditions. As for Germany, the revolutionary traditions of the socialists were not rich, and the German movement was legalistic in character.

CONCLUSION

After this war Polish socialism and the Polish workers' movement will be confronted with new tasks. Reality will impose certain necessities on the policy of the workers.

Polish political reality is above all defined by the existence of three great social strata, which are natural factors for democracy: the peasants, the workers and the intelligentsia. After the war, the intelligentsia will be completely impoverished, economically ruined. A large part of the Polish bourgeoisie, too, has been reduced to misery by the Germans. The invader has taken over the monopoly of exploitation in Poland, and all classes are victimized by the policy of plunder. We will probably find in Poland a large group of marginal, declassed people, without employment or trade, without homes, living wretchedly from day to day.

Under these conditions the Polish labor movement will not be able to limit itself to the struggle for the improvement of the living conditions of the proletariat or manual workers, but will have to include the large masses of the intelligentsia. In this it will continue a policy begun several years before the war.

However, it is not indispensable that all the intelligentsia and unfortunate declassed persons should be placed within the framework of the working class movement. They should be taken care of by a truly democratic independent party that might gather the intellectuals around its standard. Present day developments in Poland seem to tend in this direction.

The alliance of the three great groups of the peasants, workers and intellectuals, that is the Peasant Party, the PPS (Polish Socialist Party) and the Democratic Party, is a fundamental condition for the creation of a political democratic system in Poland which would be based on organized social forces and not on temporary popular emotions. Such an alliance could solve the economic and social problems of Poland, lead the country out of misery and guarantee the elementary rights of the citizens. Moreover, it could stabilize social conditions, which is tremendously important in this

part of Europe. For no society can possibly survive too frequent economic and social upheavals. After the war, once life has been reorganized, and the necessary reforms have been consequently carried out, a long period of stabilization of social relations will be necessary.

With regard to foreign policy, the Polish working class movement has accepted the conception of a federation of central and eastern Europe and of an European Union. Such a federation would naturally be a member of a world system of collective security, which is the prerequisite for a permanent international order after the war. Polish socialist and democratic circles also realize the necessity of an understanding with Soviet Russia. There have been many attempts in this direction, and the trend of events is clear. This understanding depends first of all upon the good will of the Soviets.

The Polish people are today waging a bloody war against the German invader. For many centuries this people has fought every invasion. The Poles are ready to limit their sovereignty for the purpose of collective security if the other nations do the same. Without collective security and a federation Poland cannot defend her own interests. But limitation of sovereignty must be based on cooperation, not on foreign domination.

NEW YORK CITY

THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT IN
THE RUMANIAN PRINCIPALITIES, 1821-1848:
THE GENERATION OF 1848¹

by John C. Campbell

THE propaganda of the past few years from Bucharest picturing the Rumanian nation as the defender of Western civilization against the barbarians of the East is more than an echo of the voice of Dr. Goebbels. It has been the refrain of Rumanian nationalists ever since the Rumanian "national renaissance" of a century ago. The events of the past few years would seem to show that the varnish of Western civilization in Roumania was never very thick nor evenly applied. But modern Rumania, in its political thought and institutions, has been formed in the image of Western Europe. Through contact with the West the Rumanian upper and middle classes developed a new literature, new political institutions, and an intense nationalism. It was the "Westernizers" who built the independent national Rumanian state, which took form with the union of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1859.

Both before and after the winning of national independence the Rumanians were more receptive than the Slavic nations of the Balkans to the influence of Western thought. Located on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, the Principalities had enjoyed a status of semi-autonomy under the Sultans. The native Rumanian aristocracy survived the Ottoman conquest and perserved, in the capital cities of Bucharest and Jassy, a culture at first Byzantine and ecclesiastical in character but gradually influenced by intellectual currents from the West. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries these currents reached the Principalities by way of Hungary and Poland. The eighteenth century, during which Moldavia and Wallachia were ruled by Phanariot Greeks, has an unsavory reputation in Rumanian history as a time of unparalleled corruption, intellectual stagnation, and of ruthless exploitation of a naturally rich land by a swarm of foreign and native locusts. Some of the Phanariot princes, however, had been educated in the West and represented, in a rudimentary way, the contemporary cult of enlightened despotism. To illuminate their benighted surroundings, they imported French secretaries and tutors and created in upper class circles a fad for French political writings.²

¹ This article is an expansion of a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Chicago, 1941.

² Nicolae Iorga, "Le despotisme éclairé dans les pays roumains au XVIIIe siècle" (*Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences*, IX, Part I, No. 34, Mar.

News of the French Revolution reached the Danubian Principalities chiefly through the merchant class, whose centers of operations were Trieste, Vienna, Budapest, and the Transylvanian cities of Hermannstadt and Kronstadt. This class, more Greek than Rumanian, made positive efforts to propagate the new revolutionary ideas in the urban centers of southeastern Europe. While the principles of political liberalism and popular sovereignty, the program of the French bourgeoisie, could have little meaning in the static agricultural society of the Principalities, they were taken up by certain groups as weapons with which to fight their immediate oppressors or political opponents. They were used, for example, by a group of boyars who wanted to be rid of the Phanariots and to install native princes in Moldavia and Wallachia;³ by another group which petitioned Napoleon to make the Principalities into a republic;⁴ and by leaders of the peasantry, such as Tudor Vladimirescu, to whom liberty and equality were slogans of revolt against all landowners and tax-gatherers, whether Greek or Rumanian.

A French consul in Bucharest reported that "for the small portion of the boyars who know how to reason, the French Revolution is not without attraction".⁵ But it was not until after 1821, when the Phanariots had been replaced by native Rumanian princes, that constitutionalism and nationalism, two forces which had swept across western and central Europe, gained the adherence of any appreciable number of Rumanians. Constitutionalism was strongest in Moldavia, where a group of lesser boyars calling themselves *Cărvunarii* (Carbonari) persuaded the prince to introduce a constitution apparently modeled on the French Charter of 1814 or the Spanish Constitution of 1820. It contained articles guaranteeing individual liberty and equality before the law, and providing for freedom of contract and of trade, a representative assembly, and a state-owned printing press to publish books in Rumanian.⁶ This "democratic" system, however, was to extend only to members of the boyar class. These "radicals" wanted an equalization

1937, pp. 129-42, 321-48); Pompiliu Eliade, *De l'influence française sur l'esprit publique en Roumanie* (Paris, 1898), *passim*; Iorga, *Histoire des relations entre la France et les Roumains* (Paris, 1918), pp. 88-119.

³ Memoirs of Ioan Cantacuzino, cited by Iorga, *La Place des Roumains dans l'histoire universelle* (3 vols., Bucharest, 1935-36), III, pp. 40-42.

⁴ A. D. Xenopol, *Istoria Partidelor Politice* (2 vols., Bucharest, 1910), I, pp. 42-3.

⁵ E. Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor* (30 vols., Bucharest, 1876-1922), XVI, p. 520.

⁶ A. D. Xenopol, "Primul proiect de constituțiunea Moldovei din 1822; Originile partidului conservator și ale celui liberal" (Academia Română, *Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*, Ser. II, No. 20, 1898; D. V. Barnoschi, *Originele Democrației Române* (Jassy, 1922); I. C. Filitti, *Frământările Politice și Sociale în Principatele Române de la 1821 la 1828* (Bucharest, 1932), pp. 95-124; Iorga, "Penseurs révolutionnaires roumains de 1804 à 1830" (*Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen*, XI, 1934, pp. 81-102).

of privilege within that class, nothing more. But by its very terms their constitution was an introduction of dynamite into the stratified society of that day. The logical development of those terms into a creed of democracy for the whole nation was to be the work of the generation of 1848.

II

Nationalism, of which the new constitutionalism was but a manifestation, was the one doctrine of the French Revolution which struck deep root in southeastern Europe. Because the various peoples living for centuries under Habsburg and Ottoman rule had clung tenaciously to their national languages and customs, and as the consciousness of nationality already existed, the nationalism of the nineteenth century found a basis in reality; it could become something more than a fashionable idea. However, the pattern of its manifestation was common to all the nations of Europe. Most Balkan nationalists, holding their ideals and their program to be the unique and eternal expression of their own nation's being, generally deny the extensive borrowing process which characterized the spread of nationalism from west to east. But it is clear that nationalism in eastern Europe did not spring from the earth nor from the "soul" of the peasantry. It was a movement fostered by intellectuals subjected to the influence of the West. In the Principalities it was the product of three intellectual currents: (1) the cult of Latinity; (2) the Romantic movement, with its glorification of the heroic national past; (3) the direct influence of French literature and political thought.

The Latinists were, for the most part, Transylvanian Rumanians who, through their Uniate Church, had come into contact with Rome and had "discovered" the theory of the Roman origin of the Rumanian people, of which they were making full use in their social and religious struggle against the Magyars. Gheorghe Lazăr, a Transylvanian who crossed the Carpathians in 1816 and set up in Bucharest the first national Rumanian college, was the first of a series of distinguished teachers who preached the gospel of Latinism in the Principalities.⁷ It became an essential part of Rumanian nationalist doctrine. The fact that Rumania is surrounded by nations of Slavic and Turanian origin has given it added force. The historic mission of the Rumanian nation, according to the theory, is to stand as a sentinel of the Latin world and of Western civilization on the eastern march.

The Latinist movement dissipated much of its prestige by its attempt

⁷ The best biography of Lazăr is G. Bogdan-Duică, *Gheorghe Lazăr* (Bucharest, 1924).

to fit the developing Rumanian language into the mold of classical Latin. It found opponents among a group of romantic nationalists, most of them Moldavians, who sought inspiration not in ancient Rome but in the heroic era of Stephen the Great, who had led the Rumanians against the Turks, and of Michael the Brave, who for one brief year, at the end of the sixteenth century, had ruled all three "Rumanian lands": Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania. Following the example of the German and Slavic Romantics, they turned to old chronicles and to the language and folklore of the peasantry in their search for national traditions and a national literature.⁸

The Latinists and the Romanticists both contributed to, and were overshadowed by, the overwhelming influence of French culture and political thought. With the emphasis on the Latin character of the Rumanian people, the intellectual leaders turned not to Rome, with which the Principalities had no religious ties, but to Paris, the cultural center of the Latin world. The Rumanian Romanticists were inspired by Lamartine and Victor Hugo even more than by Herder and the German school. Even those who, alarmed at the appearance of a group of *déracinés* who had lost their consciousness of Rumanian nationality in becoming imitation Frenchmen, tried to rebel against the French influence, had to turn to French models for their literature of "national inspiration". The strongest current of all, particularly after 1830, was the French revolutionary tradition, which won over a whole generation of political leaders.

III

After the Treaty of Adrianople opened the Danubian ports to the ships of all nations, a flourishing trade strengthened the ties between the Principalities and Western Europe. This trade, however, like the overland commerce with Central Europe, was largely in the hands of Jews and Greeks. Economic factors contributed only in a very minor way to the spread of Western ideas among the Rumanians. After all, the overwhelming foreign influence was the French, and with France the commercial contacts were negligible despite the many pleas made by French consuls in Bucharest

⁸ The leaders of this "historical-popular" current were the historians Mihail Kogălniceanu and Nicolae Bălcescu, the poets Vasile Alecsandri and Alexandru Russo, and the economist Ion Ghica. Their reviews were *Dacia Literară* and *Propăsirea* (published in Jassy) and *Magazin Istoric pentru Dacia*, (published in Bucharest). See especially Iorga, "Le romantisme dans le Sud-Est de l'Europe (*Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen*, I, 1924, pp. 301-401); Radu Dragnea, *Mihail Kogălniceanu* (Bucharest, 1927), pp. 95-135; P. V. Haneş, *Desvoltarea limbii literare române în prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea* (2nd ed., Bucharest 1927).

and Jassy to the rulers of the Monarchy of July, urging that political and economic advantage be taken of the great prestige which France and everything French enjoyed in the Principalities.

French literature had no competitors. The official records for the importation of foreign books into Moldavia in 1837 and 1838 showed that less than 3 percent were Italian, 17 percent were German, and 80 percent, including many political writings, were French.⁹ Ioan Heliade Rădulescu, who by the quantity and diversity of his work dominated his literary generation as Hasdeu and Iorga later dominated theirs, made some forty translations of French works. He and his disciples were steeped in Rousseau, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Michelet, and Byron (in French translation), copying their literary style and absorbing their political ideas.¹⁰

The new educational system provided a broad avenue for the introduction of Western ideas. Pavel Kiselev, the Russian general and faithful servant of Nicholas I, who was at the same time a true son of the Enlightenment, governed the Principalities from 1829 to 1834 and endowed them with semi-liberal constitutions, a reformed administration, and a state school system. The fundamental educational law for Wallachia, drawn up in 1831 by Kiselev and Barbu Stirbei, a young Rumanian just returned from several years' study in Paris, took directly from France the conception that education was a primary need of the nation and a primary obligation of the state.¹¹ Even the reactionary Michael Sturdza, Prince of Moldavia from 1834 to 1849, announced his support of "an easily accessible public education in harmony with European civilization and with the needs of the country", though he did not favor rural schools, which might spread radical doctrines among the peasantry.¹² Important teaching posts in the national schools of Moldavia and Wallachia were held by foreigners, chiefly Frenchmen, and the best private schools were French. These *pensionnats* were attended by the wealthy boyars' sons in preparation for higher studies in Paris. One of them, that of Professor Vaillant in Bucharest, which was attended by Ion Ghica, Nicolae Bălcescu and C. A. Rosetti,

⁹ Minea, *Ce cetise Generațiunea Unirii din Moldova* (Bucharest, 1919), pp. 6, 17-18.

¹⁰ D. Popovici, *Ideologia Literară a lui I. Heliade Rădulescu* (Bucharest, 1935); G. Oprescu, *Eliade Rădulescu și Franța* (Cluj, 1923); N. I. Apostolescu, *L'influence des romantiques français sur la poésie roumaine* (Paris, 1909); P. Eliade, *La Roumanie au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 1914), pp. 330ff. There is an incomplete list of translations in A. Dumitrescu, *L'influence de la langue et de la littérature françaises en Roumanie* (Lausanne, 1888), p. 45.

¹¹ P. Eliade, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-9; Iorga, *Histoire de l'enseignement en pays roumains* (Bucharest, 1933), pp. 175ff.; I. C. Filitti, *Les principautés roumaines sous l'occupation russe* (Bucharest, 1904), p. 207.

¹² V. A. Urechia, *Istoria Școalelor* (2 vols., Bucharest, 1892-4), II, p. 287; Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, Supl. I, v. 5, p. 614.

three of the great names of the generation in 1848, became a center of revolutionary activities, and Vaillant himself was expelled both from Wallachia and from Moldavia for plotting against the established order.¹³

The revolutionary liberal-national ideology which spread from France to other parts of Europe had a particular appeal in the Principalities, over which the Russian Tsar, the symbol of autocracy and reaction everywhere in Europe, had by the Treaty of Adrianople established a virtual protectorate. His consuls in Bucharest and Jassy continually interfered in political affairs there and, after the departure of Kiselev, supported the most reactionary boyars. The new generation of Rumanian leaders hated Russia for this reason and also because of the ever-present danger that the Principalities might be annexed to the Russian Empire and all hope of an independent national existence be extinguished. It was not surprising that they should embrace the ideas of those writers in France and elsewhere who painted the Tsar as the enemy of the freedom and progress of all nations. The Russian government knew very well that those ideas were undermining the established order and the Russian protectorate. It attempted to control the schools and to keep the boyars from sending their sons to Paris. But these measures were ineffective, and, as one of the Russian consuls reported, could not check "the insubordinate French spirit".¹⁴

Paris, Europe's revolutionary capital and the Mecca for students of many nations, had an irresistible attraction for Rumanian youth. Constantin Golescu, known as "the first modern Rumanian", visited "Europe", as his compatriots called the West, in the 1820's and was filled with enthusiasm for everything he saw. On his return he addressed an appeal to the boyars, his own class, to abandon their complacent orientalism and their indifference to the welfare and progress of the people. He urged them to send their sons abroad to learn foreign languages and foreign ways.¹⁵ Golescu, whose four sons and three nephews were educated in France and at Geneva, was the patriarch of the school of Westernizers, the spiritual father of the generation of 1848.¹⁶

¹³ M. E. Holban, "Un raport frances despre Moldova, 1828" (*Buletinul Comisiei Istorice a Române sub Regulamentul Organic* (Bucharest, 1915), pp. 393-5, 606-616; N. Istorice a Romaniei, IX (1930), 147-184; I. C. Filitti, *Domniile Române sub Regulamentul Organic* (Bucharest, 195), pp. 393-5, 606-616; N. Cartoian, "Pensionatele franceze din Moldova în prima jumătate a veacului XIX-lea" (*Omagiu lui Ramiro Ortiz*, Bucharest, 1929, pp. 67-75); O. Cudalbu-Slusanschi, "Contributions à la biographie et à l'oeuvre de J. A. Vaillant" (*Mélanges de l'Ecole Roumaine en France*, Paris, 1937-38, pp. 1-115), 12-19, 24-26.

¹⁴ Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, Suppl. I, v. 6, pp. 175, 189.

¹⁵ C. Golescu, *Insemnare a călătoriei mele* (Budă, 1826), later editions published in Bucharest in 1910 (N. Hodoș, ed.) and 1915 (P. V. Haneș, ed.).

¹⁶ George Fotino, *Din Vremea Renasterii Naționale a Țării-Românești, Boerii Golești* (4 vols, Bucharest, 1939) is a rich collection of the correspondence of the

The Rumanian students in Paris in the two decades before 1848 were almost all devotees of the latest democratic and even socialistic theories, ardent admirers of Lamennais, of Lamartine, who agreed to become "honorary patron" of their society of students, and especially of the immortal trio of the *Collège de France*, Michelet, Quinet and Mickiewicz. It is almost impossible to recapture the atmosphere of the *Collège de France* in those years. The students were lifted to heights of emotional enthusiasm by the impassioned addresses of Mickiewicz on Poland's mission to liberate the Slavs and all European peoples from tyranny, by those of Michelet on the philosophy of history, on nationality, and on the great Revolution, by those of Quinet on the revolutions in Italy. The mystic, ultra-democratic, revolutionary idealism made a special appeal to the young Rumanians, among whom were Dumitru Brătianu, who was a student in Paris for over ten years, his younger brother Ion, C. A. Rosetti, the Golescu brothers, Nicolae Bălcescu, and others who were later the moving spirits of the movement for political freedom and national unification. Rosetti and the Brătianus became intimate friends of the three professors, whom they revered as prophets of the new era.¹⁷

IV

When the February Revolution broke out in Paris, these Rumanian youths fought on the barricades until the Republic had triumphed, then returned to their homeland to bring the glories of freedom and democracy to their own people. They had a ready-made program: abolition of the Russian protectorate; union of Moldavia and Wallachia, and if possible, all other "Rumanian lands" (Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina, Bessarabia), in an independent Rumanian state; establishment of a democratic government based on universal suffrage; equal taxation; the emancipation of the peasantry. "Justice, Brotherhood" was their slogan, the brotherhood of all Rumanians as free and equal citizens and of freedom-loving peoples

Golescu family, supplanting G. Bengescu, *Une famille de boyards lettrés roumains au XIXe. siècle, les Golescu* (Paris, 1922).

¹⁷ Ladislas Mickiewicz, *La Trilogie du Collège de France* (Paris, 1924); Paul Hazard, "Michelet, Quinet, Mickiewicz, et la vie intérieure du Collège de France de 1838 à 1852" (*Livre jubilaire composé à l'occasion du Quatrième Centenaire du Collège de France*, Paris, 1932, pp. 263-276); Ion Breazu, "Edgar Quinet et les Roumains" (*Mélanges de l'Ecole Roumaine en France*, 1927, pp. 213-401), pp. 213-35; *idem*, *Michelet și Români* (Cluj, 1935); Hélène Vararesco, "La mystique nationale roumaine aux environs de 1848" (*Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, Paris, XLII, 1929, pp. 8-19). The most revealing sources on the state of mind of the Rumanian students are their letters and diaries. See especially A. Cretzianu, *Din Arhiva Lui Dumitru Brătianu* (2 vols., Bucharest, 1933-34), I, *passim*; C. A. Rosetti, *Note intime, scrise zilnic* (2 vols., Bucharest, 1902, 1916), I, *passim*.

everywhere.¹⁸ They conceived their revolution as but a part of a great movement of emancipation sweeping over Europe. Already in 1839 these youths had planned a rising, in conjunction with a revolt that was to break out in Poland, aimed at "the complete independence of all the scattered members of our nation", a program which challenged at one time the integrity of the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg empires.¹⁹ In 1840 they were involved in a plot to establish in Wallachia "an independent administration" based on representative government and a reformed social system.²⁰ These ventures had failed, they felt, because there had been no break in the ranks of the autocrats. But in 1848 thrones were toppling all over Europe, and it seemed as if the triumph of the democratic and national revolution was certain.

It is clear that this ideology was hardly applicable to Rumanian society at the stage of political and social evolution it had then reached. The impact of these ideas, however, certainly speeded up changes which were gradually breaking down the existing political frontiers, the old economy, and the closed political system. In the background there was the discontent and land-hunger of the peasants, always threatening to erupt as it did in the Vladimirescu revolt of 1821, by its mere existence exercising a constant pressure for change. The small landowners and the growing commercial middle class also were restive and were not likely to consent to a permanent monopoly of political power in the hands of the big boyars.²¹ But these forces for change found their expression in the imported doctrines of liberalism and nationalism, and in turn became the instruments of those leaders who had adopted those doctrines as their creed. While it may be unwarranted to interpret the revolution of 1848 and its aftermath, the union of the Principalities under a constitution on the Western model, solely in terms of the influence of Western ideas, it is not probable that trends toward national political unity, the transfer of a measure of political power from the big boyars to the new bureaucracy, and the emancipation of the peasantry would have taken so clear-cut a form at so early a period

¹⁸ Ion Ghica, *Scrisori către Vasile Alecsandri* (Bucharest, 1887), pp. 687-9; I. Eliade Rădulescu, *Mémoires sur l'histoire de la régénération roumaine* (Paris, 1851), pp. 65-73; *Anul 1848 în Principatele Române* (6 vols., Bucharest, 1902-10), I, 490-501; III, 131-142; IV, 89-137.

¹⁹ P. P. Panaitescu, "Planurile lui Ion Câmpineanu pentru Unitatea Națională a Românilor" (*Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională*, Cluj, III, 1924-25, pp. 63-106).

²⁰ J. A. Vaillant, *La Roumanie* (3 vols., Paris, 1844), II, pp. 358-409: *Domniile Române sub Regulamentul Organic*, p. 261.

²¹ Ion C. Ion, "Adevăratul 1848" (*Viața Românească*, Bucharest, XXX, Feb., Mar. 1938, pp. 7-19, 34-49, an economic interpretation of the revolution.

had it not been for the doctrines which the students brought home ready-made from Paris.

The Rumanian revolution of 1848 failed completely. In Moldavia it was crushed within twenty-four hours and its leaders jailed or exiled. In Bessarabia the Tsar's order reigned supreme. The Rumanians of Transylvania, engaged in their own national and social struggle against the Hungarians, showed slight interest in what was taking place in Jassy or Bucharest. In Wallachia the young revolutionaries achieved power in June, but three months later they fled abroad when the country was invaded by both Russian and Turkish troops. They had counted on the support of revolutionary France, which they felt could not betray Rumania without betraying its own soul, of liberal England, and of popular movements everywhere on the Continent. They found themselves alone, deserted by their friends Lamartine and Bastide, who were unwilling to jeopardize the position of the French Republic for the sake of their Rumanian admirers. The Sultan, who, some had hoped, would become the patron of an anti-Russian league of free Balkan peoples, could not be persuaded to challenge the power of Russia in the name of the European revolution, especially when he was not sure of the support of France and England. The Rumanian revolutionaries were left alone on the doorstep of the Tsar's empire, trumpeting forth revolutionary pronouncements which were bound to provoke his intervention.

There were other significant reasons for their failure: the impracticability of their program and their own inadequacy as leaders. As they were unable to settle among themselves just how popular sovereignty was to be exercised, their political democracy turned out to be the dictatorship of a committee. They established a free press, formed revolutionary clubs, held parades and mass meetings in Bucharest, set commissars of propaganda ("priests of liberty and the constitution") out of the villages, and signed decrees in the name of the people. But while the people, the peasantry, which had helped in the overthrow of the old régime, waited for the abolition of the *corvée* and for the redistribution of land, the revolutionary government waited for the boyars, in the new spirit of fraternity, to give up their privileges and their land voluntarily. No "night of August 4th" ever took place, and the peasants, the one class which might have provided the backbone of a real democratic revolution, lost interest in the new dawn of freedom proclaimed in Bucharest.

Ion Brătianu and C. A. Rosetti, the leaders of the "reds", the radical wing of the Forty-eighters, considered that democracy must be based primarily on the middle class; if that class did not exist it would have to

be invented. They were ready to bestow the rights of citizenship upon the peasants and to tell them they were free and equal members of the great Rumanian nation, but of the agrarian question they understood nothing. To consolidate the revolution with an agrarian reform, the men of 1848—with three notable exceptions, Kogălniceanu in Moldavia, Bălcescu and Ion Ionescu in Wallachia—had neither the will nor the necessary knowledge of a complex set of social relationships which could not have been remade by the application of any simple formula, not even the magic "expropriation with compensation".

By September 1848 much of the early revolutionary enthusiasm had worn off. The absence of support from abroad was matched by demoralization and inactivity at home. The failures of the "government of the people" were so patent that hardly a shot was fired in its defense when the entry of foreign troops into the country put an end to its brief career.²²

V

The sorry end of the revolution and the difficulties of life in exile sobered the spirits of the Rumanian leaders. During the first few years they maintained the hope that the European revolution was just around the corner, and they plotted with the Polish exiles, with Ledru Rollin, with Mazzini and with Kossuth to speed its arrival. But the rise of Louis Napoleon and the coming of the Crimean War converted many of them to the new school of realism. Even the most fanatical devotees of the ideals of 1848, men like Dumitru Brătianu and C. A. Rosetti, began to talk in terms of the possible and to seek more respectable allies. They no longer talked of a democratic Rumanian republic but of the union of the Principalities under a foreign prince. D. Brătianu, who in 1852 had denounced Napoleon as a tyrant and a monster, and his brother Ion, who in 1853 was tried and imprisoned for participation in a plot to assassinate him, a few years later were praising the Emperor as the saviour and patron of the Rumanian nation.

The Rumanian Forty-eighters never abandoned their devotion to the West; they merely changed as the prevailing mood in the West changed. Their nationalism led them away from the romantic faith of 1848 along the path of opportunism. Many of them remained liberals only insofar

²² A full and interpretative history of the revolution has not been written, although a wealth of documentary material has been published in the six volumes of *Anul 1848 în Principatele Române*, and a greater quantity has been preserved at the Rumanian Academy in Bucharest.

as liberal doctrine could be reconciled with pursuit of the two goals most important to them, national unity and material progress.

In 1857, after the Crimean War had put an end to the Russian protectorate and had given the Rumanian question the status of a European problem, they returned to their country to organize the movement which won for the Principalities a new constitution in 1858 and union under an elected prince, Alexander Cuza, himself a Forty-eighter, in the following year. For the first time there was a government in France willing to make capital of the overwhelmingly pro-French sentiment of the new generation of Rumanian leaders. The Forty-eighters attained power in Rumania not with the aid of Michelet, Quinet, and the revolutionary spirit of the brotherhood of man, but with the aid of the authoritarian Napoleon III, applying, in the interests of French power and of his own prestige, his "principle of nationalities".

VI

The generation of 1848 produced two notable statesmen, Mihail Kogălniceanu and Ion Brătianu, as well as a group of visionaries. Both had been in the forefront of the revolution of 1848, the former in Moldavia, the latter in Wallachia. In power, in the years which followed the union of the Principalities, both showed that they would abandon some of the forms of Westernism in order to attain what they conceived to be its substance. Kogălniceanu had been educated in Germany and in France and was a historian and student of social problems as well as a drafter of constitutions. He regarded a solution of the peasant problem as absolutely necessary and felt that only a direct attack on the existing serf-labor economy could lay the foundations for a national political system in which Rumanians of all classes would be able to participate. When Prince Cuza broke with his Assembly to establish a dictatorship, which the majority of the Forty-eighters denounced as a reversion to oriental despotism, Kogălniceanu was loyal to Cuza and became his chief minister. A lifelong liberal and democrat, he accepted the *coup d'état* and the régime of "democratic Caesarism" in order to defeat the reactionary boyars, who were heavily represented in the Assembly and were using their constitutional position to block all agrarian reform. Although the Cuza-Kogălniceanu emancipation law of 1864 proved inadequate as a permanent solution of the peasant problem, it was a necessary step in the breakdown of the semi-feudal order upon which the power of the boyar class was based. It paved the way for the far-reaching reform of 1917-1922 .

Ion Brătianu's long tenure of office during the reign of Carol I was marked by material progress and the rapid modernization of the state structure. After 1870 the French influence waned, for to Carol "Westernization" meant the transformation of Rumania into a German-type bureaucratic state. He was supported by a new generation of politicians, many of them educated in Germany, but the chief architect of the new system was the former Jacobin, Ion Brătianu. Completely alienating his old doctrinaire associates, his brother Dumitru and C. A. Rosetti, he used the time-honored Phanariot methods of corruption to build a political machine which kept him in power as a virtual dictator, even though the liberal constitution of 1866 remained in force. An important Rumanian middle class, on which he had counted in vain in 1848, came into being partly as a result of economic changes but even more through the multiplication of the numbers of politicians, office-holders, professional men and intellectuals. This new bureaucratic class, which found political expression chiefly in Brătianu's Liberal Party, was Western in its tastes and its standards. Unfortunately, in order to maintain those standards, it had to disregard many of the principles which had been synonymous with the Western influence before 1848, using the machinery of the state to exploit the peasantry much as the "backward and oriental" boyars had used their economic and political power.

The Rumanian Forty-eighters, unlike those of other European nations, returned to take a prominent part in the political life of their country until nearly the end of the century. They did not establish a truly democratic system of government, nor did they find a solution to the peasant problem, without which purely political reforms meant little. But not all of the French-inspired idealism of the earlier years was lost. The groundwork of national unity and of popular government had been laid. A nation-wide educational system and an informed press had been established. Above all, the men of 1848 kept the door wide open to Western influence and brought within the realm of practical possibility many of the "utopian" ideals which they had so signally failed to realize in the glorious Year of Revolution.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

WHY DIE FOR DANZIG?

by Hans Leonhardt

AT dawn of the morning of September 1st, 1939, the German battleship *Schleswig Holstein* opened fire on the Westerplatte, a fortified Polish ammunition depot at the entrance of the port of Danzig. The *Schleswig Holstein* was paying a courtesy visit to the Free City and this visit had been announced to and approved by Poland as stipulated by treaties and required by etiquette. The opening round of salvos signified the commencement of hostilities between Germany and Poland. It was the signal for the outbreak of the second world war.

Danzig, a medium-sized city, situated on the fringes of Central and Eastern Europe, had become, as often foretold, the powder keg of Europe. And yet there were still those who refused to believe the unbelievable, and Marcel Déat, editorializing in *L'Oeuvre*, asked emphatically: "Why die for Danzig?" Why indeed die for Danzig, a remote and sullen place, a Germanic island in a Polish environment, a museum piece of medieval splendor and modern monotony?

Causes of war are often forgotten during the war. That applies to even the external, the visible causes. Danzig may be a case in point. But the case of Danzig will present itself again. It will present itself as one of the many unsolved problems which Versailles tried to tackle and which the League of Nations failed to resolve. Yet whatever the solution at the end of this war, statesmen and people should be aware that, in dealing with the delta of the river Vistula, they touch upon political complexities the roots of which reach back to the migration of peoples.

We do not know why Teutonic tribes such as the Goths and the Rugians started moving in the fourth century of the Christian era. We do know that they moved westward from the Vistula only to lose themselves in various migrations all over Europe. Into the vacuum came Slavs, who, in turn, may have been pushed westward by Mongol tribes at their back. As a result of this strange *Drang nach dem Westen* we find, at the end of the first thousand years of the Christian era, the river Elbe as a demarcation line between the Slav and the Teuton. But not for long! The Germans came back. The Germanic people, throughout the second millenium, tried to regain what they had lost to the Slavs. Here then are the antecedents for the German *Drang nach dem Osten*. Here emerges the background for mixed and irregular Germano-Slavonic settlements at the boundaries of Eastern Europe.

The process of germanization of Eastern Germany lay in the hands of the Order of the Teutonic Knights. They germanized and christianized. They built their stronghold, the Marienburg, not far from Danzig. And Danzig, like East Prussia, adopts the new faith and, gradually, Germanic patterns. But then the Slavs came back. In 1410 the first battle of Tannenberg was fought and the Knights, as a military organization, could not withstand the united onslaught of Poles and Lithuanians. A half century later East Prussia became a Polish fief and Danzig, now a member of the powerful League of the Hanseatic Cities, transferred her allegiance to the king of Poland. The Knights withdrew into their castles and remained attached to the military ideals of ruling, Germanism, and conquest. The Knights were the forefathers of the Prussian Junkers, perpetuating the notion of living among a backward people in a quasi-colonial atmosphere.

For more than three hundred years Danzig, a mighty fortress, a greater trading center, belonged to Poland and enjoyed autonomy. Her flag was the first in the Baltic. Her galleys reached far and wide. She accumulated wealth and indulged in refinement. She called herself "Die Perle der Ostsee." Her German culture and her Polish allegiance did not seem to offer insurmountable difficulties. Nationalism was still in its infancy. She acted as a natural intermediary between East and West and Poland was her hinterland. Poland was also the source of her wealth. Whenever Poland became weak, Danzig declined. The disintegration of Poland signaled the downfall of the ancient city-republic. In the second partition of Poland Danzig came to Prussia, then a state with scattered possessions in various parts of Northern Germany. The Prussian monarchy took its name from the territory now known as East Prussia, the former Polish fief. In 1701, the Elector of Brandenburg assumed royal prerogatives and was crowned in Königsberg. He called himself "King *in* Prussia", not King *of* Prussia—the Western half of the historic territory of Prussia still being in Polish possession. Strange and involved is the history of the German-Polish borderlands. The state that is to lay the foundation for the Bismarckian Reich is named after a Polish fief at the outer fringes of Germanism. Almost on colonial ground lies the cradle of the Prussian monarchy. As to the Pruzzen after whom *Preussen* is named—they have died out. They had been a people related to the Lithuanians.

Danzig never recovered from the loss of her association with Poland. During the Napoleonic era she became a Free City *par la grâce de l'Empereur* only to be finally assigned to Prussia by the Congress of Vienna. With the disappearance of Poland Danzig had lost her *raison d'être*. Her shipping,

her patricians, her local autonomy had gone. Danzig became provincial. She became the provincial capital of the territory of West Prussia and entered with Prussia into the fold of the Reich.

The Allied and Associated Powers, at the end of the first world war, were attached to the principle of self-determination of the people. President Wilson, in his famous fourteen points, had explicitly referred to it. Poland was to be recreated and Poland was to have an access to the sea. That, once again, posed the problem of Danzig. In Versailles the Polish representatives demanded that Danzig should return to Poland. Historic, economic and strategic reasons were advanced. In view of the Germanic character of Danzig, however, hesitations were felt on the part of the peace makers and, in the end, they reverted to a solution that represented a historic reminiscence and a political compromise. Danzig was to be separated from the Reich and made a Free City in which the Poles were to enjoy certain commercial facilities while the League of Nations was to be set up as a kind of protector for the newly created state structure. Germany refused to consent to this solution and, in her reply to the draft of the Versailles Treaty, drew attention to the "purely Germanic Hanseatic" character of the city. In their answer the victors conceded the German character of Danzig. "Just for this reason", they said, "it is not proposed to incorporate it in Poland. But Danzig", they continued,

when a Hansa City, like many other Hansa Cities, lay outside the political frontiers of Germany, and in union with Poland, enjoyed a large measure of political independence and great commercial prosperity. It will now be replaced in a position similar to that which it held for as many centuries.

And thus Danzig became a Free City, a solution that satisfied neither Germans nor Poles. Did it satisfy the 400,000 odd Danzigers? It did not. The Danziger is German in his sentiments, almost, it may be said, pathetically German. He is consciously German whether his name be Mueller or Schulz, Kurowski or Kwiatowski. Many Polish names are to be found in Danzig. But the Danzigers with Polish antecedents, mostly Roman Catholics, are germanized, or at least think they are and they do not like their germanism to be questioned. To be sure there is also a genuine Polish minority in Danzig. That minority, however, is very small and is proportionately smaller than many a Polish minority in many an American city.

The second, and this time compulsory, association between Danzig and Poland worked badly. It worked badly because antagonistic nationalisms pulled the intricate state structure of the Free City in opposite directions. Whereas Poland tried to strengthen her rights in the Free City beyond

treaty limits, Germany tried to convince the world of the injustice of Danzig's separation from the Reich. Incidents in and around Danzig had more than local importance. They were reflected in Germano-Polish relations and in efforts at general European pacification at large. It seemed as if nobody had definitely reconciled himself to a permanent neutralization of the Free City. In view of this it is not surprising that Danzig appears as a welcome topic in newspapers and periodicals, on lecture forums and before the Council of the League of Nations. Especially was that true after Gdynia's competition against Danzig had made itself felt from about 1926 on.

Yet there were hopeful signs. Danzig's shipping flourished. Germany under Stresemann, while revisionist in the East, scarcely thought in terms of a war. A Stresemann might well have rationalized: Why die for Danzig? And strange as that may seem in retrospect, the advent of the National Socialists improved rather than worsened Danzig-Polish relations. Poland had resented the much-vaunted 'spirit of Locarno.' It had appeared to the Poles as if Locarno had discriminated against security in the East at the cost of security in the West. Be that as it may, the colonels welcomed an emancipation from the tutelage of the *Quai d'Orsay* and the result was the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of January 26, 1934. The pact recognized the status quo between the partners, and while, to all outward appearances, it maintained the integrity of the Franco-Polish treaty of alliance, it put Poland *de facto* within the orbit of the Third Reich. Poland never felt wholly comfortable about that. There was no trust wasted between Berlin and Warsaw. Yet the Poles thought they had to live up to a treaty in which they had no faith but which, they hoped, would help in gaining time. To gain time, they speculated, might mean to gain everything. In order to live up to the pact—and the pact did not foresee that—the Polish government acquiesced in the nazification of Danzig. Beck, in his endeavor to maintain the artificial relations between Warsaw and Berlin, acted as protagonist of National Socialist lawlessness in the Free City. Mr. Eden and his French colleagues in the League Council could have seen through these machinations as did M. Litvinoff. They preferred to see nothing and to wash their hands of it. Screened behind a verbose barrage of democratic platitudes, the Western powers handed Danzig over to the *N.S.D.A.P.* Two years before the *Schleswig Holstein* opened fire in the port of Danzig, the last traces of freedom had disappeared in the Free City. A future conqueror was supreme in the only territory under the protection of the League of Nations. Well may Adolf Hitler ask himself now: Why die for Danzig?

The world may take up the question and attempt to be insistent about

it. Territorial regulations no less than general peace structures await discussions, await decisions. Three alternatives present themselves: Danzig may be made German or she may be made Polish or she may return to some sort of in-between stage such as existed prior to the outbreak of the present war.

The first alternative is the least likely. If Germany were to gain Danzig it would appear as if she were to receive a reward for having started the war. And she would absorb the very city over which she went to war. Moreover, Germany does not need Danzig. Germany possesses numerous ports both on the Baltic and on the North Sea and the mouth of the river Vistula is Poland's natural and historic access to the sea. Prior to the war it was occasionally suggested that Danzig and the Polish Corridor should return to Germany and that Poland, in turn, should receive an outlet to the sea via Lithuania, the Niemen and Memel. This suggestion, however, has caught favor with neither the Lithuanians nor with the Poles. It would scarcely satisfy the Soviet Union.

More likely to succeed would seem to be the second alternative. Poland may respond to the Soviet initiative and may try to gain compensations in the West for what she may lose in the East. Up to this moment, as far as is discernible, the Polish government in exile has not committed itself openly on this issue. The Soviet-sponsored Polish Committee of Liberation, however, has made demands for Danzig and East Prussia as well as for all other German territory east of the river Oder. If Danzig and East Prussia were to come to Poland the famous corridor would cease to exist. In the judgment of the Poles the corridor was a highly vulnerable strategic bottleneck and the Poles resented the very name of corridor which, they thought, had the connotation of a somewhat provisional solution. The Polish Corridor, in Polish terminology, was called the province of Pomorze. Acquisition of Danzig and East Prussia would improve but not solve Poland's strategic problems. Poland like many another nation is vitally interested in an efficiently working international organization.

As to the merits of a Polish acquisition of the Germanized territories of Danzig and East Prussia, the question will have to be raised as to how far one wants to retrace historic occurrences. In the first two centuries of the second millenium the territories were inhabited by peoples who were indisputably Slavic. Then the process of germanization set in and the process was successful over as many centuries except in the southern edge of East Prussia. Here in the district of lakes, forests and marshes live the Masurians, who speak a Slavonic tongue—Polish for all practical purposes. The Mas-

urians are Protestants. For this reason they voted in the post-war plebiscite for Germany instead of for Poland. Whether the recent manifestations of the Third Reich have altered their national inclinations we do not know. If Danzig and East Prussia were to come to Poland it would be a reversal of a historic development that has lasted well over seven centuries. *De rebus sic stantibus* there is no sizable majority in either territory that would show a preference for an incorporation into Poland.

It is quite possible, however, that the principle of self-determination—discredited as it is—may play a lesser role after this than after the last war. In particular, there might be a disposition to compensate Poland for her loss. The German populations of Danzig and East Prussia probably would have to be transferred if the territories were to be given to Poland. After the ravages of the Gestapo in Poland few German-speaking people would appear able to remain. In view of the fact that German minorities will also pour back from Czechoslovakia and other lands, grave maladjustments may result in the reduced realm of the post-Hitlerian Reich.

Much could be said for the fundamental justice of the widely criticised Versailles innovation. The residuum of the migration of people has left a dilemma. No solution can ever be found that will satisfy all parties concerned. Under such circumstances a middle-of-the-road policy has much in its favor. Poland needs an access to the sea. Poland possessed this access up to the end of the eighteenth century. The majority of the population in the corridor remained Polish notwithstanding the prolonged Prussian attempts at germanization. In creating the Free City an attempt was made to reconcile Poland's need for an access to the sea and her historic rights with the Germanic character of Danzig. The Free City, being included within the Polish customs boundaries, gained Poland as her economic hinterland. It is easier to criticise and to accumulate shallow arguments than to propose something that can command the respect of the serious student.

This does not say that the Versailles experiment could be repeated in all its details. If one reviews the nineteen years' history of the Free City it becomes apparent that the League of Nations was the weakest link in the whole structure. The High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig, representative of world authority and justice, had, as one jurist aptly put it, merely the position of "a watchdog." He was there to observe, to counsel and to report. His immediate authority was ephemeral. Procedures before the League Council were slow and cumbersome. They suffered from the requirement of unanimity of Council decisions and from a lack of judicial precision. Behind the framework of the League of Nations power

politics continued to blossom. In this respect Danzig's fate would seem irretrievably connected with the shape and the nature of a new world association. So much, however, might be said at the present time: future international authority will have to be strengthened in Danzig. If one does not want to die for Danzig, international police forces may have to be stationed there permanently. This, it is submitted, would increase Poland's sense of security. An international military detachment in Danzig would serve as a living symbol of the world's guarantee for the city's final neutralization. If need be, a future High Commissioner could immediately issue binding orders which, in case of necessity, would supersede the autonomy of the Free City.

In the period between the two world wars Danzig was the danger zone between Germany and Poland. With the arrival of the Red Army into the center of Europe new aspects may present themselves. The German-Polish rivalry may be superseded by the emergence of a danger zone between the Atlantic Powers and the Soviet Union. Poland, during the era of Beck, tried and failed in the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire* that was to reach from the Baltic to the Black Sea and was to act as a buffer against both Russia and Germany. After this war there will be no *cordon sanitaire* against Russia. On the contrary, Russia may try to establish a reversed *cordon sanitaire* against Western Europe. For the first time in history (saving perhaps the period of Alexander I) Russia will exercise an influence on the European continent that is in conformity with her geographic extent and the size of her population. Recent trends seem to indicate that the countries between the Baltic and the Black Sea will, at least in their foreign relations, be subjected to a mortgage in favor of the Soviet Union. If that be so, Danzig would lie on the outer fringes of the Soviet orbit. In Central and Western Europe a power vacuum is likely to occur. A new Germany may be desirous of attaining—indeed might be happy to attain—a status such as that of Switzerland. All this, however, would not imply that the delta of the Vistula has been removed as a source of friction.

Europe, a geographic appendix to Asia, has lost the prerogative of shaping its own destiny. Europe through struggle and strife has reached, as it were, its Hellenistic stage. Europe's power has shifted from the center to the periphery. This development is apparently permanent. In Teheran no country was represented that was predominantly based upon Europe. It remains to be seen whether the non-European or half-European world powers will succeed in giving an answer to the question: Why die for Danzig?

MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE

THE MODERN UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

by Nicholas Czubytyj

THE problem of the Ukraine concerns the rest of the world from several points of view. In the years 1941 to 1943 Hitler alarmed the world by his plan to conquer and incorporate the rich Ukraine into the German Lebensraum. Today the Ukrainian problem, under the appellation of the "Polish Border Dispute", threatens to divide the allies. The southern half of the border dispute at least is, properly speaking, not a Polish or a Russian, but a Ukrainian question.

If the Ukraine were an independent nation today, if she had the freedom for which the Ukrainian people fought during the four years of their national revolution (1917-1921) on the field of battle, and for which they have striven during twenty years of underground movements, there would be no question of Hitler seeking a Lebensraum in the territories of a large independent nation. Today furthermore, there would be no Polish-Russian Dispute, because in actuality, Russia and Poland have no mutual borderline; this dispute is in truth a fight for the occupation of Ukrainian lands.

The fact that the Ukraine is a *res nullius*, a land conquered by foreigners, was the sole factor that created in Hitler's mind the provoking plan of acquiring the land for the "Herrenvolk" of his higher race, even though this entailed the sacrifice of the lives and property of millions of innocent people.

What is most important is that if the Ukraine were an independent nation containing a population of 50 million—wealthy in its natural resources and with access to the Black Sea, then she would become a natural nucleus around which the smaller and larger nations of Central Europe could form into a democratic Black and Baltic Seas Block with a territory of 1½ million square kilometers and a population of 150 million people. Such a block of democratic nations would have the power to halt German and Russian imperialisms and to insure a lasting peace in Europe. Ukrainian nationalism has matured to the point where it can assist in the realization of such a plan.

THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT TO 1914

In the history of Europe, the Ukrainian people were an independent nation three separate times. The first and longest period of independence lasted from the middle of the ninth century to the middle of the fourteenth

century. The second period of Ukrainian independence was during the so-called Kozak (Cossack) State in the seventh and eighteenth centuries (1648-1764). The third period took place during the liquidation of the First World War (1917-1921).

The oldest Ukrainian state is known under the name of the Ruś Kingdom of Kiev, Ruś being the ancient name for the Ukrainian people. This was the most brilliant epoch in the history of the Ukrainian people, for Kiev was the capital of eastern Europe. The second Ukrainian state was created by the revolution of Bohdan Khmelnitzky, the "Ukrainian Cromwell," against Poland, covering, however, but one-third of the territories of the Ukrainian people, and retaining its complete independence for but a short time. The modern Ukrainian state, created amidst the flames of the Russian Revolution and the liquidation of the First World War, was unstable; however, it achieved some significant aims—the union of all of the Ukrainian lands into one Sovereign Ukrainian Republic—which the Ukrainian people realized and accomplished by the Act of Union on January 22, 1919.

These experiences of the Ukrainian people as a nation have allowed Ukrainian nationalism to root itself deeply in historical traditions. It is no wonder that the new Ukrainian state in 1917 accepted as its national emblem the Trident of the ancient ruler of Kiev in the tenth century, St. Volodymyr, and that Ukrainian monarchism reverts to the traditions of the historical Hetman rule of the Kozak State. The national ties between the ancient Ukrainian and medieval Kozak States were clearly recognized and set forth by the Ukrainian scholars and intelligentsia of the seventeenth century, in the famous Declaration of the Ukrainian Episcopate in 1620.

Modern Ukrainian nationalism was born at the time when most of the European nationalisms became prevalent, that is, after the French Revolution. It arose as a reaction against the unbearable situation of the Ukrainian nation during those times.

Russia had destroyed the remains of the Ukrainian Kozak State, but its traditions still lived on. Another section of the Ukraine, during the partition of Poland, came into the hands of Russia in a very low cultural state, with the upper strata of its population completely depleted. The Ukrainian people were composed then of "peasants and priests" as their neighbors giped. Such also was the section of Poland which fell into Austrian hands—Ukrainian Halychyna (Galicia).

Reactions against this situation were awakened primarily in that part of the Ukraine where the traditions of the Ukrainian state were still quite

fresh in the minds of the people, that is, east of the Dnieper river. During the march of Napoleon on Russia, the definite sympathies of the educated Ukrainians were with that revolutionary conqueror. Ukrainian youth which served in the Tzar's army in numerous sorties into Western Europe brought new liberal ideas into the Ukraine.

Immediately after the Napoleonic wars, there arose in eastern Ukraine such Masonic lodges as "The Love of Truth" in Poltava and "Lodge of the United Slavs" in Kiev. Members of these lodges were well known Ukrainian patriots, such as the writer Ivan Kotliarevsky, S. Kochubey, V. Kapnist, V. Lukashevych, some of whom were well known for their pro-Napoleonic sympathies. The Ukrainians also took part in the southern society of Decabrists (1825), the creators of the first liberalist revolution in Russia. The freedom loving ideals of the Ukrainian liberals were woven together with the ideals of the Slavophiles, which entered into the ideology of the first political organization of the Ukrainian nationalists, "The St. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood" in Kiev, founded in 1846.

The Brotherhood of St. Cyril and Methodius set for itself a definite goal—the creation of an independent Ukrainian democratic republic composed of all the lands inhabited by the Ukrainian people. The Ukraine was to become the core of an all-Slav federation of equal democratic republics. There was to be no serfdom in the Federation nor inequality between classes. In this all-Slav federation of equal nations there was to rule a true Christian civilization and religious tolerance. The founders of the Brotherhood of St. Cyril and Methodius were obviously well acquainted with the ideological foundations of the organization of the United States of America, because they based their actions upon those of that distant country across the ocean. Kiev, for example, was to become the Slav District of Columbia, the common territory of the whole federation. The membership of this Brotherhood consisted of all the contemporary spiritual élite of the Ukrainian people such as the Ukrainian historian M. Kostomariv, the greatest Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, the ethnologist O. Markovich and many others. The ideologist of the Brotherhood was the historian M. Kostomariv who assembled the ideals of the Brotherhood in his book *The Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian Nation*. Among the members there existed a fiery religiousness, unselfish idealism and humanitarianism. The Russian police discovered the existence of this Brotherhood in 1847 and severely punished the members for harboring such "revolutionary" ideas. Almost all of the members were sent into exile. Taras Shevchenko suffered for 10 years in Turkestan and

only in the last years of his life did he return from his exile, completely broken in health.

There has been, probably, no poet in the world who has been able to express the collective will of his people to tellingly as Taras Shevchenko. The poems of T. Shevchenko published in a book entitled *Kobzar* (1840) became the most popular book for the Ukrainians. Hence the influence of T. Shevchenko on the flowering of Ukrainian nationalism over all of the Ukraine was decisive. His political thought may be briefly summarized. The Ukrainian people will obtain absolute possibility of national growth and social justice only in their democratic state—"without a serf and without a master". He believed that the laws of the future Ukraine should be fair and humane as were those of the country of Washington. He felt that the Ukrainian people would gain their freedom only after severe battles and he called his countrymen to the struggle with these words: "Arise, break your chains and sprinkle your freedom with the enemy's blood". Shevchenko was opposed to Russian and Polish domination over the Ukraine. Indeed, he was also opposed to any domination of one country or people by another. The freeing of the Ukraine was regarded by Shevchenko as the realization of all human ideals of freedom of brotherhood. His fiery words were largely responsible for the national enlightenment of the Ukrainian masses. From the time of Shevchenko, Ukrainian nationalism became the property of the masses.

In carrying out the Testament of the poet, who died in 1861, his closest friends began working from every possible approach among the Ukrainian masses. Shevchenko even converted to the Ukrainian cause an intelligent and distinguished group of Polish nobility in the Ukraine, the so called "Chłopomani" under the leadership of the historian V. Antonovych, and brought them definitely into the Ukrainian national camp.

This mass expansion of Ukrainian national thought alarmed the Russian government. Repressions came one after another and finally the Minister of the interior Valuev issued a decree forbidding the printing of anything in the Ukrainian language because, as he stated, "There never was a Ukrainian language, there is none and there cannot be". This prohibition of Valuev was renewed 13 years later by the so called *Lex Josephovicia* (1876) which extended the prohibition to cover also amateur drama. Then the Ukrainian writers transferred the printing of their works to Austrian Galicia, and a number of Ukrainian intellectuals such as the historian Drahomaniv, the anthropologist F. Vovk, the sociologist Ziber and others emigrated to Swit-

zerland and from Geneva continued to influence their compatriots with their publications.

In Galicia the national Ukrainian renaissance and its rapid spread may be largely attributed to the influence of western civilization. But the works of Shevchenko here also had a decisive influence on the mass national consciousness of the Galician Ukrainians. There arose institutions furthering culture, education and the economic structure. In Galicia new literary journals were published (*Zorya, Pravda*) which were intended as well for the Russian Ukraine. The Scientific Shevchenko Society in Lviv (Lwów, 1873), supported by financial assistance from the Russian Ukrainians, became a real All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. It is no wonder, therefore, that Galicia was called the Piedmont of Ukrainian Nationalism. In the footsteps of the rebirth of culture in western Ukraine there followed also the expansion of political thought and action.

Two emigrants from the Ukraine had a tremendous influence upon the western Ukrainians and, in general, upon the formation of an all-Ukrainian national ideology. One of these was professor at the Kiev University, Michael Drahomaniv, the other was Prof. Michael Hrushevsky.

Michael Drahomaniv left Kiev in 1876, and, having made contacts on his way with western Ukrainian intellectuals, transferred his creative work to Switzerland, where he began to publish the journal *Hromada* (The community). Drahomaniv was a progressive of cosmopolitan views as well as a severe critic of reaction. He had, above all, a tremendous influence on the western Ukrainians Ivan Franko, the greatest poet after Shevchenko, and the ethnographer M. Pavlyk.

Under the influence of Drahomaniv, Franko and Pavlyk, inspired by the then new slogans of socialism, formed a political Radical Party (1890). The Radical Party with biting anti-clerical slogans found little support in Galicia where the Greek-Catholic priesthood had gained great prestige from its labors in the rebirth of Ukrainian nationalism in western Ukraine. Therefore the right wing of the radical party and the conservatives, in the so-called *Narodovtzi* (Folk Friends), formed a National Democratic Party which, until the present world war, was the largest mass party of the western Ukrainians, while controlled by that party the daily newspaper *Dilo* (founded in 1880) was the most authoritative press organ of the western Ukrainians. Both parties, the Radical and the National Democratic, expressly accepted the ideology of Shevchenko—an independent Ukraine.

The western Ukrainian national movement in particular, and the all-Ukrainian national expansion movement in general, were hindered by the

fight between the Austrian Ukrainians and the Poles. The Ukrainians under Russia were grieved at this turn of affairs, because they had desired the union of the Ukrainian and Polish forces against their common enemy Russia. Mediation between the Poles and Ukrainians was attempted by P. Kulish, the historian, writer and friend of Shevchenko and former member of the St. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, but without success. No success was achieved either by the so-called "New Era", which attempted to patch up Polish-Ukrainian relations through the intervention of the Metropolitan of Lviv, S. Sembratovych, and the political leader A. Barvinsky. All such attempts were crushed by the unyielding stand of the Poles who had no desire to resign their domination over Ukrainian Galicia in Austria due to their historical pretensions to that territory.

The Polish Ukrainian fight broke out anew and as a result brought about the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1918-1919, the short lived domination of Poland over western Ukraine and the Polish-Russian border dispute of today. From an historical perspective the Polish-Ukrainian quarrel has brought in its train fatal results for both Poland and the Ukraine, because it greatly strengthened Russia.

Perhaps even greater influence upon the growth of modern Ukrainian nationalism than that of Drahomaniv was wielded by another emigrant from Russian Ukraine, Michael Hrushevsky, a professor of Ukrainian history at the Lviv University. M. Hrushevsky never broke his contacts with Russian Ukraine. He frequently travelled between Lviv and Kiev and was therefore the natural spiritual bond between the two parts of the Ukrainian people. As a historian he trained the whole school of young Ukrainian historians. Together with Ivan Franko, he edited an excellent journal, the "Literary-Scientific Herald", which he transferred to Kiev in 1905.

At the time when western Ukrainian life was developing within the bounds of legal parties of constitutional Austria and was definitely and clearly accepting tendencies towards nationalism and independence, in eastern Russian Ukraine, the older Ukrainians limited themselves to a narrow ethnography while the youth became immersed in the Russian revolutionary parties and gradually lost more and more of their national ideology. The international ideology of these parties to a marked degree russified the youth. To them the ideal of the St. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood and of Shevchenko—an independent democratic Ukraine—became more and more distant. Their minds were saturated with the ideas of a social revolution on an international plane. When the question arose about the political future of Ukraine, they were already satisfied with only an autonomous

Ukraine within the boundaries of a federated Russia. They believed that, with the rise of the revolutionary parties to power in Russia, national matters would be automatically and justly ironed out.

The reaction against the abandonment of Ukrainian national ideals by the Ukrainian internationalists in eastern Ukraine brought about the organization of "The Taras Brotherhood" (*Tarasivci*). True, this brotherhood had a distinctly radical social program, but it nevertheless clearly advocated the nationalistic ideology—an independent Ukraine (1890). The founders of this secret organization were Dr. Lypa, M. Mikhnovsky, B. Hrinchenko, V. Samilyenko and others. The persecutions of the police disrupted the Taras Brotherhood, but the majority of the members, with their dynamic leader, the nationalist Mikhnovsky, joined the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) which was formed eight years later in Kharkov.

RUP at the start clung to the orthodox nationalistic slogans of the independent Ukraine. These were revealed by M. Mikhnovsky in the book "Independent Ukraine" published by RUP. However, soon even in this party the socialists got the upper hand and they changed the program to that of an autonomous Ukraine. The nationalists then abandoned RUP and formed a separate Ukrainian National Party while the socialists changed RUP into a regular Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party. These two currents, on the one side independent nationalism, on the other autonomous internationalism, struggled against each other among the eastern Ukrainian intelligentsia up to the outbreak of the Russian revolution (1917) and during the first year of the Ukrainian national revolution.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

The Ukrainians welcomed the war, in which Russia had also become involved, with enthusiasm, especially since the Ukrainian problem was one of the reasons that Russia had entered the war. It was imperative that Russia get nationalistic Ukrainian Galicia into her hands and throttle the Ukrainian national life, which was so dangerous for the whole of Russia, as she did with the Ukrainian national life in Russia.

The behavior of Russian occupational authorities, who followed the Tzar's army into Galicia (1914), permitted no other illusions.. The closing down of all Ukrainian schools and the press were the prelude to the numerous arrests and the exile of leading Ukrainians, including that of Metropolitan Andrew Count Sheptytzky. Similar repressions were suffered by the Ukrainians in Russia. The entire Ukrainian press was suppressed while Prof. Hrushevsky was forced into exile. Then the illegal all-national Ukrainian

organization in Kiev, The Organization of Ukrainian Progressives, announced the neutrality of the Russian Ukrainians in the imperialistic war.

A more active stand was taken by the Austrian Ukrainians. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, they organized a Ukrainian Voluntary Legion with the intention of fighting against Russia. Political emigrants from the Russian Ukraine together with a group of western Ukrainians in Lviv formed an organization called "The League for the Liberation of Ukraine" in August 1914.

The war made possible the convergence of the eastern and western Ukrainians and served as preparatory training for the immense changes in eastern Europe which came as a result of the Russian revolution (1917). Great numbers of Ukrainian prisoners, soldiers of the Austrian army as well as political exiles, proved of great value when the Russian Ukrainians began to build the foundations of their own state. This opportunity arose quite soon in 1917.

In the first months of the war, among the Ukrainians in the Tzar's army, voices were raised, saying: "We are now fighting the Germans, soon we will begin fighting the Tzar." They kept this promise, for the first regiment to transfer to the side of the revolution in Petrograd was the Volhynia Regiment, composed of Ukrainians, which had been stationed in the capital of the Tzarist régime, ended on March 12, 1917. Russia entered not only on the road of a severe social revolution but also upon a national revolution of non-Russian peoples long enslaved by Russia.

The Ukrainian revolution in Russia immediately assumed the character of a national revolution, although the socialist character of the all-Russian revolution showed its influence thereon. The leadership of the revolution in Ukraine immediately fell into the hands of the socialist groups, whereas the democratic and nationalistic groups were left in the shadows, the one being accused of being bourgeois, the other of nationalism. This was quite valuable for a united Russia, but it was most harmful to the realization of Ukrainian national ideals.

The Ukrainian socialists still believed in the community of interests with democratic Russia and in her fairness toward the national aspirations of non-Russian peoples. In the Ukraine very interesting events took place. Nationalistically thinking peasant masses in civilian garb as well as in army uniforms demanded an immediate national revolution; the socialistic leaders turned their attention primarily to the social aspects of the Ukrainian revolution in preference to the national.

There was no socialist Ukrainian peasant party similar to that of the

Russian Socialist Revolutionaries which operated in the villages. Therefore in the first days of the revolution the Ukrainians in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party separated into their own Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries which were in general in agreement with the Social Democrats. The fashion for socialism was so strong and invincible at that time that even non-socialist Ukrainians were forced to rename themselves Socialists, even though they had very little in common with socialism. For example, the Ukrainian Democrats renamed themselves the Socialist Federalists, while the nationalist independents called themselves the Socialist Independents.

Directly after the outbreak of the Russian revolution, through the initiative of the Organization of Ukrainian Progressives, there arose in Kiev an all-party Ukrainian Committee which called itself the *Centralna Rada* (Central Council). This committee was to be the representative of the Ukrainian people in Russia and to conduct the revolution in the Ukraine. In order to get wider support from the Ukrainian masses, there took place in Kiev on April 6-7 an All-Ukrainian Congress of territorial representatives and of representatives of cultural and economic institutions. At this Congress the *Centralna Rada* was supplemented by representatives of all parts of the Ukraine and of all ideological viewpoints. Prof. Michael Hrushevsky was elected president of the *Rada*. In this manner the Ukrainian *Centralna Rada* became the Ukrainian revolutionary parliament. The *Rada* was under the definite influence of the socialist group, therefore it directed its demands for an autonomous Ukraine within the framework of a federated Russia to the Temporary Russian Government. Several days later there took place in Kiev the first Ukrainian Military Congress which solidly backed the demands of the *Centralna Rada*.

The Ukrainian demand was rejected by the Provisional Government in Petrograd which forced Ukraine onto the road of a definite national revolution. Prof. Hrushevsky terminated his reading of this rejection at a meeting of the *Centralna Rada* with the words: "The holiday of revolution is ended; dangerous days are approaching". The *Centralna Rada* was forced to call upon the reserves of national strength, the Ukrainian nationalistic masses in military uniforms, and called the Second Ukrainian Military Congress in Kiev on June 22. This Congress was forbidden to meet by the Russian Minister of War A. Kerensky, an action which greatly strengthened the sentiment for a Ukrainian national revolution.

Regardless of the prohibition of the Minister of War, the Congress did meet, and with tremendous success. Masses of Ukrainian soldiers and sailors attended. The 2,308 delegates, representing 1,600,000 of the armed

forces, demanded that the *Centralna Rada* terminate the dispute with the Russian government and that the *Rada* immediately, in the manner of the revolution, organize a Ukrainian National Government. The Congress of soldiers and sailors decided not to depart from Kiev until some decisive action were taken by the *Centralna Rada*.

Supported by such a national strength, the *Centralna Rada* on June 23, 1917, proclaimed the *First Universal* to the Ukrainian people, by which she declared the Ukraine to be an autonomous state in federated Russia. The following day the first Ukrainian Cabinet, the *Rada* of General Secretaries, was formed under the premiership of the socialist V. Vynnychenko, a well known literary figure. In this manner the 23rd of June, 1917, became the first day of the Ukrainian national revolution.

The demands of the Ukrainian fighting men carried great weight with Petrograd. In a few days three ministers of the Temporary Russian Government arrived in Kiev for conferences with the *Centralna Rada*; these were the socialists A. Kerensky, M. Tereshchenko and I. Tzeretelli. They accepted the *faits accomplis*. As a result of the agreement, the national minorities in the Ukraine, the Russians, Poles and Jews, sent their representatives to the *Centralna Rada*, and the *Rada* thus became the territorial parliament of the Ukraine.

The Russian democratic groups began a strong fight against the concessions granted Ukraine by the Russian socialist minister in Kiev, which led to a cabinet crisis in Russia. The government was seized by an all-socialist cabinet, headed by A. Kerensky, which had no intention of adhering to the Kiev agreement. The *Centralna Rada* therefore decided to consult with other non-Russian peoples in Russia, who had interests similar to those of the Ukraine in fighting against Russian centralization. A congress of representatives of non-Russian inhabitants of Russia was called in Kiev.

This congress took place in Kiev in the month of September. The peoples represented were the White Ruthenians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Esthonians, Georgians and the Don Cossacks. At this congress the non-Russian peoples decided on their aims and battle tactics for the future. Prof. M. Hrushevsky was elected the president of the permanent committee of non-Russian peoples of Russia. In this way the Ukraine became the leader of the national revolution of non-Russian peoples.

The socialistic government of A. Kerensky did not have sufficient power to control the situation and on November 7 the government was seized by the Soviet of People's Commissars in Petrograd. V. Lenin became

the premier, J. Stalin the commissar of nationalities affairs. A bloody civil war broke out in Russia.

The Bolsheviks, theoretically, took a very liberal stand toward national revolutions, for they recognized in theory the rights of every people in Russia to self-determination even so far as separation from Russia, but in reality they differed in no way from the democratic groups. The Soviet of People's Commissars immediately took an antagonistic stand toward the Ukrainian government of the *Centralna Rada*.

The rise of the Bolsheviks to power in the north bettered the situation in the Ukraine. The fight between the Bolsheviks and the non-bolshevistic Russian groups in the Ukraine was taken advantage of by the *Centralna Rada* which took over the governmental power completely. The Civil War raging in the north could have very easily overflowed into the Ukraine, therefore the *Centralna Rada* by its *Third Universal* of November 20, 1917 severed relations with Bolshevik Russia and proclaimed the Ukraine *de facto* an independent republic, reserving the possibility, however, of becoming a member of a federated democratic Russia. The government simultaneously announced elections to the Ukrainian Constitutive Assembly for January 9, 1918.

The Soviet government in Petrograd seemingly agreed with the situation. However, the Bolsheviks were secretly preparing the overthrow of the *Centralna Rada* at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Councils (*Soviets*) (Dec. 17, 1917), called on Stalin's orders by the Kiev Council of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers, which was under the influence of the Bolsheviks, in the majority of non-Ukrainian origin.

The Ukrainian government did not expressly forbid the Congress, but took care that the Ukrainian peasants were fairly represented in proportion to the whole population, at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Councils. This Congress of Ukrainian Councils, upon which the Bolsheviks depended so much, turned into a fervent manifestation in favor of the *Centralna Rada*. Of the 2,000 delegates, only 150 demanded a government of Soviets.

The Bolshevik group of 150 people, approximately 7.5% of the entire delegation, led for the most part by non-Ukrainians, abandoned the Kiev Congress, moved to Kharkhov on the Ukrainian-Russian border and there opened up their own Congress of All-Ukrainian Councils. This Kharkhov Congress resolved to overthrow the *Centralna Rada* and proclaimed the Ukraine a Soviet Republic to which it elected its own officers. At the same time, this Congress turned to the Russian Soviet government for military aid. The Soviets, being thwarted at the Congress of Ukrainian Councils, had but

one recourse left—their strength. On the same day as the Kiev meeting which was unsuccessful for the Bolsheviks the Russian Red government issued an ultimatum to the Ukraine. Bands of Moscow and Petrograd workers and workers of the Don Basin began military action on the east was the Ukraine Bands of the Red Guard under the command of M. Muravieff moved on Kiev from the north.

Simultaneously, the Soviet government began conferences with the Central Powers toward an armistice and peace. There was danger that the Soviets would attempt to contract also in the name of Ukraine, therefore the *Centralna Rada* issued the *Fourth Universal* on January 22, 1922, by which she proclaimed the Ukraine a completely independent Republic as a nation of Ukrainian people.

The proclamation of the independence of the Ukraine took place when the Soviet armies were approaching Kiev. On February 9, 1918, the *Centralna Rada* made peace with the Central Powers in Brest. The peace drew the boundaries of the Ukrainian National Republic according to ethnographic boundaries. The Ukrainian government also demanded the annexation of Ukrainian Galicia; but Austria refused. They agreed to create a separate province of the Austrian section of Ukraine with wide autonomous rights. The onrush of the Soviets into the Ukraine forced the Ukrainian government to ask the Central Powers for aid to clear the Ukraine of the Bolsheviks. This aid was given by the central Powers. Ukraine was rid of the Reds. But this help turned into a semi-occupation of Ukraine by Germany and Austria, and became the cause of numerous conflicts between the Ukrainian government and the occupational forces. These conflicts led to the downfall of the socialistic government of the *Centralna Rada* and the installation in the Ukraine of a monarchistic order under the historical name "Hetmanship", modelled after the old Kozak State.

The Ukrainian socialist parties, which had led the Ukrainian national revolution, had temporarily obscured the wealthier peasant class and landlords, known to be the patriots, and well deserving for their work toward the furthering of Ukrainian culture. They were for the most part of definite democratic viewpoints, and, therefore, often disagreed with the Ukrainian Socialist government. Organized into a Union of Husbandmen-Democrats, they negotiated with the Germans in order to seize the government in Ukraine. Their plan was to establish a democratic monarchy under Hetman Paul Skoropadsky, a descendent of the old Kozak hetmans.

This plan was welcomed by the Germans, for whom it was very necessary to check the revolutionary fermentation and to obtain for them-

selves the bread from the Ukraine so essential to the German war effort. On April 29, 1918, the monarchists, with the aid of the Germans carried through a putsch and proclaimed Hetman Skoropadsky the head of the Ukrainian state.

This *coup d'état*, accomplished with the aid of the Germans, alienated from the Hetman even the nationalistic groups of the *Centralna Rada*. However the period of this Hetmanship also had positive results. During the six-month reign of the Hetman, the government put Ukrainian finances in order, founded two Ukrainian state universities and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The development of a Ukrainian army was openly obstructed by the Germans. The Hetman's rule depended mainly upon German aid; therefore, with the downfall of the Germans in November, 1918, the rule of the Hetman was also over. A national uprising drove the Germans from the Ukraine and overthrew the Hetman's rule. The temporary government was seized by a Directorate of five at the head of which was the military leader Semen Petlura.

THE UNION OF WESTERN AND EASTERN UKRAINE

The First World War foredoomed old Austria. Her downfall opened up the possibility for the western Ukrainians to achieve their national ideal by union with the Independent Ukraine. On October 18, 1918, representatives of all the Ukrainian lands of former Austria-Hungary, that is Galicia, Bukovina and Carpathian Ukraine, announced the creation of a Western Ukrainian National Republic from these lands. They did not proclaim an immediate union with eastern Ukraine due to her uncertain internal situation.

The government was still in Austrian hands, while, standing in opposition, were two antagonists, the Ukrainians and the Poles, who wished to seize the power over Galicia. The Ukrainians circumvented the Poles and on November 1, 1918, seized the government in Lviv and in all of Ukrainian Galicia. The Ukrainian-Polish war commenced, during which the power of the Germans and the Hetman was overthrown in eastern Ukraine. The time had arrived for the union of the age-long separated parts of the Ukraine.

This historic act of union of the two sections of Ukraine, the eastern and the western, into one Ukrainian National Republic took place on January 22, 1919 in Kiev on the historical St. Sophia Square in front of the cathedral which had been built by the ancient Ukrainian monarch, Yaroslav the Wise, in 1037. The act of union of the two parts of Ukraine took place during perilous times, but it was an act of great historical importance

and the cornerstone for the development of Ukrainian nationalism. To the ideal of an independent Ukraine was added another of a united Ukraine. These are the two ideals which became national dogmas to the European Ukrainians of today.

The young united Ukrainian republic was born midst truly controversial times. Bolshevik Russia which had maintained normal neighborly relations with monarchistic Ukraine now again declared war against socialist Ukraine. In the west the Poles were waging war for control of Galicia, the Roumanians occupied Bukovina and the fate of Carpathian Ukraine was uncertain,

Western Ukraine in actuality still had to carry the weight of the war with Poland by herself. The Galician Army, defeated by the far stronger Polish army, was forced to flee to eastern Ukraine where it still could aid the eastern Ukrainians in their war against the Red and Tzarist Russians. Deprived of even the most primitive protective measures, half of the army was destroyed by the typhus and ceased to exist.

Semen Petlura, the leader of eastern Ukraine, was forced to make peace with the Poles in order to gain their help against the Reds. But the united efforts of the Ukrainian and Polish armies against the Bolsheviks, after some initial successes, were a failure. The Bolsheviks occupied the Ukraine and consummated a peace with Poland in Riga, through which they retained eastern Ukraine for themselves and granted western Ukraine to the Poles (March, 1921).

The four-year battle for a Ukrainian state was a test of Ukrainian nationalistic strength. The unsatisfactory results naturally raise questions as to the reasons for the failure. The Ukrainian state fell because of unfriendly external attitudes. But internally there were serious shortcomings among the Ukrainians themselves.

As a result of the four-year battle for freedom, there has remained a definite purpose in modern Ukrainian nationalism—an Independent and United Ukraine. Naturally, Ukrainian nationalism admits the possibility in the future of a federation with one or more of Ukraine's neighbors. But such a federation can be achieved only through the attainment of independence, when the Ukrainian people will be the masters of their own land. Enforced federation will always be tantamount to occupation. All European Ukrainians, from the socialists to the extreme nationalists, agree on the fundamental issues.

THE MODERN UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND THE SOVIETS

For a short while a group of Ukrainians expected to develop the life of the Ukrainian nation in a compromise with the Soviets. There were various circumstances which could have rendered this possible. The social structure of the Ukrainian nation offered no obstacle to this solution because the Ukrainian people as a whole were socially fairly well equalized. The initial internationalism of the communists during Lenin's time, tolerant toward the non-Russian peoples, gave rise to hopes that, after a short period of war communism, there could eventuate a cooperative life between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples within the Soviet Union.

The main obstruction to the realization of these hopes was that the Ukrainian in comparison to the Russian was a fanatic individualist, deeply religious and sincerely devoted to national traditions. The individualism of a Ukrainian on the one hand and the social equality of the Ukrainian nation on the other were ideal conditions for a healthy democracy rather than for a totalitarian communism.

One of the main hindrances to the formation of good-neighbor relations between Red Russia and the Ukraine were the Russian communist-nationalists. It is strange that the greater majority of them were Russified communists such as the Ukrainian A. Lunacharsky, the Georgians J. Stalin and Ordgonikidze, the Jew L. Kahanovich, the Pole F. Dzierzynski, the Frenchman J. Larin and among them finally the Russian V. Molotoff. Lenin combatted Russian nationalism among the communists in his work such as "The Conceit of a Great Russian", and others. But this rein on Russian nationalism among the communists lasted only during his lifetime.

The well known course of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the Ukraine turned into a period of so-called Ukrainization (1923-1929) which introduced the Ukrainian language into the governmental and party apparatus of the Ukraine and gave a relative freedom to the growth of Ukrainian culture within the framework of the Marxist ideology. During the period of Ukrainization, many Ukrainians of western Ukraine and in foreign lands built up their hopes that the Ukrainian question might be solved within the borders of the Soviet Union. All of these hopes were destroyed in the critical year of 1930.

The period of Ukrainization was a brilliant era of development of Ukrainian life in the fields of literature, science and the arts. Six years of relative freedom brought about such tremendous achievements that they frightened Moscow. Moscow was especially fearful of the spiritual tendencies toward full Ukrainian emancipation from Russian cultural influences.

In Ukrainian literature, science and even in the arts, in view that the Ukraine should look for spiritual ties with western Europe rather than with Eurasian Russia gained supremacy. This slogan was most expressly declared in the literary manifesto of the most famous literary association "Vaplite" (The Free Academy of Proletarian Literature) which was headed by Mykola Khvylovy, the most talented East-Ukrainian prose writer of the post-war period. The manifesto clearly states . . . "We should orient ourselves toward western Europe, and turn our back on Moscow." This, in fact, was a reconversion to the century-old traditional path of Ukrainian spirituality which makes the Ukrainian people a fully independent nation. But this trend ran counter to Russian plans, contrived in the past by Peter the Great, to make the Ukrainians into an ethnic mass and a part of the Russian nation.

The policy of Ukrainization brought sympathetic acclaim from the Ukrainians outside of the Soviet Union.

In the more nationalistic western Ukraine under Poland there rose a political party, The Union of Peasants and Workers (*Sel-Rob*), Ukrainian and communist, which was even able to elect six representatives to the Polish Sejm at the election of 1926.

During the Ukrainization period scientific connections were established between the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev and the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv. The Western Ukrainian cooperatives entered into their first economic ties with the Soviet Ukraine. Many graduates of the Ukrainian Secret University in Lviv went to work in eastern Ukraine. These ties were protected by the old Bolshevik, the Ukrainian friend of Lenin, Mykola Skrypnyk, the commissar of education in Ukraine and the Soviet consul to Lviv, G. Lapchynsky. Both later fell victims to the Soviet terror.

Naturally, in the course of these changes in convictions, there was much deterioration in morale after the unsuccessful war for independence. This demoralization was criticized by the nationalists, but this was the sole political orientation toward a neighbor which was not as yet condemned as treason to the nation. This was the last proof given by the Ukrainians of their willingness to cooperate with the Russian people in one Soviet Union on the basis of equality of both nations.

From the very beginning this attempt proved unsuccessful, for the period of Ukrainization was opportunistic politics on the part of Moscow, a tactical step momentarily necessitated by the internal situation in Russia. Lenin died soon after announcing the NEP politics. In Moscow there flared up a battle for the succession to Lenin between J. Stalin and L. Trotzky. Both sought the alliance of the Ukraine. Trotzky was banished from the

party in 1927 and went into exile. But he had many followers, most of whom were hunted down in the Ukraine. At this time also came the first blows against Ukrainization which was called Trotzkyism.

The assaults were directed by the Russian nationalists upon the commissary of education Ol. Shumsky for his Ukrainian nationalism. They ejected him from the party (1926) and exiled him to the north. These same attacks were repeated upon the Russian communist from the Ukraine, a true Leninite, Volobuev, who had protested against the economic exploitation of the Ukraine by Moscow. These attacks on the Ukrainization system had their consequences in western Ukraine. From the national point there developed a split in *Sel-Rob* and in the official Communist Party in western Ukraine. The Sovietophil orientation immediately vanished from among the non-communists.

The war for Lenin's succession between Stalin and Trotzky ended in 1929. Trotzky had left the country and Stalin became the dictator of the USSR. He no longer needed the support of the Ukraine, therefore the period of Ukrainization ended in that year. 1930 was a crisis year in the Ukrainian-Russian relations. There began a general struggle between Stalin's communistic Russia and the nationalist trends in the Ukraine and a reversion to the traditional policies of Tzar Peter the Great against the Ukraine.

The fight against the intelligentsia began with the trial of the "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine". The defendants were from among the Ukrainian élite, the vice-president of the Academy of Sciences, S. Efremov, the head of the Ukrainian Autocephalic (Orthodox) Church, Metropolitan M. Boretzky, and V. Chekhivsky, the organizer of the Ukrainian Communist Party and former Ukrainian premier. After the trial, which ended in long prison terms and exile for the defendants, came the execution of poets and scholars. The attack was made even upon the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and upon the greatest Ukrainian historian M. Hrushevsky. After the purge the Academy ceased to be an institution for Ukrainian cultural research. Many of its members and collaborators, together with M. Hrushevsky, were expelled from the Academy and sent into exile. Shortly thereafter the writer, M. Khvylovy, and Commissar Skrpnyk fell victims, both being forced to commit suicide. Dr. M. Haley in his book *Ukraine and Moscow* names almost 300 scholars and over 200 writers and poets who perished or were exiled from the Ukraine during the next four years. After the imprisonment of the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, M. Boretzky, orders were given for the dissolution of the church. This facilitated the expansion of the Russian Orthodox church

under Metropolitan Sergei, as an instrument for the russification of the Ukraine.

Only at this time was any action taken against the Ukrainian nationalistic peasants. Collectivism was to make of the peasant a laborer wholly dependent on the will of the Russian régime in the Ukraine. The resistance of the Ukrainian peasants toward collectivism was broken by an artificially induced famine, which even according to foreign correspondents, cost the lives of 3 to 4 million inhabitants. The faked character of the famine was confirmed by the American correspondents W. H. Chamberlain, B. Rypley and Harry Lang.

Later, a purge was begun of all the Ukrainians in the offices of the Ukrainian government, in the educational system and in the party. Sometimes as often as every year the Ukrainian premier was changed (Chubar, Liubchenko, Bondarenko, the president of the Ukraine Petrovsky and others). Some perished, others disappeared into thin air. The dictatorship over the Ukraine was in the hands of foreigners as general secretaries of the Communist Party of bolsheviks of Ukraine, such as the Pole S. Kosior, the Russians P. Postyshev, and M. Chruschev.

The professorate was punished because "they had begun a new pedagogic study in the Ukraine independent from brotherly Russia", as the state attorney accused Professors Sokoliansky, Protopopov and Zaluzhney at their trial. In one year alone, 1933, 4000 Ukrainian teachers were dismissed for their nationalism. Such practices were steadily repeated up to 1938.

During 1933 and 1934, 24,000 Ukrainians were ejected from the communist party in the Ukraine, 2,500 Ukrainians from Kharkov institutions, 1942 secretaries of the territorial and regional committees were liquidated. The Soviet policies in the Ukraine between the two world wars as well as the Soviet régime in western Ukraine during the occupation, 1939-1941, have convinced the Ukrainian people that they have no possibility of even the most elementary national growth within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. Only an independent Ukraine can assure a decent life to the 40 million Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

MODERN UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND POLAND

Modern Ukrainian nationalism, in accordance with its ideals of an independent and united Ukraine, took a negative stand also against Polish domination over Western Ukraine where there are over 6 million Ukrainians. The twenty years of Polish domination in Western Ukraine did not ally the Poles to the Ukrainians even in the face of their mutual Russian

danger, but only further alienated these two traditionally antagonistic nations.

With but a few exceptions, the Poles took a negative attitude toward an independent Ukraine, for only a few saw the danger to Poland in an anti-Ukrainian position. In this minority of sympathizers toward the rise of an independent Ukraine, not including Western Ukraine however, was Marshal Józef Piłsudski. However, even this semi-dictator was unable to better the relations between the Ukrainians and the Poles in Poland, so strong was anti-Ukrainian feeling. Ukrainian-Polish relations during those twenty years was limited to Polish plans for the Polonization of Western Ukraine through colonization, cultural extermination and pacifications. The Ukrainian answer to this policy was the revolutionary work of the nationalists with attacks upon governmental representatives, destruction of colonial settlements, etc., with resulting hundreds of trials and executions.

It is not strange, therefore, that there were found but few Ukrainians during those 20 years who would seek Ukraine's future in some sort of an understanding with Poland. If any such person appeared on the political horizon, regardless of the Polish system in Western Ukraine, then Ukrainian public opinion quickly eliminated him as a political figure. The historian Stepan Tomashivsky attempted to propagate scientifically such a pro-Polish orientation in his journal *Politika*, but without any positive results.

The importance of an understanding between two independent nations, Poland and the Ukraine, as a mutual protection against the Russian danger was emphasized by Dr. Dmytro Dontzov, theorist of extreme Ukrainian nationalism. But he never went beyond his purely theoretical approach to enter upon the path of practical Ukrainian-Polish politics.

The necessity for Polish-Ukrainian understanding was propagated among the Poles by their renowned specialist on Ukrainian problems, Leon Wasilewsky, the author of several books on this topic. However, he did not gain many followers.

The Ukrainian nationalists took a negative stand toward Polish domination over Western Ukraine but in comparing the Polish and Soviet régimes they were compelled to consider Soviet Russia as the main and most dangerous adversary of the Ukrainian nation.

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AFTER ITS UNSUCCESSFUL BATTLE FOR LIBERATION

In Western Ukraine under Polish rule, as formerly under Austrian rule, there crystallized a modern Ukrainian post-war nationalism, collecting

the crippled Ukrainian forces after the unsuccessful battle for liberation. The revived, once very influential publication, *Literary-Scientific Herald* published formerly by I. Franko and M. Hrushevsky, became the first tribune of Ukrainian post-war nationalism. In the first issue of the *Herald*, May-1922, are emphasized the basic tenets of a healthy and active Ukrainian nationalism as stated in the outlined program:

1. The foundation of the Ukrainian nation is the peasant class, not the industrial proletariat.
2. The A to Z of Ukrainian national life is the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination.
3. The Ukrainian people must depend on their own strength for liberation. Orientation toward foreign aid takes second place.
4. It is imperative to have an unquenchable faith in Ukrainian liberation.
5. In the social field we are adherents of private ownership but organized into collective institutions. Cooperation is best suited for the Ukrainian spirit.
6. We must shake off the vestiges of eastern culture in our spiritual life. We henceforth orient ourselves toward western European culture.
7. The Ukrainian nation is bound neither by the traditions of Pereyaslav (1654), that is, dependence on Russia, nor by the traditions of Hadiach (1658), that is dependence on Poland.
8. We do not desire to be the object but the subject of history. We believe that historical trends are in our favor.

These are the accepted tenets of all Ukrainian political groups today who accept the nationalist viewpoint.

Before the first World War, about 80% of the Ukrainian youth was socialistic. After the war socialism vanished completely among the educated youth. Their minds had been won over to nationalism.

There were three main nationalistic groups among the Ukrainians before the present world war: extreme nationalists, monarchists and the national democrats.

The extreme nationalists were the most dynamic Ukrainian political group. They existed in two forms: as a legal nationalistic movement and as an underground organization. The nationalism existing in the Ukraine was not actually an organized party but rather a movement which had gained the confidence of the entire younger generation and had even gained entrée into the youth organizations which were formally controlled by the social-

ists. This nationalistic movement became a part of student, worker, peasant, sport and even economic organizations. The slogan of all the nationalists was "Ukraine above all!" The nationalistic movement was divided, so to speak, into two sections: the Christian nationalists and the total nationalists. The ideologist of the latter group was the talented journalist Dr. D. Dontzov. His nationalism was dogmatic and based on non-rational foundations. The element of will was for him the principal criterion. In some respects his ideas are similar to those of the Frenchman, M. Barrès, the author of *Scène et Doctrine du Nationalisme*. Ethically speaking, that is ethical to him which is instrumental in the achievement of Ukrainian national independence. His viewpoints were aired in the newspaper *Zahrava* and later after 1932, in the "Literary Scientific Herald" and other publications. The difference between the Christian nationalists and the total nationalists was that the Christian nationalists wished to protect the rules of Christian ethics.

The Ukrainian nationalist underground was organized as secret revolutionary organizations opposed to all foreign domination of Ukrainian lands, particularly by Russia and Poland. The Ukrainian nationalist underground carried on further the armed struggle for the independence of the Ukraine, but by devious methods. In the first years of their existence, these secret organizations were guided by army officers of the eastern and western Ukrainian armies. In Western Ukraine this organization was called the Ukrainian Military Organization (UWO)—1922.

Until 1923 a partisan war was waged in eastern Ukraine against the Soviets by secret organizations. Many of the partisan leaders (some of whom were women) have gone down in modern Ukrainian history as legendary figures. The majority of them perished. The peasant masses were sympathetic to the struggles of the Ukrainian national partisans which enabled the fight to go on for years. Bolshevik terminology calls the quelling of the Ukrainian partisan-independents the "war against brigandage in the Ukraine".

The Western Ukrainian Military Organization has to its account several attacks on high Polish government officials, appropriational assaults upon government treasuries for the benefit of the organization, UWO, setting fire to colonists, and the carrying out of death sentences upon Polish collaborators. It carried on a boycott during the first elections to the Polish Sejm and the first selection to the Polish army. The first commander of UWO was Col. E. Konovaletz. Their organ was the secretly published newspaper *Surma*.

During this time a new generation of young nationalists grew up, the

army men were aging. Therefore at the Congress in Prague, 1928, UWO changed into a wide nationalistic organization for all the Ukrainian lands under the name of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Their organ became the journal *Rebirth of a Nation*. Col. Konovaletz remained the leader of OUN and after his death—(he was killed by a bomb in 1938)—Col. Andrew Melnyk, who had been his chief of staff in the Ukrainian army, took his place.

The military action in Western Ukraine was led by a regional commander, of whom the first was O. Holovinsky, and after his death at the hands of the Polish Police, Sdel. Bandera. In 1935 Sdel. Bandera was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Polish courts. He was released upon Poland's fall. Bandera gathered his followers, scattered by the Red occupation of Western Ukraine, and when the German-Soviet war broke out and the Bolsheviks left Lviv on June 24, 1941, he proclaimed the rebirth of the Ukrainian state in Lviv. He placed his assistant G. Stecko at the head of the new Ukrainian government. Two days later the Germans occupied Lviv. Bandera and his government were arrested and sent to a concentration camp. There was an unconfirmed report that Bandera perished in a German concentration camp.

The nationalists formerly under Bandera began a hopeless battle against all three occupants of Ukraine, the Germans, Bolsheviks and Poles. The fight is led in Western Ukraine by Taras Bulba (a pseudonym), who was recently mentioned by the proclamation of the Soviet Ukrainian premier M. Chruschev.

The Ukrainian monarchists or hetmanites also recognize the fundamental ideals of Ukrainian nationalism—independence and union for Ukraine. In their opinion the best form of government for a future Ukrainian state would be a constitutional monarchy with a monarch as its head, who was to be called, according to the traditions of the old Kozak state, a Hetman. The candidate for the Ukrainian throne is Hetman Paul Skoropadsky.

The ideologist of Ukrainian monarchism is the historian Viacheslav Lypynsky, the most talented Ukrainian sociological author since the first World War. He is the Ukrainian Maurras. In his work "Letters to my Brother Husbandmen", he declares himself against a parliamentary democracy, and favors a classocratic order with a chamber of representatives of the various social classes.

The Ukrainian monarchists-hetmanites have more sympathisers outside of Ukraine, as in America for example, than in Western Ukraine. There is a fairly strong group "Front" oriented itself toward monarchism, being

organized in a military manner, although with a conservative nationalistic ideology. Their leader was Dm. Paliev. The "Front" organization had the majority of its followers among the industrial proletariat, who had abandoned the socialist ranks.

The largest of the legal Ukrainian parties in Western Ukraine was the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO). Its membership consisted of the other intelligentsia, the clergy and large numbers from all classes. The UNDO controlled the entire economic life in Western Ukraine, organized mainly on a cooperative basis. This was the old Ukrainian National Democratic Party (1898) which had been reborn several times. It also recognized the fundamental ideal of Ukrainian nationalism, the independence and unity of the Ukraine. UNDO was always sympathetic to a parliamentary democracy and legal struggles. The most influential daily newspaper *Dilo*, published in Lviv since 1880, was controlled by this party. The Ukrainian nationalist groups as well as the socialist groups in the majority had an all-Ukrainian character after the first World War, with the exception perhaps of the Western Ukrainian UNDO.

Beside the nationalistic groups and parties there existed also two Ukrainian socialist parties who also recognized the slogans of Ukrainian nationalism for an independent and united Ukraine. These were the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries. In Western Ukraine the latter is called the Radical Socialist Party. The first, according to its program, was supposedly working among the industrial proletariat, the second among the peasants.

An exceptional place is held in Ukrainian national life by the Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitan of Lviv, Count Andrew Sheptytzky, a real democrat and humanitarian, and a man of great culture. Since he was a high church dignitary, he did not belong to any political group but had a tremendous influence on all Ukrainian national life from the revolutionary nationalists to the socialists. During his lifetime he has lived through three years of Russian exile and Polish internment. By his individuality, which wins all who meet him, by his high civic spirit and self-sacrifice he has won unlimited authority among the Western Ukrainians, Orthodox as well as Roman Catholics. He is always with the nation in her most difficult moments protecting her rights. His role among the contemporary Ukrainians is that of a true patriarch of a nation.

MAHWAH, NEW JERSEY

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4. Borys Krupnyckyj, *Geschichte der Ukraine*, Leipzig, 1939.
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The four newly published histories of Ukraine (Nos. 2-5) picture the Ukrainian nationalist movement from various standpoints. The history of M. Hrushevsky, the greatest Ukrainian historian, re-edited in English in the U.S.A. with an additional chapter depicting later developments, expresses the democratic socialist viewpoint. This work is supplemented by a rich bibliography. Doroshenko, the former Minister of the Exterior during the Hetman's rule, wrote objectively in spite of his monarchistic convictions. Krupnyckyj, the young historian, took advantage of all of the newest historical literature; therefore, his work is very informative, however little known in the U.S.A. The History of Ukraine published by the Ukrainian Soviet Academy of Sciences is composed in accordance with official Soviet politics in Ukraine. The first section is quite instructive, but the rest is biased and without scientific worth.

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7. E. Borschak and R. Martel, *La Vie de Mazeppa*, Paris, 1931, (French). An interesting biography of the Ukrainian Hetman, a famous fighter for Ukrainian independence against Russia in the first years of the 18th century.
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Kost' Levytzky, the Ukrainian Parliamentary leader for many years and the Prime Minister of the Western Ukrainian Republic in 1918, wrote his book in the style of memoirs.

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15. Vasyl Kuchabsky, *Die West-Ukraine im Kampfe mit Polen und Bolschevismus in den Jahren 1918-1923*. Berlin 1934.

16. Alexander Choulguine, *L'Ukraine contrye Moscou- 1917*, Paris, 1935.

Doroshenko and Choulguine, both Ukrainian of the Exterior, the first a monarchist—the second a democrat, described the history of the Ukrainian national revolution in eastern Ukraine in the first years of the Russian revolution.

Kuchabsky, availing himself of the information contained in the documents of the Versailles conference, portrays the role played by the western Ukrainians in the struggle for liberation. All three works are fundamental and written by authorities on the subject.

17. Vyacheslav Lypynsky, *Lysty do Brativ Khibortbiv* (Letters to my Brethren Husbandsmen), Vienna, 1929. (Ukrainian)

Fundamental study about Ukrainian monarchistic ideology as well as about the classocratic order.

18. Dmytro Dontzov, *Natzionalizm* (Nationalism), Lviv, 1927. (Ukrainian).

D. Dontzov, famous Ukrainian journalist and theoretical ideologist of extreme Ukrainian nationalism, expresses in this book his own ideas.

19. M. Sciborsky, 1940, *Ukraine and Russia, a Survey of Soviet Russia's Twenty-Year Occupation of Eastern Ukraine*.

The author summarizes the facts concerning the terroristic Bolshevik domination over Ukraine.

Note: Much valuable material on these topics can be found in the *Literary Scientific Herald*, published in Lviv from 1922 to 1939.

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

Reminiscent of Slav Congresses of 1848, 1867, 1908 and the Rome Congress of Oppressed Peoples of 1918, an All-Slav Conference met in Kingsway Hall, London, on May 25, 1944. The obvious purpose of the meeting was to demonstrate the unity of the Slavic peoples in the face of German aggression.

The presiding officer was Dr. Boris Furlan (Slovene)¹, who delivered one of the two principal addresses. On the platform with him were the following delegates: Dr. Rudolf Bičanić (Croatian), Jan Jagodzinski (Pole), Dr. Vlado Clementis (Slovak), M. Jarošenko (Ukrainian), Prokop Maxa (Czech), Josef David (Czech), Angel Nikolov (Macedonian), Michal Padev (Bulgarian), Michael Petrovič (Serb), Ivan Petruščák (Ruthene), J. Nový (Czech), and R. W. Seton-Watson, guest of honor.

In addition to official representatives, diplomats and military attachés of the Slav Central European peoples and Soviet Russia there were delegates from the Free Austrian Movement, the democratic Italian, Rumanian and Hungarian organizations in London, as well as the Yugoslav Partisans. Greetings from numerous "undergrounds" and heads of Allied states were read and telegrams of greetings were sent in reply. Short addresses were made by each of the leading delegates on the platform, and a general manifesto to all Slavic nations was then read and approved by the Conference. The concluding principal speech was by Prof. Seton-Watson.

It was made quite clear from the beginning of the Conference that the sentiment of the meeting was in no way Pan-Slav. The point, clearly put, of Mr. Jagodzinski that the bogey of Pan-Slavism was one of the more insidious weapons used by the enemies of the smaller Slav nations of Europe was warmly received.

The summary of the sense of the Conference by Vlado Clementis emphasized the desire of the Slavic nations for full cooperation and mutual understanding, both now and in the future. He ended his summary with these words:

We know from history as well as from the events of our own days that the eternal "Drang" of Germanism is directed against the very existence of the Slavic peoples. The Slavic nations are this time determined to eradicate, root and branch, this "Drang", and in doing so their interests coincide with those of the whole democratic world.

A complete record and transcript of all the speeches and documents of this Conference should certainly be made available in English.

* * * *

On July 7, 1944, Dr. Ivan Subašić, acting on instructions from King Peter, formed a new Yugoslav Government, composed of the following ministers:

Dr. Subašić (Croatian Peasant Party), Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of War.

¹ The designations are of course national, not political.

Sava Kosanović (Serb, Independent Democratic Party), Minister of the Interior, Social Welfare and Public Works

Dr. Juraj Sutej (Croatian Peasant Party) Minister of Finance, Trade and Commerce

Dr. Isidor Cankar (Slovene Popular Party) Minister of Education, Posts and Telegraph

Prof. Sreten Vukosavljević (Serb, Democratic Party) Minister of Supplies, Food, Forests and Mines

Dr. Drago Marusić (Slovene) Minister of Justice and Communications.

It is not a large cabinet, but representative of the more consistently liberal groups of the three constituent national elements of Yugoslavia. Prof Vukosavljević and Dr. Marusić were members of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation, which, under the leadership of Dr. Ivan Ribar, was Marshal Tito's provisional cabinet.

* * * *

In pursuance of recognition as a Provisional Government extended to the De Gaulle Committee, the Czechoslovak Government expressly renewed the post-Versailles Franco-Czechoslovak Alliance in a brief agreement signed in London on August 22, 1944. The text of the agreement follows:

While again declaring that they consider the Munich Treaty with all its consequences as null and void, the Czechoslovak Government and the Provisional Government of the French Republic state that relations between the two states have been reestablished to the same extent as they existed before signature of that Treaty. In confirming that traditional policy of friendship and alliance which unites them and their common attachment to the principles of liberty and independence, and which has been strengthened by the struggle against the common enemy, the Czechoslovak Government and the French Government have agreed that at the appropriate time such modifications and amendments be carried out in the existing agreements as will be considered necessary in order that collaboration between Czechoslovakia and France in the sphere of general security and reconstruction of Europe and the world are rendered more effective.

For Czechoslovakia, Mons. J. Srámek (Premier) and Jan Masaryk (Foreign Minister. For The French Provisional Government, General Charles De Gaulle and Maurice Dejean, Foreign Minister.

* * * *

Lithuanian appeal to the President of the United States

The following telegram was sent to President Roosevelt at the Quebec Conference, on September 12, 1944.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

QUEBEC CANADA

Latest information reaching us from Sweden presents horrible picture of terror devastation and depletion of population of Lithuania at the hands of both the

Germans and Russians stop Refugees arriving in Sweden from Lithuania call for immediate aid to unfortunate Baltic peoples innocent victims of both Germans and Russians stop Despite reiterated solemn pledges Russian military authorities in occupied so called liberated parts of Lithuania proceed with wholesale extermination of remaining population stop Eyewitness refugees report execution mass deportations suicides stop In consequence of Soviet reprisals such cities as Vilkauskis Utena Siauliai Kursenai etc. already are entirely devoid of Lithuanian population Confirmed information reports drastic Soviet measures reintroduction of Kolkhozes wholesale expropriation of private property stop Decisive action by the United States in conjunction if possible with Great Britain becomes imperative for humanitarian if no other considerations stop We appeal to you Mr. President to discuss the means of protecting lives basic human rights freedom and sovereignty of the Baltic peoples and to take some immediate measures to protect those peoples from complete extermination

LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL
LEONARD SIMUTIS PRESIDENT
PIUS GRIGAITIS SECRETARY
MICHAEL VAIDYLA TREASURER

BOOK REVIEWS

KOHN, HANS, *The Idea of Nationalism. A Study in Its Origins and Background*. New York: MacMillan, 1944. Pp. 735. \$7.50.

In the present volume the author has begun to set down the work of many years. This half of the history of the idea of nationalism covers the time from the early Hebrews and Greeks to the French Revolution. It will be followed by another volume, *The Age of Nationalism. A Study in the Growth and Fulfillment of an Idea*. Since Dr. Kohn is a distinguished journalist and professor who has long been an authority on nationalism, there is no need to dwell upon the felicity of his writing and the breadth and thoroughness of his work. For many readers the book in hand, with the successive volume, will fulfill every need; they will gladly pass over the thousand monographs on the subject, and comfortably ignore Fichte and Barrès.

Few reviewers are competent to appraise in detail a volume of such range. A striking feature of the book seems to this reviewer to be the enthusiasm for his subject which the author has communicated. Chapter II, "Israel and Hellas," although it suffers in depth from the method of treatment, is moving, and stimulating points are made about the very early in-group feeling of these peoples. Because of his interest in Israel, the author's work on the Puritan Revolution (pp. 166ff.), wherein he compares seventeenth-century nationalism in England with that of the early Hebrews, makes good reading. The conclusions, however, are perhaps not so readily acceptable (cf. p. 178). Again, the chapter on the rise of nationalism in the American colonies is well done, given the limitations of the author.

The limitations of Dr. Kohn's work are, as this reviewer sees them, largely those of method, and since the method for dealing with nationalism is important, something may be ventured on the matter. For readers deeply concerned with the origins and nature of nationalism as a social phenomenon are likely to find the handling here of the material offered them less satisfactory than the impressive wealth of this material. The dissatisfaction is due to a treatment of nationalism which is too purely ideological. The author does not intend to err in this way. At any rate, he links closely modern nationalism with industrialism and democracy (pp. vii, 3ff., 156f.). He sees "all the problems of recent history and of the contemporary world" as "focused" in an understanding of nationalism (p. ix). He correlates social change with nationalism: "Where the third estate became powerful in the 18th century . . . nationalism found its expression predominantly, but never exclusively in political and economic changes" (p. 4). But in this introductory volume these admirable views are stated, even reiterated, rather than made the basis of an analysis which cuts to the real roots of nationalism. They force the author to give at intervals summaries of economic and social change (cf. pp. 156ff.) or to assert a connection between the general culture and the specific phenomenon (cf. chap. VI); but this connection is not the essence

of the volume. The thinkers really occupy first place, and the volume often becomes too much an intellectual history of western Europe. It is conceivable that "true" nationalism will in the next volume be more closely integrated with economic and social life. One doubts, however, that nationalism conceived as "a state of mind," as an *idée-force*, which goes back to the ancient Hebrews and Greeks, is revived "in its Calvinistic form" in 17th Century England will yield to such treatment.

The present volume appears to this reviewer as something of a paradox. Dr. Kohn expressly states that there is no nationalism before the end of the 18th century (p. 3). Then he asserts that "both the idea and the form of nationalism were developed before the age of nationalism" (p. 19). He devotes 700 pages to a history of the early idea and form of nationalism, that is, to a history of the roots of a plant which never came to its fruition under any of the circumstances described. He is therefore necessarily often at pains to show why or how the idea he describes is unlike *modern* nationalism and why it does not succeed in supplanting universalism or cosmopolitanism. All this is confusing and not a little exhausting. A brief summary of those social and economic conditions which prevented the development of modern nationalism and which contributed to the rise of an in-group feeling would surely have been as helpful to the student.

Another point troubles the reviewer, who is not quite sure that she understands Dr. Kohn's position. He says: "A study of nationalism must follow a comparative method, it cannot remain confined to one of its manifestations; only the comparison of the different nationalisms all over the earth will enable the student to see what they have in common and what is peculiar to each, and thus allow a just evaluation. An understanding of nationalism can be gained only by a world history of the age of nationalism" (pp. ix-x). A nationalism which is always different in its every manifestation is not a phenomenon about which one can widely generalize, and a study of the surface manifestations of nationalisms cannot yield the basic conclusions which we need in order to make current use of such a study at all. Either Dr. Kohn does not mean what he seems to be saying here, especially as he says just above, "In modern times the pattern transcends all national and geographical limitations;" or he does not understand that a social phenomenon like nationalism arises under similar conditioning wherever found. It is this cultural conditioning which needs analysis; but Dr. Kohn in his effort to be inclusive and exhaustive has failed us.

Washington, D. C.

PAULINE R. ANDERSON

SETON-WATSON, R. W., *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks*. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1943. Pp. 413. 15s.

Among English scholars, there is hardly anyone better prepared to write a book on this subject in the detailed scope and scholarly treatment of it than Dr. Seton-Watson. For he possesses the necessary linguistic knowledge, and has devoted a lifetime of study to this and the related spheres, as is evidenced by

a long list of books on cognate subjects, which he has published. The result is a full-sized history, comprising some 250,000 words, of the two main groups of the population of Czechoslovakia. But since the Slovaks from the beginning of the tenth century had been subjected to the rule of the Magyars, and consequently were not in a position to determine their own course of development, the Czech history, in the very nature of the case, receives a much fuller treatment. It could not be otherwise. Moreover, throughout the book, like a red thread, there runs the fundamental theme of the book,—the age-long struggle of the Czechs for the right to existence and the development of their own national life and culture against the surrounding might of the Germans.

Since the chief aim of the author is to afford his readers an understanding of the modern situation, particularly from the time of the Czech national revival (1790 on), about one half of the book is properly devoted to this period. Moreover, drawing on his unrivaled knowledge of Central European history, Dr. Seton-Watson integrates the Czech and Slovak history into the matrix of the Austrian (since 1526) and Hungarian backgrounds. This is all the more helpful because it is a comparatively novel feature, for most other works of similar nature lack it either almost altogether, or at least to a large extent. The treatment of the period of the Czech national revival is written with verve and enthusiasm. And as for the period of the struggle for independence and the establishment and existence of the Republic, Dr. Seton-Watson's personal collaboration with Dr. Masaryk, as well as his first hand knowledge of the events makes that section of the book particularly authoritative.

Just because of the general excellence of the work, it is particularly regrettable that greater care had not been exercised in the matter of correct spelling of Czech names and phrases, and especially in the use of the diacritical marks. Nor has a strict uniformity in the designation of the place names been observed: thus, for instance, in deferring to the Taborite bishop, Nicholas of Pelhřimov, the German form "Pilgram" has been used (p. 64).

If Czech spelling and the use of diacritical marks proved somewhat difficult for the author (or was it perhaps the proof-reader?), the theological intricacies of the various religious groups of the Hussite period caused him even greater trouble. He seems to have remained unclear about the distinctions between transubstantiation—the doctrine held by Hus and the Utraquists—the Wyclifite consubstantiation, held by the majority of the Taborites and by Chelčický and the commemorative view of the Lord's Supper held by small extremist sects generally referred to as Picards. The author seems to suppose that the Taborites held to transubstantiation (pp. 66, 74). This theological confusion is manifested particularly in the treatment of Chelčický. To the reviewer, it appears as a misconception of both Chelčický and the Quakers to regard the former as "the spiritual forerunner of the Society of Friends" (p. 81). Nor did Chelčický hold to "Hus' doctrine of the Real Presence" (transubstantiation), but to Wyclif's consubstantiation. Neither does he "doubt" whether a Christian may serve the state; he cannot. Church and State are not "almost" incompatible; they are

entirely so (p. 82). Furthermore, the account of the founding of the Unity of Brethren (p. 83) is open to criticism because of some questionable or inaccurate statements, nor is there a clear indication that the author has taken into consideration the views of such authoritative recent researchers as Johannes Müller and F. M. Bartoš. The assertion that Comenius met John Winthrop the Younger in London should not be presented as anything more than a conjecture, for there is no specific evidence to support it, although it is probable (p. 126).

But despite such minor "Homeric nods," the author has once more demonstrated his competent scholarship and a genuine understanding of the people with whose history he is dealing. Although sympathetic, he is above all just and fair. He is by no means blind to the faults of the Czechs and Slovaks, but "speaks truth in love." It is to be devoutly hoped that this work will aid students of history and political science in the understanding of the complex and difficult problems of Central Europe in general, and the Czechoslovak Republic in particular.

The Hartford Seminary Foundation

MATTHEW SPINKA

PANETH, PHILIP, *Turkey—Decadence and Rebirth*. London: Alliance Press, 1943. Pp. 149. 4s. 6d.

This is another brief, journalistic account purporting to tell the story of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the rejuvenation of the Turks as a people under the Turkish Republic. As such, this volume must be considered, not as a serious attempt to write history.

Mr. Paneth divides his work into three "books", the first of which deals with the period of Sultan Abdul Hamid in a broad and general way, although a few pages are assigned to the remote origins of the Turks. The second "book" tell of the work of the "Young Turks" during the period of 1908 to 1918, ending in the disastrous defeat of the Central Powers, of which the Ottoman Empire was a member. The third "Book" is devoted to the work of modernization, under Atatürk and its continuation under Ismet İnönü.

The general thesis of Mr. Paneth's volume is that "among the nations that have flourished and decayed, ruled and been conquered, the Turkish nation stands out by reason of its formative and recuperative power." Few will deny that the Turkish people showed tremendous powers of regeneration following eleven years of constant warfare from 1911 to 1922. The latter third of the volume is devoted to a newspaper man's account of the "regeneration": the analysis of the character of Atatürk, the establishment of the Republic, the struggle for independence, the modernization of the schools, the separation of "church and state", the development of industry and all the other items which have gone into the basic changes of characteristic Turkish life since the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the Turkish people as a nation with a national state of their own.

The author declares the program of Turkey is a combination of "nationalism"

and "modernism", which he regards as unique since "intense nationalism tends to be retrograde and reactionary." He does not consider the Turkish form of government to be either totalitarian or "democratic" but he feels that it is probably the best form "yet devised to make a nation politically conscious and ready for political maturity." The eventual achievement of "full democracy" is the keynote of modern Turkey, in Mr. Paneth's estimation.

Obviously Mr. Paneth's small book is a war volume. For one thing it is published on a poor quality of paper and in a poor quality of binding. It is written to bring about a better understanding of the position of Turkey—for readers in Great Britain. A better volume—and somewhat briefer—is Miss Barbara Ward's *Turkey*.

Miami University

HARRY N. HOWARD

BONSAL, STEPHEN, *Unfinished Business*. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1944. Pp. xi, 313. \$3.00.

When Colonel Bonsal went to Germany, in the autumn of 1919, for the purpose of appraising the trends and prospects of the new régime, he found people in Berlin quite as engrossed with the issues of responsibility for the outbreak and loss of the war as with the prospects for the future. The tendency irked him somewhat, for he had not come to perform a *post mortem*, although he could not help becoming interested. After a quarter of a century, when the same central issue of organizing the peace to prevent a recurrence of catastrophe is facing the world again, he too finds the failure of 1919 of significance for the present. The past may be a dead weight on the shoulders of the present, as some would have, but it cannot be denied.

The chapter on his Berlin sojourn is full of interest and quite enlightening as a record of the forces at work in the new Germany. The main theme of the book, however, lies in the story of the discussions centering around the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In the year 1919, the world was in a state of suspense, of chaos in many places, and, for a brief moment, the hopes of great masses of men were commensurate with the suffering that the war had entailed. But the opportunity was lost and the business left unfinished. Hence the appropriate title and the purpose of the book which is to be of "assistance to those who will share the responsibility when the next Assizes are called to save the world from the plight in which it flounders today" (p. 291).

Colonel Bonsal is eminently qualified to tell the story of these discussions through the interminable sessions of which he had to suffer in his capacity of interpreter. As in other accounts, we meet again the inexhaustible Bourgeois doggedly defending the French view of how the League ought to be organized. Bourgeois lost his battle and wearied everybody in the process; yet, with the wisdom of hindsight, we can see how his views—narrow as they may have been in their immediate motivation of French security—were rather sounder than the vagueness of the American and British approach. Dmowski's sad comment gave

expression to the disappointment of the small powers (p. 188). Wilson, it must be remembered, shared the prevalent American feeling of distrust toward European statesmen. The feeling is understandable enough in the light of the tortured history of European conflicts, but hardly a sound approach to diplomatic dealings.

And this suggests another consideration, well illustrated on Bonsal's record, namely the importance, the decisive influence at times, that falls to the fortuitous accidents of circumstances and personality. The League was rightly Wilson's most cherished creation. But in his fight for it, he suffered from two major handicaps: himself; and his country, or at least its elected representatives in the Senate. It was awkward, to say the least, for Wilson to come back to Paris in March and to ask for amendments to the draft of the Covenant which would give the United States a privileged position in the League. Wilson realized the weakness of his stand, but the Senate had to be pacified. Wilson's tragedy lay in the fact that, in the end, even this struggle turned out to have been futile. The narrow parochialism of Lodge, to give the phenomenon its most charitable name, was the source of a demand for further qualifications when the Treaty came up for ratification.

But even then the battle need not have been lost completely. A more supple personality, House for instance, could easily have forgotten personal pride and effected a compromise that would have saved the essentials. Or again, things might have been different but for Wilson's illness which caused him to be held virtually *incommunicado* during the crucial days of the ratification battle. The causes and consequences of the still somewhat mysterious Wilson-House estrangement, the influence of Mrs. Wilson, make the closing chapter, "Blackout in Washington," as fascinating reading as any instance of the ineluctable working of fate.

To the student of the Peace Conference, Colonel Bonsal's book will not offer much that is new. But as the first hand testimony of a competent witness, it is an important historical document. And as to the timeliness of the book there can be no question.

Columbia University

RENE ALBRECHT-CARRIE

ALLEN, CARLETON KEMP, *Democracy and the Individual*. Oxford University Press, 1943. Pp. 109. 3s. 6d.

In this long essay the Warden of Rhodes House, Oxford, and author of *Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* attempts a restatement of a mature faith in democracy. I say "mature" because he is aware of the defects which flow from the good qualities of democracy without either presenting a balance sheet or indulging in effusive praise. This is a running commentary on eight aspects of the democratic process (e.g., equality, leadership, personal responsibility, the majority principle). The author promises nothing new and indeed presents little that has not been said before. The force of his style and the clarity of his thought, however, bring new life to old assumptions and criticisms. Professor Allen is saying throughout: "If you are fighting for democracy, here is the essence of what

you are fighting for." Who can doubt today that democracy needs the psychological force of repetition no less than fascism.

Without attempting to detract from the value of the work as a whole it appears to me that the last section on "The Liberty of the Individual" is less useful than other parts. It seems to trail off into the blue, indicating perhaps a lack of awareness of changing conceptions of individual liberty, how they may be reoriented and implemented. The discussion does not get far beyond the idea of political liberty common to the age of John Stuart Mill. For this, however, the author gives his own reason: "Heart and pen quail as they approach this subject. Is there anything new to be said about it? Certainly a writer untrained in philosophical methods can hope to add little to a problem which has caused all the wisest heads among humanity to ache throughout the ages." (p. 74)

It might bring this review into line with the tolerant spirit and high moral tone of the book to admit that Professor Allen is probably right.

University of Colorado

CLAY P. MALICK

PRICE, G. WARD, *Giraud and the African Scene*. New York: Macmillan, 1944. Pp. 282. \$3.00.

Authors who write with the intention of catching a high tide of interest and timeliness must be prepared for the consequences. It is the misfortune of this book, which both in its preface and its conclusion prophesies a brilliant career for General Giraud, to appear precisely at the moment when he has made his exit from the public scene. More serious, however, than the author's failure as a prophet is his failure as a historian. Some day a study of Giraud's place in history will have to be made, but this book most certainly does not fill the bill.

Giraud seems to be a relatively simple type—an honorable soldier, a devout Catholic, a rightist in politics. Apart from the melodrama of his escape from Königstein and his voyage to North Africa by submarine and plane it is difficult to find much of striking interest in his career. Politically he is an authoritarian with firm belief in an élite. His social and economic views, as far as one can judge them from an address to a trade union delegation in Algiers, are naive. One feels that Giraud has never fully been able to free himself from his connection with Vichy, and it cannot be forgotten that his first act on escaping from Germany was to report to Marshal Pétain and that shortly afterwards he wrote saying that he was in entire agreement with Pétain's policies.

The reader of this book will find that its author exercises considerable journalistic ingenuity in whitewashing the men of Vichy—Noguès, Peyrouton, Boisson, and the others. While professing to admire the courage of General de Gaulle Mr. Price almost contrives to praise him with faint damns. The weakness, so he believes, of the De Gaullist movement in North Africa was that it was largely supported by Communists and Jews. That the author has had to deal with an unusually complicated political picture may be conceded, and one may perhaps, pass over in charitable silence the publishers' blurb to the effect that

he has given an authoritative and impartial account of the differences between De Gaulle and Giraud. Mr. Chamberlain once made an unfortunate remark about Hitler missing the bus. Here is a book which misses bus, boat, and train.

Wheaton College

E. J. KNAPTON

PIHL, GUNNER, *Germany: The Last Phase*. Translated from the Swedish by G. Howard Smith. New York: Knopf, 1944. Pp. 323. \$3.00.

The Swedes are better placed than any other people to watch the dying agonies of Nazi Germany and report on them to a curious outside world. As a neutral whose sympathies are ours, but whose trade is partly Germany's, Sweden has (as Mark Twain said when asked for his views on the future life) 'friends in both places'. Like Shirer, Howard Smith and all other honest reporters, Mr. Pihl was eventually expelled from Germany, but his observations extended late into 1943. His book is not without faults; its style is jerky, its arrangements much at random, and the most trivial incidents of travel appear cheek by jowl with deep (and sometimes obscure) philosophic meditations. But it contains honest observations and wise reflections and will deserve a large reading public.

One finds, for instance, an interesting foreshadowing of the later attempt on Hitler's life and the blood purge of hostile generals in Göring's speech of January 30, 1943 in which he referred to "Germans who considered the war against Russia a mistake" and the significant fact that this passage was omitted in all published accounts of his speech. "Such things were not for German ears; they should not be reminded of them" (page 89).

We have not only ghastly descriptions of the German pogroms but careful estimates of the number of Jews in occupied Europe actually put to death. Germany is said to have killed 3,390,000; the vassal states, on their own account, 945,000 more; a grand total of 4,335,000 (pages 261-262). There were still alive, when Mr. Pihl wrote, some 1,250,000 Jews within Hitler's reach—for how long?

One of the most interesting discussions in the book is on the pros and cons of Communist prospects in postwar Germany. The author presents both sides effectively, as a brief extract will show:

The German is, at bottom, bourgeois—a suppressed and tired little man who cannot on his own account think beyond the limits of a wishful dream of more privacy in his own life . . . and preferably a little house of his own with a garden. There were no small houses of one's own with gardens in Russia, nor privacy either. Even dogmatically communistic Germans (I know a few) garnered similar impressions in Russia . . . But it has nevertheless to be admitted that the Russians have fairly good chances in the tug of war. The ravages and burdens of war have made life in Germany more like life in Russia than in any other belligerent country. . . The complete lack of personal liberty, the power of the police regime . . . may very well strengthen the conclusion in the minds of the leading Nazis that the differences between Nazism and Bolshevism are not so great . . .

Wartime Nazism has flirted with communistic ideas, and it is not impossible that it would submerge itself in a related ideology in order to live on in other clothes (pages 310-311).

University of Michigan

PRESTON SLOSSON.

CALLENDER, HAROLD, *A Preface To Peace*. New York: Knopf. Pp. xx, 280. \$3.00.

So sober and eminently sensible a survey of recent history as Mr. Callender's book deserves attention on both sides of the Atlantic. As a foreign correspondent of the *New York Times* the author has visited practically all parts of the globe worth while seeing in war-time. Yet his personal experiences are hardly alluded to, and the more scholarly and weighty appear his judgments on the questions of the past as they will affect the future. While his eyes are fixed on the coming peace, he narrates contemporary history anew and avoids the pitfalls that beset the path of most planners.

After stating a few simple truths about the shrinkage of this one world of ours he undertakes to describe American policy in the Mediterranean as seen by Mr. Murphy, the American representative in North Africa. Mr. Callender, always factual, gives his readers the whole case as made out by the Department of State, including a complete list of everything sent by the United States to French North Africa before the allied invasion. He describes how four ships were released "for service through an understanding with the Germans via Vichy", an agreement signed by General Weygand and Mr. Murphy on February 26, 1941. Whatever our judgment about these transactions, Mr. Callender prints the whole story and leaves it to his readers to judge whether, in fact, these small supplies helped to prepare the soil for the successful invasion by Anglo-American forces at the end of 1942. The ten shiploads, it may be thought, could do no great harm. What causes surprise is the statement that "the end justified any, or almost any, means." Perhaps this constitutes the only possible defence of the dealings with Noguès, who had ordered his men to fire on American troops; with Peyrouton, the former Vichy minister; with the unspeakable Darlan himself. The uncomfortable feeling that must overcome the reader in such company becomes no less strained when it is seen that a mere footnote is devoted to General Giraud's discrimination against Jews.

Mr. Callender restrains unduly his own opinion when he speaks of these blunders which can hardly be called a preface to peace. He himself is of the opinion that all the doubts about certain dealings with Pétain, Darlan and Badoglio go back to the mistaken policy of non-intervention in Spain when the democracies allowed Hitler and Mussolini to get away with a cheap triumph—a legacy from which the world is still suffering.

The author seems sound enough on Germany. He makes the point that disarmament of the enemy alone will not bring peace and that a dismemberment of Germany will not help us in uprooting German expansionist aims. He does not despair of a change in Germany: "Germans", he recalls from his own exper-

ience, "have long felt admiration, amounting sometimes to a kind of awe of the British." Meanwhile, the Allies must be ready to act in time, and allow e.g. no other occupation of the Rhineland. Yet this, like everything else, depends on our working partnership with Russia. On this Mr. Callender ought to be read with great care everywhere.

The lesson seems simple enough: none of the three great powers could win this war single-handed; whatever defences were put up by the Western Powers or by Russia, they did not "achieve the security they are seeking." Security belts, annexations or federal groupings will not succeed either. Such annexations would only lead to renewed suspicions between the great powers—and "hostility or distrust between Britain and Russia could only lead to an early revival of German power."

The conclusion seems irresistible. Whether we inject the broad issues of great principles—belief in the rights of the Small Nations, in self-determination tempered by collaboration—, or whether we reason as "realists" pure and simple: we cannot escape the conclusion that America, Britain and Russia must co-operate. If this partnership becomes a living force, all problems resolve themselves. "No great power", says Mr. Callender, "need dominate small states in the interests of its own defence." If all three form part of a collective system in which all of them believe, the incentive for advanced frontiers and bases will have disappeared.

It remains to be added that Mr. Callender is highly complimentary to Britain when he makes the shrewd point that Britain, by fighting Hitler while America was a neutral, helped to save United States influence throughout South America, bolstered, in fact, the Pan-American movement of mutual Good Neighborliness. Three articles reprinted from *The Times* of London on the future of Europe and the place of the Small Nations give added weight to his well balanced and illuminating survey.

Elizabeth College, Buxton, Derbyshire.

F. W. PICK.

ROUCEK, JOSEPH S., ed., *A Challenge to Peacemakers — Conflicting National Aspirations In Central and Eastern Europe, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 232, March, 1944. Pp. 240. \$2.00.

In editing and publishing this volume, both the American Academy of Political and Social Science and Professor Rouček have rendered a signal service to all those, and their number certainly is legion, who desire first-hand information on the underlying causes of possible conflict in Central and Eastern Europe without having to go into the time-consuming study of primary sources and specialized literature. The 24 articles published in *Challenge to Peacemakers* cover almost all the existing problems of Central and Eastern Europe; most of them, harmoniously combining brevity with scientific objectivity. It is only natural that the value of these articles is not uniform. The material published in *Challenge to Peacemakers* is divided into the following four sections: "Backgrounds",

"Nationalistic Ideology and Goals", "Central-Eastern Europe and World War II", "Peace Planning and Reconstruction." While the articles comprising the sections entitled "Backgrounds" and "Central-Eastern Europe and World War II" are generally on a high scientific level and are full of well-digested information, the same cannot, unfortunately, be said about the section "Nationalistic Ideology and Goals" in which the high standards set by the aforementioned sections are not always met.

It is in this section that we find Dr. Rustem Vambéry's article on "Nationalism In Hungary," probably the best single contribution to the volume, along with Dr. Alfred Bilmanis' "Free Latvia In Free Europe" and Mr. P. Zadeikis' "An Aspect of the Lithuanian Record of Independence," which—written as they are by officials of the liquidated pre-Soviet régimes of their respective countries—are hardly more than apologies for these semi-fascist régimes. Outstanding among the other articles of that section are Professor Thaddeus Mittana's article on "Poland Among the Powers" and Dr. Heinz F. Eulau's contribution on "The New Soviet Nationalism"; and while certain points may need additional clarification, they provide ample information on the topics which they discuss.

Dr. Stefan F. Possony's article on "Political and Military Geography of Central, Balkan and Eastern Europe" in the beginning of the volume contains an excellent explanation of the generally ignored geographic and geopolitical premises of Central-European politics. Dr. Possony's article ranks high among the contributions to the volume and is an extremely useful one. Professor Oskar Halecki's article on "The Historical Role of Central-Eastern Europe" contains a remarkably good condensation of the principal political problems which Central Eastern Europe has had to face in the past and will have to face in the future; but, unfortunately, in this article, as in most of his other work, the author tends to overemphasize the part played by the development of "ideas" over that of economic and social development. Dr. Josef Hanč contributes a useful refutation of "Some Misconceptions About Central and Eastern Europe."

The section on "Central-Eastern Europe and World War II" contains several outstanding articles which, taken together, constitute an excellent synthesis of the problem indicated in the title. Much has been written about the Governments-in-exile, but the article of Messrs. Daniel Bell and Leon Dennen on "The System of Governments In Exile" is a good and useful recapitulation, seasoned with considerable independent research. The underground struggle of the occupied European nations has also been widely reported and discussed in this country, but most of what has been written so far has been of a technical or military nature. Dr. Władysław R. Malinowski's article on "Patterns of Underground Resistance" is a successful attempt to systematize and rationalize the various forms of underground resistance according to historical background and actual experience. Among others in this section: Professor Floyd Cave's "Axis Domination in Central and Eastern Europe", Dr. Thorsten V. Kalijarvi's "Central-Eastern European Minorities in the United States" and Dr. Emil Lengyel's "Struggle Among United Nations' View Points" are good digests of information available

in their respective fields. The accuracy of Dr. Lengyel's presentation, however, of the Russian-Polish rift might have been greatly increased, if the author had read a few of the articles published side-by-side with his own.

Problems of post-war planning and reconstruction constitute a separate section. President Edward Beneš's article, "Toward Peace In Central and Eastern Europe" is a perfect restatement and condensation of the well-known views of that eminent statesman on the problem of peace organization in Central Europe. Dr. Feliks Gross' article on "Peace Planning for Central and Eastern Europe" is an extremely useful recapitulation of historic tendencies toward federation in that region of Europe. Dr. Gross points out the problems which Central-Eastern Europe will face in the post-war world.

New York City

WILLIAM J. EHRENPREIS

FISCHER, ERIC, *The Passing of the European Age*. Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 1943. Pp. xiii, 214. \$2.50.

Even those who will not be much impressed by the proofs of its fundamental thesis, will find Eric Fischer's book stimulating. The author tries to prove that European civilization is declining in Europe, but may "survive in new centers outside Europe." He compares the situation of Europe today with the situation of Ancient Greece in the period of Hellenistic expansion. Eric Fischer belongs to the school of Oswald Spengler, which regards world history as a field in which civilizations grow up and decay. The value of his book consists in some interesting broad observations on the relations between Latin America and Spain, England and the Dominions, (though he probably overstates the influence in the British Empire, and the United States and Europe. The chapter on Russia's Shift to Asia as also interesting though surprisingly Eric Fischer does not discuss the Eurasiatic interpretation of Russian history which fits in with his general thesis. The tragedy of Germany is seen in her attempt to maintain at any price the dominant position of Europe. Enlightening, but very incomplete are Fischer's remarks on European immigration to the United States and its effect on the various European nationalities. He devotes some attention to the Slovaks; a close analysis of the Ukrainians, Bulgars, Croats, and others would have been very valuable.

Basically the book suffers from the lack of precision concerning the term European civilization. Is it determined by a geographical and racial delimitation or by acceptance of certain spiritual values and by common traditions? Eric Fischer's explanation of European decay is also somewhat vague. Nationalism and economic rivalry between the imperialistic powers are stressed. Future possibilities of the Slavic world are not discussed at all. But the questionable character of the foundation is partly compensated for by statements on the shifts of civilizations, which, as Professor S. B. Fay points out in his foreword, "Americans will find profitable to read and ponder."

University of Notre Dame

WALDEMAR GURIAN

CHAMBERLIN, W. H., *The Russian Enigma*. New York: Scribner's, 1943. Pp. 321. \$2.75.

Just as in the period following World War I so now Russia attracts greater interest and attention than any other country in the world. Of the talented American authors and journalists William Henry Chamberlin is one of the most effective writers on the subject of Soviet Russia. In his recent book he has succeeded in presenting a graphic picture of the evolution of the Soviet régime in different periods and from different aspects, from Leninism to Stalinism, including a review of Soviet economics, foreign policy, sources of Russia's strength in this war and so on. In the concluding chapter of the book he deals also with the problem of Russia in the post-war world.

That Mr. Chamberlin is a shrewd observer and a well-informed writer is manifested in his analysis of facts and events. His predominant interest is in the purely political problems rather than the economic, social, psychological or ethical questions. It is regrettable that his overwhelming and sincere passion for individualism, freedom and liberty blurs his judgment and prevents a clear view of the wider horizon of the historical past and the probable future of the Russian state and people.

The introductory chapters present some views on Russian history, the country and peoples. Mr. Chamberlin has accepted a rather novel interpretation of Russia's historical development to the effect that the state plays a greater role in Russia than the elements of individualistic, liberal and capitalistic spirit do in Western Europe and in America. In his view this amounts practically to the conclusion that the state wielded power over the individuals and the people cruelly and as over slaves. He does not recognize that Peter the Great was not only an "autocrat", but rather a "servant to the people and the father-land" (he used that slogan before Frederick of Prussia). He does not see that the Russians, although ruled by autocrats, were and are a democratic people in their instincts and their every-day life. A great part of the Russian upper classes, especially the intelligentsia, made sacrifices for the common people.

It is a misunderstanding to imagine that before the nineteenth century Russian intellectual life was of a "sterile nature". (p. 32) Speaking of this period it is misleading to mention only Mikhail Lomonosov, a peasant's son, a leading member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and founder of the University of Moscow.

Deep religious life brought up such an unusual character as was protopope Avvakum, whose autobiography (1672) even an atheistic Soviet biographer characterizes as—"one of the chefs d'oeuvre of the world of literature".

Later, an original economist, Ivan Pososhkov, dedicated to Peter the Great the book on "Poverty and Wealth"; this is an inquiry concerning the origin of unnecessary poverty and reasons for the growth of greater wealth. (1725) The title is reminiscent of A. Smith's "Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations" (1776).

Empress Catherine's court poet Gabriel Derzhavin wrote the ode "God"

translated into all European and Asiatic languages. All this—to cite but a few names—surely does not justify “the impression of a nation asleep” (p. 28).

In the chapter ‘Land and People’ Chamberlin asserts that ‘there are only a few really ancient Russian cities . . . the Volga provides an especially sharp contrast to the Rhine, where old towns and castles in various stages of ruin constantly recall the Germans of the Holy Roman Empire’ (p. 48).

Many European students and travelers down the Volga visit her banks and close-by not only “comparatively young cities” but understand and admired such historical and esthetical antiquities as: Rostov the Great (founded 862), Suzdal’ (before 1000), Uglich (1100), Vladimir (1108), Yaroslav, (1125).

Chamberlin’s summation of the twenty-six years of Soviet politics is a masterpiece of descriptive writing, rich in details. We have to object to only a few points.

In Lenin’s time the Soviet policy was criticized for being too internationalistic. It now becomes fashionable to criticize Moscow for being too patriotic and “nationalistic”, Mr. Chamberlin believes that “Suvorov, the hero of the newly nationalistic Soviet Union, is as hateful a name in Poland as Cromwell in Ireland” (p. 295). A known biographer of Suvorov wrote (1912): “Suvorov’s activity in Poland, compared with the cruelties practiced by the Austrians and Prussians in the occupied regions, created for him a wide popularity among the Poles . . . In 1791 the Magistrate of Warsaw (the old Magistrate of free Poland) presented Suvorov in the name of Warsaw’s people with a golden enameled snuffbox with the arms of the city and an inscription—“Warsaw to her Liberator”. Another mistake is the remark that Suvorov “played a prominent part in subduing Pugachev, a peasant rebel of that time.” Suvorov was under orders to report for duty to Count Panin, whose army was advancing against Pugachev. But Pugachev was betrayed by his partisans before Panin’s army arrived.

In the chapter on postwar problems Mr. Chamberlin advocates the requests of the governments of Poland and the Baltic states in London. He makes an exception for Bessarabia, because “the province was occupied (by Rumania) after the First World War in a period of great Russian weakness”. If this is the justification, it should be applied to the formerly Russian Baltic provinces and the Western parts of White Russia and Ukraina (Eastern Poland) which were separated from Russia at the same time as Bessarabia.

We doubt that the difficulties between Russia and Poland are objectively described when it is stated: “One can understand the indignation of the average Pole at the suggestion that half of the former national territory should be assigned to Russia, that the new partition of Poland, arranged by Stalin and Hitler, should remain in force, so far as Russia is concerned”. (p. 294) In another part of the book the author himself cites the fact that “the majority of the population in the eastern provinces of Poland is racially White Russian and Ukrainian.” (p. 200)

Mr. Chamberlin concludes the book with the hope that this country will “cooperate with Russia in order to win the war and to maintain peace after the

war" (p. 306). But he asserts that "it would be idle to deny that one sanction for the maintenance of a disarmament convention in democratic countries is lacking in the Soviet Union under its present political organization". (p. 305).

The Soviet political system is surely far from being perfect, but it seems that the existence of a formal constitutional democracy is not in itself a guarantee against all evils. It should not be forgotten that the Weimar Republic was democratic in structure, but that did not preclude Germany from ignoring her disarmament obligations. This country too did not avoid significant mistakes following World War I.

Each of the United Nations will have reasons to display good will in criticizing its own country first for the purpose of a durable universal peace and good international relations.

Mr. Chamberlin's study is written with the sincere wish to be objective and is much more balanced and comprehensive than the frequent writings for the one-sided purpose—for or against Russia.

Washington, D. C.

WASSILY W. LEONTIEF, SR.

ANDERSON, PAUL B., *People, Church and State In Modern Russia*. New York: Macmillan, 1944. Pp. vii, 240. \$2.50.

After each internal cataclysm in Russia there followed a powerful expansion of the Russian state. The period of Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible saw the increase of ethnical Moscovia by annexation of the Tartar Khanats of Kazan and Astrakhan as well as Siberia. Following the internal crisis during the reign of Tzar Peter the Great, the Empire of Russia was born, so renamed from medieval Moscovia. The new Russia acquired the Baltic lands, and eastern Ukraine with the Black Sea Steppes. The period of Peter the Great prepared for the eventual conquest of all the Black Sea shores, the remainder of Ukraine and White Ruthenia together with a further expansion into Asia. A powerful growth of Russian influence in the world succeeded the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. It is interesting to note that the Russian church during each crisis in Russia was deprived of its authority. Nevertheless, after the crisis, the church became a very strong factor in the service of Russian imperialism. No doubt similar occurrences will transpire today in spite of the Marxist principles—inimical to all religions—of the communist party in the USSR. Such has been the rule in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, it being the national church of the Russian people. This same conclusion was reached by Paul B. Anderson who writes that "the Orthodox Church is the Church of the Russian People". The Russian church has been humiliated, has suffered and is triumphing with the Russian people.

This closeness of the church to the people is customary among the other eastern European people such as the Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, etc. As a consequence it can be stated that it is impossible to know the life of the Church, past and present, among eastern European peoples without having a full knowledge

of their national life. It is necessary, therefore, to base studies of Church relations in the USSR not only upon Russian but also upon non-Russian sources.

The USSR of today is not composed of one people, nor is there one common church. For example, the Russian Patriarchal Church in Ukraine was considered foreign, as was also Russian rule.

The book should be reviewed with such considerations in mind. This author based his able study exclusively upon Russian sources, and, therefore, his conclusions are incomplete. The author's work is excellent where he deals with the Russian Church and the Russian people, ethnically speaking. It is a real treasure of information concerning the internal trends of the Russian church in the past and especially during the Soviet period. Mr. Anderson is familiar with new Russian religious literature. His knowledge of the situation of the Russian church in the Soviet Union is outstanding. This is especially true of chapters IV to VII.

Religious affairs in the Soviet Union are viewed objectively and critically by the author, although he is obviously sympathetic to the USSR as an ally of the U.S.A. This sympathy inclines him toward accepting the constitution of the USSR as a reality in Soviet life and leads him to compare the ideals of the Bolshevik revolution with the American democracy of Thomas Jefferson. However, he does not hide the anti-religious stand of the Communist Party and the inimical treatment of the Church by the Soviet government.

The sections dealing with the church life of non-Russian peoples is weaker. Some of the information is inexact and confusing. (Chapter VIII) The historical references to the old Ukrainian Metropolitans of old Kievan Rus are not entirely correct. For instance, the Kievan Metropolitan never resided in Novgorod nor in Suzdal. Metropolitan Peter Mohyla was not consecrated by the Patriarch of Jerusalem and Constantinople. Also, he did not receive any church autonomy from the patriarch of Constantinople for the Ukrainian Metropolitans of Kiev, who since the 11th century had possessed a type of autonomy; Metropolitan P. Mohyla was their direct successor. Furthermore, Ukraine was not liberated from Tartar domination either by the Ukrainian Kozaks themselves or with Poland's aid. The Ukrainian principalities were liberated from the Tartars by Lithuania during the 14th century, with whom the Ukrainians lands were united in a form of federation.

The influences of Russian church literature are evident in the author's treatment of the Church Union in Ukraine. The Church Union of Ukraine with Rome was obviously not so strange for Ukrainians since two-thirds of all of the Ukrainians and all of the White Ruthenians professed this faith in the 18th century and since Russia, to accomplish its extermination, had to use force. And today, Church Union is far from being a "no man's land" in Ukraine since it is the national church of western Ukrainians in Galicia, which is the most nationally dynamic section of the whole Ukraine. In addition, it would be very difficult to find a Russian peasant in Galicia.

The section dealing with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Soviets is not entirely clear. During the first decade of Soviet domination in Ukraine

there were two Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, the Ukrainian Autocephalic Church—entirely independent of the Russian Patriarch, and the Ukrainian Autonomous Living Church—dependent on the Russian Living Church. To which of them the author refers as the "Ukrainian Autonomous Church" is uncertain.

Outside of these slight inadequacies, Anderson's work is a valuable handbook about religious life under the Soviet rule in the USSR.

Mahwah, N. J.

NICHOLAS CZUBATYJ

BIENSTOCK, G., SCHWARZ, S. M., and YUGOW, A.; FEILER, ARTHUR & MARSCHAK, JACOB, edd., *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. xxxii, 198. \$3.00.

This first volume in a series of international studies, published under the auspices of the Institute of World Affairs, established by the New School for Social Research, is a study of value.

It presents a good introduction to the American students of Soviet Russia's economics and social relations. The research group was asked to ascertain facts, to draw a picture "of the machinery of Soviet management, of the distribution of functions and powers in factory and farm; of the origin, status, incentives, and, if possible, ideology of managerial personnel" (Introduction, pp. xv-xvi).

The management studies are almost all concentrated on the formal side: subordination, advancement, remuneration. The wages, the amount of production, the special conditions in different industries are not the aim of this study. But one gets a very instructive picture of the role of the Communist Party, of the trade unions, of the planning organs and so on in the management. The problems of the output, cost and price-fixing are treated only briefly.

The work in the kolkhozi or collective farms—the agricultural units—is described in the same way. However the conditions there are more complicated and the results of the studies are less convincing.

The program of the book goes out of the narrow frame only in chapter nine. Here Mr. Schwarz tries to present a more analytical scheme of a social process which he presumes to be active in the Soviet State socialism. The essay of Mr. Schwarz is dominated by a critical idea (though not clearly expressed) which is well characterized in J. Marschak's introduction to the book: "By the time of the outbreak of war, industrial managers had become the nucleus of what developed into a privileged and ruling class; inequality and educational opportunists tended to make hereditary the power and standing of this group and others that enjoy a similar educational level, exercise functions of leadership, and are related to the managers and to each other by links of family and social intercourse; there are traces of a deliberate policy fostering the formation, consolidation, and rule of the stratum" (p. xxviii).

The other two authors and the editor "have not found this hypothesis sufficiently supported by facts".

In our opinion the tendency of the described development is exaggerated by Mr. Schwarz, and at the same time this tendency can be considered, contrary to Mr. Schwarz's viewpoint, as a sound evolution and a stabilization of a balanced State socialism.

Mr. Schwarz gives figures of the percentage of manual workers (and their children) among the students training for industry, transportation, and for all higher institutions as well. In 1928-33 the proportion increased rapidly. In 1933 there began a reverse development. But Mr. Schwarz does not mention that until 1934 there existed a policy of forbidding the "lishentsy" (persons of bourgeois origin) to enter high schools and universities. Children of the educated parents tried in a legal or illegal way to be registered as sons of manual workers. Later on, and especially in accordance with the Constitution of 1936, the policy became more "liberal", and consequently the figures of 1938 do not correspond with those of earlier times.

The original Soviet policy against educated families was regarded as a mistake and was defended as means of breaking down the influence of the previously wealthy circles and of preventing a reestablishment of capitalistic tendencies. At present the power of money is abolished in the social life and a stabilization of the new social order, based on State socialism, has to be welcomed. A policy of definite leveling of all social groups would be, in light of the conditions in Soviet Russia, a socialistic policy of dogmatism and utopianism and would not be able to succeed. The tendencies of the first years of Lenin's and Stalin's State policy are replaced by a more realistic rule. However the possibilities for children of common people to rise to high positions are much greater in Soviet Russia than in any other country.

It is regrettable that the authors did not approach the whole problem of management from a broader viewpoint and did not analyze the questions in connection with historical and sociological events.

For example, speaking of the kolkhozi it should have been of importance to mention the old peasant community—the "obshchina". This system of common landownership of Russian peasants helped greatly to establish the new working communities. The collective work-organization—"artel"—the word used now as an agricultural work unit—is a centuries-old Russian institution.

In the criticism of planning (page 48 and following) the author has not paid attention to the fact that really objective planning has met with many difficulties because of the backwardness of economic and statistical theory in Soviet Russia. The first Five Year Plan was worked out on the basis of broad economic research. In the following period the objective economic theory, the research work about economic facts and fluctuations, was neglected; partly because of the fear of an independent judgment on the forced industrialization and collectivization. At that time even the necessity of economic equilibrium was regarded as a capitalistic viewpoint.

"The balance of the national economy", "the all-comprehensive financial

plan," these important means aiming at successful planning—Stalin himself insisted several times on their necessity—were not worked out any longer. One may object that meanwhile decentralization in economics, which is a very efficient policy, took place. But still in these circumstances a governmental management of all national economics, requires an account of all activities and a general picture of all production and distribution, as well as a general financial turnover plan.

All my remarks on the reviewed study do not aim to diminish its significance and usefulness. The authors, although not living in Soviet Russia, have manifested an understanding of the right way to use the published Soviet materials. One important omission has to be mentioned. There was in Moscow an "Institute of Administration" (Institut tekhniki upravleniia), publishing special magazines: "Technics of Management", "Organization of Management", "Rationalization of Production", which could give some aspects of the governmental viewpoint on the subject.

On the whole the book can be recommended as a reliable source of information about the administration of industry and agriculture in Soviet plants and collective farms.

Washington, D. C.

WASSILY W. LEONTIEF, SR.

ERNST KRIS, HANS SPEIER AND ASSOCIATES, *German Radio Propaganda, Report on Home Broadcasts During the War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. 529. \$4.00.

This latest product of the scholarship of the New School for Social Research is one of the best that has appeared up to now. It deals with the significant factor, propaganda, this time on the home front in Germany.

Other studies have been made of propaganda directed by one nation against another, particularly over the radio; and, although the definitive book on propaganda is yet to be written—Dr. Goebbels would be the logical author—they have made varying contributions to our knowledge of this technique of social persuasion.

This volume is the first large-scale attempt to analyze radio propaganda intended for consumption in the very culture that originated it. It is something of a model for subsequent studies. Beginning with the basic nature of Nazi home propaganda, its techniques and limitations, it examines next the stereotypes created for the German public: the Fuehrer himself, the minor leaders, the German soldier, the people (both as "normal", commonplace men and women, and as that mysterious collective entity, the "Volk"), the Nazi party, Germany, the enemy, Axis allies, and the neutrals. Lastly, it discloses the operation of this propaganda against the background of specific situations such as the conquest of the low countries and France, Italy's entrance into the war, anticipated victory in Russia, and ultimate defeat.

Two methods are used by the authors. The first is the usual combination of description and analysis, well documented from the records of the British Broad-

casting Corporation over a two year period. The second is the quantitative approach, in which propaganda phenomena are charted and graphed as to incidence, frequency, increase and decrease, generally in association with a specific cultural background. For example: the intensity of vilification of Britain and the United States is measured before and after Pearl Harbor.

The quantification is decidedly elementary, but is nonetheless useful for purposes of visualization. It is also another instance of the need for more exact sociology, if the social sciences are ever to be truly scientific.

On the negative side are several items. Most important is the fact that the authors did not personally hear any of the radio propaganda they are talking about. Their conclusions are based on what they read from the digests of the BBC. As a methodology for written propaganda their tactics would be obviously acceptable. In the case of spoken propaganda such a course omits too much and may be scientifically dangerous.

Radio propaganda is meant to be heard rather than seen. The whole mechanism of stimulus-response is geared to a different sensory level. A broadcaster is chosen for his tonal qualities and for his ability to arouse emotions directly through the voice-ear-gland complex. He may pronounce the word "Churchill" with scorn, indifference, anger, or repulsion. He accentuates whole passages, accelerates his tempo, and otherwise vocally modifies his meanings. These factors are nowhere taken into account in this book, and the weights given to different items and concepts may be therefore entirely wrong.

The credit for authorship is an interesting though minor point. Ernst Kris and Hans Speier receive top billing. Their associates are then duly named and recognized for their respective contributions, and from this one may glean that actually the senior authors wrote less than four out of the fourteen chapters between them, one associate, H. B. White, writing at least five chapters himself. Of course Kris and Speier edited the whole, but query: is not the credit for editing sometimes overdone?

Of the two major faults (from this reviewer's point of view) of the New School for Social Research, a confusion as to the dividing line between the social and the psychological realms, even a seeming unwillingness to recognize the superorganic character of culture, and an undue reliance upon the metaphysical approach as expounded by von Wiese and a whole tribe of German pseudo-social scientists, this book exhibits very little of the first and practically none of the second.

German society is not analyzed in psychiatric terms. The word "psychosis" is not in the index. Nor is propaganda explained by reference to the "soul-needs" of a culture. Can it be that this volume marks the beginning of a new deal for the New School?

University of Colorado

WILLIAM S. BERNARD

ARMITAGE, JOHN, ed., *Europe in Bondage*, London: Lindsa Drummond Ltd. 1943. Pp. 98.

This book, destined for the general public, attempts to present a broad picture of the European countries conquered by the Nazis. The meticulously organized and varied features of direct and indirect domination are well described though in some cases it would have perhaps been useful to give more details. Luxembourg gets almost as much space as Poland. Quislings and resistance movements are also briefly characterized. Since the book was published in April 1943 the rise of Marshall Tito and the clashes in the Underground are not mentioned. But it has some value for its presentation of the views on conquered Europe held in England when the tide started to turn against the Third Reich. In his conclusion John Armitage recommends a two-fold remedy against a repetition of Germany's actions: ". . . give Germany political and economic hope for the future; . . . prevent Germany by every means in our power from the ability to make war."

WALDEMAR GURIAN

EDWARD J. BYNG. *A Five-Year Peace Plan*, New York: Coward-McCann, Inc. Pp. 184. \$2.00.

W. W. SCHUTZ, *German Home Front*, London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd. Pp. 312. 10s. 6d.

Dr. Byng is a well-educated, widely traveled British journalist, who dedicates his book to Marcus Aurelius who declared that governments repose most safely on love and not fear. His peace plan is based upon the belief that while Nazism and its confederates must be thoroughly beaten and suppressed, the future will be good or bad in consonance not with what is done to Germany or Japan but with what is accomplished to create a new world order. Dr. Byng believes that such an order can be established step by step over five years. In some respects his proposals are rather conventional. His Union of Nations does not differ greatly from the older League, even though he argues that it must have "supra-national authority" in clearly defined specific fields. On the other hand, other suggestions in the book are, if not novel, at least realistic and fairly sensible. Thus he urges that the French Constitution be reformed to give the President of the Republic power to act similar to that exercised by the President of the United States. He is opposed to the cession of East Prussia to Poland, urging that Poland accept instead a "corridor" farther to the East, including the city of Koenigsberg. In general Dr. Byng's mind seems to be that of a devotee of functional common-sense, unconcerned with the difficult problems which are rooted in historical development. Constitutional questions in particular are treated with somewhat more of breezy brevity than of cautious concern with the complex psychology which surrounds all law. This is, however, in several respects a very good book. It is aware of the economic and political facts concerning Europe and Africa, and

it is more than normally wise in its estimates of the part which America could take in the drama of post-war history.

Written in 1943, Dr. Schütz's book is even now a useful summary of information concerning German public opinion at that time. The information was derived from publications inside Germany as well as from neutral sources. While not everything then available seems to have been brought to the author's attention, his account is by far the most complete and dependable survey. He shows that the German citizen was skeptical of Nazi military claims, and that in particular he viewed the attack on Russia with deep misgivings. Meanwhile the Hitler dictatorship itself was not meeting with anything like unanimous approval. The lack of confidence in its purposes and the prevalent unwillingness to accept its view of life are clearly reflected, for instance, in the popularity of foreign broadcasts. In spite of drastic penalties, the German people kept on listening to London, Moscow and the Vatican. Religious opposition grew more rather than less formidable. Dr. Schütz outlines in considerable detail the resistance of Bishop Von Galen, while making it clear that this was no isolated phenomenon. The book was written in order to show that Hitler was not as formidable as he seemed, but it is clearly also a summary of evidence about the "other Germany" so frequently discussed.

Hunter College

GEORGE N. SHUSTER

WEISKOPF, F. C., *The Firing Squad*. New York: Knopf, 1944. Pp. 265. \$2.50.

The narrator, a young Sudeten German, is one of a detail of six Reich soldiers who share quarters, quarrels, lusts and fears in seething Prague at the time of the Hangman's assassination. He records wonderingly his comrades' disintegration and his own wretchedness—a growing sense of guilt and terror, as revealed mostly through actions and emotional reactions, with some parenthetical generalities on the demoralization of Germany as a whole. These six men are recognizable types, brought to life chiefly by the extreme materialism of their brutal existence. Some of the civilians connected with them on the home front stand forth more convincingly than the principals themselves.

Had this book indeed been written by a German Nazi reborn to the light, we should have cause to read it thoughtfully. We may wait long before a real Hans Holler finds the courage or the opportunity to confess his "fear to think", "longing for decency" and "complete solitude" in conformity with his enormous guilt; and still longer before we can believe that such an one speaks for a regenerate people. So far, most of our own and our allies' literature of anger and of hope, powerful though it may be, must be regretfully consigned to the category of wishful thinking, where it visions forth a cleansed German or Germany. A Reich firing squad may fall to pieces from opportunism, treachery, poltroonery or bad luck in the face of the enemy; but penance, in the valid sense of confession, clarifying pain and complete self-revaluation is extraordinary in a seriously alien-

ated people. Magnanimity must be credited to a Czech writer who would grant such a mercy to one of his nation's grotesque oppressors.

R.D.T.

HAGEN, PAUL, *Germany After Hitler*. New York and Toronto: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944. Pp. 240. \$2.00.

This book is a fervent plea to the Allied nations and statesmen to accord fair treatment to defeated Germany after having eradicated from the nation's life the national-socialist canker. In many respects the volume is a sequel to Hagen's *Will Germany Crack?* (See this *Journal* Vol. II, No. 4, January, 1943, p. 445 ff.). The new book which is almost a blueprint of a German democratic dreamland of the future, is a repeated profession of faith in the strength of German anti-Nazi democratic forces and their mission in Germany. After having read the book many people will rather be inclined to believe (and rightly so) that Germany's military defeat and the disappearance of the Nazi Party will result in a vacuum in German political leadership. It seems very unlikely that men liberated from concentration camps or the German underground or returning German political refugees or former trade union members will be able to fill the vacuum.

Hagen wants to make us believe that in Germany "it is the workers who are representatives of the democratic traditions" while in the western countries the middle classes led the battle for civil liberties. But the German social democrats felt and fought as socialists and not as democrats and democratic groupings in Germany were middle class organizations. It is, therefore, a play with words to advocate democratic revolution or revolutionary democracy but to regard the working class as the backbone of future democratic development and to shrink from using the label "Socialist revolution" obviously for fear of being called a communist. Revolution in Germany will hardly lead to democracy but to a more radical brand of social and political order. Only after having read 206 out of 240 pages does one find the misleading use of the term "democratic" frankly admitted by the author himself when he writes: "The democratic revolutionaries, that is, the German socialists . . ." It is understandable that Hagen—while denouncing the Bolshevik claim of monopolizing true socialism—does not like the idea of advancing the discredited term of a "German" socialism at this particular moment when the whole world is sick from the ill effects of a decade of German "national" socialism and will need a century of recovery. Hagen's program of "revolutionary democracy" is a socialist manifesto clothed in democratic phraseology. The forces on which he counts are not the democratic-liberal of the pre-Hitler period, but the socialist.

In spite of the publisher's assertion that the author "knows German history," his knowledge of German history has not perceptibly improved since the publication of his first book. In his introductory chapter, "The Case of a Retarded Democracy," prejudices, insufficient knowledge, over- and under-statements are intermingled to an almost unbelievable extent. A passionate political tract and

appeal like this is not a historical textbook aiming at the highest degree of historical accuracy. But even if allowance be made for simplification of complicated issues in order to focus the non-scholarly reader's attention on the essentials which the author wishes to stress, this cannot mean unrestricted freedom to reduce factual information to a point where it borders on misstatement. The reader who takes Hagen's word for the content and consequences of the Carlsbad decrees cannot imagine that most German governments gave a mild interpretation to the article stipulating control of the universities, that books of more than 320 pages remained exempted from censorship and that the "secret inquisition" (p. 19, i.e. the "Central-Untersuchungs-Kommission,") although an instrument of tyranny, simply does not compare with the standards of inquisitions the average reader might remember, the Spanish and the Russian. On p. 199 Hagen mentions followers of La Salle (*sic*) and "influence of 'Eisenacher'"—a remark which must be a mystery for anyone not familiar with German Social Democratic Party history.

Hagen even surpasses numerous clearly propagandistic efforts of recent years attempting to show that the alleged aloofness of the German Army from politics was always nothing but a myth and a screen purposely built up in order to veil the real designs of the masters of the German military machine; his assertion that since about 1700 of the officers, a privileged feudal cast, have run Prussia "with a few short interruptions usually following a military defeat" (p. 14), is simply unfounded. The author not only disregards the findings of Alfred Vagts in his paper "The German Army of the Second Reich as a Cultural Institution" (1940), but he wholly ignores the changes in the social structure of the officers' corps in saying that the Junkers supplied "most of the officers for the army." From Karl Demeter's investigation (*Das deutsche Heer und seine Offiziere*) it can be seen that in 1860 65 percent of the Prussian officers were nobles, but in 1913 the proportion was reduced to 30 percent; of the lieutenants alone in 1913 only 25 percent were nobles. Of Generals and Colonels in 1860 86 per cent were nobles, in 1913 52 per cent (or 56 per cent if those who were knighted during their career are included). Even in the General Staff, commonly described as the Junkers' domain and paradise, in 1913 already half of the members hailed from non-aristocratic families. It is to be hoped that in the course of time inaccuracies of the sweeping generalizations of Paul Hagen, Hans Ernst Fried and Curt Riess about the German Army will be recognized as such and the results of scholarly analysis arrived at by Alfred Vagts, Franz Carl Endres, Herbert Rosinski, Karl Demeter and others no longer be neglected.

Hagen wants the result of an impartial historical investigation of the underlying causes of Hitler's victory in Germany and Mussolini's victory in Italy to be included in the final documents of peace (p. 186). This suggestion is made in order to prevent a repetition of the psychological warfare waged by the Germans for twenty years against the "war guilt clause" of Versailles. Here, with the best of intentions to mitigate somewhere post-war bitterness and hate, the author seems obsessed with that mistaken sense of German "objectivity" which refuses to see

and to admit that in investigating the underlying causes of National Socialism one must definitely have chosen for or against Hitler. There are spiritual values at stake whether or not the "impartial" investigator is a American or a Frenchman, a Swiss or a Swede.

As explanation for Germany's "retarded democracy" the author pictures the struggle of a progressive Germany with her roots in democratic movements and an archaic Germany of pre-democratic absolutism. But he is content with an economic interpretation which completely leaves out of the picture the philosophical abyss between Germany and the Western world which cannot be bridged by outwardly embracing democracy; a man who disregards the work of Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch about the relationship of German and Western European intellectual and political developments should refrain from writing superficialities on the subject. The critical reader will have to sprinkle his copy with question marks when he reads, for instance, that "at the time of the Gettysburg address" there existed a Northern German Diet (p. 20), that Germany in September, 1943, asked for armistice terms (p. 214) and that Erzberger at Compiègne was the delegate of a (non-existent) Reichstag Peace Commission (p. 28). Erzberger did not represent "the people" in contrast to military members of the German Armistice Delegation, but he was appointed as representative of the German Government by the Chancellor Prince Max von Baden at the recommendation of General Groener. The name of "the famous steel and munitions baron" (p. 26-27) is certainly not Kardorf and the steel magnate Kirdorf never was a "baron".

Hagen continues in his second book to speak of "the German labor movement" irrespective of its sharp dissensions and divisions. Without making clear his mandate he makes himself the interpreter of the stand allegedly taken by the 'German Labor Party', for instance in the question of reconstruction by forced labor. It is remarkable that by contrast with his previous book the author displays now a much greater reserve towards the German underground movement and reports emanating from it. The rapid deterioration of the German situation which is obvious to-day makes it possible to dispense with this type of information which was valuable to a limited extent as a corrective of the over-optimistic fanfares of National Socialism in its heyday.

Hagen pleads for "the greatest possible degree of freedom and self-government" of post-war Germany. What recently has become known about the plans of the allied government in dealing with "Germany after Hitler", namely full rule of the Reich by the Allies (Pertinax in the *New York Times*, August 11), an Allied demand of permanent separation of Austria from Germany (James B. Preston *ibid.*, August 12) and full Allied occupation after unconditional surrender (President Roosevelt, *ibid.*, August 18) must come as a shock to the author. There is no faith on the Allied side in "German democracy" and there is too much wishful thinking in Paul Hagen's analyses to substantiate his case for giving a chance to the hidden German democrats. It seems there will be no room left for experimentation with any German governing body in approximate conformi-

ty with Mr. Hagen's hopes and recommendations. While he emphasizes that any future shifting and resettling of populations should be based on the principle of voluntary decisions and not be in terms of forced migrations, the Czech and Polish plans (as discussed by John MacCormac in the *New York Times* of August 10) with regard to the Sudeten Germans, Danzig, East Prussia and Silesia surpass even his worst expectations and will be exactly the opposite of a "democratic solution" of the Czech-German and Polish-German conflict.

Hagen's principal fear is that Germany be made for an unlimited period the pariah of the world which would destroy any hope for democracy in Germany. Noble as the sentiments of the author are, dictated by deep anxiety over the future of Europe and the prospect of lasting peace, his proposals are a cry in the wilderness. There is no chance at the present juncture that his warnings and suggestions will be heeded—well-founded and convincingly presented as, in many instances, they may be. By his critique of Lord Vansittart in the present book and more recently of Emil Ludwig (for instance in *Town Meeting* Vol. 10 No. 9, June 29, 1944) refuting their hymns of hate and castigating the cynicism of their "peace" proposals, Hagen does a public service.

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THE SLOVAK "STATE"

HOW IT WAS BORN AND HOW IT WILL DIE

by Vladimir Clementis

EVEN the relatively small clique of active supporters of the "Slovak State idea" is clearly realizing the consequences of the historic truth which we might formulate in a few words as follows;

The Slovak State (which was later renamed the Slovak Republic in its Constitution) came into being without the participation, indeed against the will, of the majority of the Slovak nation.

This fact explains the contradictory, nay "anarchistic" line of Bratislava's propaganda which while trying to find a historical and ideological background for the action of March 14, 1939, when Slovakia was declared "independent", is seeking to adduce legal grounds for the continuance of the Republic.

The arguments in favor of Slovakia as an independent State may be classified as arguments of "principle" and arguments of "opportunism".

Within the first category fall those arguments that point out that the Slovak Republic is not a newly created State but merely the restoration of the Slovak State of the 9th Century, the Great Moravian Empire. Thus it is argued, the Slovak Republic is the outcome of the age-long political endeavor of the Slovak nation, and the historic circumstances under which this endeavor was realized are irrelevant.

Though the Bratislava Government's propaganda does not hesitate to twist historical facts to the point of absurdity, it is quite impossible for it to manufacture out of the Greater Moravian Empire (which in a geographical, ethnical and to some degree ideological sense might be called the precursor of the Czechoslovak Republic), the historic precursor of a puppet pseudo-State existing at the mercy of Germany, the tool of her

abuse against everything symbolized by the Greater Moravian Empire and the ideas of Cyril and Methodius.¹

Indeed "Führer" Tiso himself contradicted the oft-repeated dictum of Bratislava's propaganda that the "Slovak Republic" is the outcome of an age-long struggle by the Slovak people. In one of his public speeches at Stubnianské Teplice Dec. 9, 1943, Tiso said the following:

"I publicly declare that we were not in favor of an independent Slovak State during the former Republic. I say this openly. Anyone asserting otherwise would be guilty of falsifying history. It was we who branded Jehlicka as a traitor, when he advocated this. Such is the historical fact². . . We genuinely wanted autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic."

Such being the case it is clear that the argument in support of the "Slovak State" has little hope of success if it takes the line of "principle". The very man who embodies the idea of a Slovak State to-day, the "Führer and President" himself, belies those who put forth the claim that the Slovak State is the outcome of the age-long political endeavor of the Slovak nation!

There were, however, individuals like Jehlicka and with similar ulterior motives (the annexation of Slovakia to Hungary) who were the sole people responsible for secretly conspiring to secure "Slovak independence as a State" after the Czechoslovak Republic was formed. Chief of these was Dr. Bela Tuka, now Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to the "Slovak Republic." Everybody in Slovakia knows that though Tuka is of Slovak origin he registered himself as a Magyar during the Czechoslovak census of 1920, and in 1928 he was condemned to fifteen years' imprisonment for espionage and high treason. His activities after his pardon in 1938, as well as his own admissions regarding his work up to 1928 in the years 1938 and 1939 merely serve to accentuate his personality in the eyes of

¹ Saints Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius were Moravian Apostles who were born at Salonica and knew a Slavonic language which had not yet split up into the various dialects. They left the Byzantine Empire and came up to the Greater Moravian Empire in 863 A. D. at the invitation of Prince Rastislav, where they spread Christianity, introduced the Slavonic Liturgy, invented a special alphabet known as Cyrillic, and were the founders of Slavonic Christian culture and literature. Their mission met with fierce opposition on the part of the German bishop, and documents dating from that time show that Nazi Gestapo methods in Germany have traditions over a thousand years old. The tradition of Cyril and Methodius is at one with the culture and spiritual unity of the Slavonic nations and their opposition to German imperialism.

² Jehlicka was in fact an agent in the pay of Hungary. He advocated the "independent statehood" (of Slovakia), in the belief that this was the first step towards getting Slovakia reannexed to Hungary.

the Slovak people whom he is ashamed to face in public. His Magyar accent and his miserable command of Slovak make him a laughing stock throughout Slovakia.

A few men of desperate character have grouped themselves around Tuka and these have been working with the Gestapo agents since 1938, though their significance in Slovak political life was nil. Several of them have managed to make a career for themselves. One such careerist is A. Mach, "Minister of the Interior", while others such as Murgas had to be removed from public life owing to scandal, which was insupportable even in the eyes of the Tiso régime—this, in spite of his services to the State". This is a fact of some importance in a "State" in which the very leaders are weltering in a slough of "aryanization" (expropriation of Jewish property) and other forms of corruption.

Such, in brief outline, are the reasons why the efforts made to support the "Slovak State" idea by using traditional Slovak policy up to 1938 and the substance of which its ideology is composed, are failing and are bound to fail in the end.

For this reason greater faith is placed in the "opportunist" line of propaganda, the "realistic" line which takes the view that the Slovak State was the outcome of necessity. It was an act of national self-preservation forced upon Slovakia by the international situation, an act which was carried through within a "strictly legal" framework. The various acts and regulations of the Czechoslovak Republic were respected and the Slovak State succeeded because all Slovaks realized what an advantage the present constitution has over the past, and they are going to safeguard their "State" and defend it if necessary.

It cannot be denied that the outward facts of the case did seem to support the first item of this line of argument, namely the argument of self-defence. We should, however, see this in the light of the political and psychological situation as from the autumn of 1938 to the spring of 1939. We must see it in the light of Munich and the situation created in Czechoslovakia by her abandonment at the hands of her Western Allies. Then we shall realize the genuine Slovaks were just as little able to oppose Hitler's "gift" to them of an "independent State" under a totalitarian régime headed by Dr. Tiso as the Czechs were able to prevent Hácha pleading with the Führer on their behalf to take over the "protection" of the Czech territories.

Hitler's original intention, as we have learned from documents so far extant, was to divide Slovakia between Poland and Hungary immediately

after Munich and to annex the Western part for strategical and industrial reasons.

It is hard to say whether this was his real view or only a manoeuvre with regard to Poland and Hungary. But it is certain that as early as March 1939 he threatened Slovakia with this division if the country was unwilling to accept the "independence" he offered. And nothing is more terrible for a Slovak than the idea of coming once more under Magyar domination from which the Czechoslovak Republic freed the Slovaks, thus protecting them from national extinction. And this was a further reason why the declaration of the Slovak State did not meet with open and visible resistance but was accepted with a certain passivity. Even the further international development, up to the point when Slovakia was drawn into the war against the U.S.S.R., seemed to support the "realistic quality" of this policy "of the lesser evil".

Indeed nothing which the propaganda of the Bratislava Government is adducing with such energy and scope to prove that the rise of the Slovak State was carried out within a "legal framework", bears the least relation to the truth. Quite the contrary.

From the point of view of formal law the Slovak State came into being by the law of March 14, 1939, "of the independent Slovak State". Paragraph 1 of this law runs: "The Province of Slovakia declares itself to be a free independent Slovak State. The Slovak Provincial Diet is transformed into the legislative body of the Slovak State". But it is, of course, completely absurd to maintain that "no State in the world came into being in a more legal manner than the Slovak Republic"³ and that the present régime can "place on a basis of legality every act of Slovak life by which the independence of the State came into being and was built up."⁴

What actually happened is as follows:

The Slovak Provincial Diet which issued the law quoted above was "elected" under the law on the autonomy of the Slovak province.⁵ And that means that this law did not express the will of the Slovak or Czech people. But even under this law the legal relation of the Province of Slovakia to the other provinces of the Czechoslovak Republic belonged exclusively to the competence of the joint National Assembly. Although the Slovak Provincial Diet made a decision regarding Slovakia's independence as a

³ Deputy J. Mora in the Bratislava Parliament of December 2, 1943.

⁴ Minister for the Interior A. Mach at Žilina Dec. 18, 1943.

⁵ Constitutional Law, No. 299, 1938. Collections of laws and orders, accepted soon after Munich.

State, it is not possible to qualify as legal this decision, which did not come within its competence, and especially after everything which preceded the passing of the law on the autonomy of the Slovak province and the manner in which the "elections" to the Slovak Provincial Diet were carried out.

Today even allied political and legal circles have accepted the principle which was maintained by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, that all acts—and especially those appertaining to State law—which resulted from Munich or are conditional upon the Munich Agreement, are invalid in the same way that the Munich Agreement itself has been declared null and void by Great Britain and France.

Now, to refute the theory of the "legality" of the birth of the Slovak State we need not go back even to this basic theory, for, as we have already explained, even under the post-Munich law of autonomy the Slovak Provincial Government was not competent to proclaim "the independence of the State".

And the composition of this Diet was such that it had even less legitimate moral and political than legal authority to proclaim the independence of the State. It must be borne in mind that as early as October 7, 1938, the so-called autonomous Government, with Dr. Tiso at its head, seized power in Slovakia, although this Government is only recognized by the law accepted by the post-Munich National Assembly in November 1938. Tiso was already striving to carry out a Fascist system of a corporate State after the manner of Dollfuss and without regard to the laws in force. He had unconstitutionally destroyed in Slovakia almost all civic liberties, dissolved the political parties and transferred the whole of the executive power in practice to Hlinka's Popular Slovak Party and its organs. The Trade Union Organization, societies and even newspapers which did not belong to this party were dissolved, liquidated or taken over by this Party.

Under these circumstances Tiso's Government carried out "elections" to the Slovak Provincial Diet on December 18, 1938. They were carried out in violation of all the existing laws and stipulations governing elections. Tiso himself made out the list of candidates from members of his own party or at least persons devoted to himself; he prevented quite unconstitutionally other lists of candidates from being presented and had the elections carried out in the form of the well-known Nazi "Volksabstimmung". But even so (as has easily been ascertained) the results of the election were falsified where the population voted in a body against the candidate in order that he might be able to show "an imposing majority" where none existed. I myself was intimately acquainted with the feeling of the Slovak

people at the time of these "elections", and I know for a certainty that in the event of free elections Slovakia would have voted against the candidates of Hlinka's Popular Slovak Party.

Thus we may say without hesitation that the Slovak Provincial Diet was the last institution on earth which had the legal, moral and political authority to speak in the name of the Slovak people on March 14, 1939.

Bratislava propaganda has yet a third "argument" in favor of its statehood. It goes somewhat along this line: The Slovak State has been a success, the Slovak nation intends to maintain it in the future, nay, more, the Slovak people is fighting side by side with its "protectors" and will continue to fight. In connection with this argument we must mention once more that, due to the interplay of various circumstances, completely independent of the Bratislava régime, the situation in Slovakia compared with that in Bohemia and Moravia or in other German occupied or protected States shows certain favorable points.

It is true that the Germans in their so-called agreement on the protection of Slovakia for 25 years expressly maintained that this new "State" was to renounce in favor of Germany the two most characteristic signs of State sovereignty: an independent foreign policy and the administration of military affairs. This state of affairs was made still worse by Slovakia's "acceptance" of the Anti-Comintern Pact and of the Pact between the Axis Powers. And what the Germans did not except in writing they seized *de facto*. Economic life naturally came entirely under their influence (the Germans seized part of the banking and industry, especially the heavy industry) and Slovakia had to furnish Germany with as many forced laborers and soldiers as she was ordered.

In spite of this, however, the military and economic situation of Germany-dominated Europe up to the defeat at Stalingrad did not force the Germans to intervene in a drastic manner in the vital needs of little Slovakia. The Führer, it will be remembered, decided on the creation of "an independent Slovak State" not only because under existing circumstances it made easier the liquidation of post-Munich Czechoslovakia ("Slovakia has become independent, Czechoslovakia no longer exists, Hitler is thus not bound by his promise at Munich to guarantee her frontiers") and because it furnished him with a camouflaged jumping-off place against Poland, but also because he wished to make of Slovakia—as he himself expressed it—a "Schaufenster" for his "generous" policy towards the small nations.

Besides this the economic structure of Slovakia with its great number of medium-sized and very small farms greatly impeded the carrying out

of a contracted economic system, especially since the Slovak officials were already helping the Slovak people to hide supplies instead of declaring them for export to the Germans. And the Germans, especially the high officials and functionaries, regarded Slovakia as a kind of "natural reservation" for themselves and tens of thousands of their children with whom they flooded the Slovak watering places and summer resorts.

It is, however, true that even under these circumstances the wealthy German Reich owes to small and poor Slovakia as much as five billion crowns, whereas the currency in circulation within Slovakia is calculated at three billion crowns. But for the reasons given, this state of affairs did not deteriorate into a lack of the necessities of life.

We add that the new régime dismissed from State and public service more than 20,000 Czechs and filled their places with Slovaks and that it rewarded the most "loyal" people out of the expropriated and "aryanized" property of Jewish citizens, it might almost be expected that it would win a lasting position and that the idea of an independent State would take firm hold among the Slovak people.

Things, however, developed in the opposite direction. Tiso's régime, from the moment that he seized power in Slovakia, not only gave no opportunity to the Slovak people to express its view clearly about him (for instance, in the form of elections), but, on the contrary, by means of systematic oppression, compulsory and obligatory organization, concentration camps and prisons, tried with all his might to overcome and suppress the free will of the Slovak people. And yet it is enough to follow the Government controlled press from Slovakia to find plenty of proof in the admissions of the representatives of the régime themselves that the majority of the Slovak people have been able in this complicated and difficult situation to maintain their high political and moral standard and that they decisively repudiate Tiso's régime and with it his "State."

These remarks about the views of the Slovak people might have been supported by a considerable number of quotations from the press mentioned. But to-day we no longer need to have recourse to the *views* of the Slovak people but to their *acts*, when we say that they are rising against Tiso's State to bring about a new and better Czechoslovak Republic.

I am thinking of the increasing acts of sabotage in Slovakia, of the beginning of the partisan struggle, but especially of the thousands of Slovak soldiers who have gone over to the Red Army and to the partisans and later to the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Soviet Union who are fighting

there. It is not here a case of isolated episodes or of acts of especially thoughtful and resolute individuals.

The Slovak soldiers who went over to the Soviet partisans in the Crimea, the Ukraine and White Russia, have in many places had a decisive share in the battles against the Germans in the interior and later—after the advance of the Red Army—in the defence of the population and places against the devastation of the German Army. The Soviet appreciation of these partisans and their recognition by the Soviet military leaders can leave no one in doubt.

In connection with these heroic actions by the Slovak soldiers we must emphasize the fact that the Bratislava Government sent to Russia the youngest age group, which they considered would not have been "perverted" by the Czechoslovak tradition. But the very fact that the whole of Slovak youth both on the Russian and Italian fronts and at home has taken its stand resolutely against Tiso's régime and for the Czechoslovak Republic is the best proof that the spirit and the will of the Slovak people has not been led astray.

But we should be deceiving ourselves if we explained these manifestations as an indication that the Slovak people is exclusively in favor of the return to the conditions of 1938. It does not wish for this. It wants Czechoslovakia to be still more democratic and to have more social justice than in the past. And it wants above all to place the relations of Czechs and Slovaks in the new Republic on a more lasting basis than was the case in the past. In other words, on no account must the mistakes be repeated which were made towards the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia in the past.

Not even the fiercest anti-Czech propaganda of the Bratislava Government can deny the fact that without Czech help in 1918 the Slovak nation could not have been saved from the death which was threatening it in Hungary, and that without this help the Slovaks would never have been able to develop culturally and nationally in the miraculous way in which they have done in Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, however, the Bratislava propaganda has been able to use and exploit the mistakes of the Czechoslovak Government towards Slovakia in the economic field and the staffing of State services. Actually both the Slovaks and the Czechs who wielded political power in the past are jointly responsible for these mistakes. But the bulk of the Czechoslovak people maintain that these mistakes did not entitle Tiso's Government to commit crimes against the nation. Mistakes can be set right, and today both Slovaks and Czechs are convinced and

determined that these mistakes shall not be made again in the Czechoslovakia of the future.

The bitter experience of the past few years has taught all honest Slovaks and Czechs that they belong together, that they are close together in every way, that their fates are linked together and that therefore their future is best guaranteed in a common State for which, as during the first world war, they are making joint sacrifices and both shedding their blood.

And thus we have really answered the second question which we asked in the title of our article: "How will the Slovak State die?"

This quasi-State, which did not come into being from the will of the Slovak people and has not performed its mission but has only tarnished the bright name of Slovakia, will disappear by the will of the Slovak people and their active cooperation.

LONDON, ENGLAND

GERMANY'S POST-WAR BOUNDARIES—A SUGGESTION

by James K. Pollock

THE imminent collapse of Germany makes it imperative that we give careful consideration not merely to the problems of military occupation but also to the future status and position of the German nation. For purposes of occupation it is assumed that Germany will consist of only that territory which was included within the boundaries existing on January 1, 1932. Although it is possible that an armistice may be negotiated and might well include provisions regarding the disposition of German territory, it would be better practice to embody any changes in the territory of Germany in a treaty of peace to be negotiated sometime after the end of hostilities. Problems of occupation cannot be put off until a later date, but the future boundaries and position of Germany in Europe can properly be postponed until the more immediate problems of European rehabilitation are on the road to solution. Meanwhile it is well to have a clear idea of how Germany's future boundaries should be drawn.

Assuming the return to its rightful owners of all German territory acquired after 1932, the victory of the United Nations poses several impor-

NOTE: In view of the crucial importance of boundaries in Europe, the present intentionally undocumented essay is published as a *point de départ* for further discussion. As occasion offers other more detailed considerations of German or other boundary lines in Central Europe may be presented. Ed.

tant territorial questions. In the East the question of Danzig and East Prussia must be solved. Similarly, the problem of Upper Silesia and any rectification of the former Polish Corridor will need attention. In the West the status of the Saar territory must be settled and other possible changes in the boundary between Germany and France and Germany and the Low Countries must be studied.

The determination of the eastern boundary of Germany is clearly of the greatest international significance. After the last war the compromise solution which established the so-called Polish Corridor and internationalized the Free City of Danzig did not work satisfactorily. Neither the Poles nor the Germans had a good word to say for it. Now, with the Soviet Union in the picture, as it was not in the picture at Versailles, the situation is altogether different. The insistence of the Russians on the Curzon line as the western boundary for the Soviet Union has naturally shifted the pressure of the Poles in the direction of German-held territory. All of the Polish groups are now demanding the annexation of East Prussia and some of them are even claiming Germany territory up to the River Oder.

A careful study of all of the ramifications of the problem of Germany's eastern boundaries leads to certain rather definite and well established conclusions. First of all, for security reasons alone, Germany should no longer be permitted to hold the province of East Prussia or the Free City of Danzig. Neither Poland nor Russia would be secure against future German attack if this colonial province of the Reich were allowed to remain under German control. The old boundary of East Prussia was only eighty miles from Warsaw, and it was from East Prussia that Germany launched an important part of her successful invasion of Poland in 1939. This province has always been strongly fortified, and its whole position strengthened by every German régime with a view to its future military use. The victors in this war are not committed to maintain the present German Reich or German nationalism, and the proposed cession of East Prussia is calculated to produce a more stable situation in eastern Europe.

Secondly, East Prussia has for a long time been treated as a colonial territory by the government of Germany. Special privileges were extended to this province to strengthen its agriculture and its economy and to make certain its continued connection with the rest of Germany. A vigorous policy of settling pioneers in this area has been pursued by all the governments of the Reich. Despite such favored treatment, however, East Prussia has never been able to stand on its own feet, and as a small German island surrounded by a sea of Polish population, the area has steadily dropped behind the rest

of the Reich. Over a period of years it has lost German population in a rather steady drift to the western parts of the Reich. This has been the situation not only since 1918, but also during most of the last century. With its poor soil and rigorous climate, not to mention its distance from the economic and political centers of the rest of Germany, East Prussia has always been something of a liability to every German government.

In the next place, although the population of East Prussia, which totals around two and a half million people, is predominantly German, there is a substantial Polish minority located principally in the administrative district of Allenstein, which numbers about one-third of the total population of the province. Many of these people are Masurians who voted for inclusion in Germany in the Marienwerder and Allenstein plebiscites in 1920, and they are Lutheran and not Catholic. But no amount of German doctored statistics can make these people into Germans. They form a natural connection with the rest of Poland.

It is true that the cities of Danzig and Königsberg are indisputably German, and it was in Königsberg that the Kings of Prussia were crowned. Nevertheless, the hinterland is Polish, and in the east Lithuanian, and the claims of less than two million German people should not be superior to those of over thirty million Poles. If Poland is to be given a firm position, one in which she can grow and develop, she must have undisputed access to the Baltic Sea, and the unworkable plan laid down at Versailles should not be repeated after this war.

Poland's military position in East Prussia would be greatly strengthened if she shared the control of this province with the Soviet Union. A division of the province, therefore, between the Soviet Union and Poland seems to be the soundest solution of the problem. Russia could be given the northern third of the province, including parts of the administrative districts of Königsberg and Gumbinnen and extending to the port of Königsberg. In the eastern counties there is a considerable Lithuanian population which would then be joined with the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. Primarily however the justification for this division of the province rests on military considerations, and the Soviet Union should be given only those contiguous East Prussian counties whose control is necessary to assure the Soviet communications to Königsberg. The Poles should be given the remaining two-thirds of the province together with the Free City of Danzig, regaining of course all of their former territory in the so-called Corridor. In this way two nations would be responsible for keeping the Germans from re-acquiring

this strategically important territory, and both Poland and Russia would be placed in a strong position which time would strengthen.¹

If it be objected that some two million German residents of East Prussia and Danzig might have to be transferred, the answer is that this would be no insuperable obstacle. The withdrawal of all German military, political and administrative personnel together with those German residents who prefer to reside in the Reich, plus the pressure of the Polish population, will in a decade completely change the composition of the province and eliminate the possibility of the Germans appealing successfully to the wishes of the population. Exchanges of population have taken place before, and they can take place again. Actually, the areas annexed to Poland and the Soviet Union would have a much better chance of thriving economically than they have ever had in modern times. East Prussia and Danzig would then be united with their hinterland. Furthermore, Soviet possession of Königsberg would make certain that the Baltic would never become a German lake.

With the annexation of Danzig and most of East Prussia by Poland, the frontier between Germany and Poland would be reduced by nearly a third, thus enlarging the Polish margin of security. An unnatural part of the German empire, in which the Germans have lost the historic struggle for ethnographic continuity with the rest of the Reich, will at long last become an organic part of the areas around it. Linked with Poland, East Prussia's disadvantageous situation should in time be improved.

Two other changes in Germany's eastern boundaries should be made. The administrative district of Oppeln in Upper Silesia should be ceded outright to Poland. Also, the two countries of Flatow and Schlochau which are a part of the new Nazi administrative district of Grenzmark along the former Corridor, and the county of Bütow belonging to the district of Köslin in Pomerania should likewise be ceded to Poland. These cessions are justified both on grounds of ethnography and strategy. The Oppeln district of Upper Silesia is predominantly Polish, and its possession would strengthen the Polish military and economic position against Germany. Similarly, the cession of the three counties along the western boundary of the former Corridor named above would assure the Poles of the control of an important trunkline railway, and reunite large bodies of Polish residents with their brothers in Poland. Other cessions of German territory in the East cannot be justified. The territory east of the River Oder, including Pomerania

¹ Since this article was written the British Prime Minister has publicly suggested a similar division of East Prussia between Russia and Poland.

and Lower Silesia are indisputably German, and their cession to Poland cannot be justified on any reasonable ground.

In the West two important transfers of German territory are indicated. The first one is the territory of the Saar. Although Germany was awarded the Saar territory by the plebiscite of 1935 and although this territory is overwhelmingly German in population, justice demands that France be recompensed in some tangible way for German occupation and military destruction. France should, therefore, be awarded the Saar territory in complete occupancy for ten years. During this period France could be free to exploit the resources of the Saar for her own purposes. At the end of the period the territory should be returned to Germany, if in the meantime a new democratic government had been established in which reasonable confidence could be placed.

In the second place, the people of Holland should be partially indemnified for the wanton destruction of Dutch property by German troops, by the occupancy of a contiguous German area. To this end it is proposed that Holland be permitted to occupy and utilize the administrative district of Aurich belonging to the province of Hannover and bordering Holland on the northeast.² As in the case of the Saar, the Dutch should be permitted to utilize the resources of the area for a period of ten years at the end of which time the territory should revert to Germany if conditions are favorable. The occupancy of both of these territories during the transition period by the French and the Dutch would have a military value as well.

One final territorial consideration should not be overlooked. The island of Helgoland in the North Sea and the island of Fehmarn in the Baltic should be occupied by Britain and Denmark respectively, and utilized by the United Nations as military, naval and air bases for as long a period as international security requires.

These territorial changes would weaken Germany, but they would not deprive her of anything necessary to national existence. On the other hand the transfer of these territories would help in some degree to indemnify Germany's neighbors who have been unmercifully treated by the Nazis. Boundaries would be established which would have a firm foundation both in sound economics and in military security.

The problem of Germany's internal boundaries also deserves brief

² The Netherlands Prime Minister has recently suggested that his country may feel constrained to request indemnification for Nazi destruction in the form of the cession of German territory to Holland. Mr. Attlee, the Deputy Prime Minister of Great Britain, has expressed his government's support of such a claim by the Dutch government.



ORGANIZATION



LEGEND

- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- BOUNDARY OF REICHSLAND
- TO POLAND
- TO RUSSIA
- TO NETHERLANDS
- TO FRANCE
- ⊙ NATIONAL CAPITAL
- CAPITAL OF REICHSLAND
- H HELGOLAND
- F FEHMARN

TABLE OF REICHSLÄNDER

LAND	POPULATION	AREA	CAPITAL
MECKLENBURG	4,178,800	36,147	LÜBECK
SACHSEN	6,733,900	64,322	HANNOVER
RHEIN	9,848,500	25,522	KÖLN
FRANKEN	6,228,000	44,842	KOBLENZ
	3,397,300	20,561	KARLSRUHE
THURINGEN	3,645,800	30,645	STUTTGART
BAYERN	5,025,300	52,149	MÜNCHEN
SACHSEN	9,256,800	43,010	DRESDEN
PREUSSEN	12,251,500	100,537	BERLIN

SCALE

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Km.

J.K.P./H.L.T.

mention here, even though such consideration involves several factors different from those which should determine Germany's external boundaries.³ Any territorial change necessitates internal political and administrative readjustments, and in the case of Germany a reorganization of her territorial arrangements has been long overdue. It is suggested therefore that the occupying powers utilize their controlling position during the transitional period to reconstruct Germany's principal administrative areas in such a way as to promote a more efficient military occupation, and perhaps lay a new regional foundation for future German governmental arrangements. Consequently, "Reorganized Germany" as shown on the map is drawn to present these proposed internal boundary lines as well as to suggest alterations in the international boundaries. These proposed sub-divisions of Germany are based on a careful study of the basic historical, cultural, economic, and political facts related to German development. In some respects, it is just as vital to world peace that Germany be required to reorganize within her new boundaries the centers of political and economic control as it is to impose new international boundaries upon her. For unless Germany is made into a political order which will promote the interests of the average citizen rather than those of the army and the industrialists, no new international boundaries will be of any value. Both of these steps, namely the drawing of new international and new internal boundaries, are necessary if Germany is to develop into a peaceful member of the international community.

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³ I have dealt with this subject recently in an article in the *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 38, pp. 970-975.

THE NATURE AND MEANING OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROUPING

by Alexander Kunoši .

A REALIZATION of common interests, together with the will to coordinate forces and remove rivalries, leads to international collaboration. All forms of international grouping are founded on this idea. In the post-world war international order there appeared, as a new tendency, economic regionalism. This movement was brought about by forces resulting mainly from the industrial revolution, the general transformation of the system of production, the need for exchange multiplication and acceleration of transport—all requiring large economic areas—and by their conflict with the prevailing principle of economic organization on the narrow basis of single political units and economic nationalism.

I.

Origins of economic regionalism.

The factors of physical geography confining countries to certain regions through climate, ways of communication, etc., push the economic integration towards a framework of regionalism. *So, the conditions afforded by geographical factors, together with forces resulting from modern industrial and commercial development, produce a fuller measure of solidarity which would be a sufficient driving force for regional economic collaboration.* This fuller measure of solidarity having been created, as a rule it is supported by further social factors, such as common history, linguistic affinity, common political concepts and the like. The Balkan States and the South and Central American States, having attained a similar stage of economic development, show significant tendencies towards regional economic collaboration.

When these conditions are present, for regional agreement to originate some particular impulse is needed. Thus, original agreements were frequently brought into being by a political or economic crisis. It seems that in the past the strongest impulse for the creation of regional agreements has been the political one. We see, however, that in areas where the atmosphere and feeling of political security are relatively great, economic motives are in the foreground and have a more urgent character than political problems. Then the economic reasons are a sufficient impulse for the creation of a regional group. (e. g. Hague Agreement: Scandinavian Group). Indeed, the Little Entente might have been transformed into a real economic group as a reply to the attempt of an Anschluss. An agricultural block was the

result of a deep agricultural crisis in the Danubian countries. Regional economic collaboration in South America found a very strong stimulus in the present blockade.

II.

Classification of regional groups.

The national economy in the actual state of organization of the world has its framework in the frontiers of the state. That is an identification of political territory and economic area, of political and tariff frontiers. Thus, some states are composed of various regions (Russia, U.S.A.); another region (Europe) is divided into many different states and national economies. The aim of regional collaboration may be to harmonize and integrate all the national economies in a broader form of regional economy, or to co-ordinate only some of the spheres or sectors composing the national economies. So, for example, in the case of the Little Entente the central organism of the regional group, the Economic Council, dealt with all the branches of economic life of its members. The representatives of all the economic institutions had periodical meetings; all the economic activities had to be harmonized.

In this case, even if the aims of such an organized general economic collaboration are not defined, the regional group favors a gradual formation of a larger economic area. In this instance, we have the regional group in the proper and narrow sense. Economic grouping on regional lines, but only for the fulfillment of a specific economic aim or function, is often called a regional economic group. Several examples come to mind: common marketing of opium produced in the Balkans, common efforts of Danubian wheat exporting countries for the gaining of agricultural preferences, importation in common of some raw materials and regional cartels or syndicates for concerted action in foreign markets, etc. The nature and development of these two types of regional grouping are fundamentally different.

In the case where the limits and objectives of collaboration are precisely defined, the lesser measure of solidarity required corresponds to the specific objects aimed at. The impulse of grouping would probably be exclusively economic. The improvement of economic relations between the members is not a necessary condition when we remember that the objective can be the attaining of economic advantages from outside states. The collaboration is strictly limited by the needs arising from the nature of the aim and of the branches or activity concerned. The regional group in the broader sense is limited in time and matter by the fulfillment of a specific economic aim;

no adaptation of the whole economic policy is asked for. States of even antagonistic character may take part: anti-revisionist Roumania and revisionist Hungary participate in the Danubian Agrarian Block.

When the whole national economies are affected, the regional group must be based on increased solidarity. This can result from primary interests of a political (e. g., a common danger) or of an economic nature. Within the framework of such a regional group, by means of extensive reciprocity, closer collaboration is possible than would be the case at the same time within the existing international framework. This indicates how regional grouping, in the proper sense, seeks to resolve by regional collaboration even those problems, the rational solution of which defies the regional framework. Because of this fuller measure of solidarity and very intimate collaboration, it may represent a sort of progressive element in the field of international collaboration.

The regional group has not usually *an exclusively political or economic character*. So great is the connection between political and economic problems that close political collaboration brings with it the need for coordination also in the economic sphere. Again, economic questions have usually political implications that an economic regional group cannot ignore; an effort must be made to create harmony between the political interests of the members composing the group. Experience shows too, that economic questions are difficult to solve in an atmosphere of political tension, and similarly economic uneasiness tends to emphasize the acuteness of political problems.

According to the circumstances, some regional groups may appear as political and economic—collaboration may be added only as a complement to the already existing political cooperation. Others, again, seem to have a purely economic character, for political collaboration is only systematically practiced as far as proves necessary to the pursuit of economic aims. In the first category may be placed the Little Entente, the Rome Block, and the Balkan Entente. In the second may be placed the Oslo Group and the Baltic Entente.

Economic regional groupings have often arisen as a necessary *complement to the already existing political regional solidarity* and collaboration, in which case the economic sphere has been clearly subordinated to the primary political aim, and economic collaboration has been guided by concrete considerations of political security. The regional economic collaboration has sometimes been influenced not only by factors of general security but even by directly strategical arguments. Certain types of industry were decentralized, surplus production of agricultural produce was introduced

and branches of production originated, or were restricted, not according to the economic needs of the group, but for motives of an entirely uneconomic nature. The Little Entente would be a case of this sort.

III.

Characteristics of the regional groups.

The regional group has an evolutionary character, and so far as methods of economic integration are concerned, is in contrast to the customs union. Within the framework of a regional agreement the rigid and conventional forms of trade treaties and diplomatic trickery soon disappear, as e. g., in the Little Entente, the Protocol of Rome, or the Hague Agreement. The essential characteristics of this evolution arise from the fact that the members of such a group, before its birth, built up their economies on the close basis of the political unit, but within the framework of the regional group the foundations have to be laid for the reorganization of the individual states on a broader regional basis, in accordance with the requirements of a larger area.

To illustrate this point it would be useful to look at the Economic Pact of the Little Entente, which had as its aim the unification of international trade policy and the increase of exchange of goods between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Roumania, and at the same time to integrate more closely their mutual economic relations. In the agreement of February 16, 1933, it was provided that these three countries should be as one body in such matters, and in order to regulate such a policy there was established a special Permanent Council, composed of three national sections. In each section five representatives of the main economic branches (commerce, agriculture, finance and transportation) worked together. The different committees worked out in a few years a whole series of measures concerning harbors, airlines, unification of statistics, customs regulations and other matters, and created a postal union with reduction of rates and coordination of postal savings banks.

The mutual trade had to increase by means of pre-established *plans of exportation and importation*. In some ways these plans were adapted to the actual necessities, but to a certain extent presupposed a re-adaptation of the structure of the national economies concerned.

In the preceding state of affairs there had been amassed capital investments in the individual states; institutions had been built up. These caused material impediments which could only be removed over a certain period of time by means of calculated and purposeful work of adaptation. Economic

regionalism so conceived is indissolubly linked with the *idea of economic planning*. Economic planning on the territory of a single state, economic nationalism is to be progressively transformed into an economic structure of regional dimensions and internationally harmonized. It seems reasonable to characterize these economic regional groups as holding a middle position between the protectionist idea and the idea of unlimited freedom of trade.

IV.

The most-favored Nation clause and the development of economic regionalism.

A practical means of amalgamation, a link between the members of the regional group, is preferences—mutually granted customs, quotas, payment advantages and exchange of industrial experts and organizers. The expansion and activity of regional groups have been hindered, indeed rendered impossible by the adherence to the legal validity of the most-favored-nation clause. The most-favored-nation clause has an economic significance when customs and tariffs are the most important instruments of protectionism. The economic *raison d'être* of the clause, however, is considerably reduced when protectionism uses the drastic means of quotas, currency control and the like. The effectiveness of the clause is restricted to the period of liberalism in which the tendency to do away with obstacles to trade predominates. In a period of bi-lateralism in international economic relations, when old custom barriers are multiplied and when new types of barriers to international trade are being introduced, the most-favored-nation clause does not bring about freedom of trade, and is not an efficient obstacle to protectionism. Norway after 1931 concluded only three trade treaties of the old type on the basis of the most-favored-nation clause—with Peru, Uruguay and Siam. With Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, etc., however, she concluded reciprocal quota or clearing agreements.

The most-favored-nation clause is based exclusively on the consideration of trade prosperity; it is based on the theoretical equality of the partners and on multilateral world trade. The regional preferential system is motivated by tendencies to regional solidarity, and attaches the greatest importance to genuine differences in structure and in the level of economic development in the different states. So the regional preference system appears to us, considering the development of the relationship of the regional clause to the most-favored-nation clause, as the very antithesis of the latter. For, in fact, every state standing outside the regional group, especially a great power, had the possibility of obstruction if it had a political or economic

interest in such obstruction, and could prevent small states from drawing closer to one another by the aid of regional agreements. The advantages which these usually small states desired and considered to be possible among each other would automatically have had to be granted to all states with whom treaties containing the traditional proviso had been made. Also, the most-favored-nation clause, to say the least, is in this period an impractical method for international exchange of goods. It has served mainly as a pretext for preventing the search for a way out of economic nationalism by the aid of mutual preferences within the framework of regional agreement.

The formal realization of regional agreements had, therefore, to be preceded by a relatively long and difficult preparatory period, in which the parties to the agreement had to include the Central European, Balkan, South American, etc., regional exception in their commercial treaties concluded with outside states. The latter were requested not to demand special advantages, on the basis of the most-favored-nation principle, equivalent to those granted to each other by the members of the regional group. The insertion of the clause could be obtained after the expiration of commercial treaties, when a member of the regional group, by granting some advantage to another state, could obtain the recognition of regional exception with the least possible difficulty. For tactical and material reasons it would have been very disadvantageous to denounce commercial treaties for the purpose of obtaining this recognition. It must be noticed too that this process could be carried out with ease in the case of states that were politically and geographically distant. Consequently the regional exception was admitted in the commercial treaties between Czechoslovakia and the United States of March 29, 1935, and of March 7, 1938, and in Czechoslovakia's commercial treaty with Guatemala of September 1936, with Brazil of July 22, 1936, with Bolivia, with Uruguay of March 23, 1936, with Ecuador, with Afghanistan and with Liberia. This enumeration of states with which Czechoslovakia succeeded in carrying through the regional clause is peculiarly conclusive.

Morten Tuveng, dealing with this problem in a Norwegian memorandum to the International Studies Conference in 1939, arrives at the following opinion:

"The outstanding reason for the termination of the regional cooperation with the Hague agreement properly interpreted was that in their agreements with other countries the signatory states were bound by the most-favored nation clause. *Inter se* facilities, therefore, automatically benefited other countries. This illustrates the fact that the most-favored nation clause is an

obstacle to the development of a regional cooperation in regard to a customs policy which might perhaps gradually pave the way for freer trade connections generally."

And an expert at the Fourth Balkan Conference threw much light on the situation by saying that a great work of international cooperation and pacification, the will of a compact mass of about fifty million people of six friendly and related nations, determined to establish their own union progressively upon the firm bases of economic collaboration, could be thwarted by some specious theories of the most-favored-nation clause theories, which have not been applied by those who would like to take advantage of them. A very important preferential regional agreement of 150 clauses—the Czechoslovak-Austrian trade agreement of April 2, 1936—was rendered nugatory by Germany, who appealed to the principle of the most-favored-nation clause.

The economic development supported by motives of a political order overcame partially these juridical obstacles, however, and bit by bit a whole series of regional agreements came into being. (Baltic clause, South American clause, Iberian clause, Scandinavian clause). The real economic results that could be obtained by regional groups in the presence of such obstacles were relatively small. The regional agreements remained on paper in their most essential clauses; they became lifeless and ceased to possess any actuality. Finally, various secret preferential agreements affecting customs, credit and transport matters and evading the most-favored-nation clause, became prevalent, especially in Central Europe.

The German judgment of the past attempt at regional collaboration ignored these difficulties and emphasized that it was frustrated for a simple reason, viz., a lack of complementary character of states concerned and the additional fact that regional grouping of complementary areas was certain to be hindered for political reasons.

We may even consider the fact that regional agreements were made in such large numbers and in different parts of the world as proof that regional grouping was one of the strong tendencies of this period. Here we may have to remember, for instance, the case of the increase in the scale of economic organization creating larger areas from which the tensions of competition and of bargaining were in part or in whole removed. Yet these tensions still existed sometimes in a more acute form, between the larger economic units thus created.

V.

Conceptions and meaning of regional economic grouping.

In the protected area of the regional group by the aid of regional

preferences and linking of all factors comprising the national economies concerned—tariffs, social conditions, transport technique, education, tourism, etc.—increased productivity and especially extension of trade between the members of the group and outside the framework of the regional agreements is supposed. For, if trade is improved by means of preferences and in consequence of this the national revenues increase, each member state also becomes capable of receiving larger imports even from external states. On the basis of larger imports, an expansion of exports is then possible. The system of generalized preferences is conceivable through the creation of regional groups: of the proposals for inter-regional collaboration in the Hodža Plan, through granting of preferences between the economic Little Entente and the Rome Block.

No doubt the plan of bringing into existence a unified economic area by means of progressive tariff reductions among the members and by preferences of all kinds presumes some sort of protection of the area. Such arrangements tend to break down gradually, as described, the protection of home markets thereby increasing specialization and intensifying international division of labor; *but the regional group might be harmful if the protection of regional economy were a multiplication of impediments to the development of world economy—for instance, by diverting trade from its natural channels. This system must be part of a general system of collaboration, otherwise it can only bring about complications, and increase in some way economic chaos.*

Several points are often argued for economic regionalism: the first usually put forward is that of the increased buying power of a large area. It is necessary to note here that this principle does not have universal validity. A larger population does not necessarily mean increased buying power which is not achieved solely by members. An increase in buying power will depend on the increase in the national income and on its proper division. It is a firmly held opinion, too, that it is desirable for a regional group to be created from mainly industrial and agricultural states. It is rarely taken into consideration that mainly industrial areas are customers for the overwhelming majority of export goods; it is in the greater part of the world, above all, the industrial urban population and not the agricultural which consumes these goods. The combination arising from the attachment of agricultural areas to predominantly industrial ones is not of itself, necessarily the most advantageous. This idea most frequently arises from a static point of view which completely leaves aside the dynamic of capitalism, without replacing it by something else.

It is often stressed, also, that regional grouping has meaning chiefly

when it is a union of rich and poor countries. Such a grouping of rich and poor countries does not necessarily, of itself, bring about the proportionate supply of capital. Even in close national economies, this has not been attained. A more proportionate distribution of capital in a regional group could be obtained only by the creation of this sphere of at least the pre-conditions that have been attained in national economic units. This means the creation of a uniform currency system in the regional group, common banking institutions which could carry out an appropriate distribution of capital throughout the regional group. As, however, capital follows the greatest and quickest opportunities of profit, the first assumption is, above all, a common regional program of investment and a direction of capital according to this, even should it oppose the principle we have noted.

Further, a sort of economic stability and increased social usefulness of economic activity are aims supposed to be better attained within the framework of a regional group with a planned economy than on the basis of small states.

It is supposed too, that a rational building up of an organized wider international economic system would be facilitated by a prior organization of economic areas, of which units it must consist. Thus, then only can world economy be organically cured, regenerated by regional economy areas first being created from national economies. It is supposed to be easier to satisfy by planning in the framework of this large area of natural economic requirements of the political units. This larger area is considered a much more favorable basis for economic planning too; for it is difficult to conceive a rational planned economy on the territory of the small single political unit.

Finally, it is often argued that the world as a whole has greater economic stability than continents, and continents have a greater stability than the political units into which they are divided.

For the classification of some essential points it would be useful to consider the characteristics of the German conception of regionalism. It is based on the economic advantages arising from the complementary character of the countries concerned and aims at the formation of an economically balanced whole. The Germans introduce as argument the results of the German commercial relations with Southeastern Europe, contrasting them with the so-called failure of the regional attempts of the Balkan Entente or the South American economic groupings.

In these two cases, small nations were combined for commercial collaboration merely to develop their economic resources, and to attain aims which they felt to be unrealizable by themselves, in the face of the great

powers. The results of economic relations between industrial Nazi Germany and these small agricultural countries of Southeastern Europe may be explained so far by the opportunities of trade of a great power with small states, and the necessity for them to accept unfavorable terms of trade. Thus, the German idea emphasizes as a primary condition a mutual complementary situation and refuses to consider the case of:

1. Possibilities of future complementary situations by mutual transformation, or
2. Homogeneous national economies which may be combined with good results so that their common advantages of comparative costs increase their joint production in a larger territory and under more favorable conditions.

Contrasted with the German conception is our view that regionalism will mean a multiplication of an area's own economic capacity by exchange with others, the avoidance of disadvantages and possible loss of political independence.

Great powers have not, in the past, shown any inclination to create such groups, primarily because they had no need to fear to such an extent foreign attempts at economic domination. Naturally, such a regional collaboration affecting the economic development of small states, does not prevent a larger international collaboration, in which small states would not be obliged to face alone great powers.

Regional economic collaboration must appear as a means not only of avoiding loss of political independence as a consequence of economic integration on account of continuously narrower economic connections, but *a fortiori*, of guaranteeing this independence. It ensures, through economic cooperation, an organized supply of goods and services which, with economic independence, would be lacking.

This movement, of far-reaching commercial and economic combinations, is simply designed to derive advantages from a larger economic area without sacrificing political independence and national individuality where economic areas are so divided.

LONDON, ENGLAND

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE ARMISTICE WITH RUMANIA

by Pavel Pavel

ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1944, the "Agreement between the Governments of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the United States of America on the one hand, and the Government of Rumania on the other, concerning the Armistice", was concluded.

This Armistice ended a war of more than three years which Rumania waged against Soviet Russia and, theoretically, also against the other members of the United Nations.

The Armistice was the legal consequence of Rumania's breaking of relations with Germany, on the 23rd of August, when she immediately, and of her own will, aligned herself by the side of the United Nations, who were always considered by the majority of the Rumanian people their natural Allies.

This event, which had great political, strategical and military importance for the whole system of Allied military operations in Central Europe and the Balkans, was at once welcomed by an outburst of joy from the camp of the United Nations.

Yet, certainly no one among the Rumanians imagined that this "working her passage home", to utilize the synthetic formula of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, was going to be an easy matter for Rumania. On the other hand, it was hardly imagined that the road towards a free and independent national life was going to be made difficult from the start, at least by a doubt, such as is contained in Art. 19 of the Armistice Agreement, with regard to Transylvania.

While drawing attention to some of the very recent past events, I do not intend to accuse Hungary in order the better to defend Rumania. The records of both countries for the last twenty-four years are at the disposal of all those who wish to consult them. But I cannot escape the impression that these records are already either altogether forgotten or they are misread. Should either of these two suppositions be true, I am afraid that the distribution of justice begins from now onwards to be vitiated and that the new European settlement which is planned contains already in it all necessary elements for a new conflict in the future.

Without going too far into history one can safely point out that in 1938, following certain diplomatic events well-known to all, Europe was categorically split into two camps. On the one side were Germany and her accomplices (including Hungary among them), who wished to impose

on Europe a "New Order". In plain terms, this "New Order" meant the domination of Europe by the Axis Powers, especially by Germany. By 1938 and the beginning of 1939, the German ambition for European domination had already proceeded beyond its theoretical phase and had begun to take a menacing concrete form by the annexation of Austria, the disintegration and then the suppression of the Czechoslovak Republic as an independent State.

What was the attitude of Hungary and Rumania at this opening of a world-wide international crisis? Hungary wasted no time in presenting to Hitler her bill of compensation for her historical complicity with Pan-Germanism. And she was promptly satisfied by annexing with Hitler's help, the greater part of Slovakia and the whole of Ruthenia in which scarcely any Magyars were to be found. Rumania not only refused to annex the small Rumanian region of Ruthenia but was ready to fight alongside Czechoslovakia against Germany. For no crisis however great could change Rumania's fidelity towards her friends and the established international order.

On the other side were the Western Powers, led by Great Britain, who after some conspicuous failures in their endeavour to "appease" Hitler, decided, at last, to maintain the international order as established by the Peace Treaties of 1919 and 1920. That happened after Germany's attack against Poland, September 1, 1939, when the present Second World War started. The fact that Rumania belonged to this group and that she was considered as being menaced by Germany is proved *inter alia* by the guarantee she received from Britain and France, together with Poland and Greece. Hungary, finding herself constantly in the opposite camp, naturally could not be guaranteed, for such a possibility would amount, almost directly, to the guaranteeing of Germany—Hungary being the consecrated outpost of Germany's expansion towards the East and the Southeast.

The Rumanian people's sentiment of hostility toward Germany was not a secret to anybody and least of all to Germany, as Hungary's fidelity towards Germany was always beyond any doubt. That was the main reason why Germany tried to weaken Rumania and to strengthen Hungary. So long as at the Carpathians and at the mouth of the Danube there existed a strong Rumania, the German expansion towards the East and the Southeast was always likely to be made at least difficult, if not actually to be checked. From the point of view of German ambition for European domination, the weakening of Rumania was, therefore, a previous necessary condition.

That was the political sense of the Vienna "Award" of August 30,

1940, by which a great part of Transylvania was given by the Axis Powers to Hungary.

The fact that this was understood by Britain at that time is proved by the statement made by Lord Halifax, then Foreign Minister, in the House of Lords, on September 5, 1940, six days after the Vienna "Award". "It equally follows, however", he said, "that they are unable to accept the settlement now announced of the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute over Transylvania, since the settlement is the result of an award by the Axis Powers and imposed under duress on Rumania".

Another fact which could not possibly escape the notice of any student of international affairs was that Hungary contributed more than indirectly to the provocation of the present war, just as Austria-Hungary provoked the last war. Further, that Fascism, with all its medieval attributes, was born in Budapest in 1920. Italy disturbed the peace of Central Europe via Budapest. The economic and military penetration of Germany into the Balkans was made through Budapest again, and Hungary was on all occasions generously compensated for her complicity with Germany. Indeed, in April 1941, she again annexed a large area of Yugoslav territory, while Rumania not only refused to share in the spoils but accorded all possible aid and protection to the Yugoslav armies and people who sought refuge on her soil.

It was, therefore, only natural that Hungary should be warned that all her ill-gotten acquisitions could be only of short duration and that her kind of international morality could not have the approval of the civilized world.

But there was another fundamental fact. Every informed international observer was aware that Rumania's western frontiers were not fixed in haste and without good knowledge of the ethnographical, economic, geographical and strategical conditions. One single quotation will be sufficient to recall this. "The argument", writes the historian of the Peace Conference, H. W. Temperley, in *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1928, "now popular among apologists of Hungary, that the Allies fixed on frontiers in ignorance of the true racial character of the lands in dispute is totally untrue. The recommendation on which the line was drawn was agreed to by various experts of the Four Great Powers".

It was also known that the Trianon boundary was a compromise between the American and British lines which would have moved the frontier about 40 miles to the east, and the lines proposed by the French and Italians which would have put it about the same distance west of the frontier finally adopted.

Apart from that it was well known that the Hungarians themselves proposed, more than a century ago, as for instance Baron Wesselenyi in 1843, the same line of demarcation between Hungarians and the Rumanians of Transylvania, as was eventually fixed at Trianon.

Great Britain's opposition to the conception of the domination of the world, politically and militarily, by Germany, manifested itself not only by the taking up of arms, but, as was to be expected, also in the moral and political fields as well. From the outset she declared that she would not recognize any territorial changes made during the war except if they were made by free consent of the parties concerned. This principle was adhered to also by the United States of America; when in 1941 this principle was codified in the solemn declaration known as the Atlantic Charter, it was also adopted by all members of the United Nations. Soon, it began to acquire a concrete political definition, at least in two cases: in the case of Czechoslovakia, when the Munich Accord was repudiated; and in the case of Austria, whose independence was agreed upon at Moscow.

It is true that it was not expressly stated that the annulment of the Munich Accord and the declaration of Austria's independence signified the automatic return to the *status quo ante* of European territorial settlement. This idea was, however, strictly implied. Since no territorial changes made during the war were to be recognized, it is logical to assume that the juridical status which existed before was recognized, at least in principle. This question might also be put in a different manner: this declaration meant that the starting point for the new European settlement will be that established by the 1919 Peace Conference of Paris. In no case would it be possible to interpret this in the sense that Germany and her satellites, who provoked the present war and who seized the territories of their neighbors when they were at the climax of their power, would be able to retain them after they had lost the war. Such an interpretation would lead to the ironical situation that certain territorial changes carried out since 1938 (and against which Great Britain, the United States and other nations protested by waging the present war) were *only* bad because they were made by the Axis Powers and that they could be good if they had been made by the United Nations.

In the same category as Czechoslovakia and Austria, one may also find States such as Yugoslavia and Rumania, for instance (without trying to give here a complete list), though I admit there may be certain differences, which in some cases may be more than slight nuances. The general principle, however, covered all of them.

Nevertheless, as events are unfolding now, they are creating the im-

pression that the principle which constituted the strongest and most dynamic forces of resistance against the ambitions of German domination, begins to be abandoned. The wording of Art. 19 of the Armistice, for instance, could easily lead to the erroneous interpretation that the authors wished, though unwittingly, to offer Hungary a kind of a premium for her rapacious attitude against her neighbours, as well as for the permanent role played during the last twenty years, when she consistently impeded the consolidation of peace in Central Europe. Art. 19 runs as follows: "The Allied Governments consider the decision of the Vienna Award regarding Transylvania as null and void, and are agreed that Transylvania (*or the greater part thereof*) should return to Rumania, *subject to confirmation at the peace settlement*, and the Soviet Government agrees that Soviet forces shall take part for this purpose in joint military operations with Rumania against Germany and Hungary". (Italics mine).

While all Rumanians express their gratitude to the Allies for this initial sign of justice, implied by the annulment of the "Award" of Vienna, everyone of them is unfavorably impressed by the phrase "*or the greater part thereof*", combined with the reservation "*subject to confirmation at the peace settlement*". In a period as confused as the present, the method whereby Art. 19 was formulated can only increase the confusion and generally lead to a dangerous pessimism regarding the planning of the new European settlement.

To-day, after the events which have transpired, Rumania is already a country very much weakened. What interest could the Allies have in weakening here even more than Germany had done? A weak Rumania will not be able to serve any purpose in the interest of equilibrium in that part of Europe. At the same time, in view of her key position, her instability would certainly lead to the upsetting of the whole political and social balance in Central Europe and the Balkans.

A modification of Art. 19, by the elimination of the phrase, "*or the greater part thereof*", and of the reservation "*subject to confirmation at the peace settlement*" should, in my opinion, be immediately considered.

This modification seems to be necessary as a matter of principle and from the point of view of moral, ethnical, economic and political motives. Transylvania is an organic unity which cannot be split up into artificial component parts.

The precedent created in the question of Transylvania might be invoked by Hungary also against Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and thus, instead of a clarification of the political situation in Central Europe and

in the Balkans, there could arise the greatest confusion which would probably lead to new conflicts, by which only Germany could benefit.

The western frontiers of Rumania, as in fact of all the Central European and Balkan countries, are the result of careful research which had lasted at least half a century. I have the firm conviction that no other problem has been more thoroughly studied than that of the various nationalities of Central and South-Eastern Europe. The literature on all their aspects, racial, linguistic, geographical, economic, intellectual and moral, amounts to thousands of volumes. The frontiers of 1919 and 1920 were fixed on the basis of this detailed research, and it would be a mistake for them to be changed, even as a matter of principle, before people should know at least the general principles of the new European settlement.

LONDON, ENGLAND

THE QUESTION OF BUKOVINA — THEN AND NOW

by Traian Văleanu

I

WHATEVER may have happened at the beginning of the Christian era in the region now known as Bukovina has no real bearing on the clarification of certain present day problems. It is sufficient to recall that as long ago as that, there began to crystallise the first local political organizations.

From a historical and political point of view, Bukovina had no individuality, but was one with Moldavia, both geographically and chronologically. Since 1359 history mentions with clocklike regularity the names of Rumanian Princes and Voivods, feats of arms, names of towns and churches, almost all of which were situated in Bukovina.

In 1365, at the death of the Voivod Bogdan, who had just finished building the Rădăuți Monastery, Bukovina, according to precise historical data, was a geographical area well organized politically, while from a cultural point of view it could have been considered among the European areas to have considerable cultural 'density'. During the same period Russia lost its independence and fell under Mongol domination. Shortly afterwards, Bielorussia and Kiev were also caught in a centrifugal process and absorbed into the Great Duchy of Lithuania.

From a historical standpoint Moldavia grew up within Bukovina and

continued to exist until 1775 without interruption within Bukovina's borders which sometimes expanded, but never contracted.

The first capitals of Moldavian political organization also came to life in Bukovina, at Siret and at Suceava, only to be moved to Jassy when the greatest pressure against the Moldavian frontiers was exerted more powerfully from the southeast than from the north.

This phenomenon of the migration of the capital is one of the best illustrations of the process of birth and development of a political organization in western history. It can therefore be asserted without much possibility of contradiction that Great Moldavia had been expanding for 600 years without a break, at least as far as the Dniester and the Ceremus, and sometimes even beyond these two rivers.

'Bukovina' was therefore non-existent during this enormous length of time. It also received no particular attention and no distinctive character from its administrative divisions—which were different from what they are today—and the external delimitation of its frontiers was so precise, that however little these might have been infringed, the defence of Moldavia always commenced in their immediate neighborhood, on the river Ceremus, beyond the Pruth, and in further defensive stages, step by step further south at Cozmin, Suceava and Neamțu. The fact that Moldavian Princes were buried at Rădăuți, Sucevița and Putna is additional proof that they considered this central area safe from foreign desecrations, surrounded by a fairly large zone of security. Princes' graves have not, as a general thing, been situated on the borders, but in the very heart of a country and its traditions.

The wealth of arguments proving the historical identity of Bukovina with Moldavia is so great, and the number of documents from which it results that the first stably organized dominion, extending as far as the river Ceremus and the Dniester, was Moldavian is so large, that it is almost superfluous to dwell on the subject.

In international law and in the practice of all times the most powerful title of 'property,' and possibly the only undeniable one, is that deriving from the effective possession of an unclaimed or an unsettled land. This title becomes the more valid, when the act of possession is not only nominal but real, and accompanied by sound colonization and by a thorough political and administrative organization.

Throughout the ages the advocates of imperialist policies have hesitated to reduce their expansionism to a single formula, but according to circumstances always exploited for the achievement of their aims a whole series

of more or less serious arguments. Among these artificial and cynical "justifications" which disregard the opinions of the intended victims, one may mention: inheritances, marriage settlements, the 'rounding' of territories, 'living-space', 'security' zones and 'complementary' economic zones, war-like actions and transfer under the threat of brute force.

Imperialists rarely use arguments, and then only as second-best alternatives, but always use pretexts and excuses, none of which follow a constant and permanent criterion. These pretexts are different for each case, and are really used only to throw dust in the eyes of the world.

Thus, at one time, the motto of the Habsburg Monarchy was: *Bella gerunt alii, tu, felix Austria, nube*. A little later, however, the excuse chosen in the case of Moldavia was the imperative necessity of a direct connection between Eastern Galicia and Northern Transylvania. This was after Austria had acquired, through the partition of Poland, not only the experience but also the appetite for violent annexations. International law has taken cognizance of such annexations and labels them an 'International piracy'. Other recent cases are those of: Fiume, Albania, Abyssinia, Podkarpatská Rus, etc.

Thus, when by the first partitions of Poland, Galicia fell to Austria, the very configuration of her Eastern frontier seemed to be, in Austria's eyes, sufficient justification for a further application of the *Drang nach Osten* policy, but this time across Moldavia, with the intention of leaving as little of this country as possible to the Russians!

Proof that the argument of the need of a better geographical link between Galicia and Transylvania was only an excuse, lies in the fact that the best mountain passes connecting the two regions were, and still are, in Galicia, and that until 1918 Austria was unable to build a direct railway line between Bukovina and Transylvania. To this excuse was later added a subsidiary one, of an alleged hygienic and sanitary nature. But the sole aim was to gain the necessary time for the authentication of an occupation previously carried out by violence.

German troops entered Moldavia in 1774, but the Austro-Turkish Agreement was only signed on April 25, 1775. For one whole year Austria played, through Baron Thugut, then Ambassador to Constantinople, and with the use of six pieces of chess, such a perfect game on the diplomatic chessboard that in good time the central figure, the Moldavian Prince, was liquidated.

The fact that the Prince had to be murdered is a sufficient demonstration

that the annexation of his country was an act of obvious piracy. It also shows that the Moldavian political organization resisted and refused to recognize the "arrangement" carried out by the two imperialist powers, Austria and Turkey.

An overwhelmingly important factor in Austria's aggression against Moldavia was also the third imperialist power, Tzarist Russia, which, although in a smouldering rivalry with the Habsburg Monarchy, was, nevertheless, making common cause with her whenever there was a chance for territorial expansion, whether northwards at the expense of Poland—where Teutonic Prussia had become a partner in the spoils—or in the southwest, at the expense of the already decadent Ottoman Empire.

The Austro-Russian partnership of that time could be expressed in a few words. Thus: "one slice to you, one to me, another to you, another to me," until the two imperialist powers became separated only by the narrowest possible strip of land, by a skeleton-like Moldavia, between the Carpathians and the Pruth, to which was assigned the function of a buffer between the two.

Among the six chess pieces mentioned above, there were: the Russian Marshal Romantzew, at that time commanding officer of the Russian forces of occupation, who had great influence at the Tzar's Court. On February 7, 1775, Thugut informed Kaunitz, the Austrian Chancellor, that he had: "presented Romantzew with 5,000 gold pieces and with a gold and diamond set cigarette case, after which I have received definite proof that we may count on the favourable attitude of the Marshal towards us." To this 'tool' may be added: Ipsilanti of Wallachia, a Greek Prince maintained on the Wallachian throne by Vienna; Iachovachi Riza, Prince Ghica's father-in-law, who was a traitor and a plotter; Constantin Moruzi, an interpreter of Turkish origin who had been bought for 10,312 piastres, and who became a successor to the Moldavian throne after the murder of Prince Ghica; Tahir Aga, a Turk who had been entrusted with the tracing of the new frontiers, whose selling price was 38,000 florins; and finally Reis Effendi, a Turkish statesman "sweetened" with the gift of a golden dagger and precious stones.

Moldavia, through her Prince and the whole of her ruling class, made every effort to oppose this aggression: Prince Ghica intervened at the Porte, and the "Country's Council" sent a complaint to Petrograd. The whole of Moldavia was in a turmoil over the violation of her national territory. But the deed was nevertheless carried out and Prince Grigore Ghica was murdered for his unrelenting opposition to Austrian imperialism.

In this way was lost, if we may rely upon the admissions detailed in Thugut's correspondence with Kaunitz, that part of northwestern Moldavia which for at least 600 years, without a break, stretched as far as the River Ceremus and the Dniester.

Until 1775 when this theft took place, the history of the territory comprised between the Rivers Ceremus, Dniester, Molna and the Carpathians was one and the same, identical and undivided from that of Moldavia.

We have mentioned above recognized grounds for territorial expansion. We might have included purchase, sale and mortgage.

If these methods were taken into consideration and had any actual historical value, then Moldavia would be the one entitled to claim the stretch of land of some 8,000 square kilometres, known under the name of Pocutia, extending beyond the Ceremus. In 1388 the Moldavian Prince received it as a guarantee for the refunding of a loan of 3,000 Genoese marks which he had made to the Polish King and which was never returned to the Moldavian exchequer. The history of this part of Moldavia which was ravished by the Austrians then branches off for the better part of 160 years and between 1786 and 1849 becomes a part of Galicia. This period was the worst from all points of view in the history of Bukovina.

Latâr, Bukovina, for a certain length of time also named by the Austrians the "Comitat of Suceava", became autonomous rather than Austrian, and remained so until the downfall of Habsburg imperialism.

Although not separated from the Moldavian entity either by mountain, sea or river, during all these 160 years of artificial separation, events on each side of the belt often had far-reaching repercussions on the other side.

Immediately after 1775, a wave of Rumanian political emigrés, and masses of peasants, intellectuals and clergy, started an exodus towards Moldavia proper. Not long afterwards, about 1831, the same phenomenon took place, but in the opposite direction, when many Moldavians took refuge in Bukovina, fleeing from the Phanariot and Eterist agitators.

Thus there was an almost uninterrupted ebb and flow of people between the two Rumanian settlements, facilitated by the similarity of their history, race and ideas. The memory of Moldavia continued to be alive in the minds of the Bukovinians from 1775 until the Union of 1918, and in no less measure, Bukovina continued to play with constant freshness the part of the "brutally severed limb" in the hearts of all Moldavians.

Bukovina's legal structure, seen through the light of international law and practice, presents itself thus:

(1) The so-called region of Bukovina was from the first identical with Moldavia, and had well determined frontiers, westwards from the Carpathians, and in places even further beyond them, northwestwards from the River Ceremus, with temporary extensions across it, and north and eastwards on the Dniester.

(2) From a political administrative point of view, Bukovina originated in an act of aggression. Her transfer was made without the consultation of the population and against the wishes of the legitimate Government.

(3) Because of the death of her Ottoman Guardian and of the disappearance of the Austro-German invader, Bukovina, or rather that part of Moldavia known under that name, could not be reclaimed by the body from which it had been temporarily severed.

(4) Although from a legal point of view the Union of 1918 did not need the assent of the people, it was nevertheless confirmed by the majority of the Bukovinians and by the entire autochthonous population.

(5) Bukovina was reunited to the mother country not only because it had no one else with whom to reunite, but also because the only country entitled to this *restitutio in integrum* was Rumania.

(6) Bukovina has never had other frontiers than those of 800 years ago, and therefore any real Union could be achieved only if these frontiers were respected.

(7) Besides Moldavia and Austria, no other country had ever either owned or administered the stretch of land known as Bukovina.

In fact Bukovina's northern and western frontiers were so solidly consolidated that Austria's attempt to join her to Galicia, between 1786 and 1849, was doomed to failure, and in the end the Viennese Government was forced to grant to that part of Moldavian territory an administrative autonomy within the unchanged limits of its ancient frontiers.

We must emphasize the reasons inducing the Habsburgs to attempt to bring Bukovina and Galicia under common administration. Being an amorphous and multi-national State, the Habsburg monarchy could maintain itself in power only through force, a thoroughly well-organized body of officials, and the persistent use, against the conquered peoples, of the famous *divide et impera* formula.

In Galicia, the Germans immediately started to encourage by all possible means the antagonism between Poles and Ruthenians. As on the one hand this game was often near failure because it tended to bring these two nations together in opposition or by the possibility of a rapidly increasing political

influence either of the Poles or of the Ruthenians, a third ethnical community would have been welcomed in order to restore the necessary balance. As, on the other hand, Bukovina was under the influence of a body of people, of whom the majority was Rumanian, Vienna did not hesitate long before trying to merge these two regions.

Vienna envisaged the following aims:

- (1) Political and administrative unification.
- (2) The encirclement of the Ruthenian minority with Poles and Rumanians.
- (3) Dilution of Rumanian ethnical unity and uniformity.
- (4) Alienation and exploitation of the stupendous treasures given by the Moldavian Princes to the Bukovinian monasteries for collective and public needs.

It must be recognized that the Viennese vanguard of German imperialism carried out superficially many of these aims, but without much eventual success, because it was proved in the end that the welding together of Bukovina and Galicia was impossible. When the Bukovinian and Transylvanian Rumanians identified themselves in overwhelming numbers with the ideals of the 1848 revolution, Vienna was forced to give herself a new constitution, as a consequence of which Bukovina was separated from Galicia.

Although it had tried for 63 years to merge within its empire the particular character of Bukovina and to obliterate the memory of her national frontiers, this foreign and autocratic occupation had, in the end, to admit defeat. Moldavian Bukovina could be neither absorbed nor divided.

The National Assembly of the Bukovinian Rumanians, meeting on May 20, 1848, under Eudoxie Hurmuzache's leadership, organized in Cernăuți the first plebiscite for the autochthonous masses, after an enslavement of over 107 years, by issuing the "Petition of the Country". This plebiscite must have impressed even the Viennese imperialists, because the first point of the "Petition" was: "The separation of Bukovina from Galicia" and a demand for autonomy.

Bukovina became autonomous within her 800 year old frontiers, because it was entirely Rumanian in race, origin and past.

Thus the common history of Bukovina and Moldavia began anew. The exchange of intellectuals and ideas between Bukovina, Moldavia and Transylvania never ceased and there were periods like that of 1848 and after, when Bukovina became the meeting place of learned minds and the center of inspiration for the ideals of all Rumanians for freedom and independence.

Prominent people from the "Old Kingdom" settled in Bukovina. Well-known Transylvanians reached the heights of their intellectual development among the Bukovinian Rumanians and countless Bukovinian young people and intellectuals went to Transylvania and to the "Old Kingdom", thus completing the pattern of the continuity, identity, and the historical unity of all Rumanians.

But the period which was to prove fatal to the Austro-German team was approaching. The Berlin, Vienna and Budapest rulers in whom imperialism was inbred were hurriedly—though with clear heads—preparing the conditions most favorable for a war of conquest and enslavement. All nations subjected by them, fully conscious of the rights they had been denied for centuries, were in their turn preparing themselves morally, economically and even militarily. Their preparations were therefore not platonic but concrete. Countless numbers of Bukovinians were sneaking across the Austrian border in order to join the armies of their free brothers and to become soldiers and officers.

In the first imperialist world war the people fighting for freedom, self-determination and national sovereignty had to wage a hard and often uncertain battle. There were periods when the fighting was so undecided that all objective military commentators were in doubt whether the Allies could have won in the end, without both the active and passive help given them by the Greeks, Rumanians, Serbs, Croats and Slovenians.

If the peoples enslaved by Austria had not made this contribution, this docile partner of Prussian imperialism would have been able to throw into battle not 80 but 120 divisions. The central powers would thus have had in 1917 410 against only 220 Allied divisions and there is little reason to gainsay the possibility that the Austro-German occupation eastwards might have reached even beyond Moscow and consolidated the military defeat of Russia.

But this is not all. The nations enslaved by Austria were not satisfied with passivity but went over to the Allies in large masses and Czechs, Yugoslavs, Rumanians, Poles, Ruthenians and Italians took part in offensive fighting on their side, contributing 16 divisions to the total mustered by them.

In the first phase of the war, when the Russians succeeded in expelling the enemy from Bukovina, the Rumanians living there considered them as Allies and gave them all their support. After their retreat, Bukovinian teachers, intellectuals, peasants and clergy alike, had to pay with their lives for the aid they had given. When Rumania also joined in the war for

national freedom, the desertion of Bukovinian Rumanians was a serious blow to the local Austro-Hungarian gang led by Count Etzdorf.

Russia's collapse and the difficulties in which Rumania found herself put the Bukovinian Rumanians in a very unfortunate position. Prison sentences and executions became a matter of course and deportation and internments a habit. But the Habsburg monarchy was disintegrating, and at long last the Allies' pressure brought about the long awaited end: the collapse of the Central Powers.

On October 27, 1918, representatives of the Rumanian population in Bukovina, under Iancu Flondor's leadership, based on the principle of national sovereignty, declared themselves to be convened in a National Assembly of that part of Rumanian territory, and decided "upon the union of the whole of Bukovina with the other Rumanian provinces, constituted in an independent National State".

On November 28, 1918, the "General Congress of Bukovina" carried out an act of union with the support of all minorities, through the following document to which no additional conditions were attached, and in which it was stated:

"Today, when after enormous efforts, sacrifices and losses, suffered by Rumania and her noble and powerful allies, the principles of justice and humanity apply to all nations, when the Austro-Hungarian monarchy has collapsed and when all peoples formerly enslaved by her have earned the right to self-determination, Bukovina's first thought is for the Rumanian kingdom, on which she had always based the hopes of her freedom."

"For this reason, We, the General Congress of Bukovina, embodying the supreme power of the country and being alone invested with legislative power, have decided, in the name of National sovereignty, on the permanent and unconditional union of Bukovina, within her ancient frontiers between the River Ceremus, Colacin and the Dniester, with the kingdom of Rumania."

This document, an expression of popular will, simply obliterated the theft of 1775. It is true that between October 27 and November 11, 1918 there were some outbreaks of anarchy in several Bukovinian districts, but this was quite natural and to be expected whenever an established central power disappears. The German minority was in a state of wretched agitation. The Ruthenians were dreaming of a large anti-Soviet Ruthenia, the Poles thinking of *Polonia restituta*, and even the few thousand Hungarians were caught in a whirl of uncertainty.

Only the Rumanians remained calm and collected and kept a clear

vision of their aims. Through their action of October 27, they restored order and saved the lives and possessions of all minorities, whatever their creed, race or class. Bukovinians who had taken refuge in the old kingdom returned in great haste and contributed in a large measure towards the complete destruction of the "Belt" created by Kaunitz.

"Restituta in Integrum" became an accomplished fact on November 28, 1918, through: (1) popular decision; (2) the acceptance of this action by the whole world, whether tacitly or *expressis verbis* without the slightest protest from any power whatever.

The history of the region extending southeastwards from the Rivers Ceremus, Colacin and Dniester was once again one with the history of Rumania, this time also from a legal, national and international point of view.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES

However elastic the notion of geographical unity may appear at first sight in some cases evidence for its precise formulation makes any argument superfluous. A single glance at a physical map will show clearly that Bohemia is uni-cellular, presenting all the characteristics of a perfect geographical unit. It can in no way be divided without breaking the most elementary geographical and economic rules and considerations. This is why there has been nothing more monstrous than the Munich 'agreement', by which the Sudeten region was cut off from Czechoslovakia. This agreement was the application of the ethnical principle, but stretched *ad absurdum* under pressure of German Imperialism.

An objective but rather general analysis of the geographical and economic realities in Bukovina may be best achieved by an elementary but correct method: a glance at the map!

If we do so we shall see that Bukovina fits perfectly in the geographical group of single cells with complementary function, so wide-spread throughout the globe, e.g. Wales, Switzerland, Catalonia, Alsace-Lorraine, etc.

In the first place then, Bukovina is a single cell. Its natural basis is on the Carpathians, which, by successive and gradual hills, reach as far as the center of the Province. All these hills follow the general direction Northwest—Southeast and cut the country-side northwards, not far from the Pruth, at the place where the Ceremus, describing a wide bend, completes the connection between the Carpathians and the Pruth.

Even if one did not know that the northern geographical and natural frontier of the province was on the Dniester, one would see that this is the only river which may serve as a boundary to the Bukovinian plain, both

from a physical and hydrographical point of view. As a matter of fact, the Dniester is the deepest and largest river flowing between the Carpathians and the Podolian plain, and the only one to leave a deep mark on the surface of the earth.

The Pruth, flowing in its Bukovinian sector parallel with the Dniester, does not possess so obvious a character of a geographical barrier, as it winds its lazy course in a region of plains and fields presenting no difference on either side of its banks.

Considered from a purely geographical point of view, Bukovina should have extended Northeastwards along the course of the Dniester as far as its source in Galicia. But history and the thnical element gave Bukovina the frontiers it now has, through what may well look as a compromise between these and the purely geographical factors. Bukovina's rivers stress still further the unity of the province, which could be called the political organization with parallel rivers', as not the smallest part of Bukovina could be allocated to an external river basin.

The Bistritza, Moldava, Suceava, Sireth, Pruth, Dniester, all from the smallest to the largest, give Bukovina's hydrographic pattern an unusual harmony, similar to that of its parallel mountains. Geographical units may be harmonious or unharmonious, but there can be no doubt that Bukovina's is of the former type.

The plain is a natural and necessary complement of the mountainous zone. All Bukovina's valleys are directed towards the plain, and through the ages, centers of economic exchange appeared at the junctions of these complementary regions, from the river Suceava to the Dniester, on an almost perfectly straight line: Gura Humorului, Rădăuți, Sireth, Storojineți, Cernăuți. Diversity may give harmony to a region, and if we look at Bukovina even from this point of view, we realize that it cannot be divided on any vertical or horizontal line.

This must suffice regarding Bukovina's economic and geographical unity, which is further completed by the natural and artificial system of transport and communication, which runs in its entirety in parallel lines along the river valleys toward the vertical artery Burdujeni Cernăuți. The region extending between the Pruth and the Dniester represents the indispensable 'hinterland' for the capital of the province with its corresponding net of roads and railways.

The obvious character of Bukovina's geographical unity and of her economic self-sufficiency is beyond doubt, and in only few other instances throughout the world do the maps prove this more conclusively than in

this case. Bukovina, though clearly a unit in itself, was part and parcel of the Great Moldavian geographical unit, despite the fact that she had been brutally torn away from it and despite the fact that her frontiers were imposed by an arbitrary action, after the bribing of the Turkish delegate by Thugut.

The similarity of the bases on which both territories stand, that is the Carpathians, the similarity between the rivers and valleys all of which rise in Bukovina, but flow through the center of Moldavia, the similarity between the undulating forests extending along both sides of the so-called frontier, and the similarity between the nature of the soil, is a perfect illustration of the Rumanian saying: 'Same river, same country'. To no one can this saying be better applied than to the Bukovinian-Moldavian geographical unit and community.

One may see how unreal the delimitation imposed by the Austrians really was, when one looks at the deeply indented appearance of Bukovina's southeastern frontier. Austro-German Imperialism found the rivers Pruth, Sireth, Suceava and Moldova a good excuse for biting even deeper into Moldavia proper, thus preparing four spring-boards for further offensive actions, unhampered by geographical obstacles. If the history of Bukovina is inseparable from that of Moldavia, the geographical bond connecting these two countries is shown to be even closer.

Bukovina's economic independence may be more clearly realized from the following data:

Bukovina's arable agricultural area amounts to only 0.37 hectare per head of population, 60% of this area being located in only two districts: that of Cernăuți and Storojineți, which together represent only 42% of Bukovina's total area. More striking still is the importance, from a supply point of view of the district of Cernăuți, which represents only 17% of Bukovina's total area, but 37% of its total agricultural area.

Tilling land constitutes the following proportions of the total area of the respective departments:

Cernăuți	67.8%
Suceava	45.8%
Rădăuți	27.4%
Storojineți	26.8%
Câmpulung	3.2%

But while the district of Suceava has only 59,000 hectares, that of Cernăuți has over 120,00 hectares of excellent tilling soil. Under these conditions if this is so, it is obvious that the northern region has an urgent need of

the 200,000 hectares of forests to be found in the district of Câmpulung, and the 125,000 hectares to be found in Rădăuți.

III. ETHNICAL STRUCTURE

At the time that Bukovina was conquered by the Austrians, the economic and social régime prevailing throughout Europe favored the emigration of cheap labour. Other factors, of an accidental nature, like wars, persecutions, epidemics, famines, etc. were also causes of migrations.

It is obvious that in the particular case of Bukovina—that is, of Northern Moldavia—the proximity of foreign countries and territories rendered frontiers much less 'air tight' than they are now. Whole groups of families could cross the frontier without great risks or inconvenience. Despite all this, statistical data shows that in 1774:

(1) Bukovina had a population of 71,750 inhabitants, of whom 73.6% were Rumanians.

(2) The number of Slavs was only 15,000. There were also other inhabitants whose total figure amounted to some 4,000.

At that date, then, Bukovina had a strong ethnical unity. The best explanation that may be given with regard to the 15,000 so-called Slavs appears to be from the above mentioned reasons, that only part of them were Ruthenians, who at that time were called 'neighbors', while the other was formed by the Hutuli, who infiltrated during the seventeenth century through the whole Carpathian range. This was easy to achieve by them, as they were mostly shepherds.

There is no proof that the Hutuli were actually Slavs, and they could just as well have been a tribe of mountain dwelling Dacians who had not been subjected to Roman influence, but to that of the Ruthenian language.

Bukovina's ethnical structure evolved in the following manner:

	1774	1869	1880	1910	1930
Rumanians	52,750	207,000	190,005	273,254	379,691
Slavs	15,000	186,000	239,690	305,101	265,500
Others	4,000	118,364	138,758	216,474	187,418
Total	71,750	511,364	568,453	794,829	853,609

This table illustrates at the same time the persecutions to which the Rumanians must have been subjected during the period their land was under alien occupation. In any case it serves to show how, as soon as it

was occupied, Bukovina was opened to a wave of mass immigration, which the Austrians hoped was going to bring about a rapid disintegration of Bukovina's original ethnical character.

Between 1800 and 1870, Germany's population increased from 24.8 million to 41.1 million, that of Italy from 17.2 to 26.8 million and that of Russia from 38 to 79 million inhabitants. This means that in the space of one century the population of those countries increased, on the average 120%. But in Bukovina the population registered, during the same period an increase of 694%, that is 7 times as great as in the case of these other countries. Obviously this could not have been a normal increase.

In one hundred years the number of Rumanians increased by 400%, whereas that of the Slavs increased by 1,300% and that of 'Various other nationalities' by as much as 3,000%. It must not be overlooked that the period during which Bukovina was administratively amalgamated with Galicia, between 1786 and 1849, falls within these one hundred years.

Only thus can be explained the fact that the proportion of Rumanians decreased quite suddenly from 73.6% to 40.5%, to reach shortly afterwards in 1880 an even lower level, which was actually the lowest on record, 33.3%.

During the same period the percentage of Ruthenians increased from 20.8% to 36.4% and reached, in 1880, its highest figure of 42.1%. In 1910 they formed only 38.6% of the total number of Bukovina's population.

Between 1910 and 1930 the Rumanian element was able to develop its biological forces quite unhindered, as it was living not only under better conditions, but also because the immigration wave had somewhat subsided. So that about that time, in 1930, the Rumanians were representing 44.5 and the Slavs only 31.3% of Bukovina's total population.

The upsetting of this balance, and especially the persecution of Rumanians, by immigration, colonization, de-nationalization and economic impoverishment, resulted in the diminution of the preponderant majority which they had enjoyed before the imposition of Austrian rule, but never succeeded in alienating Bukovina from an ethnical and racial point of view.

Even if we were to take as an example the 1940 annexation of Bukovina by the Soviets, which was carried out according to the ethnical criteria most favorable to them, it is seen that the number of non-Slavs living in the occupied zone was still larger by 25% than that of the Russians, Ruthenians, and Hutuli put together.

Department	Villages	Towns	Rumanians	Slavs	Others
Cernăuți	94	4	78,589	139,675	87,228
Storojineți	67	3	57,595	78,964	33,265
Rădăuți Sov.	27	—	12,804	9,883	16,705
Rădăuți Rum.	40	2	76,498	8,459	39,718
Suceava	61	2	96,411	3,253	20,836
Câmpulung	50	4	58,104	6,844	29,762

Quite apart from the injustice of Bukovina being dominated by an imperialist power, which aimed at the liquidation of all Rumanian influence, it is clear from the above table that also from an ethnical point of view, an equitable and human partition of Bukovina is impossible, as there are only few regions where the Rumanians would not form the majority, and even in these areas ethnical conditions are very confused and the peoples intermingled.

But it is only fitting to dwell a little longer on the way in which the Rumanian majority was ill-treated and undermined by the Austro-Hungarian invaders, who acted against the main foundations on which society was constructed at that time: the church, the school, and the economic and labor conditions.

The Orthodox Church of Bukovina was immediately brought under the authority of the Serbian Bishop of Carlovatz, while a Theological School under Dean Blahovici and staffed by Serbians was opened in Cernăuți. After the death of the Rumanian Bishop, Herescu, the Episcopal Seat of Bukovina was occupied by the same Blahovici. The German schools were erected in Cernăuți and Suceava with the funds confiscated from the Rumanian schools, which were all closed. During one year alone, 1793, thirty Rumanian elementary schools were closed and their staffs replaced with Germans or pro-Germans. The possessions of the Rumanian Monasteries were amalgamated in an 'Orthodox Fund' in order to be kept under closer watch and to be better exploited by Vienna and its agents.

The Catholic Ruthenians who, at that time, were emigrating *en masse*, were immediately turning to Orthodoxy in order to collect great profits from the Funds of the Rumanian Monasteries as soon as they could. The cheap labor represented by these newcomers led naturally to a rapid impoverishment of the Rumanian peasants. Part of them were compelled to emigrate, while the other part was subjected to a dangerous process of 'proletarianization'. The large Rumanian land-owners were replaced by aliens, who exploited the cheap labor offered by the newcomers. This led to a deterioration of the social system and to the further exploitation of labor.

Thus the old Moldavian 'Work on the Road' of 6 to 12 days a year, was raised to as much as 100 days a year.

Both towns and villages were overrun by these immigrants who, by this very fact, completely prevented the formation of a Rumanian middle-class. Apart from this the Hapsburg administration was doing everything in its power to grant jobs only to aliens or to those with a German or a pseudo-German upbringing. In the same way the new industries, created with foreign capital, were tending to become outposts of foreign imperialism, and local labor was tending to be exploited on colonial lines. Under such adverse political, social, economic and cultural conditions, it seems only natural to wonder how it was possible that Bukovina could preserve its Rumanian character.

The population by Departments and nationalities was in 1930 and 1774:

						1938	1774
Rumanians	78,589	57,595	69,002	96,401	58,104	379,691	52,750
	<i>Cernăuți</i>	<i>Storojineți</i>	<i>Rădăuți</i>	<i>Suceava</i>	<i>Cplg.</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>	
Ukrainians							
& Russians	139,675	78,964	15,342	3,253	6,844	244,078	15,000
Germans	19,586	8,900	17,857	9,991	19,109	75,553	+ Hutuli
Jews	51,247	15,322	11,508	6,677	7,380	96,492	
Hungarians	610	62	10,291	813	105	11,881	
Poles	15,243	7,985	2,311	3,311	1,730	30,580	
Czechs	343	76	87	63	57	626	4,000
Armenians	78	54	19	97	32	280	
Bulgarians	92	69	88	27	—	193	
Hutuli	—	3	12,244	—	190	12,437	
Total	306,194	168,894	160,778	121,327	94,816	853,009	71,750

From this somewhat more detailed table it appears that:

(1) In no Bukovinian Department do the Russians hold an absolute majority.

(2) The Rumanians possess an absolute majority in no less than 3 Departments.

(3) There is an impressive number of minorities which could not have existed there unless they had arrived recently from various regions of Austria and Germany.

The Poles took refuge in Bukovina after the partition of Poland. The Germans were evidently sent as a vanguard and guardians of the German 'civilization' of Swabia, Rumania and Franconia. In 1774 there were only 526 Jews in Bukovina. The Ruthenians who, in their turn, were pushed towards Bukovina with the double aim of breaking the Rumanian ethnical

unity and raising cheap labor for the new land-owners, had begun to infiltrate even prior to the annexation, fleeing from the Galician land-owners who forced them to serve 156 days of 'work on the road' in the year, and under whom rebellions were a common occurrence.

Bukovina's religious structure appears to be even better knit together than its ethnical structure, as the following table will show:

In 1930 it was as follows: (in thousands)

	<i>Total</i>		<i>Greek</i>	<i>Roman</i>				
<i>Department</i>	<i>Pop.</i>	<i>Orth.</i>	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Evang.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Lip.</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
Cernăuți	306.2	205.3	11.5	30.7	5.2	0.1	—	51.7
Storjineși	169.9	132.7	3.3	15.4	2.0	—	0.5	15.4
Rădăuși	160.8	113.5	2.1	26.0	4.3	0.4	2.1	11.6
Suceava	121.3	97.1	1.7	10.2	4.0	—	0.6	6.7
Câmpulung	94.8	64.7	0.8	16.0	5.2	—	—	7.7
Total	853.0	613.3	19.4	98.3	20.7	0.5	3.2	93.1

The overwhelming number of Orthodox adherents is due not only to the transfer to the Orthodox faith, under the influence of the autochthonous population, of the largest part of the immigrating Ruthenians, but also to the number of Ruthenized Rumanians, who had remained Orthodox and who were spread throughout Northern Bukovina, in towns and villages whose names had been corrupted by Austrian officials.

The ethnographical neutralization of Bukovina so greatly sought by the Austrians also results from the varying powers of vitality of the different minorities, because it was observed that during periods when there was no intermixing and immigration was practically non-existent, the part of the Province populated mostly by Rumanians proved to have the greatest coefficient of excess population.

Thus, in 1938, when the coefficient of excess population for the whole of Bukovina was 7.2, the Department of Suceava had a yearly natural surplus of 9.5, the Department of Câmpulung 0.6, while that of Cernăuți attained only 3.7 per thousand.

As a matter of fact, this is the reason which will explain the increase in the number of Rumanians which rose, between 1910 and 1930, from 273,300 to 379,700, while that of the Ruthenians decreased from 305,100 to 265,500. The figure of 'other nationalities' decreased during the same period from 216,500 to 187,400. The second reason which may account for this decrease in the ranks of non-Rumanians is the fact that many Rumanians decided to forego the pretense of their sham-Austrian origin, which they had to assume for fear and by necessity, by corrupting their Rumanian names.

The Ruthenization of Rumanians was a natural consequence of joining a school or the Civil Service.

Names of places were also Ruthenized, and it is worth while quoting a few examples in order to show the ingenuity which was used: the village of Christești, which means Cristea's village, became Kriszczatek; Tăuteni, or the village of Tăutu became Toutry, Vrânceni became Werenczanka, Vintileanca became Witiliunka, Gura-Humoroului was Germanized to Gurahumora, Câmpulung to Kimpolung, Vatra-Dornei to Dornawatra, etc. Pure Rumanian names like Vasile were entered in birth certificates as Basil, and Dorneanu was changed to Dorniuc or Dórnian.

IV. 1919 — 1939

After the Union with Rumania, Bukovina's economic, social and cultural situation began to improve, and the tempo of this improvement, from the quantitative but especially from the qualitative point of view, was greater than the average progress realized by the rest of the country.

This phenomenon is explained not only by the solicitude shown for Bukovina by all Democratic Governments of Bucharest, but also by the fact that the physical and spiritual values and potentialities of the great mass of Bukovinian Rumanians, who until 1918 had been kept as isolated as possible from the cultural and economic life of the Province, were once again fully released.

At the same time, within Great Rumania, Bukovina enjoyed a privileged economic and geographic position, because all upper-Moldavia's wealth, as well as Bessarabia's, would find their way towards the international markets through it. At Cernăuți a first class Stock Exchange and a solidly organized international financial and trade activity was organized under Rumanian impulse.

Placed at the cross-roads between Poland, Czechoslovakia, Transylvania, and the Soviet Union, Bukovina became an important international thoroughfare. Many improvements were made in the communication system, both from the national and international points of view. Thus, the links between Bukovina and Transylvania, Bukovina-Transylvania and Czechoslovakia, Bukovina, Poland and Transylvania, were perfected, and the shunting system on the Cernăuți-Grigore Chica Vodă line extended.

Although laid waste during the last world war by many German, Austrian and Russian offensives and counter-offensives, with bridges blown up and factories destroyed by fire, with railway stations and repair sheds shattered, with its forests—its most important wealth—uncultivated and partly destroyed, with its population impoverished and depleted, with schools,

hospitals and churches crumbling in ruins through military use and Austrian carelessness, there was no need for Bukovina to undergo a period of complete reconstruction for which, in any case, the 20 years of Rumanian rule would hardly have been sufficient.

If reconstruction in itself would have been a great achievement, then the realization of progress in most branches of activity would have certainly meant a good deal more!

With a very reduced agricultural area per head of population, 0.85 hectares, Bukovina, nevertheless, attained in 1938 an average production exceeding by far the average production of the whole of Rumania. Agri-

	<i>Bukovina</i>	<i>Rumania</i>
	(ch/ha)	
Corn	13.5	10.4
Oats	9.8	7.1
Rye	13.9	10.7
Wheat	13.2	13.0
Barley	9.9	6.1
Potatoes	120.0	81.5
Pumpkins	27.4	16.4
Sugar beet	187.3	153.9
Hemp	5.3	4.5
Trefoil	39.5	35.0
Luzern	49.9	36.6

culture, which was quite well balanced, as a consequence of the economic complimentarism between South-West and North-West Bukovina, had at its disposal some 130,500 hectares for the culture of cereals, 66,900 ha. for that of corn, 48,500 for potatoes and 48,000 for trefoil, hay and luzern.

The nature of Bukovina's soil had, in 1939, the following aspect:

	<i>Cernăuți</i>	<i>Storofineți</i>	<i>Rădăuți</i>	<i>Suceava</i>	<i>Câmpulș.</i>	<i>— Total</i>	<i>Northern Bukovina</i>
Arable	120.3	71.1	64.6	39.5	7.6	322.9	218.9
Grazing	16.4	23.9	38.1	12.4	27.5		
Meadows	1.8	0.8	1.0	1.1	0.2		
Forests	21.5	83.7	124.6	24.7	198.2	482.7	199.7
Others	17.2	85.8	7.8	33.2	1.4		
Total	177.1	265.3	236.5	130.9	234.9	1,044.7	591.8

Thus three-fourths of Bukovina's agricultural land is situated in the north, while over three-fourths of her forests are to be found in the south-west.

The wealth in cattle, which found markets not only throughout

Rumania itself, but also in the Levant, Germany and Britain, played an important part in the economic life of the Province. In 1938, the position was as follows.

	<i>Cernăuți</i>	<i>Storojineți</i>	<i>Rădăuți</i>	<i>Suceava</i>	<i>Câmpulung</i>	<i>Total</i>
	(In thousand head)					
Horses	24.1	15.6	15.1	13.7	8.2	76.7
Cattle	43.7	51.5	44.1	29.8	45.1	214.1
Sheep	55.7	35.0	84.8	62.7	58.3	295.6
Swine	30.9	31.1	30.5	22.6	10.7	125.8
Hens	325.8	231.1	221.9	221.1	110.2	1,110.0
Bee-hives	5.6	6.3	4.9	2.9	3.3	22.9

This indicates substantial wealth, especially when compared with the rest of Rumania or with other States, because whereas in Bukovina there was one head of cattle per four inhabitants, the average for the whole of the country was 1 to 5.

But in 1918 the agrarian problem had, in Bukovina, a very worrying social aspect. For a little over a century Vienna had aimed at the social disintegration of Bukovina's autochthonous element. This is why she added to the already sinister political game in which she used to play the Poles against the Ruthenians, the Ruthenians against the Rumanians and the Germans against all the others, an equally sinister social and economic strategy through which the Bukovinian Rumanians were brought to be, in 1914, the poorest people in the Province. In 1918, in a Province as small as Bukovina, with only 800,000 inhabitants, there were 150,000 completely proletarianized peasant families. This means that more than half the population was unable to earn a decent living. Obviously the greatest proportion of these 'rural proletarians' was formed by Rumanians. And, as shown above, the agricultural area per head of population was already very small.

The Union with Rumania, carried out in a true democratic spirit, led in Bukovina too, to a notable contribution towards ideals of social justice. When the expropriation of land was organized, no distinction between the various nationalities, races or religions was made.

A total of over 74,000 hecatres were destined to be expropriated, out of which 3,800 ha. were to be taken from parishes, 27,600 from the Church Fund, and 14,900 ha. from 235 private land-owners. The land was distributed among: Rumanians, Ruthenians, Germans, Poles, Hungarians, Jews, Slovaks, and Bukovinian Armenians.

One ought not to be surprised by the small amounts of land given to some of the inhabitants, because, apart from the Rumanians and Ruthenians,

most of them were townspeople. One in every 10 Rumanians, and one in every 17 Ruthenians received one hectare of land.

This was only an apparent discrepancy, because the Rumanians were much poorer, and because the Ukrainians, who had settled in large numbers in the best agricultural area, themselves opposed any redistribution of agricultural property. As a matter of fact, if there had been any discrimination, they might have been given nothing at all; yet they received almost 15,000 ha.

Now, although this expropriation ought not to be underestimated, it is quite true that it did by no means satisfy the social needs of the entire population, because there were a great many more people entitled, according to the law, to receive land, but who were given none simply because of the limited agricultural area available.

Even in 1939 the number of poor Rumanian families was much higher than that of the poor Ruthenians. This is confirmed by the fact that there was a continuous exodus of Rumanians from Bukovina towards the Old Kingdom, where they were prepared to do any kind of work, as their own village, district and Province was no longer able to offer them sufficient means of support.

But it remains a fact that even in the agricultural districts the position of the peasant population improved considerably between 1919-1939, as compared with the period prior to 1914.

This arises from the fact that, while under Austrian occupation, many Rumanians and Ruthenians emigrated overseas, when Bukovina returned to Rumania, emigration ceased almost entirely. Thus, the total number of Ukrainians and Ruthenians to emigrate from the whole of Rumania during 1938 was 83, and even these left only because they had been requested to do so by their families.

In 1930 there were 16,049 commercial and industrial enterprises in Bukovina. A striking fact is that 62.8% of these were created between 1919 and 1930, which means that in only 12 years of Union with Rumania, the number of Bukovinian enterprises increased from 6 to over 16,000. This is further proof of the progress realized through the Union, which therefore, had not only a political and historic meaning, but also an economic one.

<i>Industry:</i>	<i>Total No.</i>	<i>1919-1930</i>	<i>H.P.</i>	<i>Staff.</i>
Underground mining	12	50.0%	100	600
Metal Industry	1,312	59.9%	1,200	3,900
Forest Industry	1,462	63.3%	9,800	9,100
Building Industry	283	51.9%	700	1,300

Textiles Industry	123	73.2%	700	2,100
Manufacturing	2,718	61.9%	200	5,500
Food Industry	1,525	54.8%	14,100	7,300
Printing Industry	143	55.2%	100	500
Chemical Industry	181	57.6%	500	700
Electric	17	29.4%	11,600	200
Other Industries	11	45.5%	—	100
Trade and Credit	7,739	65.5%	—	31,500
Various and unspecified	546	66.1%	—	1,800
TOTAL	16,049	62.8% (av.)	39,100	48,800

The distribution of these enterprises throughout the various Departments was as follows:

	<i>No. of Enterprises</i>	<i>H.P.</i>	<i>Staff.</i>
Cernăuți	6,107	21,240	22,375
Storajineți	2,751	3,449	6,135
Rădăuți	3,115	4,675	7,853
Suceava	1,751	3,066	4,808
Câmpulung	2,099	6,590	7,375

The timber, food and manufacturing industries were the ones employing the most labor, and 66% of the people employed by the totality of enterprises were working in Northern Bukovina, which was surrendered to Soviet Russia in 1940. In this region too is Cernăuți, which is the center of gravity of all commercial and industrial enterprises, so that without it the population of the rest of the Province must suffer appreciably not only from an agricultural, industrial and commercial point of view, but also from a social one, as can now be seen.

These above quoted data cover a period of only 12 years. But the great possibilities of Rumania are well known, especially as they were in Bukovina between 1930 and 1939, when not only many new enterprises were started, but when production increased appreciably throughout all branches of economic activity.

A legitimate inquiry is, whether all Bukovinian citizens benefited from the economic recovery and progress. Although the official statistics did not aim at, and actually could not identify, the Capital invested in the various enterprises according to criteria of race or nationality, the reply to the above question may easily be found in the social and economic realities as created by the Habsburg régime.

As the Rumanian element was persecuted and maintained as much as possible in a sort of 'Rural Primitivity', it was natural that the trades, industries and handicrafts should be occupied by those nationalities whom

the Habsburgs trusted most and which had more capital to invest. The majority of banking and financial enterprises were in Jewish, German and Armenian hands, while industry was also controlled by Jews to a proportion of 80%. Trade was in Jewish hands in the same proportion. Handicrafts and Workshops were owned by Germans, Poles and Jews. Incidentally, after the war, Bukovina was covered with a wave of Jewish, Ruthenian and Polish emigrés, who increased still further the amount of non-Rumanian capital.

The economic boon created by the natural fact of Bukovina's union with Rumania, favored therefore those with initial capital, and in no way those who had nothing, that is the Rumanians. This may also serve to explain the fact that the new large timber businesses were built by Jews, just like the great textile mills. National feeling and a certain amount of jingoism induced these capitalists to offer the best paid and the most responsible positions and to look for the proper staff first among their own nationals. Between 1919 and 1930, through evolution, and only by legal means, the Rumanian element just started to infiltrate in Bukovina's economic life, through the creation of new enterprises of such size as to be able to compete with the older ones with some hope of success.

There is, therefore, no doubt that all nationalities, without discrimination, reaped the benefits of an economic life which became more intensive during the 20 years of the Rumanian democratic régime. Out of the 10,000 new enterprises between 1919 and 1939, more than half belonged to non-Rumanians.

This gain achieved under a Rumanian régime was also apparent in the departmental revenues, which in 1937 to 1938 amounted to 71 million Lei, half of which was contributed by a single Department: Cernăuți. Rădăuți was second with 13.1 million Lei, Câmpulung third with 10.0 million, Storojineți fourth with 8.1 million Lei and Suceava last with 5.7 million Lei.

In 1938 almost 30 Bukovinian localities had the advantage of using electricity. In Bukovina 26.9% of the population benefited from its use as against 25.5% in the rest of the country. The electric energy produced by Cernăuți increased between 1920 and 1938 from 4.2 to 14.4 million million Kilowatts.

The financial soundness of the population closely followed on the improved economic conditions, as testified by the considerable decrease in the amount of protected bills of exchange between 1932 and 1938. The

drop in the general figure was from 204.8 million Lei in 1932 to 16.1 million Lei in 1938.

Even greater progress, outpacing the rhythm of the time, was achieved in the field of social relief, as is evident from the following table showing the date at which the various Bukovinian Social Relief institutions had been created.

1800 - 1899	8
1900 - 1909	11
1910 - 1919	5
	—
	24
1919 - 1929	30
1930 - 1939	14
	—
	44

The greatest benefit from these institutions was drawn by the minorities, because they were employed in a larger measure in the various economic enterprises. It is not intended to recall here all the achievements realized during the 20 years of Rumanian rule, the number of new schools, of new bus and tram routes, of works of reforestation, in a word it is not desired to recall here the whole series of improvements characteristic of a progressive State.

From a cultural point of view, most of the attention was turned towards the intellectual uplifting of the Rumanian people, who had been kept uneducated by the Habsburgs for many scores of years. In order to achieve the complete liquidation of the Rumanians, Austria had, in fact, used not only the political and economic weapon, but also the cultural one. She favored all German and Pan-German cultural institutions, as well as any Polish, Jewish, Ruthenian and Hungarian institutions, but did nothing for the cultural advancement of the Rumanian majority. And so, in 1919, all nationalities, the Rumanians excepted, were well provided with cultural institutions.

In this respect the Union with Rumania achieved only one thing: it opened the doors of schools also to the Rumanians and encouraged them by propaganda to take advantage of them, of the theological colleges and of the universities provided for them.

In 1913 and 1914 there were in Bukovina some 16 high schools with 5,748 pupils belonging to the minorities and only 1,502 Rumanians. In 1927-1928 there were 19 high schools with 4,569 Rumanian pupils and

3,237 pupils of other nationalities. From these figures it may be seen that there had been no upsetting of the previous position, but only an improvement with regard to the number of Rumanian pupils.

The number of teachers' colleges also increased from 2 to 3 while the number of trade schools was increased to 12. Whether because the minorities had no confidence in Rumanian teaching or because they were too deeply attached to German culture, to Vienna and to Berlin, the fact remains that they preferred to build their own private schools. The Rumanian State, which at that time was a democratic one, did nothing to prevent this tendency towards educational autonomy. Thus, in Bukovina alone there were 36 private elementary schools with 3,740 pupils, of whom 2,334 were Jews. There were some 209 private high schools with 36,000 pupils, out of whom 23,000 were non-Rumanians, including 2600 Jews. Along with the 7 state directed kindergartens with 819 Ruthenian, 990 Jewish and 1842 Rumanian children, there were 14 private kindergartens with 374 children 170 of whom were Jewish. In 1937/38 there were registered at the Cernăuți University (Science, Law, Arts) besides 953 Rumanians, 188 Jews, 101 German, 73 Ruthenian and 28 Polish students.

The number of students belonging to the various minorities would almost certainly have been larger, but their better material situation enabled them to study abroad, even before the beginning of anti-Jewish agitation.

Until 1939, Cernăuți, which had a strong university tradition, was proud of its 5 Jewish, 4 Ruthenian, 8 German, 2 Polish and 6 Rumanian Academic Societies. Each one of these in turn represented the active élite of national consciousness, and was free to move across the country and to develop a most intensive cultural, social and national activity.

All nationalities without exception had their "national houses" in Cernăuți, with branches spreading to a few other towns. In those "national houses" each minority was entitled to celebrate its own national and cultural heroes, their respective national days, to present its own shows, organize its own concerts and its literary and artistic meetings. No one had anything to say when the Ruthenians were celebrating Sevcenko, the Jews Theodore Herzl, the Germans Schiller or Goethe, the Poles Sienkiewicz or the Rumanian Eminescu.

There was no longer friction between the various nationalities, but at the most a spirit of rivalry. But there were some exceptions: the exponents of a bourgeois-nationalist and chauvinist movement, who had made a profession out of it.

The freedom of speech and of opinion might be illustrated by the

following table, showing the press situation of 1936; there were, at that time, in Bukovina:

- 1 Rumanian daily paper
- 1 German daily paper
- 2 Jewish daily papers, printed in German
- 1 Social Democrat daily paper, printed in German
- 1 Rumanian weekly
- 2 Ruthenian weeklies
- 1 Zionist weekly, in German
- 1 Polish weekly

Reviews, pamphlets and books were printed in all languages and literature imported from Germany filled the shelves of Rumanian book-sellers.

A few words must now be added on the political life in Bukovina. After the Union, and as a consequence of the democratization of the political life achieved mainly through the granting of a universal, secret and individual vote, of which the Bukovinian masses enjoyed the privilege for the first time, the Rumanians living in that Province immediately joined the political parties of the Old Kingdom. Their adherence to these parties was spontaneous, and obviously natural.

Bukovinian minorities, however, branched off into two directions: one part started to carry on a nationalist political program within Rumania, the other group joined the existing political parties. Consequently there were Jews, Germans, Hungarians and Ruthenians who were members of their respective national parties, and other Jews, Ruthenians etc. in the Liberal Averescu, National-Peasant, Social-Democrat, Communist, or Cuza parties. Bukovina did not send to Parliament only Rumanians, but also Jews, Ruthenians, Poles and Germans, Nationalist and Zionist Jews, Social-Democrat Jews, Liberal Nationalist and National-Peasant Ruthenians, etc.

Rumanian democratic parties tried during every election to ally themselves with the minorities, and often, especially in departmental and communal elections, the minority candidates obtained the best returns, because through the agreement with the Rumanian party they were sure of a safe seat in the Rumanian lists, while they were also winning additional seats with their own national and dissident lists. Often, therefore, the minorities had more representatives than they would have had on a strictly proportional basis.

It appears therefore quite clearly, that the minorities took an active part in Bukovina's political life, enjoying implicitly all political rights and

prerogatives on an equal footing with the Rumanians. Bukovinian minorities were able to speak their minds not only in the Parliament of the country, but participated effectively also in local administration. The minorities stood only to gain from the rivalry between the Rumanian political parties, and also from the fact that all of them were open to any and all Rumanian citizens without distinction.

This was Bukovina until the day when internal forces and, above all, a powerful Nazi and Fascist pressure broke, in Rumania too, for the time being, the democratic chain. In this part of Europe, Rumania was the last to lower the flag of democratic freedom, and this only after all neighboring countries had had to yield.

* * *

From what has been said above, the following objective conclusions may be drawn:

(1) Bukovina, extending between the Dniester, the Ceremus and the Carpathians was, from time immemorial, part of Moldavia. It had never been divided, but only as a whole occupied by Austria, after a well known act of piracy.

(2) At the fall of the Habsburgs in 1918, no one claimed Bukovina, which freely decided to re-unite with the rest of the country from which it had been torn in 1775.

(3) From a geographical point of view, Bukovina is an indivisible part of the Moldavian geographical cell, and is itself a complementary unit, whose division would amount to an artificial deformation of her harmony.

(4) At the time of her annexation, Bukovina was uniform from an ethnical point of view. Her de-nationalization and the colonization of her territory by other nationalities were arbitrary measures carried out under the impulse of an imperialist power.

(5) By her Union with Rumania, all nationalities, including those of a recent historical origin, enjoyed equal political rights, achieved exceptional economic and cultural progress and benefited without discrimination from the expropriation of land.

In the light of the above mentioned facts, Bukovina can hardly be said to constitute an international problem in any real sense of that term.

To brand it as an international problem, could be done by taking into account only the new and rather confused ethnical criterion, and by disregarding the historic, geographic, economic, and political criteria. But the just tracing of a political frontier can be done only if *all* these criteria are duly taken into account.

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THE LAST EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

by F. W. Pick

FOR THE first time the story of the last peace settlement can now be told with the help of the official records. A basis for a proper appraisal of the last European settlement has been provided by the Department of State in Washington at the very moment when we are at the threshold of a new attempt to give peace to Europe. Four volumes have so far been published (*Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919. The Paris Conference*. Pp. 63, 575, \$1.50; 82, 812, \$1.50; 4, 1,062, \$2.00; 4, 880, \$2.00). How many more volumes will be needed to print all official records kept at the time, the Minutes of the policy-shaping Premiers and Foreign Secretaries as well as of the preparatory fact-finding experts of the many sub-committees, cannot yet be stated. What is certain, however, is the fact that here we have an indispensable source of information, indispensable both for the historian of the last peace settlement and for the politician who tries out a new — and, as we pray, better one — in our own days. What is also certain is that these papers have been edited with great scholarship and must rank with the famous *British Documents on the Origin of the War* of 1914 as an outstanding source of objective knowledge.

This is the more remarkable since we are so near to the events and deliberations here depicted—so near, in fact, that the volumes can be read, if one feels so inclined, as a topical commentary on to-day's newspaper. To heighten this feeling many of the actors in the fearful drama of 1919 are stars still shining brightly to-day: a glance at the Directories printed in volume III affirms this. Perhaps this is least true of the American participants since all five main delegates to the Conference, from President Wilson to General Bliss, are dead (their papers have been used for this series wherever necessary). But John Dulles, Governor Dewey's adviser on foreign affairs, was there, and so was Ambassador Grew, then Secretary General to the Delegation. Mr. Baruch and Mr. Herbert Hoover played an important part, and so did that great expert in European boundary questions, Dr. Isaiah Bowman who accompanied Mr. Stettinius to London in the summer of 1944. Mr. Breckinridge Long, recently an Assistant Secretary of State, is well represented with some notable memoranda.

On the British side two of the main Delegates are still with us, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill. The words "with us" seem rather feeble if applied to the latter who will be, once more, his country's

chief representative at the peace conference. General Smuts, too, was there, and thus appears in these documents as the great progressive thinker he is. Tyrell, Harold Nicolson, Robert Cecil, Keynes, Harlech, Carr, Hankey, Perth, Phipps,—the list of British members of the Paris Conference who are still active, many of them in key positions, seems endless. Perhaps this is just another contribution to our knowledge about the essentially traditional element in British politics, whether the administration be headed by a Liberal like Lloyd George or a Conservative of Winston Churchill's kind. It certainly shows how strongly entrenched British professional diplomacy is, as compared with the coming and going in the ranks of American diplomacy. Moreover, as far as the opening of the archives is concerned, it provides a pertinent comment on the fact that the American Department of State is the only Foreign Office of the world that has decided to take this great step and let us see what really happened at Paris. The British Foreign Office, in spite of some public prodding, has steadfastly refused to publish any counterpart to this great American series.

The French Delegation who provided the President and the seat, Paris, to the Conference, shows no name amongst its main members who could still be called a living force in French politics—M. André Tardieu, the only one still alive, has withdrawn from the scene. But the spirit of Clemenceau and Foch is still with France, is still represented by the younger men who participated in the work of 1919, just as Woodrow Wilson's spirit, the soul of opposition to Clemenceau's, cannot be quenched in the United States. Albert Lebrun, then Minister for the Liberated Areas, the last President of the Third Republic, and M. Flandin, then an expert on aviation whose reputation has since suffered the strangest ups and downs, are only two of the long list whose names catch the observer's eye. Of the Italian and Japanese Delegations of 1919 one cannot speak in the same breath with the others: their countries joined the enemy's camp in the present conflict, and no parallel is thus possible. Lists of the present representatives of the Smaller Powers complete the picture. These 153 pages, giving the skeleton of that huge Conference together with the composition of each Delegation and each Secretariat, all printed in volume III of the present series, form a valuable *Who's Who* for both the historian of 1919 and the politician of 1945.

"Everything for which America fought has been accomplished", President Wilson, in the hour of triumph, in November 1918, told the American nation. This time we approach the hour of victory, *ora formidabile*, with less optimism, with a deeper understanding of the disruptive forces. Whether

we shall build better, we shall, undoubtedly, see within our own life-time. President Wilson had made vast preparations for the hour of peace-making, more so than his European colleagues, unless we count arrangements like the Treaty of London which induced Italy to join the Allies, amongst preparatory work for the peace settlement (and not as another manifestation of the power-politics of the past). The American President had empowered the setting up of "The Enquiry", an independent body of experts who were to study, in Dr. Mezes's words, "war-breeding areas". The third Assistant Secretary of State, Breckinridge Long, can claim to have fathered this organization though he did not make clear why the work could not be done (as to-day) within the Department of State itself. As now, whether at Washington or in London by means of the "European Advisory Council", strict secrecy was kept. To do it openly, the Secretary to "The Enquiry" (no other than Mr. Walter Lippmann) thought, "would create an immense amount of gossip and special interests. A better way . . . would be to do it quietly along the lines we are pursuing in collecting reference data for the peace conference." This was a strange confession, but it may supply us with just another clue to the change of front which Mr. Lippmann, once a supporter of President Wilson's great policy, has since undergone. He believed in the forces of public discussion even then. He did not realize—and is it realized now?—that the very secrecy of preparatory work would leave the public without guidance, without the real means of judging aright and of endorsing the final outcome of the Conference. To "do it quietly" meant that back-stair gossip and special interests had the field all to themselves. The Department of State in Washington, acting upon this lesson of the last failure, has therefore published the present series of documents as a basis for sound judgement. Mr. Cordell Hull has, therefore, kept in close touch with Senators and newspaper-men, with the public who is thus, much more than in the days of self-proclaimed "Open Diplomacy," truly conversant with the really important facts.

Some of the preliminary war aims as set forth by "The Enquiry" make strange reading to-day if compared with President Wilson's own peace aims. The lack of principles—of reference to ethnographic boundaries or the right to self-government—mislead the secret commission, "engaged in forging instruments in aid of judgment", to making proposals of sheer expediency. Without giving as much as a word to Greece they accepted e.g. a Greater Bulgaria, a subject Albania and seemed to regret that the separation of East Prussia from Germany "is probably not within the bounds of practical politics." (December 22, 1917). The Greater must appear Presi-

dent Wilson's achievement in injecting the new League principles of co-operation, on the basis of satisfied, self-governed states, into this maze of proposals born out of temporary expediency. The more impressive, seen against this background, become his staunch lieutenants like General Bliss whose remarkable memorandum of December 15, 1918 (vol. I, 294-6), ought to be re-read.

How shall we draw Central European frontiers? Tasker H. Bliss asked himself. Some, "in order to be prepared for the next war, demand there must be a scientific, strategic frontier". One might excuse a soldier for accepting this proposition—as Foch did. Bliss, however, told Lansing that the acceptance of this doctrine would merely mean that "our work will be futile in our own life time. If we make the probability of future war our guiding principle we must remember that any of the small states thus created, by amalgamation with some other one, may upset all our strategic calculations." Thus stand the adherents of the need for strategic frontiers condemned out of the mouth of the soldier, arguing solely on the ground of boundaries without even being in need of the obvious argument that new weapons, from plane to flying bomb, play havoc with strategic frontier safety. The necessity and justification, General Bliss continued, of the League of Nations "are based on the fact that not all nations can have scientific, strategic frontiers, such as military men demand. Belgium has not and cannot have such a frontier. When one interest demands the inclusion of an alien and racially antagonistic population, in order to secure a strategic frontier, the reply will be that the League of Nations is the strategic frontier of every nation which has no other."

With this Secretary of State Lansing agreed. With this, as was shown throughout the Conference, the President was in full agreement. For these principles he and the American Delegates fought all along. As these documents show, the British Delegation generally came down on the same side, even when it meant hurting the feeling of a Dominion Premier like Mr. W. M. Hughes of Australia who was out for annexation unashamed. Under the League the President then declared, "all the other nations would be pledged, with the United States in the lead (*sic*), to take up arms for the mandatory. Therefore, all danger of bad neighbors was past." (III, 742) The absence of bad neighbors is merely another definition of peace well established: so near had the world come to its establishment. Yet, his work was undone. The lead was not taken. The United States withdrew from the very structure it had helped to build in the face of powerful resistance by continental power politicians who looked for security in square miles,

river and hill positions, instead of finding it in a fair deal for all under the League. The man who had done most to inject the new principles of the League, who had secured at least as great an admixture of ethnographic self-determination as was possible in the war-torn continent of Europe, was denounced by a public he had left without sufficient guidance. The British, in turn, withdrew from Europe. France and her Eastern allies had to fend for themselves. Looking back it seems remarkable that there was even a short spell of fourteen years of peace in Europe from the end of the Polish-Russian war, i.e. 1922, to the beginning of the Spanish so-called Civil War of 1936-39. And yet, how many seem to argue to-day if we had only seen less of the principles of self-determination, if we had only tried to inject fewer League ideals! One can thus argue: but it is an argument for more suppression and thus for more wars.

* * *

The first volume of the present series of documents deals with the technicalities rather than with the contents of actual politics. The material on "The Enquiry" is incomplete and there is very little new light thrown on any power unless it be Italy whose case, for what it is worth, and for more than that, is stated by an American resident in Rome, Mr. H. N. Gay. To the North the Italians demanded the highest Alpine ridge: while "the prevailing language is German", the valleys of South Tyrol are fertile, and strategically speaking valuable; they therefore must become Italian. Fiume was annexed to the Hapsburg Empire by Maria Theresa in 1766 and must therefore "return" to "Italy" (non-existent in the eighteenth century?). To avoid competition between Fiume and Trieste, it was further argued, both ports ought to be in the hands of a single power, namely Italy. Not even the Treaty of London, it will be remembered, had promised Fiume to Italy. The Adriatic aims of Italy were, indeed, boundless. But so were the African: "Colonization based on legitimate emigration is sound democratic national policy—not imperialism." Going back on the Italian promise of 1896 recognizing Abyssinian integrity, the Italians went back to the treaties of 1891 and 1894 when Britain had recognized Abyssinia "as within Italy's sphere of influence" (vol. I, 416-447). Small wonder, then, that General Bliss commented: "the claims of that government are based solely on an assumed revival of war in the not distant future." Those who claim to-day that this assumption of principled power politicians and strategists has been proved right, should ponder whether it was not exactly this kind of demand that led the world towards a new war. By taking

Italian claims—then those of a friend, not of an enemy—it may be possible to reach the right conclusion all the easier.

Like a footnote to this appears the memorandum of the Italian Military Representative who claimed that these claims for the other side of the Adriatic "were the objects of the war." And he added, almost pitifully: "Is it possible that Europe will agree to denying to victorious Italy the fruits of their great victory?" Those fruits, as in the olden days, were to be power, as expressed in overwhelming armies, and new territories, as expressed in far-flung annexations.

* * *

With volume II we enter the field of almost timeless questions: there are fascinating papers on Germany, Austria and Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, the newly formed States, a short commentary on Russian affairs, a revealing set of prophecies on China and Japan. Financial questions, reparations, food relief and the blockade bring up the rear, being indeed relegated to a very secondary rôle. The new German Government, through its Foreign Secretary Solf, naturally tried to assure the best possible beginning by denouncing everything that could prejudice the final position of Germany previous to the Peace Conference (for the summoning of which it pressed). The blockade ought to be lifted, less rolling stock than was asked for from Germany should be expected. "The French Government seems even (*sic*) to have taken the stand that the severing of Alsace-Lorraine from the German Empire is an accomplished fact" (II 62-4). Such claims, made as between equals and without any feeling for the fact that they had suffered defeat, lessened undoubtedly the value of other demands the Germans might make on purely humanitarian grounds, as e.g. for transport or for the return of some of their troops by ship from Istanbul instead of by road or rail through Russia. Similarly, Solf suggested that "all the belligerent powers should declare their readiness to place at the disposal of such a Commission (on war guilt) all of their records." While all the Great Powers—Russia, Austria, Germany, France and Britain—eventually opened their archives (with the one glaring exception of Italy), they did so of their own accord to the satisfaction of their own conscience. It was merely another sign of German lack of understanding of other countries to have asked, as a matter of right, for an opening of the archives.

Until the last volume of *Memoirs of the German Ambassador to The Hague*, Friedrich Rosen, is published (it was completed before his death), his report on the German Emperor's flight to Holland printed here will help to fill a gap in our knowledge. (II, 80). "On his arrival in

Holland—and twice since—the former Emperor has expressed to me his very clear opinion that there are no chances whatever of his regaining the throne of Prussia or of Germany. He does not in any way entertain such a desire.” And then came the revealing words, typical of Hohenzollern mysticism that seems to be fashionable with German leaders: “His religious conviction leads him to believe firmly that what has occurred to him is a decree of Providence, the ultimate object of which he cannot understand, but which it is his duty to submit to in Christian humility.” No wonder he could grow old with grace, unperturbed by the thought of past error—of which he under Providence saw none.

Of absorbing interest are the documents, some thirty-five in number, about the quickly changing scene in revolutionary Germany where the monarchy had come to so dishonorable an end and the rivalling groups of Socialists, Spartacists and extreme Bolsheviks struggled for power. Reports came from Switzerland, chiefly about Bavaria and Kurt Eisner's new administration; from The Hague and from Copenhagen about Western and North Germany. On the strength of it, Mr. William C. Bullitt, of the Division of Western European Affairs, came to a remarkably correct appraisal of the real situation. His report of November 25, 1918, was therefore submitted by the Secretary of State to President Wilson. Lansing thought it “possibly should be acted upon without delay.” (II, 98-101). Mr. Bullitt said that only quick action could save Europe from a Germany lost to Bolshevism and thus, eventually, to a Russo-German collaboration of dangerous implications. “The old order”, he said, “has been rooted out, though naturally in isolated country communities and complicated Governmental departments remnants of the old bureaucracy remain.” It is the tragedy of more than the last German Republic that those isolated remnants of the Imperial order grew into yet another danger to the free world. Again the question which the members of the I-told-you-so school ought to ask themselves is how much their own attitude must have contributed to the growth of that danger—instead of indulging in the complete denial of any other German forces but those of aggressiveness and militarism. “If the present German Government of moderate democratic socialists,” said Mr. Bullitt, “is to hold its position, it must be sustained not only by economic assistance but also by political support.” He therefore recommended the closest unofficial relations with the Ebert Government.

Lansing followed this up, and on instruction of the President he wired House in Paris. It would be a wise step to take, he said, if the allies would notify the Germans “that there can be no official dealings with them . . .

in connection with the final settlements of the peace until a constituent assembly has been brought together and a definite form of government agreed upon and set up." (II, 102). Yet when the French were approached, they declined to have anything to do with any such move. Scheidemann, the Republican leader, who urged such a declaration, was, in Clemenceau's eyes, merely an agent of William II. The French Foreign Secretary, S. Pichon, therefore refused this "direct intervention in the internal affairs of another country"; instead, he hoped for the disintegration of Germany, "the essential act destined to assure indispensable guarantees against the resumption of hostilities." (II, 107).

The so-called Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office, with a memorandum of December 21, 1918 (II, 126-29), then summarized the German position and put the problem, in the guise of French views, very neatly thus: "There are two sections of opinion", it said of the French. "The first is Chauvinist, imperialist and annexationist, without even worldly wisdom. It wants as much of Germany on the left bank of the Rhine as it can get, and does not want Germany ever again to become a great European power. The other section is afraid of a successful, progressive and really democratic German Republic." To a France thus divided between the fear of a powerful Germany and the fear of a successfully Republican Germany, Europe was left to its devices, both Britain and America pursuing their own aims.

To pierce the fog and to gain inside knowledge of the position in Germany, the Department of State sent Mr. Ellis Dresel on a whirlwind tour. He started from Berne where Eisner's associate, Professor Foerster, had been made Bavarian Minister, to proceed to Munich, here to meet his first surprise: "No distinct separatist movement is as yet visible", he reported. What struck him most was what may well strike observers at the end of this war an even greater degree—he found apathy, complete apathy as to the political future of Germany. He found also, what Mr. Bullitt had stated already, that Ebert's moderate friends stood a good chance if the allies promised to treat with a stable Government only. He too thought the junkers and big landowners politically dead. An "over-friendly" attitude towards the United States seemed to surprise him: he seemed unaware that President Wilson's words were the only gleam of hope for an eventual peace for war-torn and race-ridden Europe.

Not the least interesting part of Mr. Dresel's fact-finding tour were his interviews with twenty-three prominent Germans whose views, as formed by the end of 1918, are printed here in full. Cardinal Faulhaber, an import-

ant man throughout the Republican days, judged the German bourgeoisie weak, lacking in political experience, and easily terrorized. Dr. Solf feared complete anarchy. Dr. Rathenau thought the German people sound at heart, but "they understood nothing about politics", having been taught to obey from their earliest youth. The Minister of the Interior, Hugo Preuss, **was the only one who saw further than the next ten years**: he feared the reactionary Right. "The danger for the present Government for the time being is from the Left. To him the greater danger appears to be from the Right, not for the present, but in the long run, for he believed the reaction which was not showing its head now would emerge sooner or later and would emphasize any lack of success in any field." His Constitution was drafted to meet the dangers, and as far as constitutional devices could be effective, he was not unsuccessful—unless Proportional Representation, offered to an inexperienced nation, can be called a mistake. What he could not do was to provide the coming Republican Government with successes at home and abroad, in the battle for collective security at Geneva and against unemployment at home. Max Warburg, who expected to become the financial adviser to the Republic—just as his Hamburg firm had been the banker of the Foreign Office down to the war—was a very different man. He hoped colonies would not be taken from Germany "because the people must be left the hope and possibility of expansion (sic) and must not be deprived of every chance of recovering their economic strength." ("The Dresel Mission," II, 130-72).

After Germany, Austria. Alpine Austria, at least Vorarlberg, it was suggested in Italian circles, might join Switzerland. Italy, in thus discussing the so-called Mazzini idea of a Switzerland including both Alsace and Vorarlberg, forgot the Swiss who, in their traditional wisdom gathered throughout the six-hundred and fifty years of independence, had learned that alien annexations do not pay. They accepted a customs union with lilliput Liechtenstein only. In Vienna, meanwhile, the neutrals met under the Papal Nuncio to ask the allies for the early occupation of the capital—and for food—to prevent anarchy. On November 12, 1918, the Provisional National Assembly of rump-Austria "unanimously resolved to constitute German Austria into a democratic Republic which is to form part of the Great German Republic." Dr. Bauer, the Foreign Secretary, asked President Wilson to grant the German-speaking Austrians what he had promised Poles, Yugoslavs or Italians—namely self-determination. For strategic reasons, mainly owing to the able representation of Czechoslovak views, this was refused. The Republican régime in both Germany and

Austria began, indeed, with the heavy handicap of military defeat and utter helplessness. Their tragedy and downfall were to lead to the doom of collective security, and to prepare the ground for Hitler's mad adventure.

The following documents show an ever increasing confusion: Ukrainians protested against an invasion by Polish troops, Austrians called for help against Czechoslovak forces and asked for English and American troops of occupation to save Klagenfurt for them from Yugoslav hands. Professor A. C. Coolidge, sent to Vienna to report on the situation of the Tyrol and Sudeten Germans, had to face a perplexing task in unravelling mysteries and discovering ever new minorities in every newly formed succession state. ("The Coolidge Mission," II, 218-37). There is little about Bulgaria or the Balkans generally, since "American forces did not participate in the military campaign in the Balkans", as Lansing put it, when Bulgarians had to hand over the Dobrudja to Rumanian troops, America looked on with hardly veiled indifference. The heydays of "The Enquiry's" dreams of a Greater Bulgaria had long been forgotten by then. Mr. Lippmann, it was true, still thought of compensating Bulgarians in Thrace for what they lost in Macedonia; his idea of seeing Bulgaria "Joining or being absorbed into a strong Yugoslav State" was even further removed from both realities and allied principles of self-determination. (II, 250).

Only a few documents are dedicated to the Turkish question, relatively simple in 1919 owing to the absence of Russia, but nevertheless complicated by the demands of Greece and Italy, which, added to the French and British interests, were to remain too difficult for any Conference to meet. The real difficulties cropped up when "Territorial Questions and Relations with New States" (II, 287-461) had to be tackled. Italian claims clashed with Yugoslav wishes, and King Nicholas of Montenegro hoped to be restored to his throne with the help of Italy. Britain, too, refused to accept the absorption of Montenegro into the Yugoslav kingdom before the Conference had decided,—"territorial changes being left to the Peace Conference". What caused this step it is impossible to say without the publication of the relevant British papers. Britain backed independent Albania, but again her attitude, represented by an isolated memorandum for American consumption only, cannot be fully explained as long as she prevents the opening of her own archives. The same is true of the interesting statement by a member of the British Foreign Office on the German-speaking fringe of Czechoslovakia: strategic and economic reasons were declared to be "of such paramount importance" in some districts as to override all other considerations"; but the great difficulty of their presence was fully recognized

and allowance is being made for ethnographic considerations round Eger and Reichenberg. It would be interesting—with an eye on the Munich frontiers of 1938—to see the map then drawn by the British Foreign Office and passed on to the Department of State (addendum to 763.72/12451; vol. II, 376) Dr. Bauer's demand for a plebiscite was repudiated by Dr. Beneš who said that the Germans were "quietly accepting incorporation" if it were not for Bauer, "a minority Socialist who participated in the Bolshevik revolution in Petrograd in the year 1917; he undoubtedly favors by every means the extremist movement in other countries." Perhaps it is unkind of these documents to recall that it was Dr. Beneš who then used the Bolshevik bogey to great effect. His real reason for opposing a plebiscite was quite different. "The inhabitants of these districts", he admitted to the Council of Five on February 5, 1919, "would vote for exclusion, chiefly through the influence of the Social Democratic Party, which thought that the Germans would henceforth have a Social Democratic régime." (Vol. III, 881). Again, this may well be taken as a commentary on the interdependence between the failure of the German Republic and the way the Allies gave way to fear, allowed themselves to be swayed by bogies of the anarchist type and the militarist kind, and thus fell short of their own proclaimed principles.

In Western Europe the only difficulty seemed to come from Belgium, since the outbreak of the war in the centre of warfare and thus holding a special place in the sympathy of the world. She hoped for the inclusion of Luxembourg, Eupen and Malmédy as well as Dutch Limburg and the mouth of the Scheldt. "The separation from Belgium in 1839 (of Luxembourg) has brought about a grave menace to the existence of Belgium". (II, 437-40). On the other hand, there were French interests. "From my British colleague", the American Minister in Brussels told the State Department, "I learn that England is concerned and will take steps to contest French supremacy (in Belgium). From his conversation I infer that England will oppose the desire of the French Government to annex Luxembourg and that she will not consent to Belgium's securing the left bank of the Scheldt." (II, 42). And this was the solution eventually reached. Only the demands on Germany were met. Allied troops entering these districts after twenty-five years of Belgian rule there, have measured for themselves how far this compliance corresponded to Wilson's aims.

Denmark provided a jarring note since she negotiated direct with Germany through her Foreign Minister Scavenius. "The (Danish) King is said to have reproached M. Scavenius for having assured me that no

conversations were being had with Germany in regard to the cession of North Slesvig, when he knew the contrary to be the case." The Government of which Scavenius was then a member had based its policy, from the beginning of the war, on the assumption, if not of German victory, at least of a draw between the belligerents whereby Germany would continue to be an ever present menace to Danish independence. (II, 452). Scavenius, surely, has remained true to form. Mainly through the King's influence, Denmark accepted the good offices of the Peace Conference for a settlement of the Slesvig question on the basis of plebiscites. Finally, in the short chapters on Russian affairs, we have three interesting protests from the Estonians, Letts and Lithuanians against the German activities in the Baltic States. (II, 467, 480-83). No better compliment to their *de facto* independence could have been paid than the memorandum which Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr., drew up about the muddled position with regard to economic intervention in Russia—in it the Baltic States did not figure at all. (II, 471-75).

The brilliant chapter on the Far East—with Dr. P. S. Reinsch and Dr. W. W. Willoughby as its stars and Mr. Breckinridge Long as its schemer of stratagems (II, 512-15)—cannot detain us here; nor can the Financial Questions which belabour the familiar question marks whether and how to maintain governmental control over industry? to stop credits? cancel orders? discontinue the advances made in support of exchange? There is some sound advice, e.g. from Mr. John Foster Dulles, and some less sound opinions on reparations and on food distribution. It is with the chapter on Trade that we re-enter the political field liable to more than fluctuations leading to international strife. G. McFadden, of the War Trade Board, wrote on November 9, 1918: "The United States and Great Britain, in the post-war period, will be logical and vigorous competitors. . . The United States . . . should have the better of the competition as the United States will be independent economically of Great Britain, while Great Britain will be dependent upon the United States for certain food supplies, commodities etc." One does not need the experience of the inter-war period to realize to what unhealthy tensions such arguments must lead: and how easily they may be countered by political means. And yet, how many seem to argue the same way to-day, whether with regard to the United States and Britain or with regard to Russia. G. McFadden asked for complete liberty of action for America, the right to do exactly as she pleased—yet his Board added: "If the peace negotiations are to result in the constitution of a league of nations or some closer coöperation of the nations of the world

than has existed hitherto, we must not prior thereto create international jealousy and distrust." (II, 729, 737).

* * *

The third volume of our documentary series, after printing the useful Directories of the Peace Conference, records the eight meetings of the preliminary Conference as well as the six plenary meetings—all more or less the occasion for prepared set speeches. Raymond Poincaré, in opening the proceedings, gave them a typical turn. "What gives you authority to establish a peace of justice," he told the conference, "is the fact that none of the peoples of whom you are the delegates has had any part in injustice." And he hastened to add that they had met together on the very day when the German Empire was proclaimed by an army of invasion forty-eight years earlier. Clemenceau, elected President of the Conference, saw the fearful task ahead of them: "We have come here as friends. We must leave this room as brothers. The League is here. It is in yourselves." (III, 159, 168).

Woodrow Wilson's words have an importance transcending the year, even the decades during which his League was on trial: "We can set up permanent processes. We may not be able to set up permanent decisions." America, therefore, could take part in a European settlement only if peace was to be supervised by all everywhere. (III, 179).) Yet, an international force seemed to him premature; and France, which considered such a possibility with perhaps more sympathy, could think of such force as installed on her side of the Rhine frontier only. It fell to G. N. Barnes, the British Labor leader and Minister without Portfolio in Lloyd George's Government, to go further: "I should have been glad," he stated publicly, "to have seen some provision for the nucleus of an international force which would be ready to strike against an aggressive nation. This, I know, cuts into the idea of the sovereignty of nations." (III, 226). He obviously felt, without as yet developing the idea to its logical conclusion, that the great and healthy principle of self-determination must have its correlation, or corrective, in a freely accepted and acceptable limitation of the "right" to wage war.

From the general to the particular was no easy step, and when André Tardieu read, on May 6, 1919, a summary of the Peace Treaty the press was carefully excluded. Portugal was dissatisfied with her reparation share (just as she had been dissatisfied with the lack of suitable reference to God in the preamble); China objected to the treatment of Kiaochow and Shantung, Japan to racial disqualifications. The main protest, however, came

from Marshal Foch, the victorious marshal himself. Within five years, he warned the delegates, we shall be weakened, perhaps so weak as to be unable to make the Germans pay any further. "The barrier of the Rhine"—nothing less would satisfy him. "If you are not on the Rhine you have lost everything." (III, 384-88). He was listened to; but the days of annexations had come to an end, in Western Europe at least. "Is it unreasonable", President Wilson burst out when the protection of minorities was under discussion on May 31, 1919, "is it unreasonable and unjust that, not as dictators but as friends, the Great Powers should say to their associates: 'We cannot afford to guarantee territorial settlements which we do not believe to be right'." Right, of course, in the eyes of those who believed in the value of the individual, in the dignity of man, and thus in the principles he had formulated so finely.

Then came the hour for the weighty settlement of accounts, as Clemenceau put it, when he handed the draft treaty to the Germans, telling them that there would be no oral discussions and that an answer had to be given within fifteen days. Brockdorff pleaded the cause of those who suffered from the continued blockade measures. Germany's duty, he declared, was "the restoration of the territory of Belgium and Northern France which were occupied by us and devastated by the war. The worst method would be to continue to have the work done by German prisoners of war. Such labor is certainly cheap. It would, however, cost the world dear if hate and despair were aroused in the German people." (III, 413-20). One outcome of this experience of war prisoners was the Geneva Convention of July 27 1919, signed by almost fifty nations, and providing for release and repatriation upon cessation of hostilities. (art. 75; *Foreign Relations*, 1929, I, 354). Signature of the Peace Treaties with Germany, Austria and Bulgaria followed without any hitch. The last excuse for the blockade had thus disappeared.

The Minutes of the Council of Ten, the five Premiers and five Foreign Secretaries of the principal Powers, printed next, give a wealth of material which constitutes the last word in textual exactness. They make superfluous a great deal of the libraries written so far about the last peace settlement and render redundant even much of Temperley, Hunter Miller and other standard works on the subject. Except for "colour" and for explanations of the participants themselves, i.e. for Memoirs, we can disregard many hitherto useful books. It may be pointed out by way of illustration, that a good deal of Stephen Bonsal's recent *Unfinished Business* is proved to be textually so incorrect as to prevent it from becoming a first

hand source book. These Minutes of the Council of Ten are of absorbing interest right from the beginning, January 12, 1919 (III, 4467, to March 24, 1919 (IV, 475). The last named meeting took place an hour late because the Big Four had met before to work out a compromise formula—and they were to keep to this arrangement of private meetings henceforth, so that the Minutes of the Council of Ten, and then of Five of the Foreign Secretaries, are robbed of their main interest. Secondary questions only are dealt with openly in these later records: the minutes of the discussions of the Big Four (or Three) have still to be printed.

* * *

The main difficulty—besides the cleavage about fundamental principles as already shown—proved to be Russia. And with the disunion about the correct approach to the Russian problem went the doubt as to how to deal with Polish aspirations. Right from the beginning this Russian and Polish uncertainty showed itself. The main spokesman for the Poles, not entirely to their profit, was Marshal Foch himself, and the manner in which he put his—political—demands caused increasing opposition. "The situation of the Polish population is not in bearing with the promises made by the Allies", he told the Council. Small wonder he had to listen to Wilson's doubts whether Bolshevism could be "checked by arms at all". His demands for the immediate dispatch of Polish troops to the Eastern front, for the transport of Russian prisoners of war not into Russia but into Poland and the Ukraine, were flatly refused. He returned to the charge repeatedly, always with the same negative result. Clemenceau himself gave him no support. Lloyd George was ready to accept the Bolsheviks as the *de facto* Government of Russia; "we had formally recognized the Tsar's Government, although at the time we knew it to be absolutely rotten. Our reason had been that it was the *de facto* Government . . ." (III, 491). He therefore proposed the Prinkipo Conference. Undoubtedly, he would have liked to see all Russians appear in Paris, but Clemenceau would have none of it. He, Clemenceau, openly advocated a "policy of encirclement" of Bolshevik Russia—he would never forgive them for letting France continue to fight alone the war against Germany in that dark year of 1917. His own ambassador, Joseph Noulens, and the Danish Minister, Scavenius, both urged the Conference to intervene in Russia and destroy "the centres of Bolshevism by capturing Petrograd and Moscow." (III, 623-33, 634-43). M. Litvinoff, who had, in the meantime, seen the special assistant to the London Embassy of the United States, told the allies that peace could easily be re-established; even the question of the foreign debt would be dealt with

in a "conciliatory" manner. (III, 643-46). Nothing came of it, although the Baltic States quickly signed peace treaties with the Soviet Union, thus being the first to recognize the new régime there *de jure* as well as *de facto*.

On January 24, 1919, Lloyd George asked for the reduction of all allied armies who wanted to go home. Foch feared the worst. "Should a real leader (in Germany) arise, it would not be difficult for him to reconstruct the armies." The ex-corporal Hitler thought exactly the same thing at the same time. *Les extrêmes se touchent*,—or does the military mind work similarly everywhere? The democratic leaders pressed for demobilization. The German Republic disbanded the Imperial armies (on order, it was true), English and American soldiers hoped to be able to go home. the sooner the better. "Sooner or later", President Wilson was heard to say, "the Allies would be compelled to trust Germany to keep her promises. He thought they should at the same time study a scheme to relieve unemployment in Germany." (III, 709, 712). Germany, echoed Mr. Lloyd George three days later, would be entitled to ask what her economic future was going to be: robbed of the means of subsistence, she would become a source of unrest, and peaceful European development would not be secured.

By the end of January the Polish question once again held the interest of the Conference. Instructions for the Commission sent to Poland were drafted by Pichon, altered by Balfour, changed once more by Clemenceau before they were accepted: they were to warn Poland to abstain from aggression in the East and West, since "the invasion by the Poles of German territory tends to restore the German military spirit." (III, 779). Can one wonder that the Poles felt forsaken and began to think of Wilson, Lloyd George and Balfour as 'pro-German'? In truth, as these documents reaffirm, the Anglo-Saxon statesmen were simply trying to make a reality of the principle of peace—self-determination, tempered by self-willed collaboration—, principles whose strength the very rebirth of the gallant Polish nation had confirmed. Clearly the Poles could not claim the application of these principles to their own people and yet deny it to their neighbors, the Lithuanians, Russians, Czechs, or, even, members of the defeated German nation. M. Roman Dmowski, in a moderate declaration, stated the Polish case. (III, 77-84). There was much that inspired confidence in Poland's ability to reconstruct, after a hundred and twenty-five years of suppression, a nation-state of its own. Yet his remarks about the neighbors of Poland showed with what difficulties Eastern Europe was beset. Lithuanians, he said, were not "fit" to form a state and govern themselves. Russia, he thought

"strictly speaking not fit" for admission to a League of Nations. With Czechoslovakia the new Polish State carried on a small war for the Teschen district. His repudiation of German aggressiveness was only natural. The outlook was gloomy indeed.

On the other hand, even Dmowski, the patriot, declared: "In Poland they were afraid of the anarchy prevalent in the Eastern districts of old historical Poland" (meaning, probably, the position around 1600) "and therefore they were satisfied to renounce these districts for the sake of perserving peace and order within their own borders." He carefully avoided reference to self-determination or plebiscites, but he was obviously ready to accept something like the Curzon Line; this was over three years before Piłsudski's and Sosnkowski's successful war against the Soviet Union. As to East Prussia, he suggested that the small island of German people be left—his words—and that they be allowed to organize themselves into a Republic with Königsberg as their capital. Decisions were postponed, commissions were appointed to prepare the ground for action.

Next came the Greek claims to Southern Albania, the Dodecanese, Cyprus, Thrace and Western Asia Minor. "A wide latitude of action was admissible because Turkey had signed the Armistice without conditions", thus argued M. Venizelos, explaining unconditional surrender without reference to any other principle than the one that, formerly, gave limitless power over the vanquished. Constantinople, he said, was "in reality a Greek town" but, knowing his history and the rôle played by the Eastern question, he did not claim it: perhaps the League would rule the Straits? (III, 859-66, 868-76). "The new Greece would have the singular appearance of a State formed around a sea. That certainly was an inconvenience. But for thirty centuries Greeks had lived under these conditions." Within three years, Turkey had expelled all Greek-speaking people from Asia Minor who could get away, over a million being settled in Macedonia, no less than 135,000 orphans there being cared for by American relief organizations. . . .

The Czechoslovak case came next. Dr. Beneš was at his most persuasive, and he is always one of the most convincing of speakers. The kernel of his claim for an independent State needed no further cementing. He went straight for the border-cases. "Without the peripheral areas Bohemia could not live. If the Germans were to be given the outer rim of Bohemia, they would also possess the hinterland." Of course, pressed by Mr. Lloyd George, he had to admit that the Germans there would vote for exclusion, not for inclusion in the Czech state, since they hoped for a German democracy. He claimed Teschen, submitting a wealth of figures, and some Hungarian

territory. A Danube frontier was needed since an internationalized Danube was the only waterway out of Czechoslovakia. Finally, "in order to free itself from the grip of the Germans and Magyars, the Czechoslovak State wished to establish close relations with the Yugoslavs and with Italy. The nearest sea was the Adriatic. He thought that by means of a small territory either under the Czech or Yugoslav Government, or under the League of Nations, a means of communication would be best established. A railway line alone, with territory on either side of it would, he thought, be insufficient. He would suggest that this territory should be marked out on the confines of the Germans and the Magyars. It would thus furnish a corridor between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia." (III, 877-87).

While all these claims were scrutinized by sub-Commissions, the Minutes of which are to be printed in later volumes of the present series, the question for immediate consideration was the renewal of the armistice with Germany. Foch demanded large armies of occupation with officers to be placed in each German factory. Wilson, on the other hand, proposed to send a Commission of civilians to find out what food and raw materials Germany would need to return to something like normal; in exchange they would be asked to reduce drastically the German armies and speed up demobilization. Clemenceau would have none of it. "He did not wish to starve the Germans, but the blockade must be maintained." "Foch, not civilians, had to remain in charge." The two compromise formulas then proposed by Lloyd George, one after the other, met with his determined refusal. President Wilson called the French plans of an occupation of the Ruhr and of all factories a "panic program." No progress was made the following day. Wilson, too, would not budge. "These continual aggravations of the armistice", he thought, "put the Allies at a moral disadvantage." Lord Milner's attempt to find a way out, satisfactory to both America and France, failed. Four days had to pass by before the Conference resumed negotiations about the renewal of the German armistice, filling the time with inquiries, a discussion of the naval terms and with listening to M. Hymans who asked that Holland be "summoned" so that she might give Belgium the mouth of the Scheldt and Limburg for a compensation for German territory around Emden. (III, 958-69).

The meeting of February 12, 1919, on the renewal of the armistice proved livelier even than the previous ones. President Wilson wanted to get away from fault-finding and from adding ever new conditions to be imposed on the Germans as a kind of afterthought. This made things worse. Clemenceau was deeply wounded, and he now lashed out: the Germans

are "placing all power in the hands of the accomplices of William II. News had been received that morning that Scheidemann, one of William's most direct agents, was to govern Germany." This was his view of Republican Germany and of the Social-Democratic leaders. "It must not be forgotten that we were still at war. War continued in the minds of men"—meaning of course, "the same minds that had made the war of 1914", the Germans. Wilson's remarks, to him, were but "the echo of a sentiment he had read in German newspapers." After this outburst, President Wilson showed himself the statesman he was. The Conference did not come to an end, he did not return home. He brought the discussion back to the technicalities, showing that military terms might well be separated from the peace terms proper. He regretted the rumor that France had stopped demobilization. He was ready to disarm Germany first and then to take up the peace terms of disarmament. (III, 895-956; 971-1,006) Three days later the President returned home for a short visit. He had set up the League, and Clemenceau thus worried him less than might otherwise have been expected.

* * *

On the eve of his departure the President met Mr. Winston Churchill, sent over by the British Cabinet to discuss the Russian situation. President Wilson expressed himself in favour of a withdrawal of allied troops from Russia. Mr. Churchill reminded him that this would mean the surrender of all non-Bolshevik forces, some half a million men, "and an interminable vista of violence and misery was all that remained for the whole of Russia." He added—a remark missing in his memoirs *The Aftermath*—that "volunteers, technical experts, arms, munitions, tanks, aeroplanes, etc. might be furnished" to the anti-Reds. (III, 1,039-44). The next morning, already in the absence of President Wilson, the discussion was resumed. With it opens Volume IV of the present series. It was then that Winston Churchill spoke of Russia as "the counterpoise of Europe." France alone could not replace it. What if Russia fell into German clutches? "It was only from Russia that Germany could derive those resources which she had lost through the loss of her colonies and through her defeat on the Western front. . . In his opinion, Russia was the key to the whole situation, and unless she formed a living part of Europe, unless she became a living partner in the League of Nations and a friend of the Allied Powers, there would be neither peace nor victory." These sentences explain more than his playing with the idea of anti-Bolshevist intervention in 1918-19: it shows the working of his mind, it shows him as the strategist all along. To make Russia a "living partner", by any means whatever, was his aim. Clemenceau, on

the other hand, "favored the policy of encirclement: the policy of setting up a barrier around Russia." Thus no action could be agreed upon. (IV, 10-21; it may be noted, in passing, that volume IV suffers from careless proofreading which mars an otherwise finely edited work).

Throughout the latter part of February Clemenceau was absent from the Council Chamber since he had been wounded by a bullet. Yugoslavia's case was taken under consideration; Albania's followed. Foch returned to his charge for arming the Poles and pushing on against Russia—"1919 would see the end of Bolshevism, just as 1918 had seen the end of Prussianism." (IV, 122). Belgium, through M. Hymans, pressed for Dutch compensation in Germany so that the Scheldt and Limburg would become Belgian: "It would be manifestly wrong to hand over unwilling German populations to Holland," he was told by Balfour (IV, 142). And the Dutch anyway were not prepared to grant the Belgian demands. The Armenians came next, desiring Trebizond on the Black Sea and Cilicia in the Mediterranean; Palestine was discussed (IV, 161-70). With Clemenceau recovered the central problems could be discussed once more. March 3, 1919, witnessed a lively meeting, almost an explosion, if it had not been for a timely adjournment: Foch asked for a quick decision so that the peace terms could be handed to the Germans by March 20, after which date he would not guarantee anything. "This was equivalent to holding a pistol at the head of the Council", so quiet a man as Balfour exclaimed. He next noted that the air clauses were to last a short time, the military terms until the Day of Judgment—the naval for a generation: why could not a generally acceptable formula be evolved? Foch refused to discuss this; terms were "final". To which Clemenceau added that he was not ready to sign an invitation to Germany to prepare for another attack by land after an interval of three or even forty years. (IV, 189). Yet, the last word had not been spoken. Lloyd George returned to Paris and rushed in to tear the decisions of the military experts to shreds. The soldiers had proposed to give Germany 200,000 men, every year! After a year's training another 200,000 men were to be called up. If this was the combined view of all the military experts, he would not listen to it, not even look at it. The figure was whittled down to 140,000—less, thought Bliss, would endanger security inside Germany. Foch, in passing, mentioned a hundred thousand as preferable if a long-term, instead of a short-term army was to be granted to Germany. Lloyd George jumped at it: a hundred thousand, no more. "In that case", Balfour began to wonder, "Germany must be secured against invasion. There was no plan at present before the Confer-

ence for general disarmament . . ." While Degoutte, Weygand and Cavallero formally protested against Lloyd George's long-term a-hundred-thousand-men army for Germany, the politicians had their way. Balfour, thoughtfully, asked the military why they had decided to dismantle Germany's fortifications in the West only? Degoutte answered him: there were none in the South—and as to the East, "they might serve as a protection against Bolshevism." (IV, 215-20, 230-38, 263-65, 294-300).

Blockade and food supplies for Central Europe constituted another subject where divergencies could hardly be veiled. First, France asked for food for Austria so as to prevent the Austrians from throwing in their lot with Germany. But the railway line had been cut by the Italians following an incident at Ljubljana (Laibach) and Baron Sonnino spoke of a "military occupation of Ljubljana" rather than of providing food for starving Austria. (IV, 197-207, 255-61, 269). Naturally, supply of Czechoslovakia had become impossible as well. Talks with the Austrians, moreover, Foch reminded Mr. Hoover pertly, were impossible since "all conversations with the enemy were forbidden while the war lasted". To the Italians, the Yugoslavs were the enemy—former Austrians, obviously. At the same time, the Germans refused to hand over their mercantile fleet before a promise about food supply had been made. (IV, 253, 266-7). Nothing, said M. Clementel on March 8, 1919, "nothing had as yet been sent." Lloyd George thought the honor of the allies involved General Plumer of the army of the Rhine reporting that his troops of occupation were sharing their rations with starving civilians. But M. Klotz would not budge before payment had been secured. Lloyd George "appealed to M. Clemenceau to put a stop to these obstructive tactics." It was then agreed that the Germans were to hand over the ships—but food, too, was to be sent as had been promised two months earlier. (IV, 274-93).

Next Eastern European problems, mostly boundary questions, took the stage. Dr. Beneš had discovered, so he thought, a military plot hatched by Germans, Austrians and Hungarians. "The new map of Europe", Lloyd George remarked, "must not be so drawn as to leave cause for disputations which would eventually drag Europe into a new war." The road towards this aim was Wilson's—self-determination. What Czechs asked of the Austrians, said Lansing, reminded him of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia of 1914—"monstrous" demands, echoed Lloyd George. (IV, 317-20, 327-30) on the other hand, Lansing agreed with Beneš in so far as he, too, feared that Berlin was still too much under the influence of the old bureaucracy of the past régime. The whole bubble of the plot burst into thin air.

Worse were Italo-Yugoslav relations. "The recognition of the new State would not constitute an amiable act towards Italy." To discuss frontiers, said Orlando, "in the presence of the enemy" was out of the question. Lansing reminded the Italians that none of the contending parties could sit as a judge of its own case. But that was exactly what victorious Italy wanted to do. No wonder then that the solution of the Peace Conference was overthrown by Italy even after she had accepted it.

With President Wilson's return to Paris the military clauses to be imposed upon Germany could be given their final form without great difficulty. Poland constituted the real stumbling block. Foch, having failed to ship material and supplies via Danzig, demanded help for Lemberg via Italy, Austria and Rumania—the latter having promised to send troops as well. He met with violent opposition from Lloyd George: it would lead to the eventual invasion of Russia, "to the perpetration of a great mischief." Instead, a truce between Poles and Ukrainians was once more to be arranged. Lloyd George wondered: "The Poles were not incapable of claiming more for themselves than was theirs by right. They had done so in respect to their frontiers with Germany and Russia." Would they do likewise with regard to the Ukraine? Next came the German-Polish frontier. Lloyd George queried the inclusion of 2.1 million Germans in Poland; it would mean a wide departure from the Fourteen Points and sow the seed of future wars. The Polish Commission, therefore, ought to reconsider the boundaries proposed. Foch, meanwhile, continued his campaign for military help to be sent. The Polish Commission reported back that no alterations seemed possible, that about three million Germans would have to go to Poland in the latter's interest. What was Lloyd George to answer, especially in the face of violent press attacks made possible through leakages? He trod softly—because from now on the Big Four, and then the Big Three, met privately to hammer out the main decisions. The curtain was rung down. Even the Minutes printed here cannot tell us anything further. (IV, 314-16, 379-85, 404-42, 448-58, 472-3).

What follows, the second half of volume IV, is of great value to the student of special questions; but the main issues do not appear in the Minutes of the meetings of the five Foreign Secretaries. Only secondary importance thus is to be attached to their records. Yet the picture on the whole has become clear enough. The reasons for each action and each decision taken in 1919 are clearly set out. Each shade of opinion is well represented. It is for us to think the same thoughts once more; to judge the actors in that fearful drama of peace-making with the help of the

knowledge available to them at the time; to judge the self-same questions, as they stare us in the face to-day, with the knowledge we have since acquired and which we can add to theirs. It is for each of us to go through these documents with what care we can command and to try and find the road towards a better peace for Europe, for a continent heavy with history, and rich, abundantly rich, in spiritual values.

ELIZABETH COLLEGE
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BOOK REVIEWS

RUPP, GEORGE HOOVER, *A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941. (Harvard Historical Studies, XLIX.) Pp. xiv, 599. \$5.00.

This book is based on wide reading which includes some previously neglected Russian and Magyar sources and on some research in the British and Austrian archives. It deals with an important subject, the breakdown of Russian-Austrian cooperation in the Near Eastern question from the rising in Herzegovina to the Congress of Berlin. The subject is admittedly complex and the diplomatic sparring was often designed to conceal rather than to reveal aims and motives. But here is confusion worse confused: the writing is badly organized, much of the material inadequately digested, translations are inaccurate, and quotations even from English sources, are frequently garbled.

There are too many paragraphs like the following:

Anyone reading the correspondence from St. Petersburg in the spring of 1878 will understand how fervently Alexander desired the return of Bessarabia. This province had been wrested from his father on his deathbed. Alexander had a very attractive personality, and had besides something of the inconstancy of character which "brilliant" personages often betray. He tried to be all things to all men, or at least made efforts in those directions. Every inch the grand seigneur, the richest man in Russia and an autocrat ruling an autocracy by divine right, he had tried by his land policy to please both patriciate and peasantry. Ardently devoted to his mistress, the Princess Dolgoruky, he yet tried to remain a loyal consort of the Tsarina Maria Alexandrovna. Dying of a hectic fever, the Empress was forced to realize that her rival's children were playing on the *étage* over her head. (p. 57).

Words are used in strange ways: "Austro-German relations were in a putative stage" (p. 94); "the notice reduced at Reichstadt" (p. 281).

A few examples of mistranslation and of garbled quotation must suffice for a review. On page 39, for example, in line 9, "Southeast" should be "southwest;" in line 12, "where" should read "when." On the same page, the direct quotation beginning in line 15: "they complain that Austria already has too many Slavs in relation to its population" is based on: "on dirait que notre monarchie qui possède un territoire trop grand par rapport à sa population, entreprend des conquêtes injustifiables." On page 105, lines 13 and 14, "to which she does not belong" should read "which she did not expect." On page 231, line 23, "The occupation of Egypt would from England's standpoint not necessitate raising the question of the Dardanelles" is quite different in meaning from the original: "Die Okkupation Ägyptens würde nach Englands Ansicht nicht hinreichen, um die Schwierigkeit wegen der Dardanellen zu heben." In many direct quotations, omissions are indicated where they should not be or not indicated where they should be. (Examples on pages 237, 250, 251, 256, 258). In many other direct quotations, no distinction is made between the words of the original and

Dr. Rupp's paraphrases. On page 258, to take one illustration, we read: "Perhaps he merely wishes to gain time. As he trusts to the obstruction of Turkey . . . a very safe belief, I fear. Or he really is working for the diplomatic triumph of the conclusions of a peace . . . Or perhaps the Russian court actually sees that a war lies financially outside its capacities." The original is: " . . . It may be he merely wishes to gain time. Or he may trust to the obstructiveness of the Turk—a very sure reliance, I fear. Or he may really wish for the diplomatic triumph of making peace . . . Or again, the Russian Court may really find that a war is financially beyond its grasp." The first segment of the quotation from Jászi on pages 4 and 5 comes third in the original and the third segment first. The letter of Treitschke on page 85 is garbled in a similar way.

The more useful parts of the book are the emphasis on the Southern Slav problem in relation to the crisis of 1875; the suggestion of an economic basis for the *Dreikaiserbund* of the 1870's (the actual treatment of this is inadequate and inconclusive); the accounts of the Reichstadt agreement and of Ignatiev's conversations with Andrassy; the bringing together of a large number of items of information about major and minor participants in the making of Russian and Austrian policy; the illustrations; and the bibliography.

University of Minnesota

LAWRENCE D. STEEFEL

MARRIOTT, SIR J. A. R., *Anglo-Russian Relations, 1689-1943*. Methuen, London: 1944. Pp. 227. 8s. 6d.

The distinguished British scholar and author of numerous books has compiled another book on a timely subject. This work has been accomplished under peculiarly difficult circumstances and therefore carries all the brunts of the author's handicaps. From the Preface we learn that Professor Marriott considers himself "an exile deprived by a German bomb of access to all but a fragment of his own library, and, to practically the whole of his carefully collected memoranda." This tells the whole story and simultaneously disarms the critic.

In tracing the two and a half centuries of Anglo-Russian relations the author commences with a statement which strikes me as particularly significant. "Cut off by Poland, East Prussia, and Sweden from the Baltic," he states, "and by the Ottoman Turks from the Black Sea, Russia had for a long period no access to European waters save by Archangel, which for a considerable part of the year was blocked by ice." Here is neatly summarized the entire problem of Russia's foreign policy, and had the British government been more sympathetic or desirous of tackling this very problem in an intelligent manner, much antagonism and bloodshed might have been prevented during the last century and a half. Ten Downing Street listened to all pleas with total indifference; Kipling's verses and "imperial interests" sounded more convincing.

Though the book makes no new revelations, Professor Marriott brings to the student of history memoranda that should be borne in mind while studying the complicated subject. Yet one can not escape the impression that it is still

a British compilation and if "peace and happiness of the world" is to be expected after this war, something coming from the other side must be added. The author, in spite of his attempted fairness, still holds that "the record of the relations between the two countries . . . may not, indeed, seem to hold out very roseate hopes for the future." He anticipates difficulties and ever aroused passions. He does admit that in the Baltic problem "Great Britain is not directly interested," which is quite a concession. But he still adheres to the school of Palmerston and Disraeli that Britain "cannot so lightly regard the problem involved in the future relations of Russia with Turkey, Greece, and the Balkan States." If the old Tory view still prevails and Britain places the route to India above all other interests the problem will be indeed insoluble and nothing but wars will be in store for us. Concerning Poland, Professor Marriott modestly admits that here British interests are involved "only so far as world peace" is concerned.

With all these little concessions and admissions, Professor Marriott still looks toward a solution of the past with nothing startling or radical; it is still a hope for some diplomatic rapprochement and nothing deeper. And there lies the weakness of the author's thesis. In this connection we may conclude with a citation from a recent speech of Anthony Eden before the House of Commons which summarizes the whole problem far more neatly than Professor Marriott's book: "[International suspicion] has unhappily always played its part in Anglo-Russian relations, and it has a habit of accumulating suspicions on this side which produce counter-suspicions on ours and, before we know where we are, a mountain of suspicion is the result." It is for unbiased scholarship to remove this mountain, and here Professor Marriott has failed altogether.

University of Nevada

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR

LEVITATS, ISAAC, *The Jewish Community in Russia, 1772-1844*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. 300. \$3.50.

The Jewish community in Eastern Europe has been the subject of many monographic studies particularly since the work of Simeon Dubnow. The present volume, however, is the first attempt to present a picture of the Jewish community in Russia as a whole. In this attempt the author is entirely successful. He has restricted himself to the Jewish community in Tsarist Russia proper (i.e. excluding Poland) and covers the period between 1772, when the Jewish community was accorded legal status, and 1844, when this status was revoked.

Dr. Levitats calls his work a "study in Jewish autonomy." His interest however, is broader than that usually found in a study of group autonomy. He is concerned not only with the legal status of the Jewish community but even more so with the "practices of self-government by the Jewish group which sprang from time-honored traditions." As such Dr. Levitats deals not only with the governmental legislation on the *kehal*, but with the inner social, economic and cultural aspects of community life. There are excellent chapters on taxation

and military service, on governmental attempts at compulsory enlightenment of the Jews, on *kabal* representation, on the mechanics of elections, officers and meetings, and, of especial importance, on the religious and educational activities of the community, its courts and its economic regulations, and its handling of important social functions such as supervision of morals, charity distribution and burial administration. Perhaps the most original section of the volume is that dealing with the association, or *hevrah*. The *hevrah* constituted the nucleus of Jewish communal autonomy. It "represented an association of Jews for the promotion of specific occupational, educational, religious or charitable interests" and was in many respects similar to the Friendly Societies. This section presents an intimate picture of the workings of these various types of association and is based on extensive use of the minute books of numerous associations, including 26 manuscript minute books.

Dr. Levitats' volume is a work of sound scholarship. The author shows complete mastery of the vast literature of source materials and secondary works in Russian, Polish, Hebrew and Yiddish. He is particularly skilful in the fine handling of materials from Jewish folk-lore and popular literature. The work, moreover, is not only of interest to the scholar. The materials are so interesting and the presentation so colorful as to make it absorbing reading for any lay reader who wishes to get an insight into the inner life of the Jews of Eastern Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Queens College

KOPPEL S. PINSON

LEVANDIS, JOHN A., *The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers, 1821-1898*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. Pp. X, 137. \$2.25.

The topic of the study is more interesting and important than the title would indicate: because much of the history of nineteenth century Greece, domestic as well as diplomatic history, is mirrored in the history of her foreign debt. Dr. Levandis' study is an interesting and meritorious attempt to tell this story, but the task has not been fully carried out. Of course, in order to write the definite history of the Greek Foreign Debt, the student will have to base his narrative on the unpublished documents as kept in the European archives. However, the reviewer wonders why Dr. Levandis did not avail himself of the published papers of two competent observers of nineteenth century Greece. The French Comte de Gobineau and the Austrian Freiherr von Prokesch. The articles published in this Journal in April and July 1941 were largely based on the published and unpublished papers of von Prokesch; of these the author of the study on the Greek Debt has made use only of the least revealing because most overpolished *History of the Greek War of Independence*. The reviewer certainly does not claim that these two diplomats were unbiased in their reports or correspondence; but the most revealing sources for historical writing are not always those written in an objective vein. Furthermore, the reviewer is unable to discover the standards by which the distinction between "primary" and "secondary" sources has been

made in the bibliography. Why are M. Cline, *American Attitude toward the Greek War of Independence* or L. H. Jenks, *The Migration of British Capital* to be considered as primary sources?

The underlying idea of the study is to advance an argument that Greece—according to “all canons of justice”—was treated very harshly in a one-sided way by the great powers as far as her foreign debt was concerned. As a matter of fact, there can hardly be any doubt about the eagerness of the money-lenders who were backed by their governments, to compel Greece by almost every means to fulfil her financial pledges, and one has to admit that the original arrangements were usually harsh and exacting. However, incidentally, the author records that Greece could borrow “on the same if not more favorable terms” as did Spain (p. 18). But the international bankers were never known to have claimed to be humanitarian institutions as the author sometimes assumes (cf., e.g. pp. 103, 99); and there is the example of Cavour preparing financially for the war of 1859, in order to prove that a poor country must not submit to the dictates of “a foreign financial coterie”. We miss in these sections of the present study almost any discussion of how the Greek governments negotiated and the analysis of the alternatives presented to them. The reader would like to learn more about the political background at the times when the decisive loans were contracted. While he feels inclined to agree with the blame pronounced by the author on the lending bankers, he cannot adhere to the judgment “that Greece was an honest borrower, endeavoring at all times to live up to her promises” (p. 114), until he is told what the plans and endeavors of the borrowing governments were. Otherwise he may feel inclined to accept the sentences by which Dr. Levandis continues: Greece’s “periodic defaults were the result of inherent financial impotence rather than acts of dishonesty. The only accusation that may be leveled at her is the failure to gauge accurately her economic capacity in relation to her obligations.” But this would in no way seem to the reader to be a justification of the Greek acts in the history of her Foreign Debt which is a painful one however one may face it.

The Catholic University

FRIEDRICH ENGEL-JANOSI

BLIED, BENJAMIN J., *Austrian Aid to American Catholics 1830-1860*. (Milwaukee, Wis, 1944) Pp. \$2.50.

It is somewhat surprising to read today about help which came from Austria to American citizens, even when this help was offered in the nineteenth century. Father Blied presents in his volume for the period 1830-60 “in which the Catholic Church grew to maturity in the United States” (p. 183), the history of the Austrian Leopoldine Society “whose sole objective was to help the American missions”.

The name was given to the society, founded in 1829, in honor of St. Leopold, a Babenberg margrave and patron saint of Lower Austria, and of Archduchess Leopoldine, a daughter of Emperor Francis I, who became Empress of

Brazil where she died in 1826. The society published annual "Berichte" which are a main source for the study of Father Blied. To the activity of the society are due contributions in money sent to America; e. g. \$157,820. In the decade from 1832 to 1841, and \$125,987 from 1852 to 1861 (p. 25); but its main field was missionary activity proper where Austrian priests took an interest in the immigrants and especially in the Indians—hence the slightly surprising title of chapter V: "The Austrians and the Indians".

Much interesting and, so far as the reviewer is able to see, unknown material concerning the activity of Austrians in American Catholic institutions and in the Mission field is collected in chapters V-VIII; the chief value of Father Blied's study centers in these sections of the book. Light is also thrown on some broader topics such as that of the Central European attitude towards the Indian mission. About 1850 "the conversion of the Indians receded into the background and emphasis was placed upon aiding white people to keep their faith" (p. 91); the poor German immigrants whose number was rapidly increasing by then, absorbed the attention of the Austrian priests in America; one of them described the situation which had arisen in these words: "while a person converts sixty Indians, 600 Germans lose the faith because they have no priest" (p. 153). Father Blied makes also contributions to the history of Catholic schools in America and brings evidence of the not always smooth relations between Irish and German Catholics in this country.

In the table of Austrian priests in America given for the years 1869 and 1882 and classified according to their dioceses of origin, (p. 149) it is interesting to note that the number of those coming from Brixen, South Tyrol, leads distinctly in the two years 1869 and 1882 respectively: 30, and 43; then follows Laibach with 15, and 19; from Vienna came 4, and 3 priests. However, the Austrian numbers shrink in importance when compared with such German dioceses as Münster: 120 and 188; or Paderborn which sent 102 and 182 priests.

"The historian"—thus Father Blied concludes his study—"who examines the American Church will find that it was Austria which unostentatiously provided many small drops of the elements which the Church needed" (p. 184).

While the author has succeeded in carrying out his main task, the drawbacks of his study are to be found in the background; he fails to make use of such standard works as the Metternich biography by H.v. Srbik, or the History of Austrian literature by Nagl, Zeidler, Castle; on the other hand, he bases his work largely on Wurzbach's *Lexicon* without any critical restraint. The pages on the Enlightenment and Romanticism are all too sketchy (p. 14f.); the printed literature on Archbishop Rauscher is not taken into account; a judgment on Austrian Josephinism (p. 150,—note 1) "few religious communities in Austria were strong (around 1830) owing to Josephinism" seems hardly objective to the reviewer; the evaluation or characterization of Görres (p. 32) is very poor; the definition of the province of Styria as "a part of Austria around Graz" (p. 66) seems somewhat surprising. A lack of consistency may be noticed in the author's conceptions concerning an Austrian nationality. However, Father Blied

has made a definite contribution to the history of Austrian spiritual life in the nineteenth century.

Catholic University of America

FRIEDRICH ENGEL-JANOSI

TREVRANUS, G. R., *Revolutions in Russia. Their Lessons for the Western World*. New York: Harper, 1944. Pp. 303. \$3.00.

The author of the book was a member of Brüning's government during the years 1930-1932. He represented in this government the "Volkskonservative Vereinigung." Previously Herr Treviranus belonged to the ultra-rightist and nationalistic "Deutschnationale" party, collaborating with Count Westarp and, later, with one of Hitler's future associates—Herr Hugenberg.

Herr Treviranus always was and still remains Hitler's political opponent. But he stays faithful to his ultra-nationalistic feelings. In this one can find the roots of many of his assertions concerning the Russian Revolutions, and an explanation as to the way some of his judgments coincide with those of the Nazis.

To this day Treviranus remains loyal to Kaiser Wilhelm and to the generals and diplomats of the first World War era—the Ludendorffs, Hoffmanns, Kuelmanns, etc. At the same time he keeps his dislike of all the foes of the Hohenzollern Germany. Even now he accuses England of having proclaimed (at the Genoa Conference of 1922) the right of Russia to claim damages from Germany and denied the right of Germany (the defeated Germany!) to claim damages from Russia. He refers to the *Militärwochenblatt* and the *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau* from 1938 as to a truthful and authoritative source. He frankly sympathizes with the contemporary "learned German generals" who, in his opinion, are to be criticized only because they "allowed the Austrian lance corporal to overrule their better judgment".

The nationalistic bias of the author determines his interpretation of past facts as well as his hopes for the future. Who, would you think, is to blame for World War I? Who started it? And when? We read that the first World War did not start at all in 1914 but in 1911 when Italy attacked Turkey for refusing to cede Tripolitania. "This assault started World War I, a snowball which rolled on into the avalanche of 1914" (p. 56). Apart from Italy, Russia was also guilty of starting the war as the only—according to Herr Treviranus' opinion—world power willing, even while badly prepared, to get into a major conflagration. The evil genius of Russia was not Rasputin (who was opposed to a Russo-German war) but the Russian minister of foreign affairs, M. Sazonov, Treviranus has also an answer to the delicate problem of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany: "The safety of Germany depended on the immediate request to Belgium to grant passage of troops" (p. 65).

An extreme nationalist and outspoken conservative—not to say reactionary—Treviranus strongly indicts the Tsarist period of Russian history as well as the short period of Russian liberty (March-November 1917). At the same time,

being a resolute defender of the capitalistic system, he admires Lenin's, Trotsky's and Stalin's "genius" despite all their mistakes and crimes. The Bolsheviks have once and for all gained his high appreciation by concluding the Brest-Litovsk separate peace treaty against the will of the Allies. The author's strong political prejudices make him use the risky words "strange contrast" when he compares the Brest-Litovsk Treaty to the "Unconditional surrender" imposed on Germany by the Allies in 1918. Despite well known and firmly established facts Herr Treviranus finds the Brest-Litovsk peace softer. Why? Because its clauses were discussed for months while the conditions of Compiègne were dictated in a few hours. "The Russians at that time could only accept the final dictate". The same cannot be said, in Treviranus' opinion, of the Germans at Compiègne and Versailles. Apparently because they were not defeated at all, according to the Nazi legend.

Treviranus makes innumerable mistakes, large and small, in the description of events and in their interpretation, in dates and names. Very seldom can one find a page without some sort of mistake. Some of them are unimportant.* But sometimes a mistake in a date can pervert the whole historical and political perspective. So, for instance, Treviranus writes that "as late as December 1918, was installed the Extraordinary All-Russian Commission for the fight against the Counter-Revolution, Speculation and Misuse of Official Authority" (in abbreviation called W. Ch. K.). This allows him to assert, on the next page, that the Red mass terror started only when Lenin's life was threatened by the Social-Revolutionaries, and Uritzky and Volodarsky had been assassinated. But if one knows that the "Cheka" was organized exactly *one year before that*—not in December 1918 but in December 1917,—it will be clear that the Bolshevik terror was not at all an answer to the terroristic acts committed by the enemies of Bolshevism but that it was precisely what provoked these acts.

Herr Treviranus himself notes the inaccuracy of the Bolshevik data. He knows perfectly well the part played by propaganda in the Bolshevik editions. Despite that in most of the cases he obediently and conscientiously reproduces the Bolshevik version of different events. He is not, of course, a Bolshevik and it is therefore more than astonishing that his "philosophy of history" coincides with that of the Bolsheviks. Fortunately Treviranus is not bound by the party "directives". This allows him to criticize some facts and personalities—a feature which favorably distinguishes his book from many others written by some foreigners on the basis of one-sided material.

Herr Treviranus is not afraid to speak of many things which for the last few years have usually been left unsaid or have been interpreted according to

*"The fifth Duma" never existed: the Revolution of 1917 broke out at the time when the powers of the Fourth Duma had not yet expired. Speransky was never "First Minister" and Witte was not "Prime Minister" when he was in Portsmouth at the Russo-Japanese peace conference of 1905. The civil law was codified not under Alexander II but under Nicolas I. Not Shestkov but Shestakov; not Kuskeven but Krushevan; not Buyin but Bulygin; not "ostrezki" but "otrezki"; not Vladirovi but Vladimirovici; etc., etc., etc.

the official Soviet version. Thus, for instance, he rejects the absurd explanation of the 1933-1938 "purges" as aimed at the liquidation of the "fifth column". He does not hesitate to say that the concentration camps were first introduced by Lenin's order in September 1918; that the common folk are now more en-chained than in the Tsarist times; that there cannot be published one single word which does not conform to the views of the ruling body in every respect. "If seemingly contrasting views appear in print, one may be sure that this is part of a plan" (p.177); that "there has been more anarchy in the rise of Russia to an industrial power than in any of the capitalist profit-taking economies" (p.182). Herr Treviranus does not think that any other people "beside the Chinese and the Japanese endure such privations as patiently as the Russians". He notes similarities between the glorification of "the Father of the People" and the deification and adoration of Il Duce; he understands the fictitiousness of the elections in U.S.S.R. where a one-party candidate gets 97% of the votes. "Is this not a sure sign that the leader rules 'of the people, for the people, by the people'?" (p. 166)—Treviranus quotes Goebbels.

The information given by Treviranus as to the solidarity between the Bolsheviks and the Germans first in the diplomatic and then—secretly—in the military field is not devoid of interest. Treviranus writes: "Rapallo initiated a period of cooperation between Germany and Russia extending into the military field from 1922 until 1929. A mission of generals and engineers surveyed the ground and the liaison bureau was established in Moscow in May, 1922. German officers were to supervise the manufacture of airplanes, chemicals, ammunition and hand grenades. In exchange, German flyers were entitled to be trained by German instructors on Russian airfields. Numbers of Red Army students came to Berlin to study military science and to exchange views on the lessons of modern warfare. Junkers-Dessau, the pioneer in metal planes, erected a branch factory in Moscow for a yearly production of 600 planes, etc. (p. 222). Herr Treviranus is an authority in these matters.

It is also worth while to note Treviranus' description of the five methods used by the Soviet government to plan the security of the U.S.S.R. on a global scale. Those methods of global strategy called by Treviranus "zones" are divided into "zones of incorporation, of infiltration, of interference, of interrogation and of information". They were used in the past, they are used now and they will be used in the future. Despite the dissolution of the Comintern, there will remain the magnetic appeal: "Arise, the damned of the earth" (p. 270).

Herr Treviranus began his book with the glorification of the Bolsheviks because the Bolsheviks opposed the Versailles settlement and made a separate peace with Germany. He was entirely under the influence of his anti-Versailles feelings when he wrote his book. But in the process of describing the Bolshevik achievements the conservative and capitalistic-minded author was compelled to pay attention to the price paid by Russia for these achievements. And so it happened that he described more or less accurately the damages suffered by

Russia. Despite this fact, he returns to his point of departure when he has to draw the conclusions. These conclusions stress the similarity of Communism and Christianity—an idea which does not correspond either to reality or to the points of view of the Bolsheviks as well as of the leaders of Christianity.

In Herr Treviranus' opinion Communism is a Russian version of the Christian ideology. "The Christian missionary ideal of equality among all who are born to God's image had attained a degree of practical application in Soviet Russia unknown in other countries" (p.270). Many thought that "Anti-Christ has arisen in person". Nevertheless "the Russian version of communism . . . is farther removed from Christian dogma but nearer to Christian ethics". "Every Anti-Christ serves to awaken man's religious notions from contaminating contacts with the rough life of every day". In addition the Soviet bolshevism is very far from the Western liberalism that Treviranus dislikes so much. "Western liberalism is far more pagan in the belief that ills will rectify themselves by the selection of the fittest in a natural process. Russians had never known the Renaissance and Humanism and had tended to collective association, a strong Christian trait" (p.272).

Of Herr Treviranus' book one can use his own words: "Truth and fiction are often entangled. It would be unfair to assume that the author intended to write fiction. . . Even historians suffer from prejudice the nearer they are to the time of happening". And so they write fiction unconsciously. This is what has happened to Herr Treviranus.

MARK V.

JÄCKH, ERNEST, *The Rising Crescent. Turkey Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944. Pp. 278. \$3.50.

For more than thirty years Dr. Ernest Jäckh has been associated with Turkey and the Turks whether under the former Ottoman Empire or the Republic of Turkey, beginning with the Young Turkish revolt in 1908. Founder and president of the Hochschule für Politik and of the German League of Nations Union, Dr. Jäckh has been a British subject since the advent of Adolf Hitler in 1933.

The Rising Crescent may be considered from two points of view. It is, first, a personal memoir of the author's long experience in Turkey, especially from 1908 to 1918. Secondly, it is a popular treatise on the growth and decline of the Ottoman Empire, with stress laid on the later years, and on the rise and development of the Republic of Turkey under the leadership of the late President Atatürk and of President Ismet İnönü. The general theme of the book may be stated simply and briefly: It is to place the history and development of Turkey and the Turks in such a perspective as to eliminate the misunderstandings and prejudices concerning the Turks which still prevail in some quarters. Chapters IV, VIII and IX are especially interesting in this respect, since the author discusses the "fez", the veil, the harem, infidels, fatalism, fanatics, massacres, and "the unspeakable Turk" in these sections (see Ch. IV.) Many will disagree with the details of his discussion of "Judaean-Christian Islam's Faith" (Ch. VIII),

but few will question the general position regarding the tolerance prevailing under Islam or the attitude of Turks as Moslems. Dr. Jäckh's brief discussion of the "millet" system and the "capitulations" in the Ottoman Empire is interesting, especially his own memorandum to the German Chancellor in 1917 urging the elimination of the capitulatory system in the Ottoman Empire.

Historians will find of interest the documents which Dr. Jäckh publishes concerning the conclusion of the Turco-German Alliance of August 2, 1914, which add some details to existing knowledge of the subject. Although they strengthen the conclusion that the alliance came on the initiative of the Ottoman leaders, especially Enver Pasha, it is clear that the Germans desired the alliance if a general war were to come in which Russia would be involved. It is also clear that the possibility of a Turco-Russian alliance was not to be completely ruled out until after the actual outbreak of the war.

Dr. Jäckh gives a very sympathetic account of the development of the Turkish Republic, many of whose leaders he has known well. He describes succinctly the process of modernization which has taken place since 1923. It is difficult to accept his thesis concerning present-day political democracy in the Turkish Republic (Ch. IX), although it is well to insist on the "liberating" character of the government of Atatürk and President İnönü and to point out that the fundamental trend is in the direction of a more democratic régime.

In view of Turkey's break with Germany on August 2, 1944, Dr. Jäckh's analysis of Turkish foreign policy is of particular interest. He points out that Turkey has proved a factor of peace and stability in the Near East since the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). A member of the League of Nations (1932), Turkey took a leading part in the Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente (1934), settled outstanding differences with Greece and became an ally of that country, and in general led in the movement toward Balkan unity. Turkey became an ally of Great Britain and France in October 1939. Despite its non-belligerence, Dr. Jäckh contends that Turkey's neutrality actually served the cause of Great Britain by preventing Germany from obtaining control of the country's position at the crossroads of the continents.

While some readers will be inclined to disagree with some of Professor Jäckh's interpretations of Turkish history, his volume should contribute to a better understanding of Turkey and the Turks.

Miami University

HARRY N. HOWARD

CRIPPEN, HARLAN R., *Germany: A Self-Portrait. A Collection of German Writings from 1914 to 1943*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. xvi, 477. \$3.75.

The exigencies of war against Germany can be expected to evoke a plethora of books on the subject. The popular magazines, the newspapers, the radio, the movies and governmental communiques have contributed their specialized share. The remarkable trend in this respect is that even before the war has

been completed the more discriminating journals and books reflect the attitude that stock-taking is essential. Mere general condemnations no longer suffice. Not that Nazism is considered less despicable, or that faint-heartedness or appeasement is intended. It is a question of whether Vansittartism and all that it connotes is practicable or feasible. That is, will a "hardboiled" attitude toward Germany—partitioning, denuding of industry, transfer of populations and the like—will these bring about the desired result of eliminating Germany once and for all as a disturbing element in European politics?

Such reflections force the thinking people to search among the Germans for indications of democratic, cooperative and humanitarian germs. If such should be uncovered, then there is hope that they will develop when properly nourished. Crippen sets out in his *Germany: A Self-Portrait* in search of just such germs. Yet he is not merely intent on "proving" a thesis. Enough material is included to show the unfavorable side of the German characteristics to invalidate any thought of one-sidedness.

The inclusion of chauvinistic literature in the first part of the book ("Iron Cross") illustrates Kaiserism's hold on the German people. It is quite clear that the German people accepted imperialism and the first World War blithely and confidently. Opposition existed and was growing until 1914. It stemmed from among the intellectuals, the middle class and the Social Democratic Party. However, it was impotent in the face of the supporters of the Kaiserreich: ". . . industrialists, bankers, officers and their families, the noble clans, and fawning parasites from the professions" (p.23). When these elements could not bring about an unnecessary victory for Germany, we see in the selections included—both nationalist and its counter-part—that the German people were bewildered, stunned and incapable of fathoming their plight when the first World War came to an unexpected end.

It is the second part of the book that is significant. The designation "Reluctant Republic" causes confusion. The material here included is familiar enough to the American interested in contemporary literature and history. The confusion lies in the fact that it is clear the German people were groping for an unknown goal. The democratic elements were dissatisfied with the *status quo*, but they did not after all agitate for the resurrection of some "Golden Age" of the past. They strove to extend democracy into all the ramifications of human activity. For example, the "Spartacus Manifesto" denounced the Social Democrats for not being radical enough; it denounced ". . . Prussian militarism, that scourge of humanity", the Kaiser, the war and ". . . the brigandage . . . of Brest-Litovsk . . ." (pp.126-130). The Constitution of 1918 certainly betrays no reactionary, anti-democratic propensities. Surely no one could suspect Carl von Ossietzky of militaristic or anti-humanitarian inclinations. If the Nazi program was already extant by the time of the fall of the Weimar Republic, the reactionary literature was not so articulate (at least, not regarded seriously by the world). The impression one gathers on re-reading the literature of the

period is not that the Weimar Republic was "reluctant", but that it indulged in a superfluity of naive optimism; that it did not cope drastically with the dissident elements; and that "the more Germany moved to the Right, towards open militarism, the more consideration it received from the outside world . . ." (p. 286) in 1932.

The third part of the book ("Crooked Cross") consists of excerpts from novels and newspapers that tell of the horrors in concentration camps and the Germans' realization by 1943 that they had not yet won European or world domination. It is salutary, moreover, to peruse again in this section of the book Thomas Mann's "An Exchange of Letters" with the Dean of the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Bonn on the occasion of the withdrawal of the honorary doctorate previously conferred on the Nobel Prize winner.

Crippen introduces each era under consideration with excellent political, economic or diplomatic recapitulations, as the occasion requires. His style is vivid and facile. An extensive bibliography classifies the works used as (1) banned by the Nazis, (2) in practice not acceptable by the Nazis, and (3) acceptable to the Nazis. Why Remarque, Fallada or G. Hauptmann, for example, are not included the author has not made clear. However, the inclusion of Fritz von Unruh, Ernst Toller, Oskar Maria Graf and Carl von Ossietzky should satisfy those seeking discerning and typical reflections of German thinking from 1914 to 1943.

University of Houston

LOUIS KESTENBERG

BRECHT, ARNOLD, *Prelude to Silence. The End of the German Republic*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. xxi, 156. \$2.00.

Although the author of this thoughtful little volume was a non-party man and did not participate actively in German political life, he held high positions in the civil service from the chancellorship of Prince Max until 1927 and from then until 1933 was one of Prussia's chief delegates in the German Reichsrat. He was in an excellent position to see the steps by which Hitler rose to power. His contention is that the German people succumbed to Nazi dictatorship not because the great majority of them "were either National Socialists themselves, or predisposed to condone if not to embrace totalitarian doctrines because of their political or intellectual heritage", but because of certain mistakes or errors in judgment made by German statesmen between 1918 and 1933. At the outset at least four errors were made by those who drafted the Weimar Constitution. (1) Proportional representation strongly promoted the splitting up of parties and contributed to that breakdown of parliamentary government upon which Hitler capitalized. (2) In view of the multiplicity of political parties, election of the President by popular vote rather than by a national assembly opened the way for the choice of a man like Hindenburg. (3) Carelessness in not carefully limiting the presidential powers made possible Hindenburg's dismissal and ap-

pointment of chancellors without regard for the Reichstag, and his emergency powers could thus be exercised by a chancellor who had no possibility of securing the support of the Reichstag. (4) Execution of federal laws by the state governments instead of by the central government made it difficult at times for the federal authorities to take effective steps to protect the Republic.

Prior to 1930, the author asserts, Fascism was never really a problem or issue; it became serious only with the economic depression. In 1930 Chancellor Brüning made two "errors in judgment". Instead of resorting to "compensatory government spending" to meet the unemployment and economic crisis, he decided on a policy of deflation and thus added to the popular distress and discontent upon which Hitler again capitalized. Then, rather than give up this policy, which no Reichstag majority would support, Brüning dissolved the existing Reichstag in 1930 when it still had two more years to run and thus gave the Nazis an opportunity to increase their Reichstag representation from 12 to 107, consequently still further paralyzing the government. Next, in 1932 Hindenburg, who "may have seriously hoped that a more conservative Chancellor would have a better chance of overcoming Fascism than Brüning had", dismissed the latter from office and appointed Papen "in flagrant disregard of parliamentary principles". But the German people in the ensuing elections did not establish a precedent against Hindenburg's interpretation of the constitution as the French did against MacMahon's in 1877. They repudiated Papen but did not provide a majority for any alternative. Hindenburg thereupon dismissed Papen and appointed Schleicher who, the author believes, "was determined to avert outright Fascism and Totalitarianism". Then an event occurred that "no one had foreseen"—Papen joined forces with Hitler, who had already taken the oath of allegiance to the Weimar Constitution. "No one . . . believed that Hitler *would* preserve the Weimar Constitution"; nevertheless, Hindenburg appointed him chancellor, and the opposition parties acquiesced. The author admits that at this point the "political fight against Fascism had ended in failure," but "this was due to a preposterous concatenation of adverse circumstances". According to him, even at this late date "the vast majority of Germans were far from anticipating the real outcome". What that outcome was going to be was indicated in the steps taken by Hitler and his government in the succeeding weeks until July, 1933, when the Führer openly violated both the law and the Constitution.

The book is a very plausible explanation of how the so-called "good" Germans, who never wanted a Nazi dictatorship and yet who never did anything very desperate to prevent it, suddenly discovered themselves under a totalitarian regime. The author seems to try very hard to convince his readers that those who did not resort to force to defeat Hitler and thus preserve the Weimar Republic were actuated by the fear that if they did use force they would technically violate the constitution. The book appears to reflect a tremendous respect for constituted authority even when that respect must be at the expense of constitutionally guaranteed personal liberty. To this reviewer the author seems to reveal

one of the causes of Germany's illness—an almost abject readiness on the part of “decent” Germans to submit to constituted authority regardless of how it gets constituted. “Courts and civil servants”, the author concludes, “probably would have fought loyally against a revolution that did not come in legalistic disguise.”

Indiana University

F. LEE BENNS

MACKIEWICZ, STANISLAW, *Colonel Beck and His Policy*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1944. Pp. 139. 7s. 6d.

Józef Beck, Polish Foreign Minister from Nov. 2, 1932, to the fall of Poland in September 1939, will doubtless remain a sinister figure in Polish history for a long time. Thoughtful Poles have little reason to regard any of his activities as constructive or salutary. He was a pupil and confidant of Marshal Piłsudski, and was chosen for the Foreign portfolio by the Marshal. He was never popular in Poland, and in the chancelleries of Europe thoroughly distrusted when he was not held in contempt. His name will always be associated with the reversal of Polish foreign policy—from an anti-German to a pro-German policy, which, whatever else it was intended to do or did achieve, certainly made Hitler's path easier in the early years of his preparation for the present war. Because of the grim eventuation of Beck's policy, his own people have been, if anything, more bitter in condemnation of him than almost anyone else.

M. Mackiewicz, an eminent Polish publicist, the author of a history of Poland from 1918 to 1939 (published in Polish in London in 1941), sets out in this fascinating book to examine the record to see how far this adverse judgment of Beck is justified. He lists the charges commonly made against Beck, then proceeds to examine the historical and personal or diplomatic backgrounds of the situations out of which they have arisen, and the processes by which these situations were resolved.

From this methodology it will readily be seen that we do not have an ordinary chronological study, nor indeed any attempt at a logical or topical analysis of Beck's work. We are presented with a sort of lawyer's brief. Almost from the first page we know that M. Mackiewicz is a prosecuting attorney, Beck is under accusation, and he is repeatedly convicted of recklessness, arrogance, vanity, incompetence, blindness, bad taste, isolation from the thought of Poland, and a lack of understanding of the real issues in European politics. On the other hand he is defended against charges of breaking the French alliance, of taking orders from Berlin, or of ever being willing to join an anti-Soviet crusade. The prosecution is not content with a conviction of Beck. Smigly-Rydz is sharply condemned on numerous counts, and the cynical viciousness of French politics, domestic and foreign, comes in for a generous share of wrathful and biting condemnation. Piłsudski is loyally defended. His authorship of the shift from reliance on the French alliance to a pro-German policy is asserted and defended as completely necessitated by French vacillation in the face of a rearming Germany. It should be remarked that M. Mackiewicz might object to the term

'pro-German'. At any rate that is the light in which the shift was generally regarded in European capitals. It had the same effect, save at the end (1938-1939) and in the case of the anti-Soviet crusade.

So long as Piłsudski lived Beck's incompetence did not become apparent, as he was guided by the sagacity of the Marshal. But the death of the latter in May 1935 cast Beck upon his own resources, which were to prove to be very meagre. One gets the impression that Piłsudski, from the standpoint of Poland, never made a diplomatic mistake, but that Beck's attempted imitation of his master was so gauche as to constitute the worst kind of an error—*corruptio optimi pessima*. This is one position, and M. Mackiewicz argues it with conviction and a knowledge of "inside" European diplomacy in the 'twenties and 'thirties that is formidable, if often confusing.

But it seems fair to say that perhaps too much is proved. The fact is that Piłsudski chose Beck after some years of intimate association, when, by M. Mackiewicz' own protestations, there were many abler men in the Polish diplomatic service. To that extent Piłsudski must bear a considerable share of the blame for Beck's mistakes. The Marshal's sagacity failed in a most important matter, if this collocation of facts is accepted. But of course even if Piłsudski must bear a part of the blame there still remains a substantial debit for which Beck's own ingenuity must answer. It should further be pointed out that to a non-Pole there would appear to be something fundamentally wrong in a political structure that will keep a Foreign Minister in office for many years after he has ceased to represent the will of the people. Granting Beck's unpopularity in some very vocal quarters, it has not yet been clearly proved that he was going counter to the will of the whole people. Neither Beck nor Smigly-Rydz were Piłsudski, nor did they have his personal prestige, and opposition to them never reached the point of breaking out into rebellion against their leadership.

M. Mackiewicz, with a very low opinion of Smigly-Rydz, remarks on a number of occasions that he wanted to have Beck removed. It might be difficult to decide whether that would have improved or worsened matters. Foreign relations, if they are to mean anything, grow out of the will of the people, adapted to geographical and politico-economic realities. In this respect Poland's situation is and always has been tragically difficult, demanding political leadership of a high order, long vision, patience and political maturity on the part of the Polish people. Her neighbors contrived, in modern times, to make sure that she should not have time to develop these qualities. The fault should not therefore be hers, but her neighbors'. Beck certainly gave no indication of facing these basic needs realistically. He tried to substitute superficial cleverness for wisdom—a costly substitution.

M. Mackiewicz gives much attention to the immoral fatuity of French politics in the inter-bellum years, because of its bearing upon the value of the Franco-Polish alliance, to which, he claims, Beck should have clung. Great Britain's political morality in these years is treated with perhaps less acerbity, as

there the shortcomings were on a different level. It seems to him ironical that Briand was given the Nobel Prize for Peace, to say nothing of Stresemann. In any event, it is about time the farce of regarding Stresemann as a man of peace in any real sense be given up. Mackiewicz is hard on the Little Entente, which is of course not surprising in view of the limited aims of the Entente and Poland's traditional sympathy toward Hungary. He speaks of Munich as a "triumph of British policy". One wonders what he thinks of Britain repudiating her diplomatic "triumph", and shedding much blood and treasure to wipe out its effects.

Withal this essay is written with enthusiasm, wide information of men and events, and a number of firmly held convictions. It would be well if more books were written with this equipment. The fact that not a few points in his argument would perhaps be put in a different perspective by another observer is only another way of saying that more light is still needed on a very complex story.

University of Colorado

S. HARRISON THOMSON

ARCHER, LAIRD, *Balkan Journal. An Unofficial Observer in Greece*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1944. Pp. 254. \$3.50.

This is an interesting but, for the historian, rather unrewarding book. As Foreign Director of the Near East Foundation, Mr. Laird Archer has worked and travelled very extensively for 21 years throughout the Balkans. This work consists of periodic notes and observations which he recorded between June 1934 and July 1941 when he left Greece after the German occupation. At one point Mr. Archer refers to the statement of one of his colleagues to the effect that "... Greece had built well and beautifully on the upper levels but, like other Balkan states, had neglected the lower strata with the danger that the very foundations of her economic and social structure would break down. . ." This book suffers from precisely the same sort of neglect. Although the Near East Foundation is concerned primarily with giving practical aid to the depressed urban and rural classes, yet nowhere in this work is there any serious analysis of their plight. This is especially unfortunate since the Foundation must have an abundance of valuable material which Mr. Archer might have utilized. Instead of a study of the basic Balkan economic and social problems, which after all are the *raison d'être* of the Foundation, the author has confined himself to pleasant but not very informative surface observation.

Judging from this *Journal*, Mr. Archer spent much of his time with Bulgarian, Albanian and Greek political leaders whose cooperation was necessary for the work of the Foundation. The speculations and comments of these men, as the various European crises arose, are recorded here, but they reveal very little which already is not known. However the latter part of the book does give the reader a sense of the spirit and atmosphere in Greece during the terrible campaigns against the Italians and Germans, and also of the remarkable aid which the resident Americans were able to extend to the soldiers and civilians.

The one significant section is that on the mysterious suicide of Prime Minister Korizis, in treating which the author makes clear the fifth column activities of the former collaborators of Dictator Metaxas.

Smith College

L. S. STAVRIANOS

SFORZA, COUNT CARLO, *Contemporary Italy: Its Intellectual and Moral Origins*, trans. by Drake and Denise De Kay. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1944. Pp. 430. \$3.50.

SPRIGGE, CECIL J. S., *The Development of Modern Italy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944. Pp. 216.

The need for a carefully written treatment in English of modern Italian history as yet has attracted few scholars qualified to undertake the task. In recent years, Professors Greenfield, Marraro, Megaro, Rath and Smyth, have contributed valuable articles and books on specific topics. Thus far, however, no synthesis of the findings of the latest research has appeared. The amateur and specialist interested in Italy must still depend on the faulty English translation of Salvatorelli's *Sommario*,¹ or else refer to the more narrow works of Bolton King, Benedetto Croce and William Ebenstein. Both Count Sforza and Mr. Sprigge on the basis of broad knowledge and experience, are in a position to provide worthwhile general histories; it is to be regretted that neither has produced a study which will satisfy the academic historian.

Contemporary Italy had its beginnings in a series of lectures and discussions given by the author at the University of California, 1942-43. The manuscript was written in French and had to be translated before publication. The extreme prevalence of errors, appearing either in the original or arising in translation, coupled with a lack of cohesion and organization, make the book almost unreliable for anything except Sforza's personal viewpoints on men and events. That someone realized the frequency of mistakes is patent, for a note is appended to the volume: "This book being a study of the relationships of ideas and civil life in Italy, and not a literary history, nor just a history, men and books are often quoted without chronological precision. But for the convenience of readers a table of dates will be found at the end of the volume." Two examples from page 396 will illustrate the information in the table of dates:

1865—Italy joins Bismarck's Austria in "Seven Weeks' War" against Russia; Italians defeated at Custoza; armistice at Nikolsburg; Austria cedes Venetia to Italy. Garibaldi, attacking Rome, is defeated at Mentana.

1869—Decree of Papal Infallibility.

The dating of the Seven Weeks War in 1865, "Bismarck's Austria," and "against Russia," would be noticed by a student in an undergraduate European history course. The implication that the preliminaries of Nikolsburg ended the war for Italy is inexact. It was not until August 12, 1866, that Italy signed the armistice

¹ Luigi Salvatorelli, *Sommario della storia d'Italia* (Turin, 1938), trans. by Bernard Maill as, *A concise history of Italy*, (New York, 1940).

of Comons with Austria, more than a fortnight after Nickolsburg. Garibaldi was defeated at Mentana, November 3, 1867, not 1865. The dogma of Papal Infallibility was promulgated on July 18, 1870.

The historian must further ask himself whether the polemical and argumentative character of the book, particularly when treating Church matters, contributes anything to a knowledge of Italy's problems. The weight given to personal experiences, anecdotes reported on hearsay, and the verbatim reproduction of conversations which took place one to four decades earlier, is likewise suspicious. This lack of a measured, critical approach, may be shown by an excerpt from page 81. Sforza writes of the Roman Question:

One prelate alone perceived that the Church had taken the wrong road—Cardinal Consalvi, the Secretary of State, whom Pius VII had sent as his plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna.

It was a misfortune for the Church not to have had at her service after 1870 a Cardinal Consalvi to negotiate with Italy in lieu of Cardinal Antonelli with his peasant deceptions. (Antonelli was not even a priest.)

The term, "peasant deceptions," while in keeping with the Count Sforza of the aristocratic Roman *Cercolo della Caccia*, is somewhat out of place in the writing of the democratic Carlo Sforza, leader of the Free Italy movement. Antonelli was not a peasant, though his grandfather had been. Neither was he a priest, albeit Sforza fails to mention that Consalvi, the "one prelate alone," never took holy orders either. Parenthetically, Dr. Nicholas G. Mavris and the Dodecanesian League of America, well aware of Sforza's participation in Italian imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean,² will be interested in his silence on his disavowal of the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement of June 19, 1919 for the cession of the Dodecanese to Greece.

Spigge's little book is quite different. This long-time Rome correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* has written a pleasant summary of Italian politics since the unification of the peninsula, making no pretense of profound erudition or original research: "The present book," he says, "is offered to fellow-journalists and to others upon whom may depend our future relations with Italy. . . ." Spigge has a piquant style and provides an eminently readable introduction to modern Italy. Certainly apt is his designation of the second chapter, dealing with the years from the occupation of Rome to the rise of Crispi as "The Dominion of Dryasdust."

Spigge seems to have become tired by the time he gets to Fascism, for his account of the Mussolini state is brief, and the weakest part of his work. He is at his best in outlining the Crispi and Giolitti eras. Throughout, his analysis of men and motives is objective and Spigge's modesty of language is all too rare among some of the practitioners of the journalistic trade.

University of Missouri

DUANE KOENIG

² Dr. N. G. Mavris, *Sforza vs. Sforza: the Free Italian movement and the foreign policy of its leader*, (New York, 1943).

ŠAFRÁNEK, MILOŠ, *Bohuslav Martinů, The Man and His Music*. New York: Knopf, 1944. Pp. xxvi, 127. \$3.00.

The role which music has always played in the life of the Czechs and the Slovaks adds particular interest to any light which it casts upon the essential nature of the people. The life and work of Bohuslav Martinů are such as to give clear insight into many aspects of that nature. The tempests of war fortunately brought him to America, where he was finally enabled to take up once more his remarkable creative work and, by his numerous new symphonic and chamber compositions, gain the attention not only of those who, like Sergej Koussevitzky, already highly esteemed him, but also of a whole group of conductors, professional musicians and music critics.

Bohuslav Martinů is, since Antonín Dvořák, the first Czechoslovak composer in America to have gained such general recognition. Indeed he reminds one of Dvořák in his extraordinary productivity and basic musicality, though it is evident that he is of another generation. We can welcome, therefore, this serious attempt to explain to the American public the man and his music. An essay such as this, difficult under the most ideal circumstances, is in this case made more difficult by the fact that the protagonist is at the height of his creative powers and any estimate of him now can not hope to be definitive.

Miloš Šafránek, in the July 1942 issue of the *Musical Quarterly*, published a short study of Martinů, and the present book is essentially an expansion of the ideas that underlay the earlier study, with, however, some new biographical material. This new material may be accepted as authentic, as in some cases we are given the composer's own extensive expositions of his works. In these cases, and where the composer's own letters and discussions are quoted, the book has high documentary value.

The book is divided into five parts: I. Childhood and preparation; II. Decisive Years of Struggle; III. Operas and Ballets; IV. World Revolution; V. Conclusion. Each of these parts falls into several shorter chapters. The first part is the most lively, particularly in the description of the family life at Polička and later in Paris. But in subsequent sections of the book, where description becomes less prominent, there is a certain unevenness which may be understood in a treatment that does not claim to be definitive.

Through his personal relations with the composer the author has been able to capture, in a compact and trenchant form, many significant fine points. But for a complete understanding of the artist's personality it would still be necessary to make a systematic study of all his works, to analyze their form as well as the personal and external influences which affected their expression. From that point of view the book is not completely satisfactory, and many of the important works of Martinů are either hardly mentioned or are treated in an inadequate fashion. This is particularly true of several of his operas, ballets and chamber pieces. It is known that Martinů himself does not favor formal and schematic analysis, but, from the standpoint of stylistic critical evaluation the composer's wishes can hardly be determinative. As a matter of fact several

of the considerable digressions in the course of the book could well have been dispensed with and more space given to critical analysis. The authentic notes of the composer of certain works are illuminating as far as they go, but more are necessary for a sound work of synthesis, which obviously still remains to be done.

No great musician can really be understood apart from the milieu out of which he grew. Šafránek is apparently only slightly concerned with the figure and the significance of Bohuslav Martinů in contemporary Czechoslovak music. There is a short reference to the composer's reaction to contemporary musical currents in the Prague of his youth (p. 13), but this gives an incomplete and inaccurate picture of the whole Czechoslovak musical world. It will eventually be imperative to relate Martinů to contemporary Czechoslovak music of which, in spite of his desire to remain aloof from it, he forms a definite part. His stylistic and expressive distinctiveness will take on even more significance in such a correlation. For a later systematic work of this sort the book of Šafránek will certainly be a useful prolegomenon.

New York City

JAN LOEWENBACH

GOODRICH, LELAND M. and CARROLL, MARIE J., edd., *Documents on American Foreign Relations. Vol. V. July 1942-June 1943*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1944. Pp. xxxv, 735. \$3.75.

The series of *Documents on American Foreign Relations* is now so well established as a reference work that comment on the general plan and scope of the project seems unnecessary. The latest volume, which covers the twelve months from July 1942 to June 1943, is devoted mainly to war activities. Necessarily there are gaps in the record because of the confidential character of so much of the diplomatic and military correspondence, but from relevant materials that are available in newspapers, the *Bulletins* of the Department of State, and other government publications more than 250 items have been assembled. They cover a wide range of topics, including some that are more domestic than foreign (e.g., the Budget, Selective Service, Manpower Commission). Economic problems occupy fully one-third of the space in the volume—a significant collocation in view of the probability that economic collaboration after the war will be fully as important as, and perhaps more difficult to achieve than, political cooperation. The editorial notes are adequate; some might be called elaborate, as, for example, those on the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China and on the Giraud-de Gaulle controversy.

As the editors point out, the documents reflect two especially significant developments within the year covered: on the military front the United Nations passed from a defensive to an offensive war, while at home there was a growing recognition of the need of planning for peace. The first of these developments has raised new problems in government (e.g., political relations in French North Africa); the second has drawn attention to the evolution during the war of various agencies of consultation and cooperation, such as the Casablanca Conference and

the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, which should provide experience for the solution of the more difficult problems of world organization which lie ahead.

Central Europe, much of which was under temporary Nazi domination during the year 1942-43, does not receive much attention; but there are documents on Czechoslovakia (Lend-Lease), Poland (Lend-Lease, relations with the U.S.S.R.), and Austria.

University of Colorado

COLIN B. GOODYKOONTZ

SHOTWELL, JAMES T., *The Great Decision*. New York: Macmillan, 1944. Pp. x, 268. \$3.00.

The basic thesis of Mr. Shotwell is that "our victory over the Axis powers can be made a victory over war itself, if we bring to the support of peace the same kind of realistic strategy which we devote to war." Science has changed the arts of peace and now is revolutionizing the technique of war. This transformation will go on in increasing tempo in the future. From now on all war will be total war and therefore "the preparation to meet it will also have to be total." Total war extends its operations in time as well as in space by the continuing disturbances which it causes in the economic field. Furthermore, total war is not over when the firing ceases, "because the firing has only been a part of it, all citizens and all activities of the nation having been mobilized behind the front."

How to achieve "total peace" is then reasoned out, step by step, by Shotwell in only 234 pages. Fortunately, he is not shadow-boxing at any point and not delivering the full punch as those afflicted with the present-day hysteria of "peace-planning" are. Another striking characteristic of the volume is the relative absence of the former insistence on "peace at any price," and Shotwell's insistence that international peace depends also "upon the conditions under which workers live in other countries, as well as upon the capacity of the world market to absorb the goods which production turns over to trade" (p. 183). Shotwell promotes the premise that "international peace must be safeguarded by institutions not unlike those which have shaped and maintained domestic peace. But, while the community of nations must be strong enough to end the threat of anarchy, it must be designed so as not to overturn but rather strengthen the institutions of freedom within each state." Men must want peace to have it, and they must solve certain internal social and economic problems if they are to generate the confidence that is necessary to make international organization work. Shotwell hopes to see a revived League of Nations, the eradication or lowering of trade barriers, the establishment of methods of settling international disputes by recourse to peaceful diplomacy or arbitration and a technique for enforcing peace by the quarantine and suppression of aggressors. The airplane, Shotwell believes, gives the United Nations a weapon particularly fitted for police use at little cost provided there is preliminary general armament reduction among all the nations. In the field of economics, the International Labor Office and such wartime creations

as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the United Nations Organization for Food and Agriculture should be even more useful after the war by their extension.

It is not the reviewer's intention to argue separate points with Mr. Shotwell and the Commission to Study the Organization for Peace. The reviewer feels that the book represents the best that our leading specialists in the field of history and international relations have to offer. In this respect, the work is the product of clear thinking which should go far toward sweeping away much of the deadwood of outmoded clichés now cluttering the field of peace-planning. It is a compact consistent job, the product of practised craftsmanship. No part of it is overdone and everything is fused into a compatible whole.

But the reviewer has his doubts in regard to Shotwell's basic premises. Do we have a "realistic strategy which we devote to war," and are there any indications that whatever "realistic strategy" we have now we shall continue to promote in the future? Do men always want peace? Can we and do we want to solve our recurrent internal social and economic problems? How about the numberless "variables" which always seem to hamper all the best articulated projects? And—above all—is not Shotwell's group too optimistic about human nature? What humanity could do if it could but have a fair course to run, if fire and pestilence did not gird our steps and earthquake engulf them, and if man did not match his creativeness with evil that disrupts and destroys? Today many social scientists insist that the dominance of irrational forces in human nature has perhaps never been as complete as at the present. If the present course of human events has demonstrated anything, it is the fact that the real persons do not follow the artificial rules of the game as it "ought to be played" according to the best intentioned lovers of peace. The underworld of human nature—envy, hostility, revenge, and lust of power—and anti-intellectualism will remain to plague Shotwell's blue-print, as well as all the blue-prints for "total peace." But it is a proper function of the intellectual to hold up certain moral values before the eyes of the people, even if it is not possible to realize them in action at the moment. In that respect, Shotwell has done a magnificent job.

Hofstra College

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

PARES, BERNARD, *Russia and the Peace*. New York, Macmillan, 1944. Pp. 293. \$2.50.

This excellent little book, written by one of the greatest British authorities on Russia and one of the most sincere friends of the Russian people in the English-speaking world, offers wide sidelights of knowledge and understanding to anybody who values a human approach to the Russian problems. All that the author says on this subject awakes the curiosity of the reader and deserves his attention. However, there are some statements which are particularly significant to those who wish to penetrate more deeply into the subject of Russia from a psychological as well as a political point of view. As a Czech historian I shall stress in particular those statements and ideas which I believe are of interest

for the readers of the JOURNAL from the Central European standpoint.

Why has communism succeeded in Russia as a result of the first World War? In the author's opinion the Bolsheviks after having seized power in November 1917 kept it firmly in their hands not only due to their terrorist policy and other circumstances, but also because communism had to some extent deep roots in Russian politics, religion, psychology and economy.

Regarding Russian economy, it is a fact that until 1906 farming had been collective. It was rooted in the old social system of the local "mir" or village community. The second underlying feature of Russian collectivism was the instinct of sympathy shown by all classes for those who were oppressed and suffered. This feeling made it possible for the leaders of the revolution, despite the ruthlessness of their methods, to establish a régime in the name of the proletariat and for its benefit. In addition, Russian communism fits also the national character which, due to its deep Christian conception of life, is inclined toward the ideal of universal brotherhood. The atheist attacks on the Orthodox Church and religion had no other result than to purify the Church and "drive religion back to the individual conscience". Mr. Pares rightly quotes the statement by Lunacharsky who led the atheist campaign: "(In Russia) religion is like a nail—the harder you hit it, the deeper it goes into the wood".

The second statement I wish to point out concerns the application of the federative principle by the Bolsheviks to the internal and border problems of the new state. It is based on the notion of absolute racial equality, but in practice the nationalities are respected by the central government only in so far as they follow the same communist direction given by the omnipotent Party. Moreover the Soviet Socialist Republics have to put at the disposal of the central government all their economic resources so as to make possible the carrying out of a common economic plan and, if necessary, a common military defense of the Soviet motherland.

From a Central European point of view we must consider the Soviet solution of the multinational problem as a desirable but hardly attainable goal for the Danubian peoples. Nevertheless no federative plan for Central Europe can disregard the basic fact that it must rest on an identity of political and social ideology. Moreover, should it follow the Soviet example, it would have to be based on a strong central power and party-organization. As long as the Czechs, Austrians, Hungarians and other Central European nations do not reach an ideological unity and do not carry out a true political democracy through a strong executive power attempts at a Central European Union will be doomed to fail.

The third lesson, although rather questionable, which can be derived from Sir Bernard's thoughtful and honest book concerns the relationship of Russia toward the Poles and other small nations after the war. The author points out that in the "disputed provinces" of Eastern Poland the Polish rule under the Republic remains feudal and "imperial" and that the Russians, when they marched in in 1939, divided the big estates among the peasants and introduced highly developed public services. Consequently, he asserts that to reestablish feudal

Eastern Poland that land would have to be taken back and those big estates restored in the Polish half of White Russia—a settlement (he says) which could only be maintained by a foreign standing army with no military base behind it. In other words, the author considers the treaty of Riga as annulled and Eastern Poland as a part of the Soviet Union.

Sir Bernard also condemns the Polish policy of the "cordon sanitaire" against Russia. Speaking as a Britisher he expresses his conviction that England will not fight both Germany and Russia for the Polish cause, not only because of material impossibility but also because any British attempt to force the Polish issue could only serve again to draw Russia and Germany together. By means of the British-Russian alliance Britain indirectly serves the cause of Polish independence, the author maintains, by giving to Russia a guarantee against future German aggression. This joint pledge is, to his mind, the firmest guarantee for the future peace in Eastern Europe. It seems that Sir Bernard's opinion about the Polish-Russian dispute is that the Poles scattered over Eastern Poland should be transferred to Poland, but that the territory should remain in Soviet hands.

In equally pro-Russian terms Sir Bernard discusses the problem of the Baltic states. All of them should disappear from the postwar map of Europe in order to keep Russia as a partner of Great Britain strong enough to resist German aggression and to have an active part in the organization of a new Europe. The future settlement cannot rely, in his opinion, on the exclusive application of the principle of self-determination. He does not advocate a return to the "multi-colored structure," created at Versailles for the benefit of France fearing for her security. We may ask, however, what does the author suggest for Central Europe? The only reply he has to this crucial question is to keep the great powers, Britain and Russia in particular, strong enough to guarantee the peace and protect the small nations against German aggression. "The smaller states must have, of course, the means of making their voices heard," he says; "but it is no use giving them responsibilities which they could not or would not fulfill." Russia should not annex Czechoslovakia nor Poland and the two Western Slav nations should serve rather as a "cordon sanitaire" against Germany.

Besides these considerations most of the book is dedicated to a study of Russian relations with the three great powers, Germany, Great Britain and the United States. We shall not consider them here, except for the final chapters which deal with the general issues of the peace. According to the author we cannot approach the peace settlement with prescriptions which we have no means of enforcing. The participation of the United States is indispensable in this matter, "and this is—he says—a question to which we do not yet have the answer." The peace settlement cannot be based on general principles like the equality of nations or on history and ethnography only, but on the capacity of independent nations to defend their political status against their enemies. Neither can one pretend that the three major allies on whom rests the chief responsibility for the maintenance of peace, will be prepared to surrender their sovereignty to the votes of a world assembly. Sir Bernard is also skeptical of the "any too easily

conceived plans of federation," particularly between the Balkan countries, except Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. He favors the insertion into the peace treaties of a clause providing for their revision. But the main test of whether a lasting peace can be won will be Russia and its direct dealing with other nations, especially with Great Britain and the United States. Fortunately, all three major allies have certain principles in common, being multinational and federative, and all three peoples under the influence of war are drawing nearer to mutual understanding. After the war this understanding must be developed particularly by mutual and fair trade and industrial exchange.

With this stimulating prospect ends a book which is the fruit of an unusual life experience as well as of upright political convictions and of an admirable faith in the Russian people and their role in the history of the world.

New Haven, Connecticut

VLASTIMIL KYBAL

SHORTER NOTICES

SHUSTER, GEORGE N. and BERGSTRAESSER, ARNOLD, *Germany. A Short History*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1944. Pp. 238. \$2.75.

The authors of this "short history" wish to show, by a scrupulously truthful presentation of the facts of German history, "that abiding values of western civilization are enshrined in the chronicle of German Christianity and humanism" (p.10). Then they wish to explain why "the horror of Nazism came into being," acknowledging that this too had its roots in the past. The explanation, they hold, "must be found not in the realm of rational calculations, economic for example, but in that of ethical absolutes," and they find the seeds of decay in all western countries, if to a lesser degree than in Germany: we all must bear some responsibility for the failure of those dreams fostered by our Christian faith (pp.11-12).

There should be interesting possibilities in a work written around this thesis. Had the authors declined to write an abbreviated political history of Germany—other phases are really minor, though not altogether lacking—and chosen the essay form to present an analysis of their argument, a useful study might have resulted. As it is, however, the work is too general, and the reader must tailor the raw material to the pattern announced by the introduction, a feat which the readers of short histories will seldom be able to do. But this little book does give some hint of the tragedy of the German spirit. It raises for readers the question of why Germany is a nation "that seems to produce good and evil with comparable prodigality" (p.9).

Washington, D. C.

PAULINE R. ANDERSON

MARVEY, S. M. (pseud.), *1000 Years of German Aggression*. Preface by W. F. Reddaway. London: Barnard and Westwood, 1943. Pp. 116. 5 maps in pocket. 5s. 6d.

Mr. Reddaway assures the reader in his short preface that the author is an eminent Polish historian. There is no doubt Mr. "Marvey" is thoroughly versed

in Polish and German history. Starting with the struggles between the Elbeian Slavs and the Germans in the tenth century, he follows the course of the German will to conquer, as it has been directed against the Slavic nations to Germany's east and southeast, to the present. There are extensive quotations from contemporary chroniclers and other sources in Latin, French and German, but unfortunately no bibliographical data are provided. The interested reader would frequently like to be able to trace, in his own way, more of the story than just that part selected for this account.

Without wishing in any way to intimate that Mr. "Marvey's" story takes any liberty with the facts or to deny that the Germans have consistently wished to encroach on Slav territory and have done so by violence and deceit, it should in all fairness be suggested that a more moderate and balanced statement of the facts would have made a better impression on the Anglo-Saxon reader. If it had been pointed out, e. g., that the Polish rulers and nobility and the Czech rulers and nobility, by their stupidity, casualness or carelessness, frequently shared in the responsibility for the decline of their respective states, the indictment against the Germans would have been in the end no less damning. It might even have carried a more enduring weight. The cause of Poland both deserves and needs defenders. But it is so sound a cause that it can afford to have both sides of the ledger examined.

P. F.

BEZA, MARCU, *The Rumanian Church*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1943. Pp. 64. Illus. 3s. 6d.

Mr. Beza undertakes to clarify the anomaly of a people of Latin speech and perhaps in part of Latin blood having chosen the Eastern Orthodox faith for their national church. In addition to the geographical situation and proximity to Constantinople and consequent close cultural and ecclesiastical relations with Greece, Byzantium and Palestine, Mr. Beza emphasizes the role of the Magyar-Rumanian antagonism from the late thirteenth century, when Hungarian kings laid claim to Wallachia. It is not uncommon in Central Europe to find that neighbors profess different faiths, perhaps precisely because they are neighbors. The author, an authority in Rumanian folklore and art, does not conceal the persistence of pagan and Manichean concepts among the people until relatively modern times. The bulk of the essay is devoted to the period before 1700. One does not get, therefore, any precise idea of the place of the church in modern Rumania. The final chapter, "The Present State of the Church" is written with relative detachment from the concerns of precise information. Perhaps this is a virtue.

T.

WELLS, H. G., *Crux Ansata: An Indictment of the Roman Catholic Church*. New York: Agora Publishing Co., 1944. Pp. 113. \$1.25.

It would be interesting to speculate whether H. G. Wells would have essayed this latest flight into fantasy if G. K. Chesterton were still alive. Suffice it to say in the space of a hundred pages he "indicts" the Church with as much gusto as did *The Menace*, which a score of years ago put Aurora, Missouri, on the map. Only this time it is a Japanese-Vatican alliance which is threatening

the democratic way of life. To support his views Wells produces a concatenation of history, anecdote and poetry, at times almost humorous in its naiveté. After declaring, "all over the world where statistics are still available, the number of Catholic criminals and prostitutes is out of all proportion to their numbers in the general population," and citing Coletta as a valid source for the tyranny of the Bourbons in Naples, he defines the Two Sicilies as "Italy and Sicily," quotes the abbé Lamennais on the morals of Rome, and winds up with this blast, "Watch a priest in a public conveyance. He is fighting against disturbing suggestions. He must not look at women lest he think of sex. He must not look about him, for reality, that is to say the devil, waits to seduce him on every hand. You see him muttering his protective incantations, avoiding your eye. He is suppressing 'sinful' thoughts."

It is indeed possible to frame an intellectual attack against the Roman Church which even the Jesuit fathers of *Civiltà cattolica* would be hard pressed to answer, but a study which has as its conclusion that the present war is "the world wide struggle of our species to release itself from the strangling octopus of Catholic Christianity," is scarcely on this level. Wells' booklet, with its revival of discredited calumnies and exposés (the reviewer wonders how he overlooked the Mortara affair of 1858) is only valuable as a primary source if one is projecting a history of religious bigotry in the twentieth century.

University of Missouri

DUANE KOENIG

BILMANIS, ALFRED, ed., *Latvian-Russian Relations. Documents.* Washington. Latvian Legation, 1944. Pp. 255. \$1.50.

Though diplomatic history has justifiably lost some of the high prestige it enjoyed a few years ago, it is nevertheless a source of satisfaction to have in hand a compilation of important documents, treaties, memoranda, constitutions, protocols, reports of diplomatic conversations and speeches of responsible statesmen. *Scripta certe manent.* This volume presents, in convenient form, many such documents otherwise difficult of access or to be found only in widely scattered collections. The collection is focused upon the relations of a small people with a very large and powerful neighbor, in itself an intriguing situation. In these times when there is both much talk and no little apprehension centered about the basic moralities of international politics, such a collection can be particularly illuminating.

Aside from the texts of Russia's engagements of non-aggression with Latvia, which are well known, perhaps the most interesting part of the collection is the reports of the conversations between Stalin, Molotov, Potemkin and Gotov on the Soviet side and Munters and Kocius for Latvia at the time (Oct. 23, 1939) that Russia was demanding naval bases, airfields and garrisons for 50,000 Soviet troops on Latvian soil. Stalin then engaged to withdraw completely "when the war was over." That, of course, was over five years ago. The official Soviet instructions for the deportation of Latvian nationals to the interior of Russia, separation of families, etc.,—1940-1941—is also published. The whole makes a very interesting collection.

S. H. T.

CLEMENTIS, VLADO, *Medzi nami a Mard'armi*. London: Českoslovák, 1944. Pp. 63. 2s. No. 17 of *Politická Knihovna Českoslováka*.

Mr. Clementis, a liberal Slovak journalist active in London for some years, sketches the relations between the Slovaks and the Magyars, briefly until the time of Joseph II, in more detail since that time. He notes at the beginning of the nineteenth century the rise of a conscious policy of magyarization imposed upon the non-Magyar peoples of Hungary. He points out that inevitably the relations of the Czechs with the Magyars have a different background from those of the Slovaks, who were directly under the Magyar heel. To a degree then, the Czechoslovak-Magyar problem is essentially the Slovak-Magyar problem. It is not difficult for Clementis to show the sinister character of much Magyar historical writing, nor indeed to show that the vaunted Magyar "culture" before the time of Joseph II was less original and distinctive than the Slovak, with its Hussite-reform tradition. The social "reforms" of 1848 and 1888 are easily shown to have been somewhat worse than reactionary in effect, and forcible magyarization by political, economic and educational oppression continued at an increased pace. Yet Magyar nationalists proclaimed their liberalism. He quotes an editorial in the *Pester Lloyd* of January 10, 193, which reads: "And as for the national minorities, it is well known that the groups of non-Magyar minorities have always been able to develop freely their culture, and their rights today are guaranteed by law." In view of the fact that, for two and a half million Slovaks under Hungarian rule in 1918 there were only 276 elementary schools, this seems an optimistic construction of free development of a culture. S. H. T.

EHRENBURG, ILYA, *The Tempering of Russia*. New York: Knopf, 1944. Pp. viii, 356. \$3.00.

Ehrenburg, who saw at first hand the sweat, blood and tears of Spain and France, claims for his own countrymen more sweat and blood than weeping. In this collection of newspaper articles, diary excerpts, letters found on German corpses and letters from fighting Comrades to himself, we have violent reportage, not easily digested in quantity. The letters and diaries found on cold Germans are of the most interest, as evidence of a dramatic disintegration within a period of a year.

The analysis of the enemy which runs through the book: as "hopelessly cruel and morose," driven solely by greed and fear, a patchwork army of sub-human Germans and bought or fooled foreign legions, is, for all its passion, sound. The thunderous tribute to the "Russian miracle" in all fields of the service and the home front is that of an ardent and influential "morale man." Foreign politics before the war come in for a trouncing, but there is praise for the spirit of some martyrs, both cities and men, and an appreciation of American weapons best summed up in the classic words of the hungry *Oliver Twist*. There is some wistful and on the whole tactful longing for a second front ("It is merrier to wage war together.") But chiefly we have internal Russia-at-war: phantasmagoria of obscene Germans, rotting in their own filth, and marching Russians, stupefying in their tireless hatred and pride.

The title of the book remains somewhat obscure, since the Soviet people emerge as truly steely from the beginning. R. D. T.

FRANGE, GORDON W., ed., *Hitler's Words*, with an Introduction by Frederick Schuman. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944. Pp. xi, 400. \$3.25 (paper), \$3.75 (cloth).

In the two decades that Adolf Hitler has been bombarding the ears of the world with his turgid rhetoric he has said many things to many men and with many meanings. The exact chronological record of all his speeches from 1922 to 1943 fills over 2000 pages and is a source for the scholar only.

This book is a selection of his most representative speeches, or parts of them, intended for the general public that reads as it runs. The order is logical, with sections devoted to Hitler's ideas on such topics as Lebensraum, democracy, the Jew, future Fuehrers, the Bolsheviks, America and Roosevelt, and many others. Each excerpt is documented and dated, and there is an adequate index.

It is hard to see how the process of selection could be carried to any greater extent without sacrificing the original for a paraphrase. Even in minimo, here is Schickelgruber, with all his terrifying, hate-filled, and yet world-shaking ideas. By way of test, the mouthings of future aspirants to fuhrership in this and other lands may well be compared with the attitudes presented herein. If they should match, it would be time to act.

University of Colorado

WILLIAM S. BERNARD

DEUTSCH, JULIUS, *Austria in the Framework of a World Organization*. New York: Free World Association, 1944. Pp. 20.

In this paper, apparently a mimeographed copy of a public address, General Deutsch, former Socialist Austrian Secretary of War and later head of the Republikanischer Schutzbund, who escaped from Starhemberg's Fascists to Czechoslovakia in 1932, reviews Austria's present position and her future in a post-Nazi world. He emphasizes the organized sabotage now carried on by the underground movement, and stresses the Austrian desire for complete and final separation from Nazi Germany. It is his conviction that there is relatively little likelihood of disruption in supply and distribution of food and necessities or of any real police difficulties in the period of transition from war to peace, and hopes that military occupation by an Allied army will not be thought necessary. He is certain that the Austrians can keep order by themselves. He posits Austria's strict neutrality, her participation in a world organization for security and peace, fortified by close and friendly ties with her neighbors and Soviet Russia. He is particularly interested in the suggestion that Vienna might very logically become the working capital of the new world organization, as the name of Geneva will inevitably be attached to the sad history of the League of Nations. He even makes the specific suggestion that a former imperial estate, some miles from Vienna, be the site of the administrative buildings of the new world league.

P. F.

Cesta k Svobodě. Problémy našeho boje za svobodu a budování lidové demokratické republiky. London: Nové Československo, 1944. 2 vols. Pp. 103, 67. 2s., 1s. 6d.

These two brochures are a collection of editorials published in *Československé Listy*, a fortnightly review founded by a group of Czechoslovak labor

leaders and intellectuals in Moscow in August, 1943. Because of their pungency and relevance to the problems facing the Czechoslovaks as they looked toward the future of their country in a post-war world, it was thought useful to reprint them for Czechoslovaks in the western "emigration." It was natural that Czechoslovaks living in Russia should be prompted to examine their reactions to their great Slav neighbor in the light of the history of Panslav sentiment in the homeland. For that sentiment there are no apologies. But love of their own land, their own free democratic system of life and action rings perhaps the more clear for their experiences abroad. The power of the agrarian and industrial interests in pre-Munich Czechoslovakia comes in for bitter complaint, but no doubt is voiced that the democratic means of expression enjoyed under constitutional usages can control the sinister features of these interests. Among other questions discussed are: treatment of war criminals, both German and collaborationist; the future of social democracy; antisemitism; the position of Slovakia within the Republic; the future of Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation.

P. F.

NEWMAN, BERNARD, *The Face of Poland*. Birkenhead: Polish Publication Committee, 1943. Pp. 36. Illus.

Mr. Newman's affectionate description of Poland is written from intimate first-hand experience. He has poled flatboats through the Pripet marshes, tramped the sands of the Hel peninsula, and tasted the grime of the Silesian coal pits. The booklet is in no sense political, but rather a series of reminiscent descriptions of life, work, play and worship among high and low of the Poland that arose with faith and enthusiasm from the ashes of the last war.

Educational Reconstruction in People's Poland. New York: Payne Educational Sociology Foundation, 1944. Monograph No. 1. Pp. 31. 25 cents.

This remarkable document, composed by Polish teachers in the underground and sent to America on microfilm, is symbolic of the moral and intellectual vitality of a people who refuse to bow to oppression. Under Nazi occupation the whole of the pre-war Polish school system has been destroyed or, what is worse, perverted to the uses of the Germans. Polish teachers still alive in the underground have been planning the cultural future of their people. Though much was accomplished in the twenty years of the Republic, they are not satisfied that their school system was sufficiently democratic or sufficiently responsive to the needs of the whole people. They now envisage a more socialized state and educational system, with public kindergartens for children 3 to 6 years of age, thereafter twelve years of compulsory school, elementary, high, technological or agricultural schools, free of tuition. They tackle problems of administration, selection and training of teachers by higher standards than before and scientific aptitude tests to determine students' capacities, regardless of race, creed or social status. In addition to more and better higher institutions of liberal arts, they want broader opportunities for advanced study for adults, people's universities, proper and systematic use of the motion picture, the radio, public libraries and art galleries, all in order to raise the level of social consciousness and democratic responsibility. The thinking in the memorandum is courageous and radical, in that it goes on the assumption that

a nation's culture is the property of the whole people, and must therefore be worked for by the whole people. They do not say so, but it is fairly obvious—as well as sagacious and laudable—that such a program will, if put into effect, go far toward accomplishing the integration of the Polish people, broken by the century and a half of three-fold partition under three separate conquerors, from the eighteenth century to 1918, and again violated by German occupation.

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The Situation of the Jews in Greece. New York: World Jewish Congress, 1944. Pp. 11.

This pamphlet consists of a series of reports from various sources on the fate of Greek Jewry. Of necessity these reports are sketchy and fragmentary, but the general picture they present is perfectly clear and unmistakable. Of a total of 100,000 Jews who lived in Greece at the beginning of the war, 65,000 have been deported to Poland and 5,000 to Bulgaria. The numerous and distinguished Jewish community of Salonika has disappeared and the whole of Macedonia and Thrace has become "Judenrein." A significant and encouraging feature of this tragic situation is that all the measures which have been adopted against the Jews were originated by the German occupation authorities. The orthodox Greek population has remained definitely hostile to racial discrimination and has prevented the puppet government from passing anti-Semitic legislation. This popular sentiment has enabled most of the 30,000 Jews of Athens-Piraeus to find shelter in Christian homes despite the threats of the German authorities. The National Liberation Front (E.A.M.) is particularly active in organizing and facilitating the escape of the persecuted Jews, and the latter in turn have entered the E.A.M. ranks in large numbers.

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Since March 10, 1944, the Polish Information Center, 745 Fifth Avenue, New York, has been publishing a series of pamphlets under the general title *Polish Facts and Figures*. Separate pamphlets appear at intervals of two weeks to a month and average about 32 to 48 pages in length, selling at 10 cents each. Some, depending on the appropriateness of the subject matter, are illustrated. Each pamphlet is devoted to a single subject. The titles of the first twelve pamphlets are as follows: 1. *The Polish Government and the Polish Underground State* (out of print); 2. *The Polish-Russian Controversy*; 3. *Polish Children under German Rule*; 4. *Public Education in Poland*; 5. *The Polish Army in the East*; 6. *Jews in Poland*; 7. *Poland's Fighting Record*; 8. *It Started in Poland*; 9. *Poland at Work*; 10. *The Battle of Warsaw*; 11. *The Polish-German Frontier* (a reprint of J. M. Winiewicz's *The Polish German Frontier*, London, 1944); 12. *Poland's Social Progress*. The whole makes a very considerable body of information about Poland, her domestic and foreign problems and her part in the war.

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